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ABSTRACT 
 
From Soft Power to “wenhua ruan shili”: 
Theory and Practice in the Chinese Discourse on Soft Power 
 
 
With the introduction of Joseph S. Nye’s theory of soft power in the 1990s, the analysis of 
power relations within the field of today’s world politics reveals that their nature is changing 
and that attraction wielded to generate desired outcomes is becoming increasingly relevant as 
one of its components. The study establishes this theory as a frame for the investigation of the 
discourse on China’s use of soft power in its ascendance as a world power, which currently 
permeates academic and political spheres around the globe. In this dissertation, a specific 
attempt is made to understand how China views its own soft power, placing particular 
attention on the cultural aspect of it, and stressing the features that differentiate the Chinese 
interpretation of soft power from the Western discourse. Through an interdisciplinary 
examination of Chinese leaders’ official speeches, policy documents, news and media, and 
academic papers and volumes, it will thus be shown how the original soft power concept has 
been reinterpreted, modified, and expanded since being incorporated in the Chinese context. 
The related debate, which started in the early 1990s, when the theory made its first 
appearance in intellectual circles, being presented at first through translations of Nye’s works 
and discussed from a theoretical perspective in scholarly articles, has gradually penetrated the 
policy-making and leadership levels. Since the Hu Jintao era and, even more assuredly, in the 
current Xi Jinping era, the theory of soft power has been concretely included within China’s 
national strategy, as signaled by the incorporation into the political jargon of not only the 
wording “ruan shili ” (soft power), but also the innovative concept of “cultural soft 
power” (wenhua ruan shili ). The latter shows that the PRC has been able to 
create its own unique approach to soft power, one in which the appeal generated by culture, 
both domestically and internationally, represents the core.  
The canvas on which to illustrate these features, the circumstances in which they 
emerge, and their implications, is built following a two-pronged approach, in light of China’s 
grand strategy; this draws a connection between the versatile functions that soft power has in 
the Chinese context, insomuch as it presents a vast range of applications, embracing both the 
domestic and international spheres, and some of the most relevant policy programs promoted 
by the Chinese government. As well, attempting to organize the abundant knowledge 
available on popular perceptions on China’s internal and external behavior, the study explores 
both international and autochthonous literature on Chinese soft power, but makes a conscious 
effort to focus primarily on works elaborated by Chinese scholars, in both English and 
Chinese, to better interpret the Chinese view. Aiming to dig deeper into the theory and 
practice of Chinese soft power, a vast array of Chinese sources is translated and analyzed in 
an attempt to progress from the idea of “China’s soft power” to that of “Chinese soft power”. 
Thus, the research develops around the task of examining the nature of the latter, exploring 
the historical background, process of study and evolution, formalization, popularization, and 
implementation of the concept of soft power in China.  
Today, the definition of what cultural soft power means, both in and for China, is, 
however, still being negotiated. This also touches upon the analysis of attempts made to 
translate the term “soft power” into Chinese and the implications that the choices made have 
on its interpretation and overall role. In a terminological perspective, the examination of the 
	 iv 
formulations that have entered into the intellectual and political soft power jargon is pivotal in 
revealing important nuances of meaning; together with the derivative terms that, formed on 
the basis of “ruan shili”, populate the public discourse, this shows the evident originality and 
wider breadth of the Chinese discourse on soft power. All in all, the presence of a “made-to-
measure” interpretation of soft power emerges, highlighting the emphasis placed on culture as 
an inborn advantage that can be exploited for both an internal and an external betterment of 
China’s status. This introspective interpretation is supported by the presence of elements 
related to the relevance of identity and culture-building in China’s ancient doctrines and in the 
official discourse of successive generations of Chinese leaders. The evolution of the 
formulations “wenhua ruan shili” and “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili 	” 
(enhance the country’s cultural soft power), which have become part of the official jargon in 
contemporary China, is one that merges China’s past and present realities into a vision that is 
both promoted and practiced by Chinese academics and Party-State officials alike. Focusing 
on specific phases of this process, spanning in particular from 1990 to 2015, but keeping in 
mind the relevance of China’s cultural and political history, the present work attempts to 
address the task of looking more closely at how China attempts to develop its theory and 
practice of cultural soft power. In this sense, the examination of the development of cultural 
strategies and policies aimed at enhancing China’s cultural strength completes the analysis of 
the institutional commitment to both laying the bases that guide the intellectual and public 
debate and developing a system of actions aimed at reaching the desired soft power goals, as 
part of a collective effort.  
The dissertation concludes with a case study that displays some of the most peculiar 
characteristics of the practice of China’s cultural soft power in recent years; through the 
analysis of a specific cultural policy, the language policy, attempts to regulate language habits 
within China, while at the same time promoting the Chinese language abroad, are described in 
light of their potential contribution to the enhancement of China’s cultural soft power.  
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 1 
Introduction!
 
 
The temporal setting 
The present study attempts to analyze the concept of “soft power” from a Chinese 
perspective. As this theory was developed and popularized by American scholar Joseph S. Nye 
in the 1990s, the primary temporal setting of the research spans from 1990, when the term was 
first coined, to 2015. There are, however, two secondary timeframes to which it will be useful to 
refer on various occasions throughout the study. The first represents an important turning point 
in the history of contemporary China and was initiated with the Third Plenum of the 11th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiyi Jie 
Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Di San Ci Quanti Huiyi &ġDͩÐƍ&ňŖĉ`ͩʡi
`Ђ) in December 1978. This date marked the promulgation of a new development strategy, 
encapsulated in the policy of “reform and opening-up” (gaige kaifang ȸүƿȺ) and advocated 
by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping ѬƂƩ, after his return to the leadership of the Communist 
Party of China (Zhongguo Gongchandang &ġD, CPC)1 following the death of Mao 
Zedong ʲˋ! in 1976. Starting from the late 1970s and early 1980s, the rapid economic 
growth that the People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo&ÔIʴĎġ, 
PRC) has experienced until today, together with the country’s ever-increasing important role on 
the global stage, can be considered the long-term consequence of the process of reform and 
opening-up, which entailed remarkable changes for both China’s domestic and foreign policies2. 
Organically integrating “domestic reform” (guonei gaige ġȸү) with “external opening” 
(guowai kaifang ġŁƿȺ), the process of reform and opening-up reflected the Chinese 
leadership’s understanding that, on the background of a changing world, domestic and 
international affairs were inseparably entangled with each other, while the policies formulated 
showed China’s ability to “sing with the tide raised by globalization” (yu quanqiuhua de 
langchao xiongyong xiang changhe ̕Ì̪˕˱ʽ˙̴ĕĎ ) and create the basic 
conditions for grasping, at the beginning of the 21st century, a “new period of strategic 
opportunity” (xin zhanlüe jiyu qi ɍǻ̤ɷѨɱ) for the country (Men Honghua ҇ˎÔ 2005, 
pp. 287-288). A speech delivered by Deng Xiaoping in 1984 summarizes the vision the 
politician had of China and the world, envisioning the reform of the economic system and the 
opening-up to the outside world as necessary preconditions to develop the country and promote 
a foreign policy of world peace: “China’s foreign policy is independent and truly non-aligned. 
[…] In short, we sincerely hope that no war will break out and that peace will be long-lasting, 
so that we can concentrate on the drive to modernize our country” (Deng Xiaoping 1984).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Also abbreviated as CCP (Chinese Communist Party). Although the acronym CCP is conventionally used outside of 
China, the present writer has chosen to use CPC, the official name adopted by a variety of Chinese English-language 
sources, including the state media.  
2 Buzan (2014, p. 384) defines the transformation occurring at that time as a shift from Mao Zedong’s “revolutionist 
strategy” to Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of reform and opening-up that radically changed “China’s perception of itself, 
the world, and its place in the world”. 
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With the beginning of the period of reform and opening-up, China’s grand strategy3 
underwent great changes. Under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping, the second generation of CPC 
leaders advocated for “peace and development” (heping yu fazhan ĎƩëƎ), while in the 
sphere of foreign policy, innovation was represented, in the 1980s, by what has been called an 
“independent foreign policy for peace” (duli zizhu de heping waijiao zhengcẻ͢ν*̪ĎƩ
ŁCȻͭ) (Men Honghua 2005, p. 199).  According to Goldstein (2005, p. 25), behind this 
new grand strategy there was the belief on Deng Xiaoping’s part that China’s economic 
development could take advantage of an international environment that, abandoning bipolarity 
for multipolarity, would be less threatening and more open to opportunities for China’s 
modernization. 
This conviction became even more real after the end of the Cold War, the second 
timeframe in which the present study is set. It is in this period, and especially in the second half 
of the 1990s, that the logic of China’s grand strategy was defined, completing a process that 
started in the early 1980s and that combined continuity in the country’s basic foreign policy 
with the new challenges posed by the end of the Cold War (Goldstein 2005, p. 17 and p. 20). In 
the post-Cold War period, dramatic changes affected the structure of the international 
environment and global power relations. China’s grand strategy was also touched by these 
changes, in particular in relation to some distinct yet related aspects. First, when the bipolar 
opposition between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had characterized the Cold 
War period, dissolved, China was left with no clear distinction between which countries were 
enemies to fight against or friends to ally with, as had been the case in the past; second, China’s 
sought-after goal to build a more favorable international environment that would facilitate its 
rise to the status of a great power seemed now to be somehow obstructed by the development of 
unipolarity in favor of the United States; and finally, the prospect of China’s rise had already 
started to worry its Asian neighbors and the United States (Goldstein 2005, pp. 22-26). Against 
this background, Deng Xiaoping’s advocacy for a policy of independence, peace, and stability 
was again emphasized in the mid-1990s, while by the late 1990s this approach was enriched 
with components of great power diplomacy, aimed at establishing partnerships and portraying 
China as an indispensible international actor, and international activism, aimed at reassuring the 
global audience that China was and would continue to be a responsible and co-operative player 
(Ibid., pp. 25-30).  
This brief review of China’s grand strategy from 1978 and across the post-Cold War 
period helps to delineate the background against which China’s rise was able to occur at the turn 
of the new century. It is precisely under the described circumstances, which embrace both 
China’s transformation and that of the world as a whole, that the theory of soft power put 
forward by Joseph S. Nye in 1990 opened a new perspective on the analysis of the nature of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Here, the term “grand strategy” is intended, as explained by Goldstein (2005, pp. 17-19), as the “central logic” or 
“regime’s vision” as to how to combine capabilities and international conditions in order to serve national interests. It 
is “the distinctive combination of military, political, and economic means by which a state seeks to ensure its national 
interests”, with the adjective “grand” deriving from the reference of the concept to “the guiding logic or overreaching 
vision about how a country’s leaders combine a broad range of capabilities linked with military, economic, and 
diplomatic strategies to pursue international goals” (Ibid.).! According to Buzan (2014, p. 385), having a grand 
strategy is “about articulating a set of core aims, or ends, that define the national interest in terms of both domestic 
goals and how state and society are to relate to the wider world, and relating those ends to the means that the state and 
society has available”. The author further argues, as will be discussed in the present work, that another issue for 
China, because of its authoritarian structure, is how to strike a balance between the role of civil society as the base of 
soft power and that of the state as the grand strategy’s main agent (Ibid., pp. 385-386).  
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power in global politics, that is the power of attraction wielded to generate desired outcomes in 
others. As a new, less threatening, and softer, yet increasingly effective, weapon in the arsenal 
of any potential great power, between the 1990s and the present day, the concept of soft power 
has been embraced by China’s intellectual and political elites, and favorable conditions have 
matured for the growth and development of a distinct Chinese discourse on soft power.  
 
 
The study’s tasks and overall goals 
The tasks involved in this project are many and numerous questions come to the 
researcher’s mind when first embarking on this mission. What is soft power, and what is its 
importance today? Why is there so much discussion among scholars, policy-makers, and the 
media about China’s soft power? Why is soft power relevant to China’s current situation? Is the 
Chinese interpretation of soft power any different from that of the West? What resources does 
China have to project its soft power, and what does the Chinese leadership say and do about it? 
What motivates China to promote its soft power, and ultimately, is there such a thing as “soft 
power with Chinese characteristics”? These are just some of the questions that have inspired 
and guided the present analysis.  
In order to present an insightful description of Chinese soft power, the first task that 
needs to be carried out is that of providing a definition of the soft power theory and an overview 
of how this fits into the discussion related to China’s rise and today’s changing world order. The 
study establishes this theory as a frame for the investigation of the discourse, or eventually the 
discourses, related to China’s soft power. In this regard, the study takes its lead from the 
definition and analysis of a preliminary hypothesis which posits that China has proved capable 
of seizing strategic opportunities that have facilitated its domestic growth and international 
ascent to the position of a great power. In the 21st century, China has indeed risen, and in its 
renewed role of a world’s leading superpower it is able to make use of a range of tools that 
include traditional means of power, such as economic strengths and military capabilities, but 
also, and more importantly, soft power resources. When analyzing power within the field of 
today’s world politics, it is important to keep in mind that its nature is changing and that soft 
power, as a counterpart of hard power, is becoming increasingly relevant as one of its 
components. A review of Joseph S. Nye’s pioneering works expounding upon the concept of 
soft power will thus prove extremely useful, as studying the scholar’s original conceptualization 
constitutes an important preliminary step to further expand the field of research into the Chinese 
context. Attention must then be paid to the features that differentiate the Chinese interpretation 
of soft power from Nye’s discourse, which constitute the assumptions the present study poses 
and intends to prove. Being subsequently confirmed, they also constitute part of the resulting 
findings. Overall, the study posits that China has its own unique vision of soft power, one in 
which the appeal generated by culture represents the core of the related discourse, as indicated 
by an innovative concept that has come to be known as “cultural soft power” (wenhua ruan shili 
ɇÌ且ůÀ).  
The second task that needs to be addressed is that of defining the research problem. A 
critical analysis of the excerpt drawn from the political report to the 17th National Congress of 
the CPC (Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiqi Ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui &ġDͩÐ
ʡġSϧń`), delivered in 2007 by former Chinese President and General Secretary of the 
CPC Hu Jintaoζ҄˚, in which the official view of the concept of soft power in the Chinese 
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context is presented, serves the purpose of defining the bases for the problem formulation. 
Drawing inspiration from this policy document, a number of observations will be made to 
provide a basis for the establishment of the following assumptions: in China, the mainstream 
vision of soft power places emphasis on culture, in particular traditional culture, as the core; 
surpassing the boundaries of international relations, soft power is also very much part of 
China’s domestic policy; and enhancing soft power takes on the shape of a government project. 
These assumptions will thus be explained as constituents of the research problem and 
corroborated by evidence drawn from Western and Chinese sources, receiving further 
confirmation in the analyses carried out throughout the study.  
As the debate on Chinese soft power does not develop in a void, but rather in a complex 
nexus of views on China’s domestic and foreign policies, the third task the study attempts to 
tackle is that of describing the scope of analysis of the dynamics related to China’s soft power 
theory and practice. By placing the examination of the resources, applications, and purposes of 
China’s soft power within the boundaries of the country’s grand strategy, and organizing the 
abundant knowledge available on popular perceptions on China’s internal and external behavior, 
the study draws a connection between the functions soft power has in the Chinese context and 
some of the most relevant policy programs promoted by the Chinese government. Thus, the 
study’s conceptual framework of reference, the definition of which finds its foundations in the 
analysis of the multifaceted role of culture within China’s strategic discourse and the important 
concept of “zonghe guoli ΚûġÀ” (comprehensive national power, CNP), constitutes a 
canvas on which to illustrate the discourse on Chinese soft power, the circumstances in which it 
emerges, and its implications, in the light of China’s grand strategy. What will emerge from an 
analysis of this kind is the versatility of China’s soft power insomuch as it presents a vast range 
of applications, embracing both the domestic and international spheres.   
One of the first issues that needed to be addressed in the process of researching what has 
become such a popular topic both in China and worldwide, as is the case with soft power, was 
navigating through an overabundance of contributions, mainly in English and Chinese, 
extensively debating China’s soft power from a variety of points of view and drawing from 
different “schools of thought”. Besides selecting the most reliable sources available, a conscious 
effort has been made to primarily focus on works elaborated by Chinese scholars, in both 
English and Chinese, to better interpret the Chinese view on soft power, from both an 
international and a local perspective. Thus, together with the definition of the conceptual 
framework of reference described above, a comprehensive review of the literature on China’s 
soft power that embraces both materials produced by Western and Chinese authors has proved 
useful to form a background against which it is possible to dig deeper into the Chinese discourse 
on soft power theory and practice. The fourth task of the present work, therefore, is carried out 
in a way that links the international perspective on Chinese soft power, expressed through 
Western and Chinese publications in English, with a more local perspective, expressed through 
Chinese publications in Chinese. The analysis of volumes, scientific papers, and news articles in 
Chinese, available in print, in the press, or online, however, represents a key factor in the entire 
research process, in an attempt to overcome the linguistic barrier that often creates an obstacle 
to a better understanding of China’s behaviors, ambitions, and strategies. Moreover, this level of 
analysis digs even deeper into the realm of the Chinese discourse on soft power, touching upon 
its richness and variety, which appear to have led to its detachment from its Western counterpart. 
As consensus on what cultural soft power means for China is still not clear, the analysis of the 
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specific terms that have entered into the intellectual and political soft power jargon is pivotal to 
revealing important nuances of meaning. 
In this regard, in terms of goals pursued by this research, besides shedding light on the 
distinctiveness of the Chinese interpretation of soft power, symbolized by the concept of 
“wenhua ruan shili”, a secondary, general aim is to present an insightful and original analysis of 
the topic of China’s soft power that can also inspire future in-depth studies. Given the extent 
and variety of this research area, in order to identify specific aims and limit the scope of the 
project, a preliminary definition of the main parameters that have guided this writer’s work 
process is required. Through the analysis of what constitutes Chinese soft power, the study’s 
primary intention is not one of providing a definite conclusion to the discussion of the topics 
considered. Far from constituting a point of arrival in the analysis of Chinese soft power, and 
the domestic and international dynamics that go along with it, the underlying purpose of the 
present work is to open the path towards a more attentive and thoughtful analysis of these 
aspects. Besides the positive results derived from a deeper understanding of the soft power 
discourse in relation to the Chinese context, the research process has, in fact, brought to light a 
lack of clarity in the scholarship addressing this topic. Chinese soft power has not always been 
adequately analyzed by the available literature, especially in the West, and confusion still exists 
among scholars studying it. This does not seem to be due to a lack of seminal books and 
scientific journals addressing this issue, as the production of materials on soft power has been 
flourishing in recent years, especially in English and Chinese. Conversely, the abundance of 
resources is perhaps the reason why the resultant product of certain analyses is at times 
confused and somehow limited, impairing the understanding of what soft power means in the 
Chinese context4.  
 In this light, the study can be considered as divided into two parts based on the specific 
aims it pursues. On the one hand, the first part, described above in terms of four different, yet 
related, tasks is largely theoretical and aims to look at the analysis of contemporary China 
through the perspective of soft power. It attempts to combine international and local views on 
the discourse on China’s soft power. Against this backdrop, by giving voice to Chinese sources 
discussing soft power as a concept in general and offering a glimpse into autochthonous 
analyses of soft power in relation to the Chinese context, the study then attempts to overcome 
the setback that arises when what the Chinese people have to say about how they view the soft 
power of their own country is disregarded5. This, at times, follows the fashion of labeling 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 When discussing soft power in relation to China, its vision, resources, and purposes, the expressions “China’s soft 
power” and “Chinese soft power” are both used interchangeably in the related literature. Although following the 
same custom, due in part to stylistic reasons, the present author will present, in the conclusions to this work, some 
reflections on the possibility to apply a potential, subtle distinction to the overall discourse.   
5 The present author would like to express her gratitude to Professor Alessandra Lavagnino at the University of Milan 
for the precious help and support offered throughout this research process. Among the many useful pieces of advice 
suggested, drawing the attention of the present author to the writings of leading Chinese thinker Zhang Weiwei。Η
) and the many commentaries about his work has largely enriched the study’s endeavor and resulting findings. In 
regard to the need to give voice to Chinese authors to describe China’s own story, reference can thus be made to the 
words expressed by well-known China expert Martin Jacques when reviewing the forthcoming translation of Zhang 
Weiwei’s most recent volume, The China Horizon: Glory and Dream of a Civilizational State (Zhongguo Chaoyue: 
Yi Ge “Wenmingxing Guojia” de Guangrong yu Mengxiang &ġж万:%“ɇəĮġŶ”̪ϔʘǰ), the third 
of a best-selling trilogy published in China which expounds upon the nature of China’s “civilizational state”, the 
future of the country in light of its rise, and the global impact that the model proposed by China could bring about 
when surpassing that of the West: “Zhang Weiwei is the confident and highly articulate voice of the new China. […] 
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everything that does not fit into the traditional assessment of China’s rise as “soft power”. To 
use the words of one scholar (Breslin 2011, p. 3), one can say that soft power today “is a topic 
that is discussed from different perspectives in different places for different reasons”, with the 
risk of making the whole concept rather meaningless. In this sense, the translation into English 
of relevant excerpts drawn from sources available solely in Chinese is carried out with the hope 
that they will be of help to readers who are interested in the study of contemporary China 
through the lenses of soft power but may not be familiar with the Chinese language.  
On the other hand, the second part, which will be described below in light of the 
remaining tasks and goals of the present research, aims to dig deeper into the theory and 
practice of soft power in the Chinese context. Continuing to give voice to Chinese sources, it 
attempts to describe what is meant by “wenhua ruan shili” today, also providing more practical 
examples of Chinese cultural soft power at work. More precisely, this part of the research 
develops around the tasks related to examining the historical background, process of study and 
evolution, formalization, popularization, and implementation of the concept of soft power in the 
Chinese context. Overall, it examines how Joseph S. Nye’s conceptualization has been absorbed 
and incorporated into China’s intellectual and strategic domains, undergoing progressive re-
elaboration based on China’s past and present realities. An attempt will be made to describe 
what can be considered the primordial seeds of soft power in China’s antiquity, the influence of 
traditional values on China’s vision of itself, state governance, and inter-personal and inter-state 
relations, and the first phases of the absorption of the soft power concept into the discourse of 
Chinese academics and strategists in the period between 1990 and 2007. Addressing the task of 
looking more closely at how China attempts to develop its soft power in practice, the present 
work also focuses on the evolution of the formulations “wenhua ruan shili” and “tigao guojia 
wenhua ruan shili Ȫ亚ġŶɇÌ且ůÀ” (enhance the country’s cultural soft power) as part of 
the official discourse of the CPC’s leadership in contemporary China, examining the period 
between 1990 and 2007, but also taking into consideration historical vicissitudes as well as 
more recent developments. Besides the guiding role of the CPC and its official jargon in 
deciding the general orientation of the Chinese discourse on soft power, the analysis carried out 
also covers the process of evolution of the cultural soft power theory into a national strategy 
promoted at a practical level through cultural policies. Thus, the Chinese leadership’s response 
to the need for a more clear-cut definition for a soft power theory more suitable to the Chinese 
context appears to have resulted into the formalization of a national strategy, and the call to 
“enhance the country’s cultural soft power” is described within the context of a national project 
carried out collectively and aimed at the overall improvement of China’s domestic and 
international state. The more recent developments in the theory and practice of cultural soft 
power between 2007 and 2012 are then considered in this light.  
All in all, the presence of a “made-to-measure” interpretation of soft power, precisely that 
of “wenhua ruan shili”, will emerge, supported by the presence of elements related to the 
relevance of identity and culture-building in China’s ancient doctrines and in the official 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Hitherto the most widely read authors on China in the West have been Westerners. It is imperative that Westerners 
become familiar with the key Chinese writers” (cited in World Scientific 2016a). This echoes the urgent need for 
“good Chinese story-tellers to provide the Chinese perspective”, and facilitate the understanding of China’s rise, “the 
biggest story of our time”, expressed by another leading thinker, Kishore Mahbubani, when commenting on the 
second volume of the trilogy, The China Wave: The Rise of a Civilizational State (Zhongguo Zhenhan: Yi Ge 
“Wenmingxing Guojia” de Jueqi &ġҧȳ:%“ɇəĮġŶ”̪ƕе) (cited in World Scientific 2016b). More will 
be said about the vision of China as a “civilizational state” (or “civilization-state”) in Chapter 1.  
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discourse of successive generations of CPC leaders. Focusing on the period between 2012 and 
2015, the latest developments in the Chinese discourse on cultural soft power will also be taken 
into consideration, paying particular attention to the views of the current leadership. Attempting 
an answer to the question as to weather or not it is possible to talk about “soft power with 
Chinese characteristics”, the analysis will continue to place emphasis on the degree of 
innovation symbolized by the expression “wenhua ruan shili”, while also examining 
terminological aspects related to the use of the formulation “ruan shili 且ůÀ” as the Chinese 
equivalent considered most appropriate for the rendition of the English term “soft power” in the 
Chinese context. In this sense, the examination of the terminology used in the academic, official, 
and media discourses on Chinese soft power throughout the years, which has proven to be 
enlightening throughout the entire research process, will continue to be useful, as the choice of a 
specific formalized vocabulary bears witness to the nature of the strategies adopted to build and 
enhance this rather new, yet effective, expression of China’s power.  
Through an examination of the development of cultural strategies and policies aimed at 
enhancing China’s cultural strength, the analysis of the more recent developments in the 
Chinese discourse on cultural soft power highlights that in China the level of cultural awareness 
and confidence is increasing. Among the specific cultural policies put forward by the Chinese 
government in recent years, the case study presented in this thesis focuses on one specific area: 
the language policy. Positing that, among the resources available to China to build and increase 
the country’s cultural soft power, the promotion of putonghua ɤѣБ, the official language of 
the PRC, is exploited as a useful instrument to achieve strategic goals both at home and abroad, 
the aim here is to show how the field of Chinese language standardization and promotion 
constitutes a clear display of the most peculiar characteristics of Chinese cultural soft power at 
work.   
Finally, a short visit to Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Shanghai in April 2014 also allowed 
the present researcher to collect materials and gather first-hand information through informal 
discussions with scholars and experts in the fields of international relations, media and 
communication, and language education, further continuing this constructive exchange by email 
in the years that followed. When relevant, these insights will also be included in the present 
dissertation.  
 
 
Technical notes 
 
Some clarifications about translations and transliterations are in order. Unless otherwise 
specified, the Chinese text reported in this dissertation, including that running through the body, 
has been translated into English by the present author; when the length of the text reported 
allows it, Chinese characters have been transcribed following the rules of the Pinyin system of 
transliteration, the official phonetic system used in the PRC, but avoiding the use of tones. 
Unless they are part of longer excerpts, Chinese characters have been reproduced only in the 
first occurrence, either in the text or the footnotes, maintaining the transcription throughout the 
text; translations have been extensively provided for the reader’s convenience. To avoid 
confusion, Chinese names have generally been reproduced including both surname and name in 
Pinyin, appearing with surname first followed by name as is customarily done in the PRC. 
When possible and necessary they are followed by the corresponding characters, but only in the 
first occurrence throughout the text and the footnotes. As for the bibliographic references 
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throughout the text and footnotes, for the sake of avoiding ambiguities, names of Chinese 
authors generally include both surname and name, unless sufficiently indicative or 
internationalized, and maintaining consistency with the source and the method chosen. 
Abbreviations and acronyms generally accompany their extended phrases in one instance, to be 
then used throughout the text and footnotes. In regard to referencing and citing, the present 
author has chosen to follow the method of in-text citations, employing the “author date” system 
and linking them to the full reference list at the end of the work. Bibliographical notes are thus 
limited throughout the text but fully developed in the reference list. Here, sources are indicated 
in alphabetical order, including organizations, institutions, government agencies, and other 
bodies as authors, followed by the date. In the case of Chinese sources, consistency has been 
maintained with the text, when possible and necessary characters and translations, the latter 
either provided by the source or by the present author, have been provided throughout, but 
repetitions have been avoided within a single entry.   
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1. Designing the study  
 
 
Following the rapid development of its economy, China is ready to take on the role of a global 
power. This chapter addresses the need to comprehend the great changes that are affecting 
today’s world from the perspective of China’s growing power. In the 21st century, a power shift 
is occurring and the epicenter of the world’s balance of power is moving from the West to the 
East, making China stand out on the global stage.  Even though the PRC’s economic strength is 
the first aspect that comes to mind when discussing China’s rise, in a world in which economy, 
politics, and culture permeate each other, the changes that are occurring do not only derive from 
China’s hard power but also from its growing soft power. After exploring this preliminary 
hypothesis, in order to lay the basis for the analysis of soft power in the Chinese context, three 
assumptions are posed, the main features of the research design are defined, and the research 
methods and materials are described.  
 
1.1 A preliminary hypothesis 
 
At the end of March 2014, the news website Xinhua Wang ɍÔΟ (Xinhuanet), the 
online version of Xinhua News Agency (Xinhua She ɍÔ͍), reported the following statement:  
 
șͅPЖя&ġɞŋˀ̻̪̋śǈ两ŋ̻̋久ɼɗ̢Ѵ`)0ëȌ
&ġ两ŋ̋ś
ƟΏ久7f两ɞñĎƩ̪	ôH̪	ɇə̪̋ś
 
(Xinhua Wang 2014b) 
 
Napoleon once said that China was a sleeping lion and that when this sleeping lion woke up the whole 
world would shake. This lion, China, has awoken, but it is a peaceful, amiable, and civilized lion.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
These are the words spoken by Chinese President and General Secretary of the CPC Xi 
Jinping 4ђƩ in a speech delivered in Paris for the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France. It is undeniable that the 
world is indeed shaking under the pressure that comes along with the changes brought about by 
the increasingly prominent presence of China on the global stage. Although pundits have been 
quick, and perhaps rightly so, in detecting in Xi Jinping’s use of the “awakening lion” metaphor, 
attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, the subtle intention to be more assertive in telling the rest of 
the world that China is a powerful global player (Ng and Chen 2014; Sridharan 2014)6, it cannot 
be ignored that the lion he depicted is “peaceful, amiable, and civilized” (heping de keqing de 
wenming de ĎƩ̪	ôH̪	ɇə̪) (Xinhua Wang 2014b). It is indeed a “good” lion, one 
could say, but a lion that is fully aware of its own power. Thus, the image of China that the 
President wishes to communicate to the world rests upon the awareness that the PRC is not just 
a major global power, but one that upholds the values of peace, friendship, and civilization.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Historians are still divided on the authenticity of the quote attributed to Napoleon (Ng and Chen 2014; Sridharan 
2014).  
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As a matter of fact, the global expansion that China has been experiencing in recent years, 
in all regards, cannot be ignored. Following the miraculous development of its economy, in the 
last 30 years China has become an increasingly important player in the international arena. This 
rapid achievement of economic strength and the growth of China’s overall potential have helped 
the country expand its participation in the global dynamics, in economic, political, diplomatic, 
military, and also cultural terms. This has been widely noticed, and scholars have started to talk 
about a future world ruled by the PRC.  
Perhaps, the loudest voice in the chorus hailing the imminent escalation of China’s power 
is that of British scholar and journalist Martin Jacques. In the second edition of his highly 
acclaimed When China Rules the World he argues that with the beginning of the financial crisis 
in 2008 the world started to witness a shift in power from the West, in particular the United 
States, to China, which is paving the way towards a new world order, or more precisely the 
“Chinese World Order” (Jacques 2012, pp. 585-586). Although recognizing that the phrase 
“China rules the world” is a metaphor that does not entirely correspond to the reality of the 
global balance of power, as no country can literally “rule” the entire globe, the message is clear: 
China has the ability to become the world’s leading power, sustained, most significantly, by its 
strong economy (Ibid., p. 490). Throughout his bestselling book, Jacques (2012) discusses 
several aspects in China’s rise that are undermining some of the most deeply-rooted beliefs in 
the Western mind: first and foremost, the West is wrong to think that there is only one kind of 
modernity and that sooner or later China will need to become more Western-like in order to 
succeed. Consequently, the West should put a definite end to the paradigm that equates 
globalization to Westernization and acknowledge China’s own originality because that might be 
the very element responsible for changing the world (Ibid., p. 564). Secondly, this radical 
change is brought about by the impact that China will have on the world, which is not only 
measured in economic, but also in political, cultural, and ideological terms: in the 21st century, 
as stated by Jacques (2012, p. 243), the world will be led by a great power with “a totally non-
Western history and tradition”. Elements of China’s millenary tributary system will re-emerge 
regionally, while globally, the mentality of a nation-state that is also a civilization-state, 
supported by a long history and deeply-rooted culture, will become more evident (Jacques 
2012)7. How, then, should the world, in particular the West, react to such a scenario? For 
Jacques the answer is clear: “[t]o appreciate what the rise of China means, we have to 
understand not only China’s economic growth, but also its history, politics, culture and 
traditions” (Jacques 2012, p. 243).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 More will be expounded upon about these aspects throughout the study. For the sake of the present discussion, and 
in order to elaborate on the idea of a “civilizational state” presented in the introduction to this thesis, it is relevant to 
report the analysis provided by Jacques (2012, pp. 17-18) of the concepts of “civilization-state” and “nation-state” in 
regard to China’s status: even though today people tend to define China as a nation-state, aligning the country’s status 
to that of the other nations in the world, defining China as a civilization-state would be more appropriate for a 
country whose identity was formed long before acquiring the status of nation-state over the last century, differently 
from the West. Referring to a history which lasted five thousand years, the Chinese define themselves through 
“civilization” rather than “nationhood” (Ibid., p. 18). In regard to the tributary system, and its potential reemergence 
in East Asia, Jacques (2012, pp. 374-375) explains that, differently from the Westphalian system, but not in a 
mutually exclusive way, this “international concomitant of China’s identity and existence as a civilization-state” was 
primarily based on a hierarchical relationship. Common to the two systems is a cultural component represented by 
hegemony and soft power: in the case of China, minorities of overseas Chinese and a shared Confucian heritage 
reinforce the already present and constant attractive force of Chinese culture in East Asia, Northeast Asia, and other 
areas, facilitating the persistence of a “tributary state mentality” also in the present day (Ibid.).  
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One aspect that is already being affected by China’s renewed position in the world is the 
approach to foreign policy. Jacques (2012, p. 593) highlights how the pragmatic approach of the 
past is being replaced by “a new-style foreign policy” which taps into China’s own history, 
traditions, and culture. Generally speaking, he further argues, the rise of China has generated 
two different responses in the Western audience: both share the erroneous belief that, by will or 
by force, China will take the road to becoming more Western (Ibid., pp. 561-562). But, while 
the first is characterized by what can be called an “economic wow factor”, which measures 
China’s power in terms of economic achievements, failing to recognize the importance of 
politics and culture and foreseeing a future in which China will be more similar to the West, the 
second expects China to fail, unless it adopts the Western model (Ibid.). 
In brief, the scenario depicted by Martin Jacques is one in which China will be able to 
exercise major global influence on its own terms and in many different aspects. In this sense, 
China’s will have at its disposal a variety of forms of power to be able to exercise its growing 
international influence, the most important of which is its economic power (Jacques 2012, p. 
610). It is precisely China’s economic wealth that is providing the foundations for an increase in 
its capacity to exercise not only military power, but also cultural and ideological influence, 
namely its soft power (Ibid.). By considering aspects such as infrastructure, parenting, and 
education as components of an expanded view of soft power, Jacques (2012, pp. 609-616) 
shows how a developing country, as China still is, can effectively influence the West. There is 
in fact no reason whatsoever, at least in principle, why China should not be able to exercise 
influence on other cultures in the same way as the West did in the past (Ibid., p. 613). This is 
also confirmed by an article which was published in 2009 on the English-language version of 
the webpage Renmin Wang IʴΟ, the People’s Daily Online, the online counterpart of the 
newspaper that constitutes the official organ of the Central Committee of the CPC (Zhongguo 
Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui&ġD&ňŖĉ`), namely the Renmin RibaoI
ʴɕȏ (People’s Daily). By singling out some specific aspects belonging to China’s tradition, 
the message the article wishes to convey is that Chinese culture can be of significant benefit to 
the entire world. Its introduction reads: “It is said that China will be the leader of the world in 
the 21st century. Apart from economic strength, China will also contribute four other key values 
to the world, namely; family, harmony, assimilation with innovation as well as efficiency” 
(People’s Daily Online 2009). 
Based on these premises, it can be assumed that along with China’s ever-growing 
economic potential there will come other capabilities, among which is the wielding of cultural 
influence and soft power. As stated by Shambaugh (2013, p. 207), in the process of searching 
for the status of a global power China has been exposed to the importance of international 
image and soft power. This can also be seen in the words pronounced by former President and 
General Secretary of the CPC Hu Jintao on the occasion of the celebration of the 90th 
anniversary of the foundation of the CPC:  
 
ϭ̺̹<ȧÅ&ÔɇÌ七’̢《Ǹǹġġ书ĩ·̴ż̪͛ɇÌ且ůÀȪ亚&ÔɇÌġ
书ǍđÀ
&Ôʴɑ¶ѥ7˪іˑ҆	Øńͷ˞̪&ÔɇÌ&Ôʴɑ3ŭηŃĨ、Ȅ&Ô
_͔bΔɇÌ̪ĳ͆¶ѥ«&ÔɇÌɍ̪ч˿
 
(Xinhua Wang 2011) 
 
It is necessary to focus on pushing Chinese culture towards the world, form cultural soft power well-
suited to China’s position in the world, and increase the international influence of Chinese culture. 
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The Chinese people created a well-established and profound Chinese culture and the Chinese people 
are also certainly capable of bringing about a new splendor for Chinese culture based on carrying 
forward the outstanding traditional Chinese culture.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
The following pages will present some elements useful to confirm this initial hypothesis: 
China has risen and it is quickly gaining the status of world superpower. The analysis which 
follows will briefly touch upon traditional aspects of power, namely economic and military 
strengths, but also look at soft power in the context of China’s rising power.  
 
 
1.2 Traditional aspects of China’s rise: economic and military power  
 
Looking at the ranking of the 10 most powerful countries in the world, reported by the 
website Maps of World (2015), and based on the Global Presence Index 20148, China ranks 
fourth, after the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, and ahead of France, Russia, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, and Italy. In particular, scoring relatively low in the 
technological, energy security, and foreign affairs categories, China is seen as a country, the 
most populous in the world, that continues to expand its global sphere of influence primarily 
thanks to its economic and military power (Maps of World 2015). Based on the International 
Futures model9, many believe that China will soon become the world’s most powerful country, 
overtaking the United States as early as 2030 (Ibid.). In a similar way, a long-term global 
governance assessment, issued in 2010 by the United States’ National Intelligence Council 
(NIC) and the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) identified 2025 as the 
year when the relative political and economic clout of many countries will shift, according to an 
International Futures model measuring GDP, defense spending, population, and technology for 
individual states (NIC and EUISS 2010, p. 11). These data are confirmed by the results of a 
survey conducted in 2014 by the Pew Research Center which, examining global public opinion 
concerning the United States, China, and the international balance of power, recorded that in 
most countries, those of the European Union leading the group, people believed that China had 
either already surpassed or would surpass the United States in the future as the world’s leading 
superpower (Pew Research Center 2014, pp. 32-33). More specifically, to support this view was 
a median of 49% across the 44 countries surveyed, while a median of 34% across those same 
countries believed that this would never happen (Ibid.). The same report also detected a shift 
towards China as the perceived superpower in the previous six years, as across 20 countries 
surveyed in both 2008 and 2014, a median of 41% in 2008 said that China would replace or had 
already replaced the United States as sole superpower, but in 2014 the percentage saying China 
was or would be the world’s leading power reached 50% (Ibid., p. 34). Half of the Chinese 
people surveyed were confident that China would surpass America, with an additional 9% 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The Elcano Global Presence Index measures the projection in the world of 80 countries based on three dimensions: 
the economic presence (exports of energy products, primary goods, manufactures, services, and foreign direct 
investment), the military presence (troops deployed in international missions and bases overseas, together with 
military projection equipment), and the soft presence (migration, tourism, performance in sports competition, culture, 
Internet access, international patents, articles in scientific journals, foreign students, and development assistance 
(Real Instituto Elcano 2015).  
9 The International Futures (IFs) model is a comprehensive forecasting modeling system which uses the best 
understanding of global systems to produce forecasts for 186 countries to the year 2100 (University of Denver 2013).  
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claiming that this had already occurred (Ibid., p. 33). In pure economic terms, among the 44 
countries surveyed in spring 2014, the widespread opinion was that the United States still had 
the world’s leading economy, but that China was rapidly catching up, having become the 
world’s second-largest economy after surpassing Japan and being on the verge of surpassing the 
United States in overall economic strength in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) 10 (Ibid., 
pp. 34-35). In December 2014, the news that the Chinese economy had already overtaken that 
of the United States, in terms of PPP, made the headlines of many financial reports (Arends 
2014; Chan Szu Ping 2014, 2015; Worstall 2015). The estimates were released by the 
International Monetary Fund in October 2014 and, as reported by Arends (2014) 11, showed that 
“when you measure national economic output in ‘real’ terms of goods and services, China will 
this year produce $17.6 trillion — compared with $17.4 trillion for the U.S.A.” and that “China 
now accounts for 16.5% of the global economy when measured in real purchasing-power terms, 
compared with 16.3% for the U.S.”. On balance, economy experts had been predicting this 
economic power shift for quite some time: in 2013 a report by PwC indicated that China would 
overtake the United States as the largest economy by 2017 in PPP terms and by 2027 in market 
exchange rate terms (PwC 2013, p. 1). Another calculation by The Economist (2014a) identifies 
2021 as the year when China will overtake the United States as the world’s biggest economy 
and the magazine even invites the readers to predict online, by means of an interactive chart, 
when this prediction will materialize.  
As indicated by the data presented above, China’s economic strength is indeed the first 
aspect that comes to mind when discussing China’s new role as a global superpower. 
Considering the speed at which China’s economy has been growing for the past three decades, 
one cannot deny the vast capabilities of China’s economy and its marked impact on the global 
economic system. Chinese authors Li Jingzhi and Pu Ping (2014, p. 81) state that, today, 
China’s economy represents an essential part of the world’s economy, a consequence of China’s 
economic strategy and an important step along the path of the country’s “peaceful 
development”12. This new status as a key member of the global economic system was marked in 
November 2001 by China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which 
connected the country with the world’s economy in a closer way (Ibid.). The authors stress that 
economic development means for China to complete the process of modernization, which was 
initiated in 1978, in a sustainable, fast, healthy, and coordinated way, an area in which the 
results achieved so far are remarkable: the annual growth rate of China’s economy between 
1979 and 2010 was around 10%, with GDP values growing from approximately 147.3 billion 
dollars in 1978 to four trillion dollars in 2008 (Ibid.). In a similar way, identifying China’s rise 
to the position of a great power with the country’s remarkable economic achievements, one 
reporter calls China’s apparent surpassing of the United States in terms of economic power “a 
geopolitical earthquake with a high reading on the Richter scale”, referring to the fact that 
throughout the course of history political and military power have always been dependent on 
economic power, as the destinies of historical world superpowers, such as Britain, France, and 
Spain, have shown (Arends 2014).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 A definition of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is provided by the Financial Times which reads as follows: 
“Method of currency valuation based on the premise that two identical goods in different countries should eventually 
cost the same” (Financial Times, ft.com/lexicon, n.d.).  
11 The author refers to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx.  
12 The concept of “peaceful development” will be explained in Section 3.3.  
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Quite often, scholars and pundits debating China’s rise have been preoccupied with the 
“threat” that such an extraordinary power may pose to the leadership of the West and today’s 
world order. For instance, Huang Yanzhong and Ding Sheng (2006, p. 28) point out that the 
alternative political-economic model employed by China in recent years (the so-called Beijing 
Consensus)13 has been perceived by many as a potentially serious threat to Western ideology. 
With China’s rise at the center of the debate, the economic and military aspects of China’s 
developing power have dominated the analysts’ discourse. According to Gill and Huang (2006, 
p. 17) the growing power of China has been almost completely associated with the military and 
economic aspects of its rise. Similarly, Huang Yanzhong and Ding Sheng (2006, p. 22) believe 
that insufficient scholarly attention has been devoted to analyzing how China could employ 
intangible resources to obtain the outcomes it wants in international affairs. Moreover, 
according to Glaser and Murphy (2009, p. 10), the debate around China’s emerging power and 
the way it will impact global stability in the future has been one of the most intense in 
international relations circles. The discussion around China’s hard power, the ability to use 
economic and military measures to coerce other nations, however, has prevailed over that of its 
soft power, the ability to attract others rather than coerce them, an aspect which has been 
receiving attention only in recent years (Ibid.). In this sense, the idea that China is a threat is 
solely based on an evaluation of its hard power, its military and economic resources, and not on 
a complete analysis of its overall national power, considering, as is advisable, the development 
and wielding of soft power (Ding Sheng 2010, p. 258).  
It is also interesting to note that Chinese author Zhou Xinyu ċѼŧ, a scholar in the field 
of political science and international relations, raises the question as to why foreign audiences 
are afraid of China (tamen zenme hui pa Zhongguo QWǢ.`ǣ&ġ) in a book entitled 
Zhongguo, Ruhe Ziwo Biaoda &ġœjνǹϧю (How Does China Advocate Herself), and 
states that when Chinese people discuss foreign affairs with foreigners they always have to be 
prepared to talk about issues related to the “China threat theory” (Zhongguo weixie lun&ġŘ
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 As reported by Cho and Jeong (2008, p. 461), the expression “Beijing Consensus” was coined and made popular 
by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a senior advisor to the investment firm Goldman Sachs and adjunct professor at Tsinghua 
University, in 2004 and has received international recognition ever since. “China is writing its own book now. The 
book represents a fusion of Chinese thinking with lessons learned from the failure of globalisation culture in other 
places. The rest of the world has begun to study this book”, writes Ramo (2004, p. 5). The “book” the author refers to 
is China’s approach to development, in both economic and political terms, which is increasingly being taken as 
example by those developing countries which no longer find in the Western model (the so-called Washington 
Consensus) a suitable development path. In Ramo’s words: “[…] China’s new ideas are having a gigantic effect 
outside of China. China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply 
how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly 
independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful centre of 
gravity. I call this new physics of power and development the Beijing Consensus” (Ramo 2004, pp. 3-4). In brief, the 
Beijing Consensus believes in keeping a pragmatic approach to reform, rather than taking a “shock-therapy leap”, 
achieving equitable growth, committing to innovation, experiment, and flexibility, rather than uniformity, defending 
national borders and interests, and “using economics and governance to improve society” (Ibid., pp. 4-5). As the 
Washington Consensus, it contains ideas that are not only related to economics, but also politics, quality of life, and 
the global balance of power, and can be summarized into three theorems: China’s development model is based on 
innovation; sustainability and equality are the main priorities; and foreign policy seeks self-determination (Ibid., p. 5 
and pp. 11-12). More will be expounded upon about the concept of Beijing Consensus in Section 3.2.  
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γЇ) and the “theory of China’s responsibility” (Zhongguo zeren lun &ġЦ[Ї)14 (Zhou 
Xinyu 2014, pp. 132-144).  
These aspects become even more apparent when one considers some of the events 
happening at the time of writing, when an interesting phenomenon could be observed in the 
media’s reporting on China. The almost simultaneous occurrence of two major global events, 
namely China’s “Black Monday”, which took place on August 24th, 2015 and represented 
China’s biggest one-day stock market fall since 2007, and the staging in Beijing of a military 
parade marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, held on September 3rd, 2015, 
triggered the publishing of a plethora of news articles eager to discuss China’s real economic 
and military situation. The abundance of comments on a potential arrest of China’s economic 
machinery, and on the tremendous consequences this would have for global markets, partially 
faded away when the media’s attention turned to China’s extraordinary military parade. With 
both China’s economic slowdown and the prowess of its military apparatus in the spotlight, 
China’s image and projection of future ambitions displayed in the media appeared to be quite 
contradictory. The cover of The Economist’s August 27th print edition, where, under the 
ominous metaphorical sentence “The Great Fall of China”, a red-painted Great Wall is drawn in 
a downhill orientation reminiscent of a crashing stock market15, is not only in sharp contrast 
with some of the covers chosen by the magazine in the past to praise China’s power16, but also 
somehow clashes with the representation of a more confident and assertive China portrayed in 
news articles describing Beijing’s military parade. Titles such as the one chosen by The Wall 
Street Journal, “China Flexes Its Military Muscle at World War II Parade”, seem to hint at 
China’s growing military capabilities displayed by the People’s Liberation Army (Zhongguo 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 According to Cho and Jeong (2008, p. 459), before the Chinese leadership made specific reference to soft power, 
that is, as will be further discussed, prior to the Hu Jintao era, concepts such as the “responsible power theory” argued 
against the perception of China as a rising power which would be destructive to the global order, claiming that China 
was a responsible power willing to accept accountability in the international system. Similarly, the “China 
opportunity theory” (Zhongguo jiyu lun &ġɷѨЇ and the “China contribution theory” (Zhongguo gongxian lun &
ġФ̌Ї) were intended as countermeasures to the “China threat theory” and “China collapse theory” (Zhongguo 
bengkui lun &ġƖ˩Ї) (Ibid.). Men Honghua (2005, pp. 12-22) discusses these theories, in particular the “China 
threat theory” and the “China collapse theory”, in the framework of the negative international response that the 
increase experienced by China’s influence on the structure of power and interests in East Asia and the entire world 
has received over the course of the last 25-50 years. Conversely, the “China contribution theory” and “China 
opportunity theory” focus on the advantages that derive from China’s economic development for Asia and the entire 
world, insofar as it provides widespread business and trade opportunities. Commentaries such as the one published in 
2012 on the website People’s Daily Online, which urges the Chinese people to respond calmly to the “China threat 
theory”, continuing to promote international cooperation, building a favorable national image, following the road of 
peaceful development, and developing the country’s national strength (Shi Qingren 2012), show that refuting the 
“China threat theory” is still an important task on the mind of Chinese policy-makers and leaders. As a “special 
historical symbol in China’s development process”, the “China threat theory” is bound to accompany China’s rise as 
a great power as it is caused by the rapid growth of the country’s economic and military strength, which scares 
Western countries into thinking that a strong China will challenge the existing international status (Ibid.). But the 
Western powers’ attempt to limit China’s rise by means of such theory has produced not only containment but also 
stimulation, which means that China will ultimately be able to overcome this obstacle (Ibid.). The relevance of these 
aspects will emerge on various occasions throughout this work.  
15  The cover and the contents of this issue of The Economist can be found online at: 
http://www.economist.com/printedition/2015-08-29. It is interesting to note that the article that bears the same title 
appearing on the cover somehow downplays the consequences that the negative turn in the Chinese market will have 
on the global economy (The Economist 2015).  
16 See for example: The Economist, March 25th 2006, “How to make China even richer” and, August 23rd 2014, 
“What China wants” (The Economist 2006, 2014b).  
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Renmin Jiefangjun&ġIʴϵȺ¢, PLA) in the course of the massive parade that, involving 
12 thousand troops, five hundred pieces of military armament, and two hundred aircraft, sent a 
message of national strength and unity of the CPC to the domestic audience (Page and Wong 
2015). The unprecedented event was presided over by Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the 
CPC, President of the PRC, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (Zhongyang 
Junshi Weiyuanhui&ň¢:Ŗĉ`, CMC), who reiterated China’s benevolent intensions with 
the announcement that the PLA would be reduced by three hundred thousand personnel and that 
China would never seek hegemony or expansion at the harm of other countries (Ibid.). But Xi 
Jinping’s reassurance and the message of peace that, according to an article in the China Daily 
(Zhang Chunyan 2015), lies behind the show choreographed in Tiananmen Square, failed to 
stop attentive observers from speculating on the Chinese leadership’s true purposes. An opinion 
piece published on the website of the South China Morning Post shortly before the parade, goes 
as far as comparing Beijing’s display of military power to a “major error of judgment” which 
will not go down well with China’s neighbors and the rest of the world (Tsang 2015). 
According to the author, who condemns the CPC’s choice of words when referring to the parade 
as “the 70th anniversary of China’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese 
Aggression” as a propaganda operation, what is supposed to be a message of shared 
responsibility and world peace is indeed the revelation of China’s true intentions of being 
perceived as the leading military power in Asia in the post-war scenario, at the expenses of 
Japan (Ibid.).  
For all these reasons, even from a more critical point of view as that adopted by one of 
David Shambaugh’s studies which only considers China a “partial power” still lacking many 
strengths to become a true global power, one cannot deny that “China is the world’s most 
important rising power” (Shambaugh 2013, p. 4). Arguing that China’s international activities 
still revolve around its own economic growth, Shambaugh (2013, pp. 7-8) posits that, although 
possessing many characteristics of a global power, China does not act as one, but only as a 
global actor based on the distinction that “true global powers influence other nations and 
events”. Evaluating whether or not these assumptions correspond to reality goes beyond the 
purpose of this work. Though, as pointed out by Pang Zhongying (2009, p. 127), it can be said 
that China has successfully entered into the global economy and that this has led many members 
of the global community to assess China as a “miracle” and a “rising great power” in the 
geopolitical sphere. To use Shambaugh’s words (2013, p. 5), “China’s global impact is 
increasingly felt on every continent, in most international institutions, and on many global 
issues”. Consequently, it is unquestionably necessary to interpret the new world order that is 
taking shape following China’s international ascension. As Shambaugh (2013, p. 5) states, “for 
the past three decades, observers have watched how the world has impacted China; now the 
tables are turning and it is necessary to understand how China is impacting the world”.  
For its part, China has realized that its focus on hard power, especially economic strength, 
has damaged its capacity to project soft power (Glaser and Murphy 2009, p. 20). For instance, 
as early as 2002, political leader Liu Yunshan³=Ɛ, the Chairman of the CPC Central 
Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization (Zhongguo Gongchandang 
Zhongyang Jingshen Wenming Jianshe Zhidao Weiyuanhui &ġD&ňͷ͐ɇəƾЈț
ŽŖĉ`) and at the time Head of the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the 
CPC (Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuanbu &&ňŲbѲ), in a study of the political report 
to the 16th National Congress of the CPC (Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiliu Ci Quanguo 
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Daibiao Dahui  &ġDͩÐʡġSϧń`), noted that, in designing the blueprint for 
the complete realization of a “moderately prosperous society” (xiaokang shehuiƂƻ͍`)17, 
the report clearly stresses the extreme importance of cultural construction, to which the Party’s 
guidelines attribute a strategic position (Liu Yunshan 2002). Although, as noted by Glaser and 
Murphy (2009, p. 15), the term “soft power” was not yet employed, the power of culture was 
clear in the minds of the Chinese leaders. An extract from Liu Yunshan’s statement deserves 
quoting at length:  
 
ǈN̢ɇÌΏ˒	Ȼ）̴>CϢ	̴>ˢџ
ɇÌ̪À之M˞˞̀乐Ĩʴɑ̛̪č
À	¶ѥÀĎ©ήÀ0&Ω万ɼ万Ǹ)ΚûġÀĎġ书ͤ9À̪义ϭΌǸѲ®
ġŶ̪ë
ƎĎǆ̱ʴɑ̪̉͢ĎȞIʴ̪Ɓ$ĎƬ͒Ѵ͓ƿǆńɇÌ̪ȶȱ
 
(Liu Yunshan 2002) 
 
In today’s world, culture, economy, and politics are mutually mixed and permeate each other. The 
power of culture is not only profoundly fused inside the vitality, creativity, and cohesiveness of the 
nation, but is also becoming an increasingly important component of overall national strength and 
international competitiveness. The country’s development and prosperity, the nation’s independence 
and revival, and the people’s dignity and happiness are all inseparable from the support of a strong 
culture.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
The power of culture is reiterated in terms of the advantages that it can bring first and 
foremost for China, but also for the rest of the world:  
 
m)̢ɫń̪ëƎ&ġŶǹWǙҷ亚Ȅνƞ̪ɇÌ̖ǰ亚+νƞ̪ɇÌɒƤĨ̢
ɇÌCˑĎͤ9&ȉǹġƾЈǸ)ɇÌǆġo&ġ̇υ͍`*/ɇÌMĨ&ġIʴ&Ҋ
,ξĨ̢Iʴ&ҊѴɭǆń̪ćǂÀĎǲóÀ
 
(Liu Yunshan 2002) 
 
As the biggest developing country in the world, we [China] must raise high our own culture’s ideals 
and hold high the banner of our own culture, to make our country a great cultural power in the world’s 
cultural exchanges and competition, enabling socialist culture with Chinese characteristics to have 
[exercise] a strong attractive force and power to inspire not only among the Chinese people but also 
among the people of the whole world.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Wang Wen and Jia Jinjing (2015) explain that, currently, the blueprint for the achievement of a “moderately 
prosperous society” includes six essential requirements: 1) achieving significant progress in the transformation of the 
economic development mode; 2) doubling the 2010 GDP and per capita income of urban and rural residents while 
maintaining balanced, harmonious, and sustainable development; 3) ensuring a larger contribution of technological 
progress to economic growth; 4) promoting the coordinated development of industrialization, informatization, 
urbanization, and agricultural modernization; 5) completing the regional coordinated development mechanism; and 6) 
promoting reform, opening-up, and international competitiveness through the cultivation of new advantages for the 
nation’s economic development. These six requirements combine economy with political, cultural, societal, and 
ecological advancement and are designed to create a better living environment and a “beautiful China”; the 
fulfillment of their “five-in-one” overall layout means that China will have become a moderately prosperous society 
(Ibid.). 
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As culture achieves an increasingly significant role as resource of soft power, reaching 
the same level of importance as traditional hard power resources, it comes as no surprise that 
among the many issues discussed in one of the most important events in the Xi Jinping era, 
namely his official state visit to the United States in September 2015, there was also the 
hypothesis of a future increase in cultural affinity between China and the American superpower, 
as testified by the launch of the “1 Million Strong” initiative, a program that aims to bring the 
total number of learners of Mandarin Chinese in America to one million by the year 2020 
(Allen-Ebrahimian 2015). This and other topics related to the global spread of the Chinese 
language and culture will be discussed in greater detail in the course of the present work, in 
particular in Chapter 8.  
The brief description presented thus far has served as an introduction to the chapters that 
will follow and has helped to articulate and confirm an initial hypothesis: China has awoken and 
is ready to live up to its renewed status of global superpower. Nowadays, all eyes are on China, 
while, as pointed out by Pascucci (2011, p. 107), the world’s center of gravity has moved from 
the West to the East. The West, paralyzed, on the one hand, in the grip of a financial and 
economic crisis which started in 2008 and shows only little sign of relenting, and threatened, on 
the other hand, by the violent uprising of an unstable Middle East, is no longer in a sole 
dominant position. Western countries turn to Asia in general, and China in particular, in an 
attempt to shed light on what the future of the world will be. Thus, as the global landscape is 
changing, attentive observers cannot avoid asking themselves what the new role of China will 
be. This role will unfold in ways that are not merely limited to economic and military aspects, 
and attention will have to be paid to the other resources that China possesses to exercise its 
influence in the world. As stated by Zhang Xiping 。ϬƩ (2015), in fact,  a country’s power is 
not only measured in terms of the strength of its economy (jingji Ώ˒), politics (zhengzhi Ȼ）), 
or military (junshi ¢:), but also, and even more so, on the basis of the influence it can 
exercise in the world in terms of culture (wenhua ɇÌ) and values (jiazhi guannian Zϰǟ).  
 
 
1.3 China’s rising power and soft power 
 
In the study of the dynamics which participate in China’s rise to the position of a great 
power, a concept that has become quite popular in recent years finds its place: the concept of 
soft power. According to Deng Yong (2009, pp. 63-64), the fact that a theory originally applied 
to a reigning power as that of the United States would become popular in the analysis of 
China’s rising power is remarkable, given the difference in status between the two countries and 
the different resources, means, and objectives of their soft power. In fact, as pointed out by Ding 
Sheng (2010, p. 265), the main concern in the mind of the creator of this concept was how to 
retain and reinvigorate America’s hegemony in the world, in the changing global dynamics of 
the post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, long after the end of the Cold War, the concept of soft 
power continues to be in the spotlight in the Western discourse, as demonstrated by a Google 
search conducted at the time of writing, generating over 56 million webpages containing the 
term “soft power”.   
In order to better understand these assumptions, and introduce the overall theme of this 
research, a few words are imperative to briefly discuss the theory of soft power which was 
originally put forward by American political scientist Joseph S. Nye, University Distinguished 
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Service Professor and former Dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government18, in 
his 1990 book Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power. In his volume, as well 
as in other writings, Nye questions the status of American power after the end of the Cold War, 
in the context of a new world order without the defining threat of the Soviet Union (Nye 1990a, 
1990b). In his well-known volume, he first tackles the difficult task of defining “power”, a 
concept that, he says, is “like love”, “easier to experience than to define or measure” (1990a, p. 
25). He defines power as “the ability to achieve one’s purposes or goals” or “the ability to do 
things and to control others” (Ibid., pp. 25-26). Power is also the ability “to get others to do 
what they otherwise would not” (Nye 1990b, p. 154). To analyze the concept of power, he 
elaborates on the definitions given by Robert A. Dahl, Hans J. Morgenthau, Klaus Knorr, and 
Ray Cline and argues that according to the behavioral definition of power it is essential to know 
the preferences of others if one wants to measure power in terms of changed behaviors (Nye 
1990a, p. 26). For political leaders, however, power is better defined in a more concrete way, as 
the possession of resources, including, among others, population, territory, natural resources, 
economic size, military forces, and political stability (Ibid.). According to Nye, however, the 
issue of power measurement truly revolves around “power conversion”, which he defines as 
“the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as 
measured by the changed behavior of others” (Ibid., p. 27). Another issue to be addressed is that 
of the “changing sources of power”, which Nye saw as being in the process of abandoning the 
traditional emphasis on military force to move closer to an assessment of international power 
based on factors such as technology, education, and economic growth, in lieu of increasingly 
less important factors such as geography, population, and raw materials (Ibid., p. 29). Nye puts 
forward the idea of soft vs. hard power arguing that “[g]etting other states to change might be 
called the directive or commanding method of exercising power” (Ibid., p. 31). “Command 
power can rest on inducements (‘carrots’) or threats (‘sticks’)”, he further argues (Ibid.). Yet, 
there is also another aspect that is sometimes referred to as the “second face of power”, which is 
“an indirect way to exercise power” (Ibid.). Nye’s definition of this aspect deserves quoting at 
length: 
 
A country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries want to 
follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to 
set the agenda and structure the situation in world politics, as it is to get others to change in particular 
situations. This aspect of power—that is, getting others to want what you want—might be called 
indirect or co-optive power. It is in contrast to the active command power behavior of getting others to 
do what you want. Co-optive power can rest on the attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the 
political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express.  
(Ibid.) 
 
He further argues:  
 
The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as 
culture, ideology, and institutions. This dimension can be thought of as soft power, in contrast to the 
hard command power usually associated with tangible resources like military and economic strength.  
(Ibid., p.  32)  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 For a complete description of his life and academic achievements see the author’s website: http://joenye.com/.  
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Nye describes power as comprising both a hard and a soft aspect; soft power is the 
dimension of power expressed through the ability to get others to want the same outcomes one 
wants. This aspect of power does not require the use of “carrots” or “sticks” and is associated 
with intangible resources, while command power is usually associated with tangible resources. 
“Soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power”, he further argues (Nye 
1990a, p. 32). The utility of soft power lies in the fact that:  
 
If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its 
wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow. If it can establish 
international norms that are consistent with its society, it will less likely have to change. If it can help 
support institutions that encourage other states to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant 
state prefers, it may not need costly exercises of coercive or hard power in bargaining situations.  
(Ibid., pp. 32-33) 
 
The universalism of a country’s culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules 
and institutions that govern areas of international activities, Nye concludes, are crucial sources 
of power (Ibid., p. 33). In relation to the hegemony of the United States, with the “proof of 
power” being “not in resources but in the changed behavior of nations”, the question that Nye 
poses is not as much related to weather or not the country will be able to enter the twenty-first 
century as a superpower as it is to the extent by which it will be able to get other countries to do 
what it wants (Ibid., pp. 174-175).   
Over the years, Joseph S. Nye has continued to develop his theory at the basis of which 
was the realization that with the beginning of the post-Cold War era the nature of power in 
world politics had begun to change. Generally speaking, power was seen as becoming less 
transferable, or fungible, less coercive, and less tangible due to modern trends and changes in 
political issues that were affecting the nature of power and the resources producing it, making 
co-optive power and soft power resources, such as cultural attraction, ideology, and 
international institutions, more important than in the past (Nye 1990a, p. 188, 1990b, p. 167). 
Intangible forms of power, such as national cohesion, universalistic culture, and international 
institutions were also acquiring more relevance due to the changing nature of international 
politics (Nye 1990b, p. 164). In a changed world, traditional means of power, namely economic 
and military power, may be less effective than a “more attractive way of exercising power” that 
a country can use to get other countries “to want what it wants” instead of “ordering others to 
do what it wants” (Ibid., p. 166). Thus, in Nye’s opinion, the real issue for the United States, or 
for any other world power, is how power is changing in world politics, with soft power 
acquiring more and more importance. Nowadays, for a country in search of global power status, 
it is necessary to tap into soft power resources, as the key to change the behaviors of others lies 
in the ability to attract them towards the same desired outcomes. In this sense, as Nye points out 
when he continues to elaborate on the concept of soft power in his successive volume on the 
topic, entitled Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, soft power is “attractive 
power”, in behavioral terms (Nye 2004, p. 6). Many of the points he makes in this well-known 
book are similar to the ones made in his previous masterpiece, but the analysis of soft power is 
more thorough and the setting closer to the present day. Once again, Nye starts from the 
definition of power, repeating one of the metaphors used in his 1990 volume: “Power is like the 
weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it” (Nye 2004, p. 1). He 
highlights that in the global information age of today, “winning hearts and minds” is more 
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important than ever before but political leaders still struggle to incorporate soft power 
dimensions into their strategies (Ibid.). He takes into consideration the different ways in which 
power can be conceptualized, in terms of changed behavior of others or the possessions of 
resources, and emphasizes the importance of the context in which power is exercised (Ibid., pp. 
1-5). In particular, he points out that to effectively change the behavior of others, one needs to 
evaluate the context in which the relationship takes place (Ibid., p. 2). There are several ways to 
affect the behavior of others: you can coerce them with threats, you can induce them with 
payments, or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want (Ibid.). “Getting others to 
want the outcomes that you want” is soft power; it “co-opts people rather than coerces them” 
(Ibid., p. 5). Once again, an association is made with people’s everyday life, comparing the 
power of attraction and seduction to the ability to shape the preferences of others typical of soft 
power:  
 
A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its 
values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. In 
this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to 
force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions.  
(Ibid.) 
 
Nye uses the image of a spectrum along which the types of behavior between command 
and co-option are aligned, from coercion to economic inducement, to agenda setting, to pure 
attraction; but this relationship is imperfect: military strength and economic prowess can be 
attractive in the eyes of other countries and become sources of soft power (Ibid., pp. 7-8). Most 
importantly, the American scholar elaborates on the intangible resources that can generate soft 
power for a country: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values 
(when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as 
legitimate and having moral authority) (Ibid., p. 11).  
Since the present research places its focus on China’s rise and impact on the global 
community through the lenses of what has come to be known as “cultural soft power”, the first 
soft power resource mentioned by Nye takes on particular relevance. Nye defines culture as “the 
set of values and practices that create meaning for a society” and states that “[w]hen a country’s 
culture includes universal values and its policies promote values and interests that others share, 
it increases the probability of obtaining its desired outcomes because of the relationships of 
attraction and duty that it creates” (Nye 2004, p. 11). Recognizing the complexity of the issue at 
hand, Nye warns that as powerful as it can be, culture still has some limits. In his words: “Of 
course, Coke and Big Macs do not necessarily attract people in the Islamic world to love the 
United States” (Ibid., p. 12). In fact, Nye seems to be aware of the potential limitations of the 
concept of soft power. He specifies that there are conditions under which attraction will more 
likely generate desired outcomes: popular culture, for instance, is more likely to attract people 
and produce soft power in contexts where there are cultural similarities rather than in situations 
where cultures are totally dissimilar (Nye 2004, pp. 15-16).  
There is also one last point that is relevant for the purpose of this discussion: the role of 
governments in enhancing soft power. Nye states that civil society is the main source of soft 
power and that in a liberal society a government “cannot and should not control the culture” 
(Nye 2004, p. 17). This leads the present discussion to introducing some of the findings that will 
be proved and analyzed in-depth in the following chapters. Firstly, one of the key differences 
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that will emerge between the original conceptualization of soft power by Joseph S. Nye and its 
Chinese interpretation lies precisely in the fact that in the Chinese context soft power strategies 
take on the shape of a government project. Secondly, the idea behind the Chinese concept of 
soft power places emphasis on culture as the core of soft power in general, and on traditional 
Chinese culture in particular, striking another difference with Nye’s conceptualization, which 
mainly takes into consideration American pop culture among a variety of other soft power 
resources. Thirdly, the most salient difference between the American and Chinese discourses on 
soft power pertains to the field in which they are applied. For Nye, soft power is a face of power 
that complements hard power in the power games of world politics. Conversely, it will be 
demonstrated that, in the Chinese context, soft power is also very much an important part of 
China’s domestic policy. 
These aspects constitute the three main assumptions that, discussed and demonstrated 
throughout the present research, the study intends to prove. Chapter 2 will explain the 
reflections upon which their proposal is based.  
 
 
1.4 Framing the research field  
 
The present research has come across an abundance of literature, in both English and 
Chinese, produced after the year 1990 and mostly in the last decade, concerning China’s soft 
power. This confirms that in addition to the economic and military aspects of power, which 
have been briefly introduced in the previous sections, there is yet another component which 
scholars are called upon to consider when discussing China’s position in the world today. It is 
indeed soft power.  
Interestingly enough, this softer aspect of power emerges, at times, also in relation to the 
topics discussed thus far, in particular in the case of China’s economic power. In this regard, 
Jacques (2012, p. 610) observes that soft power mostly rests on the fundamental precondition of 
having economic power because the people’s desire is usually to be similar to those that are 
wealthier, and economic wealth allows for the development of greater soft power resources. 
Consequently, Jacques disagrees with Nye’s approach to power, which perceives hard power 
and soft power as “separate compartments” (Ibid.). This is the reason why, for instance, 
following a devaluation of the Chinese Yuan, a consequence of the troubles faced by China’s 
economy at the time of writing, at least one news reporter (Francis 2015) tried to discern the 
reasons behind this economic maneuver, focusing on the need for China to keep alive the 
attractiveness its markets exercise on foreign buyers and pointing to the high cost soft power 
has for China. As will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters, soft power and 
international affairs experts often agree in pinpointing a strong link between China’s allure in 
the global arena and its economic strength, at times even comparing China’s soft power with the 
power of money (Troyjo 2015).  
Thus far, it has also been shown that China’s aspiration to become a great cultural power 
can be considered legitimate and in line with its renewed position as a global player. China’s 
economic strength is considered a precondition for its cultural influence, as “a virtuous circle of 
expanding influence tends to develop” around a country’s rise (Jacques 2012, pp. 548-549). Yet, 
China’s cultural power still remains in the background in comparison to its economic and 
military clout. Although one cannot deny that economic, and also military might, can generate 
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attractiveness, the present research places greater emphasis on the importance attributed to the 
appeal generated by culture within the discourse on China’s soft power.  
As Martin Jacques suggests, the global changes brought about by China are transforming 
the world in a much more fundamental way than happened with the rise of other new global 
powers before (Jacques 2012, p. 579)19. Generally speaking, it can be argued that the uniqueness 
of the impact that China’s rise has on the world derives from the country’s awareness of the 
peculiar features of its own nature as a civilization-state, as briefly discussed in Section 1.120. 
For instance, taking the case of the promotion of the Chinese language worldwide, Jacques 
focuses on the presence of an embryonic competition between English and Mandarin for the 
status of global lingua franca and points out how these two language and cultural systems are in 
fact widely different: the first is an alphabetic vehicle of a single spoken language that has 
grown through overseas expansion and conquest, while the latter is a pictographic written 
vehicle for many different spoken languages which has widened its presence through territorial 
growth (Ibid., p. 546). It can thus be assumed that even in the field of language promotion, as 
will also appear to be the case for traditional cultural values, one can detect yet another symbol 
of the uniqueness of the manner in which the rise of China is affecting the world. These are 
aspects that will be discussed in greater detail later on, however, drawing on this uniqueness and 
following the suggestion proposed by Jacques (2012, p. 564) that “[u]nderstanding China will 
be one of the great challenges of the twenty-first century”, the present analysis posits that it is 
also necessary to better understand China’s approach to soft and cultural power.  
By paying attention to culture as a resource of soft power, the study will show how in 
recent years China has been developing strong cultural awareness and how this is reflected in 
the new cultural policies put forward by the government. It will thus be shown that China has its 
own unique approach to soft power, one that has come to be called “cultural soft power” 
(wenhua ruan shili) and is a vision of culture and identity-building in which the overall policy 
aims at building a sense of belonging to the country among the Chinese people, national 
cohesion, cultural identity, and linguistic unity, while at the same time increasing the 
attractiveness of Chinese culture to the world and expanding China’s cultural soft power 
externally.  
In the Chinese intellectual and political circles, culture is envisioned as the soft power 
resource “of choice” because of the role it plays as a means to enhance the country’s appeal and 
influence on the global stage, but also, and more importantly, as a means to meet China’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Jacques (2012, pp. 564-579) detects eight key characteristics of Chinese modernity that pertain to both its internal 
structure and the impact this will have on its relation with the outside world: 1) China is a civilization-state more than 
a nation-state in the traditional sense; 2) the legacy of China’s tributary-state system is likely to influence its 
relationship with East Asia; 3) Chinese people have a particular attitude towards race and ethnicity regarding 
themselves to be a single race, the Han Chinese, as a single race and describing the non-Han Chinese as separate 
nationalities instead of races; 4) China is continental in scale; 5) Chinese polity has a highly specific nature embodied 
in the fact that the rulers of the Chinese Empire were never required to share power with other competing institutions; 
6) the speed of the country’s transformation characterizes Chinese modernity; 7) the CPC has been ruling since 1949; 
8) China combines the characteristics of both a developed and a developing country and this will be the case for 
many years to come.    
20 To complete the analysis of this aspect, which will nevertheless permeate the entire thesis, it is interesting to note 
that the expression “wenmingxing guojia ɇəĮġŶ”, translated in English as “civilizational state”, is used in the 
works written by Chinese author Zhang Weiwei, and mentioned in the introduction to this study, with reference to 
China’s proposal of its own logic for development, which, shaped on the basis of the characteristics of the country’s 
own traditions and historical and cultural roots, nowadays presents a challenge to the West and its values (World 
Scientific 2016a, 2016b). !
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domestic demands. Closely linked to the construction and development of a “system of socialist 
core values” (shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi ͍`*/ʐǘZi͹)21 that, tapping into China’s 
long history, rooted traditions, ideology, political institutions, and social structures inherited 
from the past, are able to adjust to the PRC’s present reality, China’s soft power discourse 
appears to be inseparable from the discourse on identity and culture-building as well as that on 
cultural strength and cultural appeal. Every task of the present analysis is thus carried out 
paying particular attention to how culture is envisioned and utilized in relation to the Chinese 
theory and practice of soft power.  
The deployment of cultural soft power, which will appear to occur in ways that are 
directed both outwardly and inwardly, is thus examined in light of the value attached to culture 
as a factor that can attract the international public but also, perhaps more importantly, as a force 
to which the Chinese people are drawn domestically; an arena around which people can rally to 
find inspiration and take pride in their country and in the Chinese national character. In this 
sense, traditional culture is envisioned as a particularly powerful tool in China’s cultural soft 
power toolkit. 
To conclude this overview of the main features of the research design, it must be pointed 
out that, as seen thus far, crossing and overlapping numerous different yet related research areas, 
this project pertains to many fields of study, ranging from analyses related to China’s 
international relations and global politics to aspects concerning domestic strategies and, in its 
more practical aspect, cultural policies and socio-political dimensions of language 
standardization and promotion. The most suitable way to tackle a research of this kind has been 
the choice of an interdisciplinary approach that looks at China’s soft power from different 
perspectives. More specifically, the research method chosen can be defined as a “two-pronged 
approach”, in view of the fact that attention has been paid not only to aspects pertaining to the 
field of international relations and global politics, but also to the dynamics that characterize 
China’s internal conditions. This two-pronged approach has been applied in an interdisciplinary 
manner and draws upon studies that highlight the presence of these two levels in the way soft 
power is interpreted in the Chinese context.  
Twofold is also the corpus of materials chosen as the examination has taken into 
consideration both Western volumes and journals, or publications written by Chinese scholars 
in English for a foreign audience, and contributions in Chinese targeted to the domestic public, 
or Mandarin-literate readers. Therefore, throughout the entire research process, a conscious 
effort has been made to maintain a binary stance, in order to bring to the surface, and then 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 A more in-depth description of what is meant by the expression “shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan ͍`*/ʐǘZ
ϰ” (socialist core value system or socialist core values) will be provided in Chapter 7. For the present discussion, it 
will suffice to specify that the idea of building a system of socialist core values is presented as an important thought 
stressed in the course of the 17th National Congress of the CPC in 2007 and a major task put forward by the CPC after 
having summed up the historical experience and evaluated the current circumstances (Xu Zhigong ІǛÂ 2008). 
Against a background in which culture intertwines with every other aspect, the proposal of this idea possesses an 
“extremely strong realistic focus and a significant practical meaning” (ji qiang de xianshi zhenduixing he zhongda de 
shijian yiyi ɿǆ̪̒ůѽżǦĎ义ń̪ů与Ǳ/) (Ibid.). Generally speaking a system of core values is constituted 
by values that occupy a leading position in a society’s life, being able to ensure stability and development, and in the 
case of China this means that the leading ideology of Marxism occupies the highest level (Ibid.). As will be 
expounded upon in Chapter 7, in more recent years, socialist core values have been specifically defined as “national 
goals of prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony; social goals of freedom, equality, justice and the rule of law; 
and individual values of patriotism, dedication, integrity, and friendship” (Xinhua News Agency 2013). 
 25 
merge, characteristics of both the Western discourse on Chinese soft power, in English, and the 
Chinese discourse on soft power, in Chinese. It is in between these two macro areas of analysis 
that the ever-growing number of Chinese publications in English finds its location as a useful 
instrument employed by China to popularize the Chinese point of view on domestic and 
international issues worldwide22. However, it must be kept in mind that, nowadays, China’s 
press and publishing industry offers an increasingly rich and variegated range of volumes and 
scholarly writings which, elaborated by Chinese experts of national and international politics, 
targets the ever-increasing inquisitive Chinese audience, thus largely enriching the Chinese 
intellectual panorama of the topics considered here. Embracing Western publications in English, 
Chinese publications in English, and, more importantly, Chinese publications in Chinese, the 
multiple levels of analysis described give shape to two complementary perspectives on China’s 
soft power: an international perspective, the discourse on Chinese soft power, and a local 
perspective, the Chinese discourse on soft power, both functional to obtaining an accurate 
understanding of what soft power means in China and for China. In line with the first 
perspective, attention has been paid to the examination of China’s soft power on the backdrop 
of its ascent on the global stage, navigating through a vast amount of materials produced by 
scholars, policy experts, journalists, and China-watchers from all around the world. This process 
has also included data analyses, through the examination of pools and surveys concerning the 
attitudes towards China and its rising power and the perception of China’s image worldwide. 
Conversely, in line with the second, more local, perspective, emphasis has been placed on the 
analysis of China’s own discourse on soft power, through the examination of discussions on soft 
power within Chinese academic circles and their confluence into the CPC leadership’s official 
discourse, programs, and strategies. In this sense, the analysis will also take on the task of 
looking more closely at the terminology used in the Chinese discourse on soft power, in order to 
show its differences from the Western perception of what China’s soft power really is. As well, 
policy documents, news and commentaries released by the state-media, and speeches delivered 
by political leaders have provided very useful first-hand information.  
The binary stance that characterizes the present research is reflected also in the case study 
considered – an example of Chinese cultural soft power at work. The analysis intends to explore 
the idea that the standardization and promotion of the Chinese language potentially constitutes a 
resource of cultural soft power both at home and abroad. On the premise that language 
promotion can constitute a key instrument through which culture is expressed to the outside 
world, it comes as no surprise that, as a fundamental part of its culture, China’s language can be 
an effective resource of soft power, through its promotion worldwide. This is proved by the 
great success achieved globally by the Confucius Institutes (Kongzi Xueyuan Ŝśţҙ), a clear, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 These are part of the operations summarized by Li Shi (2013) with the expression “public diplomacy through 
media” to describe the initiatives strongly promoted by the Chinese leadership in recent years to influence public 
opinion in other nations, in the perspective of public diplomacy. The effort exerted in this field by the Chinese 
government has been significant, with the development, for instance, of the global media presence of four state-
owned media organizations: the Xinhua News Agency, China Central Television (CCTV), China Radio International 
(CRI), and the English-language newspaper China Daily (Ibid.). As will be further described, public diplomacy is a 
useful instrument to enhance the country’s soft power, as it works towards the establishment of a positive image 
abroad, an essential precondition to form a friendly international environment which can facilitate China’s economic 
and political ascent (Ibid.). In particular, the present work will focus, in Chapter 7, on what Li Shi calls the “power of 
discourse” of Chinese media, also aimed at rebutting the negative image of China’s affairs often depicted by Western 
news reporting (Ibid.).   
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yet at times controversial, symbolic outcome of China’s efforts to enhance the efficiency of its 
cultural soft power abroad. However, the study presents two arguments: firstly, it argues that the 
promotion of the Chinese language abroad makes it necessary for China to present to the world 
a harmonious and cohesive cultural and linguistic environment. Secondly, it argues that 
language can become a tool to increase national cohesion and infuse into the people a sense of 
identity and belonging. In practical terms, this is expressed through China’s language policy, 
which aims at enhancing language uniformity as a key component of the country’s cultural 
construction.  
! !
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2. Problem formulation and thesis structure  
 
 
As the political report to 17th National Congress of the CPC in October 2007 represents the 
official debut of the concept of soft power on the stage of Chinese politics, this chapter draws 
inspiration from Hu Jintao’s call to enhance China’s cultural soft power contained in his 
keynote speech in order to define the research problem and explain the related assumptions. 
Describing the intertwining dynamics within the scope of the exertion of China’s soft power as 
a “feedback circuit”, the foundations of the present analysis can be found in a comprehensive 
nexus in which culture is at the core and its resourcefulness can be wielded both domestically 
and internationally, thanks also to the active role of the Chinese government.  
 
 
2.1 Enhancing the role of culture as part of China’s soft power: Hu Jintao’s political report to 
the 17th National Congress of the CPC 
 
In October 2007, former Chinese President and General Secretary of the CPC Hu Jintao 
delivered his political report to the 17th National Congress of the CPC. Among the various issues 
discussed, a new topic made its first appearance in the political discourse of the Chinese 
leadership: “ruan shili” (soft power). The following pages will focus on Hu Jintao’s speech, 
which can be found in its entirety on the Xinhua Wang news website, in a section specifically 
dedicated to the 17th National Congress. This will serve the purpose of presenting the official 
view of the concept of soft power in the Chinese context, as introduced by the former President, 
and define the bases for the present analysis. Speeches by government officials and policy 
documents will constitute a focus of this entire work, also including Hu Jintao’s keynote speech 
to the 18th National Congress of the CPC (Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiba Ci Quanguo 
Daibiao Dahui &ġDͩÐʡġSϧń`) in November 2012 and successive 
speeches given by incumbent President Xi Jinping.  
The extract that contains the leadership’s definition of how soft power is interpreted in 
China is part of the section entitled “Tuidong shehuizhuyi wenhua da fazhan da fanrong ȧÅ͍
`*/ɇÌńëƎńͿϔ” – “Promoting Vigorous Development and Prosperity of Socialist 
Culture”, the seventh chapter of Hu Jintao’s keynote speech, which calls for promoting the 
development of “advanced socialist culture” (shehuizhuyi xianjin wenhua ͍`*/严ɇÌ) 
and reads as follows:  
 
ǈNɗSɇÌ万ɼ万Ǹ)ʴɑ©ήÀĎ¶ѥÀ̪义ϭ˪ˆ	万ɼ万Ǹ)ΚûġÀͤ9̪义ϭ
Ĝͺ'źͷ͐ɇÌ̛ː万ɼ万Ǹ)ǹġIʴ̪˼¯ǳɯ
ϭĬȚ͍`*/严ɇÌ¾严Ɏ’
е͍`*/ɇÌƾЈɍ亚˱˳ëʴɑɇÌ¶ѥːÀȪ亚ġŶɇÌ且ůÀoIʴĳɵ
ɇÌɸ̮ǖ»ɨŒzҠo͍`ɇÌ̛ːɨÃ'źł》oIʴͷ͐于ТɨÃɘȄ’
 
(Xinhua She 2007) 
 
The English version of the speech translates Hu Jintao’s words as follows:  
In the present era, culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and 
creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength, and the 
Chinese people have an increasingly ardent desire for a richer cultural life. We must keep to the 
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orientation of advanced socialist culture, bring about a new upsurge in socialist cultural development, 
stimulate the cultural creativity of the whole nation, and enhance culture as part of the soft power of 
our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and interests, enrich the cultural life 
in Chinese society and inspire the enthusiasm of the people for progress.  
(Xinhua News Agency 2007) 
 
Given the length of the section drawn from Hu Jintao’s speech and considered here, the 
full transcription, both in Chinese and English, will be provided as an Appendix to this work. 
For the sake of clarity, a summary of the most important issues addressed by the Chinese leader 
will be presented below.  
To begin, it is important to point out that attention must be paid to the terminology used 
by the former President. Throughout the present writing, the expressions considered most 
relevant will be selected as “keywords” or “watchwords” so as to depict an image of the soft 
power discourse in China that is as complete as possible. In this regard, the discussion must take 
its lead from a preliminary observation of the terms employed by the Chinese leading 
government official to discuss China’s soft power. By employing the formulation “tigao guojia 
wenhua ruan shili” (enhance the country’s cultural soft power), Hu Jintao calls for 
strengthening the role of culture as part of China’s soft power. He describes culture as playing 
an increasingly crucial role as an “important source of national cohesion and creativity” (minzu 
ningjuli he chuangzaoli de zhongyao yuanquan ʴɑ©ήÀĎ¶ѥÀ̪义ϭ˪ˆ), as an 
“important factor in the competition for comprehensive national power” (zonghe guoli 
jingzheng de zhongyao yinsu ΚûġÀͤ9̪义ϭĜͺ), and as a response to the growing 
demands of the Chinese people for a “rich spiritual and cultural life” (fengfu jingshen wenhua 
shenghuo 'źͷ͐ɇÌ̛ː). Emphasis is placed on culture interpreted as “advanced socialist 
culture” (shehuizhuyi xianjin wenhua) and the methods suggested to enhance it are extremely 
detailed. As reported online (Xinhua She 2007), they include:  
 
1. “Building a system of socialist core values” (jianshe shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi ƾЈ
͍`*/ʐǘZi͹) and “strengthening the attractiveness and cohesive force of socialist 
ideology” (zengqiang shehuizhuyi yishi xingtai de xiyinli he ningjuli ķǆ͍`*/ǱЋ《ǡ̪
ćǂÀĎ©ήÀ): by leveraging the system of socialist core values, which represents the 
essence of socialist ideology, the guiding position of Marxism (Makesizhuyi 五Ǥ*/) is 
reiterated but adapted to Chinese conditions; people will be united around the common ideal of 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi &ġ̇υ͍`*/) and 
inspired by means of “national spirit with patriotism as the core” (yi aiguozhuyi wei hexin de 
minzu jingshen Ûġ*/)ʐǘ̪ʴɑͷ͐) and the “spirit of the times with reform and 
innovation at the core” (yi gaige chuangxin wei hexin de shidai jingshen Uȸү¶ɍ)ʐǘ̪
ɗSͷ͐); theories of Marxism and socialism with Chinese characteristics will be publicized 
and socialist core values will be introduced into all stages of national education and the entire 
process of spiritual and cultural construction, so that they can become something that the people 
“seek on their own initiative” (zijue zhuiqiu νϳќʸ); research in the field of philosophy and 
social sciences will be promoted, with rewards of an international caliber for scholars achieving 
outstanding results.  
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2. “Building a culture of harmony” (jianshe hexie wenhua ƾЈĎНɇÌ ) and 
“cultivating civilized customs” (peiyang wenming fengshang Ĳɇə于Ƅ): to provide the 
people with spiritual (jingshen ͷ͐), or intellectual, support, the work of the press, publishing, 
radio, film, television, literature, and art must be developed and “correct guidance” (zhengque 
daoxiang ʦ͉Ž’) provided; Internet culture must be developed and managed; healthy social 
trends must be fostered, and patriotism (aiguozhuyi ̂ġ*/), collectivism (jitizhuyi ңi*
/), and socialist ideology (shehuizhuyi sixiang ͍`*/Ǥǰ) promoted; values such as social 
ethics (shehui gongde ͍`Ǘ), professional codes of conduct (zhiye daode ά 丹Ǘ), 
family virtues (jiating meide ŶƺΤǗ), and individual morality (ge ren pinde %IďǗ) will 
be promoted; ideological and political work (sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo ǤǰȻ）ƙm) must be 
strengthened and improved, and ideological and moral education (sixiang daode jiaoyu gongzuo 
Ǥǰ丹ǗɁβƙm) carried out well among young people.  
3. “Carrying forward Chinese culture” (hongyang Zhonghua wenhua 、Ȅ&ÔɇÌ) and 
“building a common spiritual home for the Chinese nation” (jianshe Zhonghua minzu gongyou 
jingshen jiayuan ƾЈ&Ôʴɑɭͷ͐ŶĞ): Chinese culture has been an “inexorable 
driving force behind the unstoppable growth and brave advancement in unity of the Chinese 
nation” (Zhonghua minzu shengshengbuxituanjie fenjin de bu jie dongli &Ôʴɑ̛̛Ǫ	
ĝΐŏ严̪ͧÅÀ) and, as such, its role must be enhanced; traditional culture (chuantong 
wenhua bΔɇÌ) must be known and adapted to modern civilization, its essence kept and its 
dross discarded; the excellent Chinese cultural traditions and the intangible cultural heritage will 
be protected; in order to learn from the achievements of foreign cultures and enhance the 
influence of Chinese culture in the world, international cultural exchanges must also be 
strengthened.  
4. “Stimulating cultural innovation” (tuijin wenhua chuangxin ȧ严ɇÌ¶ɍ) and 
“strengthening the vitality of cultural development” (zengqiang wenhua fazhan huoli ķǆɇÌ
ëƎːÀ): by letting “a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend” 
(baihua qifangbaijia zhengming ̩ϊӕȺ	̩Ŷ9Ӑ)23, the work of the cultural industry 
will be developed in order to “ensure the basic cultural rights and interests of the people” 
(baozhang renmin jiben wenhua quanyi zҠIʴĳɵɇÌɸ̮ ) and “enhance the 
international competitiveness” (zengqiang guoji jingzhengli ķǆġ书ͤ9À) of the industry. 
A “thriving cultural market” (fanrong wenhua shichang ͿϔɇÌơĪ) will bring both good 
“economic returns and social benefits” (jingji xiaoyi yu shehui xiaoyi Ώ˒Ƚ̮͍`Ƚ̮).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 As reported by Goldman (1987, pp. 242-243), this was part of the slogan launched by Mao Zedong in 1956: “Let a 
hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend”. What has come to be known as the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign (or Movement, Baihua Yundong ̩ϊёÅ) was an attempt by the CPC leadership to encourage 
intellectuals to express their ideas in the academic arena and allow them a certain degree of freedom to express their 
opinions in areas that were not related to politics, such as arts, literature, and science, in order to gain their 
cooperation in economic development. By allowing them to criticize officials, the aim was also to improve the 
bureaucratic system and its efficiency (Ibid.). In 1957, a crackdown on this relaxation toward intellectuals put an end 
to the campaign, which, turning into criticism towards the system in place and the Party itself, had gone beyond the 
CPC’s intent; in turn, an Anti-Rightist Campaign (or Movement, Fanyou Yundong ê÷ёÅ) was initiated in order 
to tighten the grip on intellectuals, who were expected to be indoctrinated, and restore in them revolutionary 
consciousness. (Ibid., pp. 253-254).   
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Hu Jintao concludes this part of his keynote speech by stressing the essential role that the 
“thriving and prosperity of Chinese culture” (Zhonghua wenhua fanrong xingsheng &ÔɇÌͿ
ϔ̱) plays, as a means to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Zhonghua 
minzu weida fuxing &ÔʴɑańĿ) 24 (Xinhua She 2007).  
Through a brief analysis of the points presented above it is possible to bring to light the 
most salient aspects suggested by the former President’s speech and draw inspiration for the 
formulation of the research problem. As introduced in Chapter 1, the research problem develops 
around three main assumptions posed by the present author regarding the nature of Chinese soft 
power: in China, enhancing soft power takes on the shape of a government project; the 
mainstream vision of Chinese soft power places emphasis on culture, in particular traditional 
culture, as the core; and, surpassing the boundaries of international relations, soft power is also 
very much part of China’s domestic policy. These hypotheses can be established based on a 
comparison between Joseph S. Nye’s original conceptualization of the soft power theory and the 
observation of how this concept is interpreted in the Chinese context, as symbolized by Hu 
Jintao’s speech. Overall, it can be noted that the cultural policies that will be discussed 
throughout the present study, for which this speech provides the guidelines, must be understood 
in light of the importance placed on the enhancement of culture as part of the country’s soft 
power, a resource that can be wielded to respond to the new emerging needs generated by the 
country’s continuous domestic growth and international ascendance. In Chapter 3, in fact, Hu 
Jintao’s directives at the 17th National Congress will be interpreted as giving culture the 
important function of achieving strategic goals both at home and on the global stage.  
Indeed, briefly paraphrasing Hu Jintao’s statement, culture is interpreted here in a broader 
sense, with reference to the cultural output produced by cultural industries but also to the 
spiritual, or intellectual, life of the Chinese people. Culture has given the Chinese nation an 
unfailing driving force to keep its unity and make progress from one generation to the next. 
Virtues and ethics can be infused into the people’s hearts and minds by means of excellent 
cultural products, able to popularize the superior symbols belonging to traditional Chinese 
culture, while a healthy cultural market, in touch with the times but rich in national character, 
can generate both social benefits and economic returns for everyone. Advanced socialist culture 
finds its foundation in the system of socialist core values, the essence of socialist ideology, a 
fecund source of Marxist principles adapted to the modern concept of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. The joint work of ideological and moral values, the new spiritual home created 
for the Chinese people, and the thriving cultural system will bring about the renaissance of the 
Chinese nation. This process of self-improvement will, in turn, lead to an increase in the appeal 
of the country’s culture internationally, thus enhancing its competitiveness.  
Based on these premises, the following pages will set the parameters for the analysis of 
China’s soft power, drawing guidance from Hu Jintao’s keynote speech. As will be further 
described, there is, in fact, widespread agreement (among others, Glaser and Murphy 2009; Nye 
and Wang 2009a, 2009b; Zheng Biao ѱǋ 2010; Cao Qing 2011; Edney 2012; Hong Xiaonan 
΁ɡ× et al. 2013; Liu Deding ³Ǘŭ 2013; Aukia 2014) that, with the delivery of this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 As reported by Schell and Delury (2013, Chapter 15), the word “fuxing Ŀ”, which means “rejuvenate”, has had 
an extremely profound meaning for each and every generation of Chinese people since the assault suffered by the 
PRC at the hands of foreign powers in the 19th century. As well, CPC leaders have taken the concept of “fuxing” as a 
symbol of China’s rise and the restoration of its greatness, which represent, in turn, the realization of the so-called 
“Chinese dream” (Zhongguo meng &ġʘ) (Ibid.).    
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important political report to the 17th National Congress, the concept of soft power made its 
official debut on the stage of Chinese politics. In the course of this work, attention will be paid 
to unveiling the rationale behind Hu Jintao’s words in an attempt to find an explanation for the 
assumptions that can be drawn from them.  
 
 
2.2 Assumptions of the research problem 
 
In order to explain the assumptions reported above, a starting point is that of taking note 
of the location of the part of the speech that deals with soft power in the body of text that 
constitutes Hu Jintao’s political report. As indicated above, the formulation “tigao guojia 
wenhua ruan shili” appears in the section dedicated to the project of developing a prosperous 
socialist culture. Its placement in the section which takes into consideration peaceful 
development, entitled “Shizhong buyu zou heping fazhan daolu ŕΎˣ七ĎƩëƎ丹不” – 
“Unswervingly Following the Path of Peaceful Development”), would perhaps have seemed 
more appropriate for a topic such as that of soft power, which is generally treated in relation to a 
country’s international relations. Conversely, the Chinese leadership’s intention to increase the 
role of culture as part of the country’s soft power appears to surpass the realm of foreign affairs, 
being propelled by the pursuance of domestic goals. As stated by Edney (2012, p. 907), the 
Chinese soft power discourse becomes part of the CPC’s official ideology in a way that is very 
much in relation to the realm of nation-building and domestic cultural construction. Elaborating 
on the official incorporation of the concept of soft power into the CPC’s lexicon in 2007, he 
further observes that Hu Jintao deals with the topic of soft power with reference to the project of 
developing socialism with Chinese characteristics rather than referring to China’s foreign affairs 
and the country’s position in the world (Ibid.). As will be further described, it is therefore no 
surprise that in China the discourse on soft power and the discourse on cultural strength often 
overlap. Although culture was only one of the three resources that Joseph S. Nye listed in the 
original soft power theory, the emphasis placed on it in the soft power discourse in China makes 
it possible to imply that, in this context, soft power “has become almost a synonym for cultural 
attractiveness” (Edney 2012, p. 908).  
In this sense, to be more accurate, in the process of unpacking the meaning of the 
formulation used by Hu Jintao, “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili”, it must be pointed out that the 
complete expression he uses with reference to China’s soft power is actually “guojia wenhua 
ruan shili ġŶɇÌ且ůÀ” (national cultural soft power), a collocation created by juxtaposing 
the words “guojia ġŶ” (country), and “wenhua” (culture) to the term “ruan shili” (soft power). 
As has been reported above, the official English version of the speech offers the translation 
“culture as part of the soft power of our country” (Xinhua News Agency 2007). By extension, 
“culture as part of the country’s soft power” would be considered an accurate transposition of 
Hu Jintao’s words, with the collocation “cultural soft power” being nonetheless very common in 
English texts as well. The present analysis will mainly utilize the term “cultural soft power” and 
demonstrate the intention of the Chinese leadership to place culture at the core of soft power, as 
is made clear with the use of this rather innovative formulation.  
Analyzing Hu Jintao’s statement, three trends emerge in relation to culture in the context 
of cultural soft power, as stated by Edney (2012, p. 908): “culture’s increasing role in national 
cohesion and creativity, its increasing role in international power competition, and the growing 
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demand by the Chinese public for greater access to a variety of cultural pursuits”. The interplay 
of aspects related to the increasingly important role attributed to culture as a source of national 
cohesion and creativity, its increasingly important role in the international competition for CNP, 
and the Chinese public’s growing demand for a greater and more varied cultural life shows the 
interaction between domestic and international dynamics in the Chinese discourse on soft power. 
This characteristic, together with the focus on culture in the approach to soft power in the 
Chinese context, will constitute the pillars upon which the present work is built, corroborating 
the assumptions established.  
Among the aspects that are extensively discussed in the course of the present work and 
permeating the different chapters, culture will be in the spotlight in order to show the process 
through which this resource has progressively come to be considered the most important feature 
of Chinese soft power. Besides the emphasis placed by Hu Jintao on cultural soft power and the 
popular opinion among scholars that culture is the core of China’s soft power, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapters, this assumption is also confirmed by other 
official statements circulating over the years in the policy community and the state media. For 
instance, in a speech reported on the webpage of the Forum for Cross-cultural Communication 
(Kua Wenhua Chuanbo Luntan мɇÌbȲЇĭ) in 2006, former Minister of Culture Cai Wu 
Ϝʩ, who at the time held the position of Director of the State Council Information Office 
(Guowuyuan Xinwen BangongshiġÄҙɍҋÁų), clearly stated that “[c]ulture is the core 
element of a country’s soft power (wenhua shi yi guo ruan shili de hexin yaosu ɇÌɞġ且
ůÀ̪ʐǘϭͺ)” (Cai Wu 2006). Similarly, an article published on the English webpage of 
the official newspaper Renmin Ribao states that even though Joseph S. Nye included factors 
belonging to the fields of culture, political systems, and media into the concept of soft power, 
“[a]mong them, culture is the core, for it fully reflects a country’s influence, cohesion, and 
popularity” (People’s Daily Online 2010). The article reports the opinion shared among 
intellectuals that China is developing its soft power in a way that fits both domestic and 
international conditions, striving to build the Chinese cultural system and increase its influence 
worldwide, and making use of the great potential for development of the Chinese cultural 
industry and its role in building and popularizing modern core values (Ibid.).  
The betterment of China’s ideological, cultural, and spiritual environments, under the 
umbrella of a prosperous socialist culture, the strengthening of China’s cultural system, the 
revival of traditional Chinese values, and the upholding of socialist core values, keeping to the 
orientation of socialism with Chinese characteristics, will also be considered more closely 
throughout the chapters. In fact, these are all aspects touched upon by the former President’s 
2007 political report as part of the task of building unity and cohesion domestically, which 
constitutes, in turn, a resource of soft power in itself as well as the broader context in which the 
program of enhancing cultural soft power is incorporated. In this regard, Edney (2012, p. 911) 
notes that soft power has been included within the program of building “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics”, which all in all constitutes a “nation-building endeavor”. These considerations 
are also reflected in Party members’ official statements. For instance, the words expressed by 
Wang Chen ̏ɣ, an official with the State Council Information Office, in 2010 are relevant 
and deserve quoting at length:  
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Ǝϭʸżϧ̒)ʴɑ̪’ǘÀĎ©ήÀżŁϧ̒)ġŶ̪HĎÀĎǍđÀ
 
(Renmin Wang 2010) 
 
China’s cultural soft power is rooted in the outstanding cultural traditions of the Chinese people, it is 
guided by the system of socialist core values, it reflects the needs for development of the times, 
internally it manifests itself in the nation’s centripetal force [cohering force] and cohesion 
[cohesiveness], and externally it manifests itself in the country’s affinity and influence.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
This does not necessarily mean that socialist core values should be promoted 
internationally, but that their domestic strengthening can bolster China’s soft power resources 
(Edney 2012, p. 911). This aspect will be expounded upon in Chapter 7.  
On balance, enhancing cultural soft power in the Chinese context appears to be related to 
both domestic improvement and international relations. In this sense, another interesting insight 
is that provided by Zhou Qing’an ċưŨ: using the idiom “the cleverest wife cannot cook 
without rice” (qiaofu nan wei wu mi zhi chui ƚŔҡ)ɓͲ0˷), the scholar explains that 
even if image molding and communication methods are certainly an important component of 
soft power, a country’s domestic political, economic, and social development levels, 
constituting the bases of its soft power, are even more important and are the “kernel of soft 
power” (ruan shili de neihe 且ůÀ̪ʐ) (Zhou Qing’an 2007).  
To conclude, the role that a strong culture can play at home, when it becomes a force that 
inspires the people to identify with their homeland, promote the national character, and rally 
around common values, is taken into consideration as a dynamic taking place internally in 
China, but the external dimension of which becomes an effective resource of soft power, taking 
its place among the forces that interact in the challenge for international competitiveness. In this 
sense, the present analysis finds its foundations in a specific and complex nexus: culture is at 
the base of Chinese soft power and, for precisely that reason, it is possible to detect the presence 
of both domestic and international dimensions in the related discourse. The interaction between 
these dimensions takes place in a manner that can be defined, by means of an analogy, as a 
“feedback circuit”, as each of the two affects the other. In this sense, this consideration takes its 
lead from the view expressed by Glaser and Murphy (2009, p. 20), who state that, in China, 
there is agreement on the fact that the development of soft power must be pushed forward not 
only at an international level, by means of cultural promotion, public development, and peaceful 
development, but also at a domestic level, working on the attraction that Chinese culture and 
economic and political values can exercise on both the Chinese people and the foreign public. 
The authors suggest that the Chinese approach to soft power should be defined as “holistic”, as 
“the domestic and foreign policy aspects of soft-power development are conceived as an organic 
whole”, in sharp contrast with Nye’s point of view which mainly focused on soft power as a 
means to improve a country’s international status (Ibid.). An example of this is also provided by 
Edney (2012, p. 913) and applied to the field of propaganda when he states that, for the Chinese 
leadership, there is a relation between the domestic and international political contexts, which 
influence one another. He finds similarities between foreign propaganda and soft power in the 
Party-State’s view, insofar as they facilitate the achievement of domestic objectives, and 
includes the efforts to increase the country’s cultural soft power within the broader spectrum of 
successful internal propaganda, identifying the shared aim of enhancing domestic cohesion, 
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which in turn will increase China’s position internationally (Ibid.). Then, adding another step to 
this circuit, and looking at this relationship from an opposite perspective, one can say that 
increasing the country’s cultural soft power for external purposes affects China’s internal 
conditions, especially in the context of cultural construction.  
In other words, flourishing at home and attractive abroad, culture becomes the core of 
China’s soft power, leading this first introductory section to one last aspect that will emerge in 
the course of the present work. It is indeed also relevant to take into consideration the 
institutional basis of the process of culture-building described, and the presence of an economic 
aspect related to the competitiveness of Chinese culture as well. The process of cultural 
construction unfolds through the application of cultural policies that affect the Chinese cultural 
industry, leveraging the potential of China’s cultural market. In 2010, for example, Hu Jintao 
stressed the need for greater efforts to reform the country’s cultural system in order to increase 
the country’s soft power, encouraging cultural innovation, the provision of cultural services, the 
fostering of new cultural industry forms, and the production of cultural products suitable to 
meet the people’s needs (Xinhua News Agency 2010). In this regard, it will be demonstrated 
that, in the Chinese context, soft power resources need to be built and cultivated to produce soft 
power outcomes. Consequently, it can be assumed that in China there are specific channels 
through which soft power is developed; its promotion is not seen as a natural process that can 
easily stem from the country’s cultural qualities, political values, and foreign policies. In these 
terms, the definition of Chinese soft power that Shaun Breslin proposes, with reference to 
international dynamics, is worth mentioning at length:  
 
[Soft power] is seen largely as a state project to internationalize the voice of China so that it penetrates 
into popular consciousness and influences policy communities debating the consequences of China’s 
rise. It is an attempt to promote a preferred Chinese idea of what China is and it stands for, including 
an emphasis on the historical roots of current thinking, identity-formation and policy designed to 
correct misconceptions among overseas audience about China’s motivations and intentions.  
(Breslin 2011, pp. 6-7) 
 
In this way, soft power can be described as a project fundamentally pushed forward by 
the government. Concluding the explanation of the assumptions established, it is important to 
note that Hu Jintao’s 2007 political report calls for China to “raise”, “heighten”, “enhance”, 
“increase”, or “improve” (tigao Ȫ亚) 25 the role of culture as part of its soft power, implying the 
presence of an action plan aimed at achieving this goal. The analysis of how China’s soft power 
theory has been turned into practice, carried out throughout the present work, will confirm this 
point of view and elaborate on the purposes that lie behind this government project, with social 
stability and economic development emerging among other goals.  
 
 
2.3 Areas of enquiry and research questions  
 
Broadly speaking, following a macro-to-micro approach, the analysis of the aspects 
described thus far takes its lead from looking at “the big picture” of China’s soft power, taking 
into consideration the main dynamics linked to it, before going deeper into the nature of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Hanying Cidian (di san ban) ʺϏЍͩ̃- A Chinese-English Dictionary (Third Edition). Beijing: 
Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 2010, s.v. tígāoȪ亚.  
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Chinese discourse on soft power, so much so as to even touch upon the level of Chinese 
terminology in order to unpack the meaning of the formulation “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili”. 
With the purpose of guiding the reader through the development of this process, the following 
pages will attempt to draw the areas of enquiry and delineate the research questions that will 
receive in-depth analysis in the course of the study. This will be done on the basis of the tasks 
and goals briefly described in the introduction to the present work, the research frame drawn in 
Section 1.4, and the definition of the research problem provided above. In particular, thus far, 
after having introduced a preliminary hypothesis which helps to investigate the soft power 
theory and its location within the background of China’s rise, some of the key concepts 
described by Hu Jintao in his 2007 political report to the 17th National Congress of the CPC 
have been examined in order to draw inspiration for the formulation of the research problem, 
which develops around the assumptions posed at the phase of inception of the present study. 
These assumptions and the related explanations provided thus far, together with the tools chosen 
to search for evidence that can confirm them, constitute the foundations upon which this thesis 
has been structured. For the definition of areas of enquiry and the selection of research 
questions, in fact, the two-pronged approach chosen to examine the co-existence of domestic 
and international aspects as one of the main pillars of the soft power theory and practice in the 
Chinese context, with the others being the emphasis placed on culture and the government’s 
involvement, has proven instrumental. The same can also be said for the binary stance taken in 
selecting the materials utilized for the shaping of an international and a local perspective on the 
overall subject of China’s soft power.   
These considerations are reflected in the structure of the present thesis: as explained in 
the introduction to this work, in fact, the study can be considered to be divided into two parts, 
the first of which includes, besides the introductory Chapters 1 and 2, the definition of a 
conceptual framework of reference, and a comprehensive literary review. This part can be 
envisioned as the first area of research enquiry, which explains the reasons as to why it is 
relevant to study the dynamics of contemporary China through the lenses of soft power and 
specifically discuss the Chinese discourse on soft power. In particular, Chapters 1 and 2 have 
attempted to answer the following questions: what is soft power and how does it fit into the 
discussion related to China’s rise and today’s changing world? How is the official view of the 
concept of soft power defined in the Chinese context and how does it compare to Joseph S. 
Nye’s theory? 
As the debate on the relevance of soft power in relation to China develops in a complex 
nexus of analyses, the elaboration of a conceptual framework is tackled in light of China’s 
strategic discourse as a whole and the domestic and global dynamics surrounding it. Although 
these aspects have been introduced in Chapter 1, this type of analysis acquires an even deeper 
meaning having now looked at Hu Jintao’s call for the enhancement of culture as part of 
China’s soft power in relation to both national cohesion and creativity and the competition in 
CNP. Former President Hu Jintao uses the word “tigao”, which means “enhance” or “increase”, 
implying that actions must be taken to upgrade the objectives culture can achieve. Then, what is 
the relation between culture as a domestic strength and its extension as a source of soft power? 
What is meant by the expression “zonghe guoli” (CNP, or overall national strength)? How does 
the competition in overall national strength unfold, and what role does culture play in it? 
Chapter 3 provides the tools to tackle these issues, forming a canvas on which to illustrate the 
multilayered circumstances in which the subject of China’s soft power emerges. Thus, the 
conceptual framework of reference is dedicated to the description of the main features of the 
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background upon which the discussion will develop in the second part of the study. By doing so, 
the intention is also to organize the abundance of knowledge available regarding popular 
perceptions on China’s internal and external behavior, including, among others, topics 
belonging to the domestic sphere, such as that of a “harmonious society” (hexie shehuiĎН͍
`), as well as some of China’s most relevant principles of foreign policy, including, for 
instance, the concepts of “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi ĎƩƕе), “peaceful development” 
(heping fazhan ĎƩëƎ), and “harmonious world” (hexie shijie ĎН̢).   
Going deeper into the research layers, the discussion will progressively enter the field of 
the Chinese discourse on soft power. As previously described, the concept of soft power 
originated in the West, in the filed of international relations; Chapter 4 will set the frame for the 
discussion of the penetration, and merger, of this concept into the Chinese context by looking 
first, from an international perspective, at the earliest and most valuable attempts to examine the 
topic of China’s soft power in Western and Chinese literature in English, to then introduce, 
from a more local perspective, some of the most relevant Chinese analyses. An introduction to 
some peculiar elements of soft power in the Chinese context will be provided, including the 
vastness and variety of the related discourse and how soft power is discussed by intellectual and 
political elites. Then, what are the most prominent features of Western literature on China’s soft 
power? What are the visions of Chinese scholars on Joseph S. Nye’s theory and the Chinese 
interpretation of it? How different is the language used? How do Chinese publications in 
English fit into this discourse? And, ultimately, how complex is the resulting scenario? Chapter 
4 attempts to introduce tentative answers to these and other related questions. By doing so, it 
provides another aspect of the background against which the emergence of a number of issues 
will be tackled in the following chapters.  
Opening the discussion on the interpretation and re-elaboration of the concept of soft 
power within the Chinese intellectual and strategic domains, Chapter 5, the first of the second 
area of research enquiry, will tackle the following problems: are there any elements in the 
Chinese system of thought that can be considered to have facilitated the acceptance of the role 
of soft power and culture in today’s China? How did scholars participate in the reception of 
these concepts? How deep-rooted are traditional values in Chinese culture, and how do they fit 
into the Chinese discourse on soft power? Does the theory of soft power remain the same after 
entering the Chinese context?   
It must be noted that the level of analysis which is introduced in Chapter 4 and then 
further developed makes this study increasingly specific and complex: it is a step that takes the 
discussion deeper into the realm of the Chinese discourse on soft power, which appears to have 
moved away from Joseph S. Nye’s conceptualization, becoming vast and variegated, as is 
shown by the emergence in China of different “schools of thought” in regard to the nature of 
soft power. Even though the “culture school” seems to prevail, an explanation of what exactly 
cultural soft power means has yet to meet widespread consensus. Based on the assumption that 
the lexical choices made by Hu Jintao in his keynote speech to the 17th National Congress are 
not casual, it can be assumed that, by employing the formulation “tigao guojia wenhua ruan 
shili” as the embodiment of a soft power national strategy, the Chinese leadership has also 
embraced the thesis according to which culture is the core of China’s soft power. The 
terminology officially used indeed proves to be representative of the manner in which the 
discourse on soft power is interpreted in the Chinese context, highlighting the guiding role of 
the CPC’s official discourse in determining the orientation towards which the theory and 
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practice of soft power have been evolving. In this sense, the question is raised as to weather or 
not, or to what extent, the choice of a specific formalized vocabulary bears witness to the type 
of strategies officially adopted to build and enhance China’s soft power. Ultimately, this 
terminological problem rests upon the addition of the word “wenhua” (culture) to the Chinese 
term predominantly used to translate “soft power”, “ruan shili”, as well as on the very 
interpretation of the concept of power. These observations are not accidental and hide a 
composite matrix of connotations that can only be understood in light of China’s internal and 
external dynamics that go along with its soft power. As well, the question here is also weather 
or not the Western interpretation of the Chinese discourse on soft power is somehow limited, or 
misguided, due to a lack of attention to the terminology used in Chinese.  
Having considered all these aspects, the part of this study which focuses on the evolution 
of the Chinese official discourse on soft power and current approaches to cultural soft power, 
including Chapters 6 and 7, reveals the main features constituting the nature of the Chinese 
cultural soft power theory and practice today. Chapter 6 will provide an answer to the following 
questions: Why did the expression “wenhua ruan shili” emerge in the Chinese context? What 
does the Chinese leadership say about China’s soft power? What role does the official jargon 
play in this discussion? How is the Chinese soft power theory turned into practice? Is China’s 
cultural soft power totally new and entirely different in comparison to the West’s soft power? 
How profound are their discrepancies, and are there any similarities? Chapter 7 will continue 
this examination, providing an answer to the following questions: how innovative is the Chinese 
discourse on cultural soft power today, and what phenomena does it reflect? And, what is “ruan 
shili”, really? Ultimately, an evaluation will be made as to weather or not it is possible to talk 
about “soft power with Chinese characteristics”, from a terminological, conceptual, and 
ideological point of view.  
This rather brief description has set some important parameters for the definition of the 
two main areas of enquiry within which this study develops, bringing to the surface research 
questions that will guide this exposition. What follows is a list of the topics discussed in 
Chapters 1-8:   
• Chapter 1: overview of aspects related to China’s rise in the 21st century; hard vs. soft 
power in the changing nature of power in world politics; establishment of the soft power 
theory as a theoretical frame for the investigation of the Chinese discourse on soft power; 
China’s cultural and ideological influence; culture as a frame for the investigation of 
China’s soft power; introduction of the main assumptions the study intends to prove; and 
description of operative methods and materials utilized.   
• Chapter 2: establishment of Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th National Congress of 
the CPC in October 2007 as the official debut of the concept of soft power in the Chinese 
political discourse; proposal and explanation of the research problem and its related 
assumptions; definition of the dynamics that revolve around culture as the core of China’s 
soft power as a “feedback circuit” and description of the comprehensive system 
surrounding it; and explanation of the thesis structure.  
• Chapter 3: based on the important keywords “wenhua” (culture) and “zonghe guoli” 
(CNP), drawn from Hu Jintao’s 2007 political report, establishment of a conceptual 
framework of reference in light of China’s strategic discourse; description of a variety of 
multilayered approaches that have emerged in the discourse around China’s soft power 
against the background of the country’s grand strategy; and description of a selection of 
domestic and foreign policy programs related to soft power.  
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• Chapter 4: introduction to some of the most relevant scholarly works that have discussed 
the topic of China’s soft power in the West and in China, including a selection of 
materials written in English by Chinese authors, in order to merge the two macro areas of 
analysis (Western discourse on Chinese soft power and Chinese discourse on soft power) 
and give shape to an international (discourse on Chinese soft power) and a local (Chinese 
discourse on soft power) perspective on the nature of China’s soft power; expansion of 
the study’s theoretical frame through further insights into Joseph S. Nye’s theory of soft 
power; presentation of the schools of thought characterizing the Chinese discourse on soft 
power, focusing in particular on the analyses provided by scholars that support the vision 
according to which the core of China’s soft power is culture, embraced also by the 
Chinese leadership; analysis of the lack of consensus on the meaning and connotations of 
cultural soft power and the disagreement that has arisen regarding the terminology to be 
employed in this field; detection of the need for a closer examination of the nature of the 
Chinese discourse on soft power and its jargon, in a way that detaches it from its Western 
counterpart and reveals important nuances of meaning; and data supporting the growing 
popularity, in China and abroad, of the topic of China’s soft power.  
• Chapter 5: detection of primordial seeds of soft power in China’s own past; influence of 
traditional values on China’s vision of itself and its relations with the outside world; and 
first stages of the penetration of the soft power discourse into Chinese academic and 
strategic circles in the period between 1990 and 2007.  
• Chapter 6: development of an official discourse on soft power in the context of 
contemporary China, in particular in the years between 1990 and 2007; evolution of the 
formulations “wenhua ruan shili” (cultural soft power) and “tigao guojia wenhua ruan 
shili” (enhance the country’s cultural soft power), officially enunciated in the course of 
the 17th National Congress of the CPC in 2007, analyzed from different angles and 
highlighting the guiding role of the CPC’s official discourse; formalization of a national 
strategy for the enhancement of the country’s cultural soft power identified as the 
Chinese leadership’s response to the need of defining a soft power theory, and practice, 
more suitable to the Chinese context; and more recent developments of the theory and 
practice of cultural soft power in China in the years between 2007 and 2012. Other topics 
explored include: the relationship between the Chinese academic discourse on soft power 
and its official counterpart; the function of political formulations in the context of 
Chinese soft power discourse; historical vicissitudes in the CPC’s approach to the concept 
of soft power; the popularization of the concepts of “wenhua ruan shili” and “tigao 
guojia wenhua ruan shili” nationwide and the formation of a collective project for the 
enhancement of China’s cultural soft power; and the practice of soft power through the 
implementation of cultural policies.  
• Chapter 7: approaches to cultural soft power between 2012 and 2015, including 
developments in the theory behind and practice of cultural policies, views on cultural soft 
power in the Xi Jinping era, and terminological analyses. Supported by recent Chinese 
scholarly writings, media commentaries, and terminological examinations of the term 
“ruan shili” and other related expressions, the question as to weather or not it is possible 
to talk about “soft power with Chinese characteristics” is tackled.  
• Chapter 8: display of the most peculiar characteristics of the practice of China’s cultural 
soft power through the analysis of the case study of language standardization and 
promotion. This chapter includes a critical analysis of the “Outline of the National 
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Medium-to-long-term Plan for the Reform and Development of the Cause of Chinese 
Language and Characters” (Guojia Zhong Changqi Yuyan Wenzi Shiye Gaige he Fazhan 
Guihua Gangyao ġŶ&҆ɱГ϶ɇŝ: ȸүĎëƎϱ±·ϭ) for the period 2012-
2020 and a selection of contents drawn from the report entitled Zhongguo Yuyan 
Shenghuo Zhuangkuang Baogao 2013 &ġГ϶̛ː̈¦ȏĈ  2013 (Language 
Situation in China: 2013), which was obtained in the course of a research trip to the PRC 
undertaken by the present author in April 2014, in which the aforementioned document 
can be found.   
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3. A conceptual framework: soft power in China’s strategic discourse 
 
 
In the first chapter, a few pages were dedicated to providing a brief summary of the most 
important constituents of the soft power theory as originated by Joseph S. Nye over two decades 
ago. This chapter will delineate the scope of analysis within which the debate on China’s soft 
power develops, providing a conceptual framework of reference for the examination of a 
number of closely-related aspects that illustrate the relevance of Nye’s conceptualization as part 
of China’s grand strategy. The question as to why it is relevant to discuss soft power in relation 
to the Chinese context will thus find an answer through the analysis of soft power in light of 
China’s strategic discourse. Performing this task, the relevance of the concept of soft power 
within China’s grand strategy, which, as will be demonstrated, unfolds through domestic and 
foreign policies, will emerge, explaining the ways in which China’s soft power is debated by 
international and domestic audiences and allowing for an investigation of the interconnection 
between domestic and international dynamics in the way it is wielded. Drawing upon an 
examination of the domestic and international role of culture in China’s strategic discourse as 
the “two sides of the same coin” and an explanation of the important concept of “zonghe guoli” 
(CNP), the versatility of soft power as a means to achieve the multiple goals of China’s grand 
strategy will be discussed in terms of a variety of approaches that emerge in the analysis of 
China’s use of soft power resources.  
 
 
3.1 Culture and CNP 
 
As a matter of fact, even though at the time when the concept was popularized in the 
West, China’s soft power remained “the farthest thing on the minds of the Chinese policy elites 
or foreign observers”, now things have changed, and soft power is considered “an arena they 
[the Chinese elites] too must and can win” (Deng Yong 2009, pp. 63-64). In October 2007, Hu 
Jintao brought the public’s attention to the enhancement of culture as part of China’s soft power 
in relation to its importance in consolidating national cohesion and cultural creativity, as it 
enriches the country’s intellectual and ideological foundations, and in terms of the role it plays 
in the international competition in overall national strength. More specifically, drawing upon Hu 
Jintao’s words (Xinhua She 2007), the “competition in overall national strength” (zonghe guoli 
jingzheng  ΚûġÀͤ9) calls for making culture more effective as part of China’s soft power 
toolkit. As previously described, culture is included among soft power resources and in this 
sense it can be considered as “the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society” 
(Nye 2004, p. 11)26. Hu Jintao’s reference to “national cohesion” is another element mentioned 
by Nye (1990b, p. 164) among the intangible forms of power, together with universalistic 
culture and international institutions, that are gaining significance following the changes that 
have occurred in international politics. Thus, it can be implied that a cultural upgrade can lead 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 As will be discussed in greater detail in the following pages, culture can be defined in a variety of ways according 
to the point of view of the observer. In the context of culture as a power resource, Joseph S. Nye elaborates on its 
definition in a successive volume: “‘Culture’ is the pattern of social behaviors by which groups transmit knowledge 
and values, and it exists at multiple levels” (Nye 2011a, p. 84). With this definition Nye refers to “human culture”, 
the aspects of which can be universal, national, or particular to social classes or small groups (Ibid.).  
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to an increase in national cohesion and this, in turn, strengthens soft power. It is therefore no 
surprise that in Hu Jintao’s speech domestic and foreign objectives become entangled with one 
another, and soft power is discussed in relation to concepts such as those of “wenhua” (culture) 
and “zonghe guoli” (CNP). Following the method of selecting relevant “keywords” or 
“watchwords” introduced in the previous chapter, the strategic discourse on China’s soft power 
will thus be introduced through the lenses of the aforementioned terms, facilitating the 
establishment of a framework of reference for the present analysis.  
Starting from culture, authors committed to the study of soft power usually take their lead 
from some of its most prominent definitions provided in the field of sociology or anthropology. 
Li Mingjiang (2009a, p. 7), for instance, refers to Neil J. Smelser defining culture as “the beliefs, 
values, and expressive symbols (including art and literature) that any group (including a whole 
society) holds in common, and which serve as ways of organizing experience and guiding the 
behavior of the members of that group”. In this view, culture is certainly a potential source of 
soft power (Ibid.). Ding Sheng (2008, p. 59) refers to Edward B. Tylor writing that “culture or 
civilization, defined in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by 
man as a member of society”. Noteworthy, and more recent, is also the definition contained in 
the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, adopted in 2001, which reaffirms 
that “culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and 
emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and 
literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs” (UNESCO 
2002, p. 62). Zhu Majie (2002a, p. 23) reports the definition provided by American 
anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn writing that culture is “a history-created system of survival 
types, dominant or recessive, having tendencies shared by the whole group or by some 
particular part in a certain period of time”. The author also states that according to other 
scholars the fundamental attribute of culture is human creativity: “creation by men and all that 
men have created” (Ibid.). A complete definition of culture is provided as follows:  
 
All in all, in its broad sense, culture refers to the sum of the material and spiritual wealth that has been 
created in the historical practice of human society. In its narrow sense, culture is the social ideology 
and its corresponding systems and organizations, including viewpoints and ideas of politics, law, 
ethics, arts, religion, science and compatible systems. In no dimension should culture be perceived as 
static; culture is a dynamic process.  
(Ibid., pp. 23-24) 
 
Zhu Majie also differentiate culture from civilization by stating that the latter comprises 
the former, being “the product of culture developed to a higher level” (Ibid., p. 24).  
Attention must also be paid to the influence of culture on the structure of international 
relations. Zhu Majie (2002a, pp. 26-28) identifies five models by which culture influences 
international relations: 1) “the broad determinant impact” culture has on the achievements of the 
state, which means that no results can be obtained if the cultural factor is disregarded, as it is 
culture that provides human life with spiritual, ethical, and economic bases; 2) culture as “the 
navigator in making decisions”, which means that leaders are guided by cultural concepts in 
their evaluation of policy issues; 3) culture as “the designer of social and economic structures”, 
which means that culture provides the blueprint for social and economic institutions; 4) culture 
as “an important variable in international relations”, which refers to the perception of culture as 
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the “dominant framework of international relations, the primary base of the national behavior, 
and the main source of international conflicts”27; and 5) the notion that a pivotal foundation for 
harmony in international relations is provided by the “commonality and complementarity of 
cultures”, which means that culture can be regarded as the “booster of international relations”.  
In this sense, it can be argued that culture also has a role as a means to achieve strategic 
goals. A more in-depth analysis of the relation between culture as a domestic strength and its 
extension as a source of soft power can help shed light on the complexity of this issue. In Hu 
Jintao’s speech, the desired strategic goals are considered in relation to both China’s domestic 
needs and the country’s position in the international arena. As a source of national cohesion and 
creativity, culture responds to the spiritual and intellectual needs of the Chinese people, while 
simultaneously increasing China’s competitiveness in the world. Here, the values attached to 
culture in terms of the results it can achieve appear to be, to use an analogy, “two sides of the 
same coin”. On the one hand, it can be argued that, according to the leadership’s view, the ways 
in which culture can be upgraded as a source of the country’s soft power, which include 
promoting advanced socialist culture, building a system of socialist core values, cultivating 
civilized practices, spreading the knowledge of traditional culture, developing the country’s 
cultural industry, and improving the people’s cultural and spiritual life, to name just a few, will 
lay the basis upon which to bring about the prosperity of Chinese culture, which will 
accompany the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Chinese people will be able to enjoy a 
renewed spiritual home, an effect in line with Hu Jintao’s emphasis on culture as an 
increasingly important source of national cohesion. Political leader Liu Yunshan also makes this 
clear in a statement in which he urges people to regard culture from a new perspective and 
theoretical point of view based on the emergence of new circumstances and tasks: culture is not 
only an “important method to push social development” (tuidong shehui fazhan de zhongyao 
shouduan ȧÅ͍`ëƎ̪义ϭǾʭ), but also an “important objective of the progress of 
civilization” (wenmin jinbu de zhongyao mubiao ɇə严ʨ̪义ϭ̲ʋ); it is not only a 
“spiritual bond that aggregates the will of the people” (ningju renxin de jingshen niudai ©ήI
ǘ̪ͷ͐Ίƥ), but it also “concerns the people’s welfare and happiness” (guanxi minsheng 
xinfu ͹ʴ̛Ƭ͒); it not only “offers an increasingly bigger direct contribution to economic 
growth” (dui jingji zengzhang de zhijie gongxian yuelaiyue da żΏ˒ķ̪̳҆ȥФ̌万ɼ万
ń), but its “role in upgrading the quality of economic development is becoming more 
prominent on a daily basis” (dui tisheng jingji fazhan zhiliang de zuoyong riyi tuchu żȪÒΏ
˒ëƎЧ之̪m̜ɕ̮͡«) (Xinhua Wang 2010b). Culture provides the people with a 
“spiritual bond” which makes what is described here an identity and culture-building endeavor 
at the national level, primarily responding to domestic needs. As stated by Edney (2012, p. 912), 
maintaining political stability and national unity is a matter of utmost importance in the Chinese 
political system, and the Chinese leadership pursues cohesion within society, as well as between 
society and the CPC. As argued by Cao Qing (2011, p. 12), even though China’s soft power can 
be considered to be directed both internally and externally, its focus is mainly on domestic 
priorities and practices, utilized in order to develop soft power resources. Building China’s soft 
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27 As stated by Zhu Majie (2002a, p. 27), this is the point of view expressed in Samuel Huntington’s article “The 
Clash of Civilizations?” (1993).   
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power falls within the boundaries of national culture-building, while its external dimension can 
be considered to be the natural extension of China’s cultural rejuvenation (Ibid.).  
Before analyzing the outward-looking side of culture, it is interesting to note that the 
process of culture-building described above happens on the backdrop of China’s rapid 
modernization. Aukia (2014, p. 72), for instance, argues that in the Chinese discourse cultural 
soft power addresses the challenges that come with modernization by placing emphasis on 
cultural safety28. According to another point of view, the Chinese leadership is searching for “a 
Chinese road to modernity” and, in doing so, it is merging two different value systems: the first 
is represented by Marxist socialism and envisioned as a means to maintain continuity with 
China’s political past and the Party’s legitimacy; the second hinges on traditional culture, 
“where China’s true strengths and enduring values lie” (Cao Qing 2011, p. 12). In either of the 
two interpretations, internal socio-political stability seems to be the fil rouge underlying the 
discourse on cultural soft power.  
On the other hand, improving China’s cultural environment also has an external reflection. 
As increasing the country’s soft power means acting on the inside in the first place, as reported 
by an article published on the webpage Renmin Wang with the title “Huanqiu Shibao Guoji 
Luntan: tigao ruan shili, zhongdian zai guonei  ̑̕ɗȏġ书ЇĭȪ亚且ůÀ义˸Ĩġ
” (Global Times International Forum: the key to enhance soft power lies within the country) 
(Zhou Qing’an 2007), a cultural upgrade of the kind described above will in turn increase the 
appeal of Chinese culture worldwide and China’s overall soft power, helping the country 
achieve a better position in the international arena. This view is similar to the idea expressed by 
Zheng Biao in a passage in which the author describes the relationship between the internal and 
external dimensions of Chinese soft power:  
 
&ġ且ůÀɞU&Ôʴɑ̪ɇÌĎZϰ)ĳ̪͆互ɞżνр̜À̪ż̪ϧ̒)ů
̒̒SÌů̒&ÔĿa ǽmÆÀ żŁ̪ɎҮѭɞ½ǱËϪ̪ɞϧ么œ	
I)ė̪ɞќʸĎН̢̪ɭ&ġɇÌ̪ġ书ǍđÀ3ɞ&ġɇÌĎZϰ̪ġ书ϧ
̒
 
(Zheng Biao 2010, p. 114) 
 
 
China’s soft power is based on the culture and system of values of the Chinese people, it means 
exerting oneself in the first place, internally it is reflected in the achievement of modernization and the 
efforts made to actualize the great undertaking of China’s rejuvenation; the external aspect is not 
deliberately packaged, [it is similar to when] the external appearance and inner thoughts coincide and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 This is the concept of “national cultural security” (minzu wenhua anquan ʴɑɇÌŨ or guojia wenhua anquan 
ġŶɇÌŨ), or simply “cultural security” (wenhua anquan ɇÌŨ), on which Aukia (2014) elaborates. The 
author suggests that, in China, soft power has become a key practice to deal with international image problems and 
domestic “cultural anaemia” and conceptualizes the notion of cultural soft power within the framework of the 
Chinese discourse on security and, in particular, against the perceived cultural threat from the West (Ibid., p. 87). In 
this sense the “theory of national cultural security” (guojia wenhua anquan lun ġŶɇÌŨЇ) can be envisioned 
as China’s strategy to respond to the challenges posed by globalization and, as such, it belongs to the national 
security system and its analysis is based on the concepts of “national cultural interests” (guojia wenhua liyi ġŶɇÌ
¹̮) and “national cultural sovereignty” (guojia wenhua zhuquan ġŶɇÌ*ɸ), as expounded upon by Han Yuan 
ұǳ et al. (2013, pp. 22-37).   
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one is at the service of others, it is a search for a harmonious world; having the influence of Chinese 
culture internationally, is also an international manifestation of Chinese culture and system of values.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
The external dimension of China’s soft power, namely China’s international influence, is 
represented here almost as a direct reflection of a domestic process. Edney (2012, p. 913) 
analyzes this notion in the field of propaganda, but comes to a similar conclusion when he states 
that making the Chinese nation more cohesive goes hand-in-hand with making China more 
attractive worldwide. Thus, it can be implied that looking at the same dynamic from an opposite 
perspective conversely highlights how a conscious effort to increase China’s soft power will 
necessarily affect China’s domestic reality, requiring efforts to work on the country’s cultural 
strength. This, in turn, will generate a betterment of the cultural and spiritual life of the citizens 
and the development of the cultural industry. These are the synergies that were described in the 
previous chapter as a “feedback circuit” and examples of which can also be found in the media. 
For instance, as stated by an editorial published on the website Renmin Wang, the only way to 
“stand straight within the world’s forest of nations” (yili yu shijie minzu zhi lin Ƒ͢<̢ʴ
ɑ0ʂ) is to have a strong “culture that can actively guide the way” (wenhua de jiji yinlingɇ
Ì̪͚ɿǂҺ), make use of “the enormous richness of the people’s spiritual world” (renmin 
jingshen shijie de jida fengfu Iʴͷ͐̢̪ɿń'ź), and “fully bring the spiritual strength 
of the whole nation into play” (quan minzu jingshen liliang de chongfen fahui ʴɑͷ͐À之
̪®ëȝ) (Renmin Wang 2011). Similarly, Zhou Qing’an (2007) points out that “image 
packaging and communication tactics are the outer shell of soft power” (xingxiang baozhuang 
yu chuanbo celüe shi ruan shili de waike 《СËϪbȲ̤ͭɞ且ůÀ̪Łļ) and therefore 
their importance cannot be denied. Yet, the outer shell and the inner kernel must correspond and 
improve each other because “if the kernel is tired and feeble the packaging will have to be thick 
and the world may lose confidence in the country’s soft power” (ruguo neihe piruan, 
baozhuang zuoda, name hui rang shijie dui yi ge guojia de ruan shili shiqu xinren œʃʐ̦
且ËϪńѭ.`Ё̢ż%ġŶ̪且ůÀŊä|[) (Ibid.). 
On balance, Hu Jintao’s directive at the 17th National Congress can be interpreted as 
giving culture the important function of achieving strategic goals. Suggesting that the country 
“enhance” or “increase” (tigao) the role of culture as part of its soft power (Xinhua She 2007), 
Hu Jintao’s words can be interpreted as a call to do more in terms of actions that must be taken 
to upgrade the strategic objectives culture can achieve. Building a better cultural and moral 
system can help the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation at home but also be conducive to 
an increase in the country’s international competitiveness. In this regard, it is advisable to 
further examine the meaning of the concept of “zonghe guoli”, as it acquires specific relevance 
in the discourse on China’s national strategy.  
Together with the concept of soft power, although in different realities, the concept of 
“zonghe guoli” also gained the spotlight in the course of the 1990s. According to Cho and Jeong 
(2008, p. 457), CNP emerged in the Chinese context in a period when intellectuals were trying 
to define a new national strategy that could lead to China becoming a global power. More 
specifically, as demonstrated by Pillsbury (2000, p. 207), although the concept of CNP finds its 
antecedents in the philosophy of China’s ancient strategists and has ancient cultural roots, the 
phrase “comprehensive national power” did not exist until the 1980s. CNP was developed in 
China as a unique scientific method by which to make strategic assessments of the future 
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security environment: Chinese analysts postulated that, by measuring and comparing CNP, it 
would be possible to predict power relations among nations (Ibid., p. 203). With military 
strength no longer being the main determinant of a nation’s power, in a period in which the 
world was moving towards multipolarity after the end of the Cold War, the competition for 
power and influence in the world was seen as increasingly involving elements such as 
economics, science, and technology, making an evaluation of a country’s current and future 
strength dependent on the inclusion of a larger number of factors (Ibid.). Territory, natural 
resources, military force, economic power, social conditions, domestic government, foreign 
policy, and international influence are all part of CNP, defined as “the combined overall 
conditions and strengths of a country in numerous areas” (Ibid.).  
Another definition of CNP is provided by Hu Angang and Men Honghua (2004, p. 2), 
who argue that CNP is the sum total of the power or strengths of a country’s economy, military, 
science and technology, education, natural resources, and overall influence. The authors further 
explain that “CNP may be simply defined as the comprehensive capabilities of a country to 
pursue its strategic objectives by taking actions internationally and the core factors to the 
concept are strategic resources, strategic capabilities and strategic outcomes, with the strategic 
resources as the material base” (Ibid., p. 3). Defining national strategic resources as “real and 
potential key resources available in realizing the strategic outcomes of a country”, Hu Angang 
and Men Honghua use eight categories of national strategic resources (economic resources, 
human capital, natural resources, capital resources, knowledge and technology resources, 
government resources, military resources, and international resources), with 23 indicators, in 
order to produce a calculation of CNP as a weighted index (Ibid., pp. 3-16). The authors also 
refer to the definition of CNP provided in 1999 by Huang Shuofeng ӓ͇于, one of the main 
proponents of the concept, and state as follows: “More abstractly, it [CNP] refers to the 
combination of all the powers possessed by a country for the survival and development of a 
sovereign state, including material and ideational ethos, and international influence as well” 
(cited in Hu Angang and Men Honghua 2004, p. 2).  
To explain the meaning of CNP, many authors (among others, Pillsbury 2000; Zhu Majie 
2002b; Hu Angang and Men Honghua 2004; Cho and Jeong 2008; Liu Deding 2013) refer to 
the pioneering works by Huang Shuofeng. In his book written in 1992, Zonghe Guoli Lun Κû
ġÀЇ (On Comprehensive National Power), Huang Shuofeng describes the constituents of 
CNP by dividing them into two main types and seven key elements: the two types are “material 
power” (wuzhi li ̆ЧÀ) and “spiritual power” (jingshen li ͷ͐À), while the seven elements 
are: “natural resources power” (ziyuan li Э˪À), “economic power” (jingji li Ώ˒À), 
“science and technology power” (keji li ͗ȈÀ), “national defense power” (guofang li ġ乡À), 
“political power” (zhengzhi li Ȼ）À), “cultural and educational power” (wenjiao li ɇɁÀ), 
and “diplomatic power” (waijiao li ŁCÀ) (cited in Liu Deding 2013, p. 38). The first four 
elements take the form of hard power (ying guoli ͈ġÀ), while the other three take the form of 
soft power (ruan guoli 且ġÀ) (Ibid.). Zhu Majie (2002b, p. 42) also refers to the view 
expressed by Huang Shuofeng in his On Comprehensive National Power and defines CNP as “a 
nation’s whole power and international influence including both the material and mental 
[spiritual] power a nation has for survival and development”. Moreover, according to Cho and 
Jeong (2008, p. 457), Huang Shuofeng’s explanation proposed in 1999 also included the 
category of “coordinating power” (political structures, government leadership, organizational 
decision-making power, management capabilities, and reform coordination capabilities).  
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In particular, regarding the relation between CNP and soft power, according to Zhu Majie 
(2002b, p. 41), CNP “includes hard power, soft power, and their influence on international 
relations” and, within this interaction, soft power is an important part. Made up of political, 
cultural and educational, diplomatic, and synergic powers, soft power can be equaled to mental 
power and it comprises soft elements, such as psychology and intelligence, which give tangible 
shape to the role of hard power (Ibid., p. 42). The combination of quantitative indexes by which 
to measure a nation’s power proposed in CNP assessments already contained elements related 
to soft power. Analysts, however, began to systematically consider soft power as an abstract 
CNP rubric in the early 2000s (Wuthnow 2008, pp. 5-6). In fact, according to Li Jie ɹɾ (2007, 
p. 19), in today’s world, competition among countries on the international stage takes place in a 
comprehensive manner, not only through hard power resources, such as economic growth and 
military strength, but also through soft power resources, such as culture and ideology. For this 
reason, in recent years, countries have been attaching more and more importance to the role 
played by soft power in the construction of CNP (Ibid.). As a consequence of the fact that 
globalization has facilitated the rapid exchange of information among countries, which today 
are capable of rapidly comparing and understanding each other’s values (jiazhi guannian), 
national spirit (minzu jingshen ʴɑͷ͐), national qualities (minzu sushi ʴɑͺЧ), and 
overall situation (zonghe qingkuang ΚûǮ¦), the conditions for soft power to exercise a 
positive effect have reached an unprecedented advantageous stage (Ibid.). This is why the status 
and influence of soft power as part of CNP is rising, soft power is increasingly becoming an 
important form of international competition, and reinforcing soft power construction is 
becoming a strategic choice for many countries (Ibid.). 
Charts such as the one published on the website Xinwen Zhongxin ɍҋ&ǘ (Sina) in 
2009 confirm that the competition in CNP to which Hu Jintao refers in his 2007 speech has 
been taking place for quite some time. The article reports that, according to the predictions for 
2010 issued by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China ranked seventh in the 
competition for CNP, with its military capacity being second only to that of the United States 
(Xinwen Zhongxin 2009). According to Guo Linxia ġʂҨ (2007, p. 39), in order to increase 
China’s CNP, the development of soft power cannot depart from the support of hard power: it is 
indeed necessary to develop soft power and hard power simultaneously, striking “a balance 
between soft and hard” (ruan ying pingheng 且͈ƩϦ). As is argued by Liu Deding (2013, p. 
1), the analysis of China’s soft power acquires significance specifically in relation to the 
enhancement of the country’s CNP, together with many other factors, such as: “advancing the 
construction of socialist culture with Chinese characteristics” (tuijin Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi 
wenhua jianshe ȧ严&ġ̇υ͍`*/ɇÌƾЈ), “responding to the assault from Western 
culture” (yingdui Xifang wenhua chongji ƳżϬɎɇÌ¤¬), and “protecting national security” 
(weihu guojia anquan ΗȎġŶŨ). The description of the interaction between hard and soft 
power in relation to CNP provided by the author can further shed light on the relationship 
between soft power and CNP:  following the process of reform and opening-up, the 
development of China’s hard power has been fast, whereas that of soft power has lagged behind; 
but hard and soft power are “the two wheels sustaining a country’s overall strength” (chengzai 
guojia zonghe guoli de liang ge chelun ȇхġŶΚûġÀ̪#%丑专) and therefore, the 
author affirms, “it is only through a more evenly coordinated development of hard and soft 
power that CNP can develop in a sustained, healthy, and rapid way” (zhiyou ying shili he ruan 
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shili xietiao fazhan, zonghe guoli cai you keneng huode chixujiankangkuaisu de fazhang ñ
ɭ͈ůÀĎ且ůÀÕКëƎΚûġÀǿɭôηϖǖȚΖ	ƻ	ǞѤ̪ëƎ) (Ibid., p. 
1).  
 
 
3.2 Soft power as a versatile means to achieve multiple goals 
 
Based on the observations made in the previous section, it can be assumed that hard 
power resources alone are no longer sufficient to ensure a win in the international competition 
among countries. Examining soft power development as a key component of China’s grand 
strategy, Wuthnow (2008, pp. 5-7) argues that soft power has emerged as an interesting topic in 
Chinese strategic discourse precisely because hard power resources have not been found 
sufficient for China to achieve long-term strategic objectives and gain the status of a global 
power. For a country, this condition can in fact be reached only on the basis of the coexistence 
of hard and soft power capabilities, with soft power acquiring the utmost importance (Ibid.). 
Evidence of this is provided also by Li Mingjiang (2009b, pp. 30-31), who presents soft power 
as “an indicator of world status”. By stating that, in order to detain the status of a great power, a 
country needs to have both hard power and soft power, as becoming a cultural center is an 
important prerequisite to be acknowledged as a major power by the international society, the 
author argues that its construction in China is envisioned by many as an urgent “development 
strategy” (Ibid.).  
Yet, in China soft power is still considered “a weak link” in the country’s comprehensive 
power (Li Mingjiang 2009b, pp. 28-30). With economic, technological, and military capabilities 
having experienced a dramatic increase, the relation between China’s hard and soft power 
appears to be imbalanced due to the slow development of the softer of its components (Ibid., p. 
31.). A survey carried out by the Pew Research Center in 2013 revealed some interesting data 
concerning the global perception of China and its soft power. According to the survey, in 2013 
the United States’ global image remained more positive than China’s, regardless of the 
widespread belief that China was becoming the world’s leading power (Pew Research Center 
2013, p. 1). Despite China’s increasing power, the ratings for the country could not be 
considered more positive, as a median of 63% across the nations surveyed expressed a favorable 
opinion for the United States, compared with 50% for China (Ibid.). The military power of both 
countries was perceived by many as a source of worry, while China’s economic might was 
thought to be causing a power shift which would soon make China the leading superpower 
(Ibid.). Moreover, China’s favorability among the countries surveyed between 2007 and 2013 
seemed to have remained largely unchanged, though recording a sharp decline after 2011 in the 
United States, Britain, and France (Ibid., pp. 24-25). What China is still lacking, according to 
the survey, is precisely soft power, which was evaluated as “limited”: in Africa and Latin 
America, the areas on which the survey focused, science and technology were the most popular 
form of Chinese soft power, while the spread of China’s ideas, customs, and cultural products 
was mostly disliked (Ibid., p. 27)29 . The Chinese ways of doing business were mostly 
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29 The 2013 survey focused on China’s perception in countries in Africa and Latin America. However, Pew’s 2014 
survey found that China’s human rights record is still a relatively weak point for China’s global image (Pew Research 
Center 2014, p. 26). Territorial disputes in Asia are another critical point that raises concerns, especially among 
China’s closest neighbors (Pew Research Center 2013, 2014).  
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appreciated among Africans (Ibid.). Despite a slight improvement of China’s global image in 
the last few months30, the ranking issued recently by The Soft Power 30, a classification of 
global soft power, surprisingly places China in the last position in the list, which is led by the 
United Kingdom (The Soft Power 30 2015, p. 25 and pp. 27-28). In particular, the report 
highlights a number of critical issues, such as the imprisonment of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu 
Xiaobo³ɡˉ31, the arrests of artist Ai Weiwei ψɳɳ32, the issues around minority and 
individual rights, censorship and lack of free press, aversion to political criticism, and weak use 
of social media, especially by the government, that may have harmed China’s soft power 
despite the investments made by the country to boost the efficiency of soft power resources 
(Ibid., p. 28). In addition to this, the survey reveals weakness in confidence that China will 
show correct behavior in international affairs (Ibid.).  
In line with the preceding discussion, Li Mingjiang (2009b, p. 29) highlights some of the 
aspects that are felt as weaknesses in Chinese soft power, starting from “drawbacks in domestic 
institutions, weakness in research, its [China’s] low level of education, the not-so-good national 
image, and the decline of national identity and social cohesion”. Based on the author’s analysis, 
Chinese scholars still argue about the potential of China’s development model and Beijing 
Consensus to become a fruitful source of soft power, but others are more optimistic and focus 
on China’s cultural power, language power, and intellectual power as means that can boost the 
country’s potential (Ibid.). As a matter of fact, Western and Chinese scholars alike are still 
debating over the inclusion of the Beijing Consensus among the sources of China’s soft power. 
The global financial crisis seems to have boosted the success of this alternative path of 
development (Kennedy 2010, p. 462) and China has begun to show an increasingly higher level 
of self-confidence in promoting the appeal of its own political and economic model, that is the 
Beijing Consensus (Zhang Baohui 2010, p. 59). In this sense, the Chinese view of soft power 
appears to be divided into two ways: soft power as the attractiveness of one country’s ideology, 
political system, and culture (also including the appeal of the model of development); and soft 
power also comprising economic and diplomatic influence (Zhang Baohui 2010, p. 58). As will 
be further described, this is also the case for the Western perspective on Chinese soft power. 
Depending on its potency, the international resonance achieved by the Beijing Consensus could 
very possibly become a challenge to the Washington Consensus and an indication of the 
expansion of China’s soft power (Kennedy 2010, p. 467). As well, there is still a lack of 
agreement about what the Beijing Consensus actually means (Peerenboom 2007, p. 6). Scholars 
insert it into the larger view that sees China as a “paradigm for developing states”, which is 
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30 According to the latest survey by the Pew Research Center (2015, p. 29), in the past year there has been a slight 
increase in ratings for China across the 35 countries surveyed in both 2014 and 2015: in 2014, a median of 49% had a 
positive view of China, but in 2015 it is 54%. Negative views have also dropped from 38% to 34% (Ibid.). 
Commentators have attributed this improvement in China’s global image to President Xi Jinping’s intent to project 
China as a rejuvenated nation capable of wielding greater cultural and economic influence, for example through the 
activities of the Confucius Institutes and efforts such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Chen Te-Ping 
2015).  
31 Liu Xiaobo is a Chinese human rights defender sentenced to 11 years in prison after many incidents related to his 
dissident writing and peaceful protest activities. Initially detained in 2008 because of his participation in authoring 
Charter ‘08, a manifesto advocating for democratic and human rights reform in China, he was charged in 2009 and 
prevented from participating in the ceremony awarding him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, a decision that sparked as 
much fury in China as did his absence at the ceremony in the international community (Cain 2015). 
32 Ai Weiwei is a Chinese artist who has been challenging the PRC government with his practice of dissent, believing 
that it is his duty and responsibility as an artist (Ai Weiwei and En Liang Khong 2014).  
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based on six pillars: 1) the approach to reform adopted by the PRC government is pragmatic and 
faces reform with a gradual pace; 2) the State’s intervention in economy is strong; 3) economic 
reforms have had priority over democratization; 4) China has challenged the alleged universal 
consensus on human rights; 5) China may be able to provide a normative alternative that is able 
to succeed where democracy and liberalism have failed; and 6) developing countries are 
attracted to China’s foreign policy insofar as it attaches importance to sovereignty, self-
determination, and mutual respect (Ibid., pp. 4-8). The first two pillars constitute the economic 
core of the Beijing Consensus, which, apart from approaching reforms pragmatically, largely 
involving the State’s intervention in economy and maintenance of equitable growth, also refers 
to market reforms without democracy, self-determination, and the rejection of the Washington 
Consensus (Ibid., pp. 5-7)33. 
As has been mentioned above, observers have linked the concept of soft power to China’s 
strategic discourse, placing it within the boundaries of China’s grand strategy. A very 
interesting description of China’s grand strategy (Zhongguo da zhanlüe &ġńǻ̤ ) is 
provided in a volume by well-known Chinese scholar Men Honghua, Goujian Zhongguo Da 
Zhanlüe de Kuangjia: Guojia Shili Zhanlüe Guannian yu Guoji Zhidu ʀƾ&ġńǻ̤̪ʖ
ʅġŶůÀ	ǻ̤ϰǟ<ġ书¼Ƹ (China’s Grand Strategy: A Framework Analysis), and 
more specifically in the preface written by Hu Angang ζҰѾ, who states that it is a strategy 
that aims to “enrich the people and reinforce the country” (fumin qiangguoźʴǆġ) with the 
basic target, to be reached within the following 20 years, of making China the biggest economic 
entity in the world, reducing the gap in CNP it has with the United States, improving the living 
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33 Ramo’s concept, introduced in Section 1.2, has received rather strong criticism in the academic community. In 
particular, Kennedy (2010) describes the problems contained in Ramo’s analysis in great detail. In his words: 
“Ramo’s Beijing Consensus is a misguided and inaccurate summary of China’s actual reform experience. It not only 
gets the empirical facts wrong about China, it also disregards the similarities and differences China’s experience 
shares with other countries, and it distorts China’s place in international politics” (Kennedy 2010, p. 462). The author 
also discusses the “China Model” (Zhongguo moshi &ġʞǁ) as a potentially more suitable framework for the 
description of China’s development experience (Ibid., pp. 473-475). According to Cho and Jeong (2008, pp. 461-466), 
Ramo’s concept does not offer anything new to the analysis of China’s development as it appears to be a summary of 
the strategy officially put forward by PRC policy elites. Moreover, in terms of soft power, the concept of Beijing 
Consensus can be seen as generating two different responses: on the one hand, advocating for the propagation of 
China’s development model to other countries, it may fuel the “China threat theory”, while, on the other hand, it is a 
sign of China’s rising soft power insomuch as it appeals to those developing countries which welcome the idea of 
maintaining an authoritarian political system while boosting economic growth (Ibid.). The spread of the “Beijing 
Consensus” label grants China’s development model international recognition, also in terms of political system and 
social structure, and highlights the uniqueness of China’s experience; for this reason, the concept is embraced by 
Chinese analysts, even if it is the foreign academia and media to have initially disseminated it, which is in itself a 
sign of soft power (Ibid.). Zhang Weiwei (2006), according to whom the Chinese model includes several key features, 
such as the relevance of meeting the needs of the people, constant experimentation, gradual reform, a developmental 
state, selective learning, and correct sequencing and distinguishing priorities, talks about its merits as follows: “Over 
the past 25 years, I’ve traveled to more than 100 countries, most of them developing countries, including 18 in Africa. 
I have concluded that in terms of eradicating poverty and helping the poor and the marginalized, the Chinese model, 
however imperfect, has worked far more effectively than what can be called the American model […]. At the end of 
the day, what matters most is finding the best ways to tackle the many challenges facing mankind. The Chinese 
model, however imperfect, has enriched the world’s political discourse and wisdom and hence expanded the policy 
options”. 
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standards of the people, and completing the establishment of a “moderately prosperous society” 
(xiaokang shehui)!(Hu Angang 2005, p. 2). This system of objectives can be reduced to four 
main targets: “zengzhang, qiangguo, fumin, tigao guoji jingzhengli ķ҆	ǆġ	źʴ	Ȫ亚
ġ书ͤ9À”, which can be translated as “growing, reinforcing the country, enriching the 
people, and enhancing international competitiveness” (Ibid.). The first target is related to 
China’s economic prowess and foresees a future in which China will be “the biggest economic 
entity in the world” (shijie zuida de jingji shiti̢ɫń̪Ώ˒ůi); the second target is 
based on China’s CNP and foresees a global order in which China “possesses leading 
capabilities as one of the world’s great powers” (juyou zhudao nengli de shijie qiangguoɭ*
ŽηÀ̪̢ǆġ); the third goal is domestic in nature as it foresees the development of a 
“moderately prosperous society characterized by common prosperity for everyone” (gongtong 
fuyu de xiaokang shehui —źϫ̪Ƃƻ͍`); the fourth goal is for China to reach the front 
row in the global race for competitiveness of its products, enterprises, and industries, as well as 
in regard to finance, basic infrastructure, science and technology, education, and other aspects 
(Ibid., pp. 2-3).  
Linking soft power to China’s strategic objectives, Deng Yong (2009, p. 64) defines it as 
an integral part of China’s strategy by stating that, in China, soft power means “the ability to 
influence others in world politics with the goal of achieving great power status without sparking 
fully fledged traditional power politics of hostile balancing or war”. Wuthnow (2008, pp. 7-12) 
states that, in relation to China’s strategic objectives, soft power is envisioned as a useful tool to 
promote a positive external environment instrumental to the country’s rise. Three non-coercive 
strategies through which soft power resources are believed to serve China’s grand strategy have 
been identified: first, the transmission of traditional culture, along with the cultivation of foreign 
elites, through activities such as those promoted by the Confucius Institutes; second, China’s 
wish to expand its leadership in the developing world; third, China’s actions to reassure its 
neighbors and other countries that it is a non-threatening, status-quo, and responsible rising 
power on the path to becoming a “responsible great power” (fuzeren de daguoУЦ[̪ńġ)34. 
More specifically, within the limits of the first mechanism, the author identifies three ways in 
which culture, defined as “an amalgam of Confucian social and political values, folk and high 
customs and art, and the Chinese language”, may serve China’s grand strategy: through 
“cultural attractiveness” (wenhua yinli ɇÌǂÀ), among overseas Chinese and in other states 
in the “Confucian” sphere; through “cultural diplomacy” (wenhua waijiao ɇÌŁC ) 35 , 
including efforts to raise the status and charm of Chinese civilization; and through education, 
which involves the creation of a cohort of foreign experts well-equipped for a better 
understanding of China by means of training in the PRC or through the activities of the 
Confucius Institutes. These aspects will be further discussed in Chapter 8.   
Thus far, three observations can be made. Firstly, it is clear that discussing China’s soft 
power within the boundaries of its grand strategy makes it impossible to neatly separate 
domestic from foreign policy goals. Hu Angang (2005, p. 3) suggests that in order to implement 
its grand strategy effectively, China needs to put in place strategic decisions that call for the 
“mutual coordination of both domestic and international strategies” (guonei zhanlüe yu guoji 
zhanlüe de xianghu xietiao ġǻ̤ġ书ǻ̴̤̪>ÕК). This consideration can be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 See Section 1.2. 
35 The concept of “cultural diplomacy” will be further discussed in Chapter 4.  
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extended also to the use of soft power resources as part of China’s strategic discourse, as 
domestic and international dimensions overlap in the way soft power is envisioned, developed, 
and utilized within the Chinese context. This interconnection of internal and external elements 
embeds the Chinese interpretation of the soft power concept in both the fields of domestic and 
foreign policy. As has been previously pointed out, this is an aspect that permeates this entire 
dissertation as the analysis posits that one of the main characteristics of the conception of soft 
power in the Chinese context is specifically the potential for binary deployment. Thus, in order 
to embed the discourse on China’s soft power in a complete conceptual framework including all 
the related dynamics, it is necessary to look at the matter from both an internal and external 
perspective. In this sense, Deng Yong (2009, p. 73) argues that the Chinese conception of soft 
power simultaneously concerns the strengthening of domestic stability, governance, and 
vibrancy, and the cultivation of acceptance and influence abroad. The link between domestic 
and foreign policies that can be found in the way the challenge of increasing soft power is 
addressed in China is emphasized also by Li Mingjiang (2009b, p. 35) with reference to the 
need of generating a system of values that can unite the Chinese people domestically and 
enhance the country’s appeal and attractiveness externally. China’s cultural soft power will in 
fact be enhanced through the construction of a system of socialist core values, through Marxist 
and socialist ideology, and through the cohesive force of pursuing common aspirations under 
socialism with Chinese characteristics (Ibid.). Thus, the domestic aspect of the dynamics 
described above lies in the fact that, in the Chinese view, soft power resources need to be 
cultivated at home in the first place.   
In some cases, this interrelation between domestic and foreign policies has been 
recognized as a general trait of Chinese politics. According to Edney (2012, p. 906) the evident 
domestic focus in the Chinese interpretation of soft power is very much in line with the way 
Party-State officials view the purpose of foreign affairs. Gottwald and Duggan (2011, p. 5), for 
example, state that “the key factor for China’s foreign behavior is China itself. International 
forces come second”. Similarly, discussing the formation of China’s national identity, Barr 
(2011, Introduction) suggests that “China’s domestic politics are inseparable from its foreign 
relations”. It can be argued that the Chinese government’s priorities are domestic in nature as it 
primarily pursues political and social stability for the benefit of the country’s development. In a 
similar vein, Shambaugh (2013, p. 7) argues that China’s own economic development 
represents “the common denominator” in a vast part of China’s international behavior. Winning 
the acceptance of the international community is thus perceived, in the first place, as 
instrumental to maintaining a favorable environment that is conducive to the achievement of 
domestic goals. In this view, soft power becomes essential to fend off, or at least reduce, any 
potential obstacles to national growth. 
Secondly, and in a related way, soft power development in China takes the shape of a 
strategic plan, the steps of which are designed to respond to specific needs. In this respect, 
recognizing its indispensability for China’s rise, Li Mingjiang (2009b, p. 30) states that “soft 
power does not grow automatically from the influence of hard power”, but “it has to be 
cultivated and built up”. Hence, in the Chinese view, soft power is not something that comes 
naturally and as such it requires the effort of both Chinese policy-makers, in their guiding role 
for society, and the entire population, in respecting and putting into practice the guidelines 
received. Evidence of this is provided by Edney (2012, p. 909) who states that, for the Chinese 
leadership, enhancing soft power exceeds exploiting existing soft power resources more 
effectively at an international level as it is mainly a matter of building and strengthening soft 
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power resources at home. An article published on the website Dangyuan Ganbu zhi Youĉƨ
Ѳ0é (Friends of Party Members and Cadres) in 2007 focuses on the role of culture in 
China’s soft power discourse and in particular on the cultural industry which is still considered 
underperforming. Promoting soft power through its betterment becomes an urgent task that 
requires a collective effort:  
 
ȪÒ且ůÀńÀëƎɇÌD ɞҵ͹Δƙ͜ҦϭȻƵȧÅʴæɨҦϭë
ƎɁβUȪ亚ʴɑͺЧѣя˞Ìi¼ȸү)且ůÀ̪ʀƾ¶Ј%σŒ̑Ķ
  
(Dangyuan Ganbu zhi You 2007) 
 
Elevating “soft power” and vigorously developing the cultural industry constitute a systemic 
undertaking that requires the government’s promotion, the participation of the entire population, and, 
even more, the development of education in order to improve the inner qualities of the entire 
population and through a deepening of systemic reforms create a positive environment for the 
construction of “soft power”. 
(Translated by the present author.)  
 
In order to improve its image abroad and obtain the desired international acceptance, 
China needs to put in place a series of policies at home aimed at meeting not only the material 
but also the spiritual needs of the Chinese people. Barr (2011, Chapter 2) points out, striking a 
key difference with Nye’s conceptualization, that China’s conception of soft power exceeds the 
limits of the international sphere, as its deployment goes beyond image-building abroad and 
becomes crucial at home too. Domestically, cultural revitalization becomes essential, together 
with reviving socialist values and national cohesion, as Hu Jintao stressed in his keynote speech 
to the 17th National Congress. According to Barr, within the country, the appeal of soft power 
comes from different reasons: among the people, for example, a cultural revival strengthens 
national identity; generally speaking, weather it is through the enhancement of culture, social 
and moral standards, or politics and governance, soft power helps maintain domestic stability 
and favorable internal conditions for China’s peaceful rise; for the Chinese government, 
however, utilizing soft power responds to the need of fostering its legitimacy and acceptance 
among the multiethnic Chinese population, rallying support around the idea of “national ethnic 
cohesion” (Ibid.). This is also to say that soft power helps China’s leaders maintain “their own 
grip on power”: it fits well with Chinese traditional thought, it is in line with the notion of 
“zonghe guoli”, and it helps refute the Western misconceptions of what China really is (Ibid.). 
The author concludes by defining Chinese soft power as both “inward-looking and outward-
looking”, as the growing importance attached to it is generated by both domestic and 
international concerns: while, on the one hand, China wishes to export its values and 
development potential abroad in order to facilitate the establishment of a more favorable 
international environment, keeping potential domestic unrest under control and strengthening 
intergenerational identities, through a redefinition of Chinese identities and a revival of 
traditional values, is equally important (Ibid.).  
The establishment of a conceptual framework and the observations made thus far are 
useful to address the analysis of the study’s problem and corroborate the related assumptions 
from a theoretical point of view. Finally, another central idea can be identified in the discourse 
around China’s soft power, expanding the assumptions previously proposed: the need for China 
to use soft power to ease international pressure and facilitate its rise. Li Mingjiang (2009b, p. 32) 
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believes that without soft power it will be impossible for China to avoid the obstacles that other 
global actors would pose to a country with an unfavorable international status. Similarly, 
Wuthnow (2008, p. 7) argues that, through the use of soft power, China can foster an 
international environment that is beneficial for China’s rise as an economic and military power. 
According to one Chinese scholar (Fang Changping Ɏ҆Ʃ 2007, p. 24), the main goals that 
China hopes to achieve through the use of soft power are to alleviate the “China threat theory” 
(Zhongguo weixie lun) in its periphery and worldwide, attain the understanding of the 
international community, and facilitate international acceptance and support for China’s 
peaceful development. This is confirmed in a variety of related scholarly writings, including 
Cho and Jeong (2008, p. 461), Li Mingjiang (2009b, p. 31), and Barr (2011). Glaser and 
Murphy (2009, pp. 22-24) go as far as to identify a “defensive” purpose in the development of 
China’s soft power, as it is regarded as providing an essential contribution to the preservation of 
a stable and peaceful international environment that will be more willing to accept a rising 
China. In this view, rebutting the so-called “China threat theory” seems to be the underlying 
purpose of China’s soft power on the international front. 
As will be further described, one of the main features of Chinese culture is the value it 
places on the concept of “peace and harmony” (he Ď). In his 2007 speech, Hu Jintao advocates 
the construction of a “culture of harmony” (hexie wenhua ĎНɇÌ) (Xinhua She 2007), and 
this goes hand-in-hand with the domestic program of building a “harmonious society” (hexie 
shehui), put forward by the government in recent years. In fact, as stated by Hong Kong scholar 
Chan Kin-man in his contribution to the International Encyclopedia of Civil Society, that of a 
“harmonious society” is a concept introduced by former President Hu Jintao, together with the 
related idea of the “Scientific!Outlook on Development” (kexue fazhan guan ͗ţëƎϰ), as 
the “unifying concepts of his administration”  (Chan Kin-man 2010, p. 821). Regarding the 
latter of the two concepts, the idea behind scientific development was put forward at the Third 
Plenum of the 16th Central Committee of the CPC (Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiliu Jie 
Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Di San Ci Quanti Huiyi&ġDͩÐƍ&ňŖĉ`ͩʡi
`Ђ) in 2003 as the new central leadership’s understanding about development (China.org.cn 
2007). Hu Jintao provided a definition of it in a speech delivered at the Central Seminar on 
Population, Resource, and Environmental Work (Zhongyang Renkou Ziyuan Huanjing Gongzuo 
Zuotanhui &ňIïЭ˪̑ĶƙmƹЛ`) held in Beijing in March 2004, in which he 
advocated for “firmly establishing and seriously implementing putting people first and a 
development concept that is comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable” (laogu shuli he 
renzhen luoshi yi ren wei ben, quanmian	 xietiao	 kechixu de fazhanguan ̅Ġʌ͢ĎЀ̸
ϘůUI)ɵҮ	ÕК	ôȚΖ̪ëƎϰ) (Xinhua Wang 2004). Consequently, calling 
for a more balanced and comprehensive approach to China’s development, the “Scientific 
Outlook on Development” represents the means through which a harmonious society can be 
built, thus solving the social disparities and conflicts that have arisen in China in recent years 
due to its rapid economic development (Chan Kin-man 2010, pp. 821-822). In October 2006, 
the Sixth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee of the CPC (Zhongguo Gongchandang Di 
Shiliu Jie Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Di Liu Ci Quanti Huiyi &ġDͩÐƍ&ňŖĉ`ͩ
ʡi`Ђ) passed the “CPC Central Committee’s Resolutions on Several Important Issues 
for Building a Harmonious Socialist Society” (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Goujian 
Shehuizhuyi Hexie Shehui Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding &&ň<ʀƾ͍`*/Ď
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Н͍`ύƨ义ń҉ҽ̪¥ŭ) in which building a “harmonious socialist society” (shehuizhuyi 
hexie shehui ͍`*/ĎН͍`) is described as a “continuously sustained process to solve 
social contradictions” (yi ge buduan huajie shehui maodun de chixu guocheng %ɋÌϵ͍
`̵̪̿ȚΖя͜) aimed at “following the path of common prosperity” (zou gongtong fuyu 
daolu 七—źϫ丹不) (Xinhua Wang 2006). The main themes of a “harmonious society” 
include: democracy and the rule of law, fairness and justice, integrity and fraternity, vitality, 
stability and order, and harmony between man and nature (China.org.cn 2007). According to 
Han Aiguo (2008, pp. 144-147), what inspired the idea behind building a “harmonious society” 
is the realization that rapid economic development in China has triggered a number of problems, 
including both material and spiritual aspects: the uneven distribution of wealth has generated, 
for instance, a widening economic gap, while greed and disregard for man and nature have 
generated safety issues regarding food, medicine, and the environment; but!the most worrying 
aspect is the “chaos within China’s social value system” and the lack of its cultivation, which 
have led to the “loss of human virtues or morals”, such as “human trust, decency, dignity, 
compassion, and civility”. This phenomenon manifests itself in a much more evident way in 
Chinese society because of China’s unique history and socio-political structure (Ibid., p. 147).  
In the third section of Hu Jintao’s 2007 speech, the relationship between the actualization 
of a “harmonious socialist society” and the “Scientific Outlook on Development” is explained 
as follows:   
  
˞ЩǎϘů͗ţëƎϰϭʸǹW͚ɿʀƾ͍`*/ĎН͍`
͍`ĎНɞ&ġ̇υ͍`*
/̪ɵЧƏǦ
͗ţëƎĎ͍`ĎНɞĨΔ̪
˂ɭ͗ţëƎƆ˂ɭ͍`ĎН˂ɭ͍`
ĎН3ҡUů̒͗ţëƎ
ʀƾ͍`*/ĎН͍`ɞЩ͠&ġ̇υ͍`*/: я̪҆͜ɱ
àö[ÄɞĨëƎ̪ĳ͆ʦ͉Ľ̖ú͖͍`̵̪̿àöя͜Ď͍`ΐʃ
  
(Xinhua She 2007) 
 
The English version of the speech reads:  
 
To thoroughly apply the Scientific Outlook on Development, we must work energetically to build a 
harmonious socialist society. Social harmony is an essential attribute of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. Scientific development and social harmony are integral to each other and neither is 
possible without the other. Building a harmonious socialist society is a historical mission throughout 
the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, as well as a historical process and the social 
outcome of correctly handling various social problems on the basis of development. 
(Xinhua News Agency 2007) 
 
As stated by Cao Qing (2011, p. 13), socialism with Chinese characteristics is 
incorporated into a “Confucian discourse of harmony”, in accordance with the revival of 
traditional culture and values that is part of China’s soft power construction. As reported by Li 
Mingjiang (2009b, p. 31), there is widespread agreement that, in China, building soft power is 
instrumental also to this end because by paying attention to culture, national cohesion, morality, 
and institutions, domestic socio-political stability can be preserved, a condition which, in turn, 
is conducive to China’s international ascendance.  
Not surprisingly, in analyzing soft power development as a key component of China’s 
grand strategy, Wuthnow (2008, p. 5) states that notions that belong to this field are the theory 
of a “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi), “peaceful development” (heping fazhan)”, and “harmonious 
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world” (hexie shijie). These are all foreign policy principles that place emphasis on the concepts 
of peace and harmony, constituting a background for wielding soft power. Chapter 3 is thus 
dedicated to the establishment of a conceptual framework which shows that outlining the 
discourse on China’s soft power in relation to its grand strategy largely expands the area in 
which this topic is embedded as it taps into both the domestic and international fields. The 
backdrop of this approach draws upon the assumption that in China “soft power is envisioned as 
a means to multiple ends” (Li Mingjiang 2009b, p. 30). These “multiple ends” have been 
described here as a nexus of resources, purposes, approaches, and challenges that can be 
discussed in relation to China’s soft power. In order to complement the versatility described 
here in terms of domestic policy, the next section will provide a brief analysis of the foreign 
policy concepts related to China’s soft power, mentioned above.  
 
 
3.3 “Peaceful rise”, “peaceful development”, and “harmonious world” 
 
Starting from the concept of peaceful rise, it is interesting to briefly address the 
relationship existing between soft power and China’s rise. First and foremost, as stated by Ding 
Sheng (2008, p. 34), with the introduction of the concept of peaceful rise, China acknowledges 
that, in the course of history, the rise of a new power has been perceived as problematic and, in 
order to overcome this obstacle, China wishes to signal to the world its intention to manage its 
rise in a way that avoids conflict. This is proved by policy proposals such as those introduced 
with the idea of building a harmonious world which can be interpreted as being part of a “soft 
power-based rising strategy” useful to build China’s desired international order (Ibid., p. 35). 
The relationship between soft power and China’s rise lies in the fact that soft power is seen as a 
more suitable tool than hard power to create an international environment that sees China’s rise 
as an opportunity, rather than a threat. In fact, if the so-called “China threat theory” is 
superseded by a new theory, that of the “China opportunity”, China will be able to wield its soft 
power more effectively and obtain its desired policy outcomes (Ding Sheng 2008, p. 29). Only 
under these circumstances will China be able to rise. This is why the idea of soft power has 
been accepted by China’s policymakers and employed to build a “peaceful, harmonious, and 
cooperative new international order, which can provide the most effective accommodation for 
China’s rise” (Ding Sheng 2008, p. 37). Similarly, Zhang Baohui (2010, pp. 57-58) argues that 
China seems to have solved the dilemma of what constitutes international influence, as is 
reflected by the increasingly prominent use of soft power in its foreign policy. As noted by Zhu 
Majie (2002a, p. 28), the end of the Cold War boosted the role of culture in international 
relations. In regard to China, the author provides a detailed description of the strategic 
guidelines that influenced the formulation of China’s foreign policy over the 1980s and ‘90s, 
but continuing also today, supported by deep cultural roots (Ibid., pp. 36-38). First and foremost, 
China adheres to an “independent foreign policy of peace” and supports friendly and 
cooperative international relations, on the basis of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence” 
36 and Deng Xiaoping’s tenet “taoguang yanghui Ҳɢ” (to conceal one’s strengths and 
bide one’s time)37 (Ibid., p. 36).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 With the aim of stabilizing China’s relations with India in the Tibet Region and in the spirit of good neighborliness, 
the PRC’s first premier Zhou Enlai ċǩɼ met with representatives of the Indian government in December 1953 to 
start negotiations which lasted until April 1954 and resulted in the proposal of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
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Nevertheless, it is also interesting to note that since the leadership transition from the 
fourth to the fifth generation of Chinese leaders at the end of 2012, analysts have highlighted a 
newer and more defined orientation for China’s foreign policy. According to an article in the 
South China Morning Post, President Xi Jinping’s talks with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon in June 2013 made it clear that China, which had been calling for a multipolar world 
order free from the existing domination by major powers, was ready to take on a more 
prominent role in global affairs, signaling an increasing assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy 
and also distancing itself from the strategy promoted by the previous generations of government, 
which stressed that China was still a developing country hesitant to shoulder more 
responsibilities (Ng and Wall 2013). In 2014, the Chinese and international media profusely 
reported on a speech Xi Jinping delivered at a conference held in Beijing at the end of 
November on the topic of advancing China’s diplomacy “under new conditions”, following the 
leadership’s intent to “gain a full understanding of the changing international developments and 
China’s external environment, lay down the guidelines, basic principles, strategic goals and 
major mission of China’s diplomacy in the new era and endeavor to make new advances in 
China’s foreign relations” (Xinhua News Agency 2014b). The President stressed that China 
should “enrich and further develop” its diplomatic approach, relying on both “past practice and 
experience” and “its role of a major country”, and “conduct diplomacy with a salient Chinese 
feature and a Chinese vision” (Ibid.). The advancement in foreign policy foreseen by Xi Jinping 
has been referred to as the establishment of a “big country diplomacy with Chinese 
characteristics” and understood as a sign that China is moving away from its past foreign policy 
orientation that limited involvement in foreign affairs, primarily embodied by Deng Xiaoping’s 
diplomatic strategy (Shi and Tweed 2014). As indicated by scholars (among others, Swaine 
2010; Zhang Baohui 2010), the debate on a more assertive China undoubtedly includes an 
inquiry as to whether or not and to what extent Beijing foreign policy is abandoning the 
principle “taoguang yanghui” and transforming China’s cautious and low-profile performance 
on the global stage into a more confident, assertive, anti-status quo, and even revisionist 
behavior. Finding an answer to this question goes beyond the purpose of the present discussion, 
but it is interesting to note that behind the belief that China is increasingly capable of playing a 
more prominent and active role in the international arena, rather widespread among Chinese 
commentators, there lies the peculiarity of the understanding of the concept of “taoguang 
yanghui” in the Chinese context, where, as pointed out by Swaine (2010, p. 7), is usually 
associated with a warning for the country to maintain a modest and positive image 
internationally in order not to risk worrying other global players in a way that could harm 
domestic development. It is a diplomatic strategy that gives rise to different interpretations 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Existence”, namely, mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence (PRC Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs n.d.). The principles were incorporated into the preamble of the “Agreement Between the People’s 
Republic of China and the Republic of India on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India”, 
which was signed in Beijing in 1954, and further developed during the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 
1955 (Ibid.). The “Five Principles” can be considered the cornerstone of China’s foreign policy and the guidelines 
that have always directed China’s peaceful approach to international relations. Representing the opposite of power 
politics, they transcend social systems and ideologies and have been accepted by most of the world’s nations (PRC 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.). 
37 Zhu Majie (2002a, p. 36) reports the complete guidelines set forth by Deng Xiaoping as “observe the situation 
coolly, hold our ground, act calmly, hide our capacities, bide our time and make our contribution”.   
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depending on the toughness of the tone chosen by Chinese analysts in dealing with China’s 
potential leading position in the world (Ibid.).  
In a similar vein, it can also be argued that, if China’s increased assertiveness proves to 
be true, the rupture between Beijing’s new stance in foreign policy and that of the former 
leadership will become increasingly evident through the use of a discourse which will leave 
behind reassuring remarks, as those made during a press conference held in Beijing in March 
2010 by then-Prime Minister Wen JiabaoˤŶŮ. On that occasion, the CPC leader confirmed 
China’s role as a responsible state, stressed that the country was still in the “primary stage” 
(chuji jieduan ·΃ғʭ) of development, and guaranteed that China would “never seek 
hegemony, even after having fully developed” (jishi fada le, ye bu chengba, yongyuan bu 
chengba Üoëю73͛Ҫʷі͛Ҫ) (Xinhua Wang 2010a). In Chapter 1, the 
speech delivered by Xi Jinping in Paris in March 2014, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary 
of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, was mentioned with the 
aim of elaborating on the perception of the emergence of a more assertive China that the 
“awakening lion” metaphor triggered in the international audience (Ng and Chen 2014; 
Sridharan 2014). The metaphor also stirred a heated debate among Chinese netizens (Qiangguo 
Luntan ǆġЇĭ 2014). Nonetheless, it can be argued that limiting the analysis of Xi Jinping’s 
statement to the elements of the metaphor that only emphasize the risk one can assume an 
awakening lion would pose ignores the other side of the coin, that is the reassurance that this 
lion will “bring the world an opportunity and not a threat, peace and not turmoil, progress and 
not regression” (gei shijie dai lai de shi jiyu bu shi weixie, shi heping bu shi dongdang, shi jinbu 
bu shi daotui Α̢ƥɼ̪ɞɷѨɞŘγɞĎƩɞÅϓɞ严ʨɞ中) (Xinhua 
Wang 2014b).  
In China, the foreign policy discourse has always made reference to the peaceful nature 
of China’s ascendance onto the world stage and, in this view, it can be argued that recurrent 
elements of the type described above represent continuity with the past, rather than novelty, in 
Xi Jinping’s conduction of the country’s grand strategy. An evaluation of China’s grand 
strategy under Xi Jinping’s guidance would perhaps seem premature, even though China 
watchers have been quick to label him a “transformative leader” keen on reforming political and 
economic relations within China and with the outside world (Economy 2014). More cautious 
evaluations point out that it is still unclear whether or not Xi Jinping’s foreign policy will match 
the novelty of his “decisive” and “blunt” style (Kaufman and Hemphill 2014, p. 1).  
This brings the discussion to the topics that will be briefly described in this section. In 
fact, elaborating on the claims that China has an incoherent foreign policy due to the lack of a 
grand strategy, Buzan (2014) argues that China does not need to invent a new grand strategy 
because it already has one that is represented by the concepts of peaceful rise and peaceful 
development. Joining the two terms into the acronym PRD (peaceful rise/development), the 
author defines it as “an indigenous and original idea deeply embedded in China’s reform and 
opening up, and effectively constituting the core concept for a grand strategy” which is 
representative of China’s return to the position of a great power (Ibid., 383-384). He further 
argues that PRD has basically been China’s grand strategy since the early 1980s when Deng 
Xiaoping linked peace and development as the foundation of the policy of reform and opening-
up put forward in the late 1970s, which made the search for a peaceful environment an essential 
prerequisite for China’s modernization (Ibid., p. 386).  
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Analyzing the concepts of peaceful rise and peaceful development separately, but in a 
related way, scholars (among others, Suettinger 2004; Glaser and Medeiros 2007; Mierzejewski 
2012; Scott 2012) have examined the process through which the former of the two was 
officially put forward in 2003 as one of the new concepts in the field of foreign policy under Hu 
Jintao’s leadership, to be replaced shortly afterwards by the latter. More specifically, the debut 
of the concept of peaceful rise occurred at the Bo’ao Forum for Asia (Bo’ao Yazhou LuntanØ
ӎ@ˏЇĭ) on November 3rd, 2003, in a speech delivered by Zheng Bijian ѱǙĬ, an 
influential policy advisor to many CPC leaders, confidante of Hu Jintao, and chairman of the 
China Reform Forum (Zhongguo Gaige Kaifang Luntan &ġȸүƿȺЇĭ), following a trip 
to the United States of a delegation that, under his guidance, attempted to investigate American 
perceptions of China’s future path and its implications for the global order (Suettinger 2004; 
Glaser and Medeiros 2007). In the speech entitled “A New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and 
the Future of Asia”, Zheng Bijian spoke as follows:  
  
In the 25 years since the inception of its reform and opening up, China has blazed a new strategic path 
that not only suits its national conditions but also conforms to the tide of the times. This new strategic 
path is China’s peaceful rise through independently building socialism with Chinese characteristics, 
while participating in rather than detaching from economic globalization. […] The rise of a major 
power often results in drastic change in international configuration and world order, even triggers a 
world war. An important reason behind this is [that] these major powers followed a path of aggressive 
war and external expansion. Such a path is doomed to failure. In today’s world, how can we follow 
such a totally erroneous path that is injurious to all, China included? China’s only choice is to strive 
for rise, more importantly strive for a peaceful rise.  
(cited in Suettinger 2004, p. 2) 
 
China’s rise is presented as the natural result of the process of reform and opening-up 
undertaken by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. Nevertheless, the international community does 
not have to feel threatened by China’s future path because the country needs to rely on a 
peaceful international environment in order to continue to develop and become a great power, 
without destabilizing the international order. Differently from how other great powers rose in 
the past, China’s aim is to rise in peace and harmony with other nations. In other words, 
depicting China’s peaceful rise as a process that started in 1978 and continues in the 21st century 
with the aim of lifting the country’s massive population out of poverty and participating in the 
world’s economic globalization, that of Zheng Bijian represented a pledge that along its 
development path China would never seek global hegemony or harm neighboring countries, but 
instead would support the maintenance of a peaceful international environment and mutual 
cooperation for the common benefit and prosperity of everyone (Suettinger 2004; Glaser and 
Medeiros 2007). These concepts were reiterated in a speech delivered by Wen Jiabao at Harvard 
University in December 2003:  
 China today is a country in reform and opening-up and a rising power dedicated to peace.  
[…] China is a large developing country. It is neither proper nor possible for us to rely on foreign 
countries for development. We must, and we can only, rely on our own efforts. In other words, while 
opening still wider to the outside world, we must more fully and more consciously depend on our own 
structural innovation, on constantly expanding the domestic market, on converting the huge savings of 
the citizens into investment, and on improving the quality of the population and scientific and 
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technological progress to solve the problems of resources and the environment. Here lies the essence 
of China’s road of peaceful rise and development.  
[…] China tomorrow will continue to be a major country that loves peace and has a great deal to look 
forward to. 
(PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003) 
 
As noted by Suettinger (2004, p. 3), Wen Jiabao’s speech gave the concept of a peaceful 
rise the status of policy formulation. His endorsement, the first by a senior CPC leader (Glaser 
and Medeiros 2007, p. 298), was followed by a series of occasions on which the concept was 
discussed and explained in official circumstances. Scholarly articles and media reports started 
discussing the concept of peaceful rise in light of the birth of a new national strategy (Suettinger 
2004; Glaser and Medeiros 2007). Nevertheless, the wording of this theory, if not the basic 
rationale, would soon be replaced. Indeed, in April 2004, on the same occasion that had 
represented the debut of the formulation “heping jueqi”, Hu Jintao delivered a speech in which 
he did not mention the wording “peaceful rise”; his key slogan was “heping yu fazhan” (peace 
and development) 38 , with other expressions including “peace and stability”, “peace and 
security”, “peace and tranquility”, and “peaceful coexistence”, but no “peaceful rise” 
(Suettinger 2004, p. 5; Glaser and Medeiros 2007, p. 299). The former President promised that 
China would pursue “peaceful development” (heping fazhan):  
China will follow a peaceful development path holding high the banners of peace, development and 
cooperation, join the other Asian countries in bringing about Asian rejuvenation, and making greater 
contribution to the lofty cause of peace and development in the world. 
(Xinhua News Agency 2004) 
 
Glaser and Medeiros (2007, pp. 300-301) highlight two aspects in relation to the decision 
to abandon the wording “heping jueqi” in favor of “heping fazhan” in the CPC’s official 
discourse: the former of the two formulations has not entirely disappeared from mainstream 
publications and public discourse; and the themes encapsulated in the latter appear to maintain 
the same orientation as Zheng Bijian’s original concept. Then, it can be argued that the 
reasoning behind this change was primarily related to the search of a correct terminology to 
uniformly use in the official discourse, as required by China’s Leninist political culture, 
although in this case in a less strict way (Ibid.). In this regard, it is interesting to consider the 
analysis carried out by Chinese researcher Liu Jianfei³ƾҿ (2006) who states that scholars 
should not spend too much energy trying to decide which one between the concept of “heping 
jueqi” and that of “heping fazhan” has greater “political correctness” (zhengzhi zhengquexing Ȼ
）ʦ͉Ǧ) because they are not substantially different. In fact, they are two different ways to 
express the same process: “no matter if it is ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peaceful development’, the stress 
for both is on ‘peaceful’” (wulun “heping jueqi”, haishi “heping fazhan”, qiangdiao de dou shi 
“heping” ɓЇĎƩƕеѓɞĎƩëƎǆК̪ѴɞĎƩ) (Ibid.).  
It can thus be argued that both the wordings “heping jueqi” and “heping fazhan” 
encapsulate the same foreign policy orientation; one that is aimed at China’s domestic 
development and ascent on the global stage while opposing any type of hegemony and power 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 As was described in the introduction to this work, “peace and development” constituted the binomial principle at 
the core of Deng Xiaoping’s governance.  
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politics. Nevertheless, there are some relevant reasons as to why the term “rise” was substituted 
with “development”. Glaser and Medeiros (2007, pp. 301-306) list eight criticisms against the 
peaceful rise theory: 1) it may weaken China’s ability to deter Taiwan independence; 2) it may 
not be possible; 3) the term “jueqi ƕе” will intensify concerns among China’s neighbors; 4) it 
is premature to discuss China’s rise; 5) it is contrary to Deng Xiaoping’s guidance on foreign 
affairs work; 6) it could undermine support for military modernization; 7) promoting “peaceful 
rise” could incite domestic nationalism; and 8) slogans are not policies. Two of the 
aforementioned critiques are particularly relevant for the present discussion: elaborating on the 
characters forming the term “jueqi”, Glaser and Medeiros (2007, p. 304) specify that the 
character “jue ƕ” contains the radical for mountain (shan Ɛ), hinting at something that rises up 
abruptly and thus making “jueqi” a “provocative rather than reassuring” term. Moreover, the 
last point raised by Glaser and Medeiros reported above seems to be in line with the reflections 
put forward by Suettinger (2004, p. 7) who equates the proposal of the concept of peaceful rise 
to a “propaganda campaign” aimed at reassuring foreigners of the positive intentions behind 
China’s economic and military growth: “[t]he peaceful rise campaign [...] reflected the Chinese 
government’s tendency to simplify complex phenomena into a tifa39, a slogan or mindset, rather 
than encourage in-depth analysis of political intentions, actions, and processes”. Similarly, Li 
Jingzhi and Pu Ping (2014, p. 20) emphasize that peaceful development is the mode of China’s 
rise and that, although “rise” has been replaced by “development” in official documents, from 
an academic point of view the concept of peaceful rise is still valid: “China puts forward the 
concept of peaceful development to demonstrate the approach it will adopt to seek the rise – 
through development rather than war, through peaceful means rather than force of arms”. In this 
sense, the expression “heping fazhan” appears to be “lower-key”:  
 
First, the word rise seems to overshadow the diplomatic strategy of keeping a low profile and imply 
that China is going to abandon the guiding principle. Second, rise sounds too aggressive and arrogant, 
which may mislead our neighboring countries (including Russia), Western big powers, and even some 
developing countries into the misunderstanding that China is striving for the status of hegemon, thus 
adding some new evidence to the so-called China threat. Third, despite China’s fast economic 
development, it is still a developing country with a long way to go to gain on the developed countries, 
so rise is a notion China still falls short of. 
(Ibid., pp. 147-148) 
 
On balance, both the concepts of peaceful rise and peaceful development indicate in a 
succinct way how China intends to pursue its growth path in the 21st century, the relation it 
wishes to establish with the rest of the world, and the effect that this process will generate. As 
stated by Buzan (2014, p. 387), peaceful rise and peaceful development qualify as a grand 
strategy because they “contain a theory about how the world works and how China should relate 
to that world in the light of its overriding priority to development”. Taking into consideration 
military, political, and economic aspects, what the author calls PRD is also a careful way to 
consider what kind of image should be projected by China to the outside world (Ibid.).  
This last observation brings the discussion back to the field of soft power. In fact, it is 
important to highlight that, among the tools available to China to put into practice its soft power 
strategy, scholars also list the language of public diplomacy, aimed at reassuring the 
international community and refuting worries such as those expressed by the “China threat 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 These elements of discourse and their functions will be expounded upon in Chapter 6.   
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theory” (Scott 2012), and a rhetorical framework, aimed at enhancing the efficiency of soft 
power (Mierzejewski 2012). In particular, Scott (2012, p. 39) observes that China’s soft power 
is both mediated through foreign policies and public diplomacy (gonggong waijiao ŁC)40, 
with the latter targeting the global audience and employing specific English language terms 
which constitute the “tool of language” in the PRC’s soft power toolkit. The author analyzes six 
specific terms belonging to China’s public diplomacy lexicon: “multipolarity” (duojihuałɿ
Ì), “multilateralism” (duobianzhuyi ł丝*/), “democratization of international relations” 
(guoji guanxi minzhuhua ġ书͹ʴ*Ì ), “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi), “peaceful 
development” (heping fazhan), and “harmonious world” (heping shijie) (Ibid., p. 40). Focusing 
on “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development”, the author states that the former is basically a 
“soft power linguistic tool”, depicting a win-win situation and common prosperity for China and 
the rest of the world, which could nevertheless inspire the image of an “earthquake/eruption” 
rather than that of “benefits” and “opportunity” (Ibid., pp. 47-48); the latter, however, has the 
advantage of drawing the people’s attention towards “China’s international socio-economic 
development rather than its external political-military rise” (Ibid., p. 49).  
In the discussion on the proposal of the concepts of peaceful rise and peaceful 
development as symbols of China’s grand strategy, another aspect is relevant: the cultural 
component. Glaser and Medeiros (2007, pp. 294-295) argue that Zheng Bijian’s concept put 
forward in 2003 contained three core principles: 1) the necessity for China to “unswervingly 
advance economic and political reforms”; 2) the necessity for China to “ensure cultural support 
for its peaceful rise” by fostering Chinese civilization and drawing on human civilization; 3) 
and the need for China to create a suitable social environment for its peaceful rise by balancing 
the interests of different sectors and coordinating the development of different areas and regions, 
and between society and the economy and man and nature. The second core principle mentioned 
constitutes what is, according to the present analysis, the cultural component of China’s 
peaceful rise and peaceful development, constituting the link to China’s soft power. Emphasis 
on the value that China’s traditional culture and ancient civilization can offer to the entire globe 
is indeed a recurrent theme in the Chinese rhetoric on soft power. This aspect emerged also in 
Wen Jiabao’s speech at Harvard University mentioned above, in an excerpt that deserves 
quoting at length:   
China yesterday was a big ancient country that created a splendid civilization. […] The Chinese 
nation has rich and profound cultural reserves. “Harmony without uniformity”41 is a great idea put 
forth by ancient Chinese thinkers. It means harmony without sameness, and difference without 
conflict. Harmony entails co-existence and co-prosperity, while difference conduces to mutual 
complementation and mutual support. To approach and address issues from such a perspective will 
not only help enhance relations with friendly countries, but also serve to resolve contradictions in the 
international community. 
[…] Entering the 21st century, mankind is confronted with more complicated economic and social 
problems. The cultural element will have a more important role to play in the new century. Different 
nations may speak different languages, but their hearts and feelings are interlinked. Different cultures 
present manifold features, yet they often share the same rational core elements that can always be 
passed on by people. The civilizations of different nations are all fruits of human wisdom and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 The practice of public diplomacy will be further discussed in the following chapter. 
41 This is the traditional concept of “harmony in diversity” (he er bu tong ĎΩ—), which will be further discussed 
in Chapter 5.  
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contribution to human progress; they call for mutual respect. Conflicts triggered by ignorance or 
prejudice are sometimes more dreadful than those caused by contradictory interests. We propose to 
seek common ground in the spirit of equality and tolerance, and carry on extensive inter-civilization 
dialogue and closer cultural exchanges. 
 (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003) 
 
As will be further described, there is general consensus (among others, Li Mingjiang 
2009a, 2009b; Cao Qing 2011; Edney 2012) that traditional Chinese culture has been designated 
as the most valuable resource of soft power: for instance, according to Li Mingjiang (2009b, p. 
25 and p. 30), scholars argue that at the basis of Chinese cultural appeal are traditional Chinese 
cultural values with “harmony” at the core, an idea that is very well received in the cooperative 
world of today and that gives Chinese culture a comparative advantage. Cao Qing (2011, p. 14) 
states that traditional culture as soft power has been incorporated into the new political identity 
of the CPC and the cultural identity of the nation. In this sense, China’s soft power can even be 
defined as “traditional-value based” (Ibid.).  
The emphasis on traditional Chinese culture in both China’s soft power discourse and 
public diplomacy language is not surprising given the enormity and richness of the cultural and 
moral heritage that has been passed down over many thousands of years of historical continuity. 
Conversely, contemporary Chinese culture is regarded as being “more problematic” to be used 
to attract foreign audiences and improve China’s standing in the world (Edney 2012, p. 909). In 
this sense, it comes as no surprise that emphasis is placed on concepts such as “harmony” and 
“peace” as sources of China’s soft power, given that a country is generally keen on displaying 
the “good part” of its culture that the rest of the world can agree with because it finds it 
enjoyable, while hiding those elements that may cause discomfort or suspicion (Li Mingjiang 
2009a, p. 8). Similarly to his 2003 speech at Harvard University, in March 2007, Wen Jiabao 
stated:  
 
From Confucius to Sun Yat-sen, the traditional culture of the Chinese nation has numerous precious 
elements, many positive aspects regarding the nature of the people and democracy. For example, it 
stresses love and humanity, community, harmony among different viewpoints, and sharing the world 
in common.   
(cited in Bell 2008, p. 9) 
 
This is in line with Hu Jintao’s call at the 17th National Congress for a “comprehensive 
understanding of the motherland’s traditional culture, absorbing its essence and discarding its 
dross” (quanmian renshi zuguo chuantong wenhua, quqijinhua, quqizaopo ЀЋ͎ġbΔ
ɇÌìͷÔä͸ʹ) (Xinhua She 2007). This is also the reason why China’s policy 
elites have assigned scholars in a variety of disciplines the mission, crucial to an improvement 
of the status of Chinese civilization, to promote traditional Chinese culture with “harmony” at 
the core in the rest of the world (Li Mingjiang 2009b, p. 34).  
The concept of harmony is also at the center of the last foreign policy concept that will be 
discussed here, that of a “harmonious world” (hexie shijie). Commenting on the release of the 
White Paper entitled “China’s Peaceful Development Road” (Zhongguo de Heping Fazhan 
Daolu&ġ̪ĎƩëƎ丹不) in December 2005, Li Jingzhi and Pu Ping (2014, p. 19) identify 
four aspects in the substance of China’s path of peaceful development, in which the proposal of 
building a harmonious world is present: 1) “China is to strive for a peaceful international 
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environment in which to develop itself and, in turn, contribute to world peace through its 
development”; 2) “China should achieve development with its own efforts and carry out reform 
and innovation”; 3) “China should seek mutually beneficial and common development with 
other countries in keeping with the trend of economic globalization”; and 4) “China must stick 
to peace, development, and cooperation, and work together with other countries to build a 
harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity”. The last aspect listed by the 
scholars draws what they define as “two dialectical relations” between peace and development 
and between China and the world, which essentially refer to the fact that China cannot develop 
in isolation because its development and that of the world affect each other and are both pivotal 
for the maintenance of peace in China and worldwide (Ibid., p. 21). As far as a definition of the 
concept of harmonious world is concerned, the scholars include common security, common 
prosperity, and mutual inclusiveness among the characteristics of a “hexie shijie”, which 
represents “China’s aspiration for an ideal international order” and a “world order concept” 
(Ibid., p. 23). In this regard, they provide very useful insights:  
 
A harmonious world is a peaceful world. China insists on combining the interests of the Chinese 
people with that of the people in all other countries. [...] China opposes all kinds of hegemony and 
power politics and will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion.  
(Ibid., p. 177) 
 
As well:  
 
A harmonious world should be a world of mutual cooperation, mutual benefit with win-win results, 
and common development, which is exactly the utmost objective of China’s peaceful development.  
(Ibid., p. 179) 
 
Consequently, the idea of building a harmonious world was officially put forward by 
former President Hu Jintao in a speech delivered at the UN World Summit in September 2005, 
with the title “Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity”, 
and then again in his political report to the 17th National Congress of the CPC in 2007, when the 
PRC Constitution was formally amended to include the building of “a harmonious world 
characterized by sustained peace and prosperity” (Scott 2012, p. 50). More specifically, Hu 
Jintao’s words in 2007 were as follows:  
 
—®EëƎɷѨ—Ƴżú͖Ȝǻȧ严IͳĎƩëƎ̪Ɣ亚: :úġIʴ̪ʑ
ɵ¹̮3ɞúġIʴ̪—ǘǳ
ǹW*。úġIʴȮǾÆÀȧÅƾЈȚ-ĎƩ	—
Ϳϔ̪ĎН̢
 
(Xinhua She 2007) 
 
Sharing opportunities for development and rising to challenges together so as to further the noble 
cause of peace and development of humanity bear on the fundamental interests of the people of all 
countries and meet their common aspirations. We maintain that the people of all countries should join 
hands and strive to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. 
(Xinhua News Agency 2007) 
 
 Overall, scholars agree on placing China’s discourse on a harmonious world within the 
larger discourse on harmony. Scott (2012, pp. 50-51), for instance, observes that building a 
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harmonious society represents the domestic counterpart of building a harmonious world, with 
the latter being strictly related to the traditional Confucian concept of “da tong ń—” (great 
harmony). Zhu Majie (2002a, p. 37) states that China’s cultural tradition places emphasis on 
“peace, harmony, and reconciliation”; from personal experience, having had to “get rid of the 
yoke of foreign powers”, the Chinese people deeply value the importance of peace and stability. 
But China’s foreign policy is also influenced by the country’s “social nature” insofar as 
“socialism stands for peace” (Ibid.). In this sense, China’s rise is different because it is that of a 
socialist country whose development is based on “its own strength rather than foreign 
aggression or colonial invasion” (Li Jingzhi and Pu Ping 2014, p. 152). 
Last but not least, there is also a profound and strong connection between traditional 
Chinese culture and the contribution that China wishes to offer for the construction of a 
harmonious and peaceful world. The concept of a harmonious world symbolizes the “essence of 
traditional Chinese culture” because it contains notions such as “agree to disagree”, “harmony is 
of the greatest value”, “harmony and cooperation”, and “mutual benefit”, while at the same time 
comprising elements drawn from the modern system of international relations (Li Jingzhi and 
Pu Ping 2014, p. 25). China’s outstanding culture will continue to contribute to the progress of 
human civilization in even a greater way than it did in the past as China is becoming a modern 
socialist country characterized by “great cultural and ethical progress” (Zhu Majie 2002a, p. 38).  
To conclude, all foreign policy concepts briefly described here, and in particular that of a 
harmonious world, are both instruments in China’s soft power toolkit, as they encapsulate 
China’s grand strategy in non-threatening, benevolent, and inspiring terms, and theories that 
conduce toward the strengthening of this softer expression of power because of the cultural 
component they contain. As stated by Li Jingzhi and Pu Ping (2014, p. 27), they display the 
“contributing power” of Chinese culture to the world and consequently enhance the 
attractiveness of Chinese values and the power of China’s diplomacy.  
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4. Discourse on Chinese soft power and Chinese discourse on soft power 
 
 
In order to complete the task of delineating a backdrop useful to guide the analysis that will be 
carried out in Chapter 5 and in the successive chapters, the first section of this chapter provides 
an introduction to some of the most relevant scholarly works that have discussed China’s soft 
power in English-language literature. The second section offers some further insights into the 
theory of soft power as conceptualized by Joseph S. Nye, expanding the study’s theoretical 
framework. The third section focuses on a selection of Chinese academic materials that discuss 
the topic of soft power, with the aim of providing an introduction to its autochthonous research, 
which has proven to be vast and variegated. This chapter is thus thought of as providing a link 
between the two macro areas of analysis concerning the Western discourse on Chinese soft 
power, in English, and the Chinese discourse on soft power, in Chinese. The international 
perspective followed in the first research area, however, must be completed by a selection of 
materials written in English by Chinese authors, discussed in Section 4.1. Conversely, the 
second research area follows a more local perspective, discussed in Section 4.3. All in all, this 
chapter is conceived as a brief literary review that also testifies to the growing popularity of the 
topic of China’s soft power. After presenting the schools of thought that have emerged in 
relation to soft power within the Chinese context, the last section of the chapter, in fact, 
provides a number of data to support this evaluation. The ever-growing popularity of the 
concept of soft power in China, however, does not correspond to consensus on what soft power 
actually means in the Chinese context. Even though Chinese scholars and political thinkers 
seem to agree on the role that culture plays as the core of soft power in and for China, there is 
still no agreement on the connotations of cultural soft power, or even on what terminology 
should be used in such a discussion. This makes examining the nature of the Chinese discourse 
on soft power more closely an urgent task, in order to reveal the important nuances of meaning 
specifically carried by the Chinese soft power jargon and detach Chinese soft power from its 
Western counterpart. 
 
 
4.1 An international perspective: discourse on Chinese soft power  
 
One of the first examples of Western consideration of Chinese soft power which will be 
examined here comes from the father of the concept, Joseph S. Nye, in an op-ed published in 
The Wall Street Journal (Asia) in 2005. In this piece, Nye urges the West, in particular the 
United States, to pay attention to China’s soft power efforts, following the first East Asian 
Summit, which, with the exclusion of the United States from the list of participants, suggested a 
new balance of power in Asia (Nye 2005). By overviewing the three resources of soft power he 
had previously identified, namely culture, political values, and foreign policy (diplomacy), Nye 
provides an evaluation of China’s soft power development, which still ranks below that of the 
United States, due to a series of issues, such as: the lack of cultural industries and universities as 
prestigious as those in the United States, the weakness of non-governmental organizations, 
insufficient respect of human rights, democracy, and rule of law, high levels of corruption and 
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inequality, and the risk of territorial disputes, among other problems (Ibid.)42. Nevertheless, 
progress has been made, as is shown by the achievements in building soft power in different 
areas: in terms of culture, the appreciation for Chinese traditional culture is being 
complemented by interest in popular culture, with notable examples such as the successful 
stories of Gao Xingjian 亚Ϥ, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2000, Ang Lee’s 
famous movie “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon” (2000), the fame of basketball player Yao 
Ming ŗə of the Huston Rockets, the hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games, the growing 
number of foreign tourists visiting China, and so forth; in terms of political values, the Beijing 
Consensus emerges as a new formula joining an authoritarian government with market economy; 
in terms of diplomacy, China has also made great progress, topping off its efforts for a 
“peaceful rise” with an upgrade of its participation in multilateral agreements, peacekeeping 
operations, nonproliferation talks, and other regional arrangements (Ibid.)43.     
One of the earliest and most relevant English-language attempts to describe China’s soft 
power in a comprehensive manner is the book Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is 
Transforming the World, written in 2007 by Joshua Kurlantzick, in which the author attempts to 
describe China’s soft power in a more encompassing way when compared to the idea originally 
put forward by Joseph S. Nye. Kurlantzick (2007, p. 6) points out that the term “soft power” 
coined by Nye was meant to fit a rather limited definition that excluded elements which would 
fall into the category of “carrots” and “sticks”, such as investment, trade, formal diplomacy, and 
aid, to focus more on a nation’s attractiveness. Stressing that China would be able to force other 
countries with sticks if they do not support its actions, but that it can also reward them with 
substantial carrots if they do, Kurlantzick posits that China “offers the charm of a lion, not of a 
mouse” and that, in the Chinese context, everything that is not military power constitutes soft 
power, including more coercive means, such as economic inducement or diplomatic leverage 
(Ibid.). A point of particular interest is that Kurlantzick identifies in China’s global strategy 
what he calls a variety of “tools of influence”, which fall into two categories: “tools of culture”, 
including Chinese culture, arts, language, and ethnicity, and “tools of business”, including trade, 
investment, aid, and the charm of China’s economic model (Kurlantzick 2007, p. 61 and p. 84). 
The approach chosen by Scott (2012, p. 39), which completes this classification with the 
category of the “PRC’s public diplomacy terms of a ‘tool of language’”, was discussed in the 
previous chapter. A link is also identified between China’s economic power and its cultural soft 
power. In fact, the country’s economic might allows for the deployment of the tools of culture 
and diplomacy, even though they do not depend on trade and investment (Kurlantzick 2007, p. 
61). This kind of cultural promotion is part of China’s enhanced public diplomacy, which can 
be defined as “the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other nations”, and helps to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Together with environmental degradation, the effect of these issues on the potential gains China could obtain 
through the use of soft power is reiterated by Joseph S. Nye and Wang Jisi in a later writing in which the authors state 
that China’s image is suffering from its “domestic deficiencies” (Nye and Wang 2009a, p. 27).  
43 These examples are enriched with more recent ones in Nye’s successive writings concerning China’s soft power, 
which will be taken into consideration in the following pages. In particular, Nye and Wang (2009a, p. 27) state that, 
in the diplomatic field, the Chinese government is promoting the idea of international cooperation, under the slogan 
of a “harmonious world”, and reiterating its commitment to a “peaceful path of development”. As well, it is 
interesting to note that in the field of literature, a more recent Nobel Prize presented to a Chinese writer has perhaps 
raised even more attention: that awarded to internationally renowned author Mo Yan ϕ϶ in 2012. The media reports 
that while the award given to Gao Xingjian was somehow disregarded, as the author has renounced his Chinese 
citizenship for French citizenship, Mo Yan’s achievement was cause for a national celebration for a symbol of what 
is perceived as China’s notably growing cultural presence in the world (Jacobs and Lyall 2012).   
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reinforce the concept of China’s peaceful development (Ibid., pp. 61-62). As will also be 
discussed later on, China’s public diplomacy includes aspects such as the expansion of the 
international reach of national media, promotion of cultural exchanges and visitor programs, 
improvement of diplomatic corps, the spread of Chinese culture and language worldwide, and 
leveraging bonds with the Chinese diaspora (Ibid., pp. 61-81).  
Although the present analysis does not follow Kurlantzick’s interpretation that a study of 
Chinese soft power should include hard-power economic tools, it cannot be denied that this 
volume falls among the earliest and most pioneering analyses of China’s soft power. As a 
matter of fact, as Breslin (2011, p. 6) points out, first attempts to discuss China’s soft power 
tended to employ a broader definition of the concept, including diplomatic and economic 
relations among the means available to China to get its way in power politics. Evaluating 
China’s soft power based also on the wielding of economic tools can be the consequence of the 
allure that China’s economy, having grown exponentially for the last few decades, undoubtedly 
generates. As pointed out in an English-language paper written by Chinese authors Huang 
Yanzhong and Ding Sheng (2006, p. 24), in order to use the concept of soft power in a way that 
is analytically useful, it is essential to separate it from pure economic strength; however, this 
could be a problem for a country with an economic performance as miraculous as that of China, 
whereas things are easier in the case of countries with a less impressive economic situation. The 
authors also address the problem of the difference between “inducement” and “seduction”, 
defining the former as an exercise of hard power, as it considers preferences as a given and acts 
directly on behavior, and the latter as an exercise of soft power, as it generates a change of 
preferences (Ibid.). In this sense, a country’s economic strength is useful to project soft power if 
the attraction it generates is not triggered by mere utilitarian purposes, such as trade, market 
access, and job opportunities (Ibid.). This paper by Huang Yanzhong and Ding Sheng provides 
a critical review of the conceptualization of soft power by its creator and, through a casual 
mechanism, attempts a measurement of soft power in a way that addresses both soft power 
resources and the extent to which a country is able to turn these resources into desired behaviors 
in other countries (Ibid., pp. 24-25). It offers a preliminary evaluation of China’s soft power in 
terms of its resources and foreign policy outcomes, putting forward three propositions: “China 
wields its soft power most successfully in neighboring Asian countries”; “China is increasingly 
having its way in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, where China’s development 
model is admired”; and “China will find it less successful to cajole Western liberal democracies 
to believe its rise is peaceful and to adopt foreign policies it prefers” (Ibid., pp. 33-35). 
Although China is becoming the “cultural magnet of Asia”, with global interest in its culture, 
language, and traditional values growing rapidly, and China’s economic capabilities, together 
with moral attraction and Confucian humanitarianism, have contributed to a betterment of its 
reputation and an increase in its attractiveness (Ibid., pp. 26-29), the authors come to moderate 
conclusions in regard to China’s ability to turn soft power resources into desired foreign policy 
outcomes. In particular, despite the extraordinary results achieved since the 1990s in this field, 
they believe that soft power remains China’s “underbelly”, as it is still a vulnerable area lacking 
an “ideal mix” of soft power resources, namely a balanced relationship among cultural 
attractiveness, domestic values and policies, and foreign policies (Ibid., pp. 40-41). For instance, 
its domestic political system is considered too rigid to produce examples that can match China’s 
projected foreign policy (Ibid.). Nevertheless, it is relevant to note that this analysis was 
published prior to 2007, the year that, as has been previously described, officially saw the 
inclusion of soft power in China’s top leaders’ policy statements, marking the addition of soft 
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power to the country’s national strategy. From that point onwards, soft power has been 
acquiring an increasingly profound meaning for both domestic and foreign policy in China.   
Two other contributions worth mentioning here are the result of Ding Sheng’s work, as 
well: a coauthored paper in collaboration with Robert A. Saunders and the study entitled The 
Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises With Its Soft Power, published in 2006 and 2008 
respectively. While the former contribution offers an analysis of China’s growing cultural 
power and pays specific attention to the promotion of the Chinese language abroad as a global 
lingua franca and a tool to boost China’s soft power (Ding and Saunders 2006), a point to 
which the discussion will come back in greater detail in Chapter 8, the latter represents a 
comprehensive study that looks at China’s rising power from the perspective of soft power. In 
particular, the study elaborates on theories on rising power, evaluating the hypothesis according 
to which a rising China will become a revisionist power and a threat to the global status quo, 
while positing that the concept of soft power can represent a new approach to the analysis of 
China’s rising power in the context of an increasingly “interdependent” world (Ding Sheng 
2008, Chapter 1). Ding Sheng raises the question as to whether or not the concept of soft power 
as a new conceptual framework can be applied to the study of China’s rise given the fact that 
not only had this process started at least a decade before Nye’s conceptualized his theory, but 
also that to be at the core of Nye’s discourse it was the United States (Ibid., pp. 20-21). By 
drawing a connection between the idea of soft power and China’s ancient culture and ideology 
and exploring its vicissitudes in contemporary China, Ding Sheng highlights the peculiarity of 
the Chinese interpretation of Nye’s concept in a way that is in line with the present discussion 
and that deserves quoting at length:  
 
The term soft power has frequently appeared in Chinese media and scholarly works, but Beijing’s top 
leaders have rarely used the exact term of ruanliliang (soft power) in their speeches or government’s 
documents. They may not want to credit Joseph Nye for the idea of soft power. In fact, what Chinese 
political elites have said about soft power is different from Nye’s definition of soft power. They 
believe China’s soft power is embedded in China’s traditional culture and ideology. 
(Ibid., p. 28) 
 
More will be said about the existing Chinese translations of the term “soft power” in 
Section 4.4 and Chapter 7, but it is interesting to note here that, in his English language 
masterpiece, this well-known Chinese Professor of Political Science goes as far as to detect a 
conscious intention in the Chinese leadership to elaborate a new idea of soft power suitable to 
China’s characteristics. This would be in tune, for instance, with the connection between the 
concept of soft power and that of “zonghe guoli”, which, as has been previously explained, is 
“an original Chinese political concept with no roots in Western political theories”, insofar as in 
China soft power deployment is seen as indispensable to increase the country’s CNP (Ding 
Sheng 2008, p. 28). The originality of the Chinese interpretation of soft power can also be seen 
in relation to the notions of China’s peaceful rise, or peaceful development, and harmonious 
world, discussed in the previous chapter, which are also concepts peculiar to the Chinese 
context.  
To continue this brief summary of the international debate on Chinese soft power, 
reference must be made to the studies carried out by Wuthnow (2008) and Hunter (2009), which, 
in a certain way, echo the preceding discussion. While the former discusses soft power as a non-
coercive strategy that finds its place within China’s strategic thinking, identifying the use of soft 
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power resources to serve the country’s grand strategy, the latter looks at the roots of soft power 
in China’s ancient philosophy, going back to the age of some of the most influential traditional 
thinkers.  
Another important study of China’s soft power, published in English and collecting 
contributions by both Chinese and Western authors, is the book edited by Li Mingjiang in 2009, 
to which this dissertation refers on several occasions. Including the works by contributors from 
various disciplines, Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics explores 
the domestic and international discourse on China’s soft power from different perspectives and 
examines China’s potential soft power resources, strengths, and weaknesses, applying an 
interdisciplinary approach that includes investigations on domestic policies, culture, history, 
social relations, and international relations (Li Mingjiang 2009a, pp. 10-16). Among the topics 
addressed, attention is paid to Chinese philosophical approaches to soft power, the role of 
education in cultivating China’s soft power, the assessment of the effectiveness of some of 
China’s soft power sources, such as the operations of the Confucius Institutes, the appeal of the 
Chinese model of development, and China’s cultural power (Ibid.). Li Mingjiang (2009a, p. 3) 
also highlights some drawbacks in Nye’s conceptualization of soft power by posing that, first 
and foremost, soft power is not intrinsically embedded in the nature of certain sources of power, 
but it has to be nurtured and cultivated. Detecting a “resource-based approach” in the original 
idea of soft power leads to a second problem that is related to recognizing attractiveness, 
persuasiveness, and appeal as elements directly embedded in the very nature of certain 
resources of soft power, such as culture, ideology, and values (Ibid., pp. 3-4). It can be argued 
that these attributes cannot be considered intrinsic characteristics of soft power resources. For 
instance, why is culture thought to be more likely to produce attraction when it can also produce 
repulsion? Why are culture, values, and foreign policies considered as separate soft power 
resources when the first two can also be part of the third? These and other related questions are 
addressed by Li Mingjiang in a critical review of Nye’s thought (Li Mingjiang 2009a, pp. 3-7).   
Throughout the aforementioned volume, the picture that emerges is that of a country with 
immense soft power potential, in terms of resources and strengths, but also with weaknesses in 
turning these capacities into desired outcomes (Li Mingjiang 2009c). In particular, Li Mingjiang 
(2009a, p. 10) specifies that, focusing on culture and values, the resource-based approach to 
China’s soft power portrays a picture that is more pessimistic than the scenario that focuses on 
China’s foreign policy behaviors, which tends to highlight the growth of China’s soft power. 
Thus, a different approach to the concept of soft power is put forward, namely the “soft use of 
power” approach, which considers the essence of soft power as being in the “soft use of power 
to increase a state’s attraction, persuasiveness, and appeal” (Ibid., p. 7). This approach also 
explains why, in the Chinese context, the discussion on soft power pertains to both domestic 
and international politics, insofar as how a government uses power on its country’s own people 
can have repercussions on the perception of the international community (Ibid., p. 9). Therefore, 
the examination calls for greater attention to and further analysis of the construction of soft 
power at home and its projection abroad. In fact, there is one point in particular brought up by 
Li Mingjiang that is noteworthy to better explain how the construction of soft power is viewed 
in the Chinese context and the relevance, in this regard, of soft power development strategies. 
The great deal of discussion dedicated to the development of soft power is generated by the fact 
that, as has been previously pointed out, soft power needs to be cultivated and built up. In the 
previous chapter, it was indeed highlighted that, according to Li Mingjiang (2009b, p. 30), in 
the view of many Chinese strategists soft power “does not grow automatically from the 
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influence of material hard power”. The tools to implement this project, in respect to China’s 
international relations, are generally considered to be largely embedded in public diplomacy and 
cultural diplomacy (Lai Hongyi 2012a, 2012b). More specifically, in China, public diplomacy 
in general, and cultural diplomacy in particular, have become the tools of choice to develop soft 
power, in accordance with the official emphasis on culture as a source of national power and to 
the extent that public diplomacy often assumes the form of cultural diplomacy because, for the 
Chinese, publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television, and sports, 
some of the instruments of public diplomacy, fall into the category of culture (Lai Hongyi 
2012a, p. 13). It is precisely in this perspective, which sees culture and cultural diplomacy as 
tools of soft power, that the funding of language promotion activities, such as the ones carried 
out by Hanban ʺÁ (the Office of the Chinese Language Council International) and the 
Confucius Institutes (Kongzi Xueyuan), takes its place along with a variety of official programs 
for global cultural influence, cultural exchange programs, and the promotion of cultural exports 
(Lai Hongyi 2012b). Hence, in the discourse on Chinese cultural soft power.  
With each of its 10 chapters providing an in-depth analysis of a different aspect of 
China’s soft power, the book edited by Lai Hongyi and Lu Yiyi (2012), entitled China’s Soft 
Power and International Relations, offers an examination of the topic from different 
perspectives, including the views of the Chinese elites on soft power, its official discourse, 
public and cultural diplomacy, foreign aid, and political strategies. As stated by Lai Hongyi 
(2012a, p. 1), the volume, which gathers contributions by both Chinese and Western authors 
writing in English, aims to address the deficiency in the literature on China’s soft power, while 
also offering a critique of Nye’s theory of soft power. In this respect, one of the main criticisms 
expressed in regard to Nye’s conceptualization concerns his selection of culture, political values, 
and foreign policies as the only three resources of soft power, failing to mention other assets 
that operate through attraction (Ibid., pp. 4-11). For instance, it is possible to exercise attraction 
on another country thanks to the allure of military strength, economic power, trade opportunities, 
and scientific and technological progress (Ibid.). Science and technology and foreign aid, in 
particular, appear to be important resources of soft power and attraction which Nye fails to 
include among soft power resources, perhaps due to a lack of clarity in distinguishing between 
resources of soft and hard power (Ibid.). This is again confirmed by another contribution in the 
volume; Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi (2012, pp. 23-26) propose their own dynamic 
interpretation of the soft power theory, focusing on the evaluation of “the soft or hard 
effectiveness of power resources in international politics” and arguing that Nye’s “static or rigid 
interpretation of soft power and hard power is limited for the study of international relations”, in 
regard, in particular, to three main points: first, his conceptual division between soft and hard 
power is considered too simplistic, so much so as to give rise to contradictions with regard, for 
example, to the fact that Nye himself states that hard power can sometimes have a softer side, in 
terms of the attractive force it can generate, but then fails to elaborate on the conclusion that it is 
indeed the effectiveness of power resources that can be soft or hard. Second, according to the 
authors, some of the points raised by Nye are not in accordance with the reality of international 
relations in regard to the fact that, for instance, admiration for a country does not necessarily 
mean total compliance with the country’s agenda (Ibid.). Third, with reference to some soft 
power resources specific to China, also mentioned above, most of the examples provided do not 
necessarily have implications in international politics or state behavior, making Nye’s 
description of the scope of soft power resources “not scientific enough” (Ibid.).  
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An attempt to contribute theoretically to the analysis of soft power, in order to respond to 
the criticism expressed in regard to Nye’s original conceptualization, is again offered by Ding 
Sheng (2008, Chapter 3) in relation, in particular, to the identification of two specific 
weaknesses: the lack of discussion on the “multidimensionality of soft power resources” and the 
lack of clarity about how countries can convert soft power resources into realized power. The 
author examines the multidimensionality of soft power to determine whether it can be assessed 
based on all three traditional dimensions of power, namely “attribute power approach”, 
“relational power approach”, and “structural power approach” (Ibid.). The author believes that 
the concept of soft power is “one of the greatest ideas developed during the last two decades in 
the field of international relations”, and in stating as such he suggests combining the 
aforementioned approaches and recognizing the multidimensionality of soft power resources to 
make the concept of soft power analytically stronger (Ibid., pp. 54-55). In regard to the process 
of conversion from soft power resources to desired policy outcomes, the author believes that 
this is indeed an issue that seriously complicates the measurement of soft power, to the 
detriment of an analytical use of the concept (Ibid., p. 48). Thus, the author puts forward a 
model to explain how soft power resources can be turned into desired policy outcomes in other 
countries, based on two forms of behavior in soft power wielding, namely “agenda-setting” and 
“attraction”:  
 
[F]irst, if country A can establish favorable international regimes — the formal and informal norms, 
rules, and procedures relevant to the international system, country B that participates in these 
international regimes will automatically obey those norms, rules, and procedures, implement the 
country A’s favorable foreign policies, and lead to A’s desired policy outcomes; second, if country A’s 
soft power resources are attractive to B’s policymakers in a “neutral” international environment, a 
rational policymaking process in country B may produce the favorable foreign policies toward country 
A and lead to A’s desired policy outcomes.  
(Ibid., p. 55) 
 
The establishment of favorable international regimes contributes to the “agenda-setting” 
process that enables the country willing to exercise power to produce desired behaviors in the 
target country. Ding Sheng (2008, p. 51) identifies three groups of policy actors in the target 
country on which the second form of behavior in soft power wielding, namely “attraction”, has 
an effect, at different degrees: top governmental leaders, interest groups and media elites, and 
general public. A condition for attraction to work is that the international environment be 
“neutral”, a circumstance which happens, for example, when the bilateral relations between the 
countries involved in the soft power resources conversion process are historically free of 
antagonism (Ibid., p. 54). Thus, a country’s soft power resources exercise attraction on policy 
actors in other countries and, provided the neutrality of the international environment, this will 
create the necessary conditions for attraction to act successfully and for the country to obtain the 
desired policy outcomes.  
The various approaches to soft power and the critiques expressed in regard to Joseph S. 
Nye’s conceptualization, suggested by the authors mentioned above, lead the present discussion 
to provide a more in-depth analysis of the theory developed by the American scholar in order to 
complete the scenario described thus far.  
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4.2 More on Joseph S. Nye’s soft power theory 
 
Joseph S. Nye’s discourse on power in global affairs in general, and soft power in 
particular, has developed over the years, perhaps taking into account some of the criticism 
expressed in regard to his theory. In his book The Future of Power, Nye describes power in 
global affairs as being related to both a definition of power as the resources a country has and 
the behaviors it is able to generate in other countries (Nye 2011a, pp. 5-9). In this sense, talking 
about “military power” and “economic power” without making clear what definition of power is 
being referred to, behavioral or resource-based, makes these two terms “hybrids” that combine 
resources and behaviors (Ibid., pp. 9-10). Nye takes the example of the debate around China’s 
rising power arguing that it mainly refers to the country’s resources without keeping in mind 
that the relationship between resources and outcomes can be imperfect and that one must take 
into account the ability to put in place strategies useful to convert resources into desired 
outcomes, as well as the context in which this conversion takes place (Ibid., p. 10). Although 
not directly addressing the criticism expressed, for example, by the authors mentioned in the 
previous section, these further explanations can shed light on the relationship between power 
measured as resources and power measured as behaviors. Nye states that, in a more careful 
relational definition, power is “the ability to alter others’ behaviors to produce preferred 
outcomes”, making “outcomes”, and not resources, the key of the problem (Nye 2011a, p. 10). 
Contexts and power-conversion strategies between resources and desired outcomes should 
receive more attention as it is indeed these strategies that “relate means to ends”, with those that 
successfully combine hard and soft power resources in different contexts becoming the key to 
what he calls “smart power” (Ibid.). In regard to the context of these interactions, Nye clearly 
indicates that resources that produce power in one context may not do the same if the interaction 
takes place in a different one (Ibid., pp. 3-4). 
In addition to distinguishing between resource and relational definitions of power, Nye 
also suggests the existence of three aspects, or “faces”, of relational power: “commanding 
change, controlling agendas, and establishing preferences” (Nye 2011a, pp. 10-11). Command 
power is the first face of power and, being the basis for hard power, which obtains the desired 
outcomes through coercion and payment, is very visible and easy to identify (Ibid., p. 16). It is 
in contrast to the co-optive power of the second and third faces of relational power, which, 
contributing to soft power in obtaining the desired outcomes through agenda-setting, persuasion, 
and attraction, is more subtle and less visible (Ibid.). The key in responding to the criticism 
expressed in regard to Nye’s theory lies in considering the distinction between resources and 
behaviors produced based on them, and the role played by the target in perceiving the actor’s 
actions. According to Nye (2011a, p. 20), confusion about soft power comes from the mistake 
of overlapping the actions taken by a country to achieve desired outcomes with the resources 
used to produce them: “[m]any types of resources can contribute to soft power, but that does 
not mean that soft power is any type of behavior”. Once again, Nye brings up the case of China 
to describe some of the dynamics involved in the projection of soft power. Taking China’s 
economic performance as a resource of power, he states that its success “can produce both the 
hard power of sanctions and restricted market access and the soft power of attraction and 
emulation”, proving the point that resources that usually fall into the category of hard power can 
actually produce soft power behavior, depending on the context and the way in which they are 
used (Nye 2011a, pp. 21-22). As stated above, the target of the strategies put in place to 
generate behaviors also holds an important position, as determining which aspect of power is 
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being used is based on the target’s previously existing preferences and its perception of the 
actions taken by the actor exercising power. In this regard, Nye suggests that “[h]ard power is 
push; soft power is pull” (Nye 2011a, p. 20) and that “[s]oft power is a dance that requires 
partners” (Ibid., p. 84). Another example Nye provides is that of the Beijing Consensus, 
insomuch as it constitutes a development model which, joining an authoritarian government 
with successful market economy, is appealing in many countries in the developing world; but to 
what exactly the admirers of the Beijing Consensus are attracted or by what exactly they are 
induced, as well as the fact that the same resource does not seem to produce much attraction in 
democratic countries, are issues that deserve consideration in the evaluation of how much soft 
power is truly generated by this growth model (Ibid., p. 86). Once again, a behavior that may 
have been produced by attraction may also have been produced by other motives, such as 
economic inducement, while the context in which the relation takes place is also of the utmost 
importance. As Nye puts it: “Sometimes in real-world situations, it is difficult to distinguish 
what part of an economic relationship is composed of hard power and what is made up of soft 
power” (Nye 2011a, p. 85).  
Confusing resources that may produce soft power with the effect of soft power itself is 
the reason why soft power is sometimes regarded as lacking effectiveness in the assessment of 
power in global affairs. According to Nye (2011a, p. 22), eating American food or wearing 
American clothing are actions that do not necessarily mean soft power, but whether or not soft 
power resources are successfully converted into favorable behaviors depends both on the skills 
of the agent in using resources to produce desired behavioral outcomes and on the context of the 
relationship. Soft power alone cannot produce effective foreign policy, but what is needed is 
“smart power”, envisioned as “the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into 
effective strategies” (Ibid., pp. 22-23). In this regard, Nye considers China’s intent to invest in 
soft power resources as a deliberate decision to develop a smart strategy which is useful to 
portray the country’s hard power, namely its rising power in economic and military resources, 
as less threatening in the eyes of its neighbors (Ibid.).   
Thus far, the concept of soft power has been further analyzed with the aim of enriching 
the theoretical framework based on which it will be possible to highlight some of the most 
relevant characteristics of Chinese soft power. First and foremost, it has been found that there is 
widespread consensus on the fact that resources that are considered useful soft power tools do 
not necessarily generate the desired changed behaviors in other countries, as effective actions 
must be taken to turn resources into outcomes. As well, the discussion presented so far bears 
witness to the fact that there exist a variety of approaches to the soft power concept because it is 
indeed an aspect of power that is difficult to define. It is noteworthy that an example of the 
behavior it refers to can be found in China, more specifically as far back as in China’s ancient 
thinking. This is an aspect that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, but it is 
interesting to note here that even Nye argues that although “the concept of soft power is recent, 
the behavior it denotes is as old as human history” (Nye 2011a, p. 81). Nye states that even Lao-
tzu (Laozi  Φś, Zhou ċ dynasty, c. XI-221 BC) believed that “a leader is best not when 
people obey his commands, but when they barely know he exists” (Ibid.). As an academic 
concept, soft power has been widely used, also outside of the United States; like hard power, it 
can be used for good or bad purposes and, at times, its meaning has been used incorrectly, to 
refer to anything other than military power (Ibid.).  
Soft power is not only difficult to define but also hard to master. Making soft power a 
successful part of a government strategy faces difficulties that depend on three characteristics of 
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this form of power: first, the outcome of soft power rests more in the hands of the target than is 
the case with hard power; second, the effect of soft power can take a long time to become 
manifest; third, soft power tools are not fully controlled by governments but rest as much in the 
hands of civil society, as is the case for culture and values (Nye 2011a, p. 83). These three 
characteristics constitute a useful summary of all of the aspects of soft power that have been 
considered thus far.   
The last point mentioned above is particularly noteworthy because, as has been posed, it 
denotes one of the key differences between the Chinese interpretation of soft power and its 
original conceptualization, namely the different involvement of governments and civil society in 
the projection of soft power. As stated by Shambaugh (2013, p. 209), soft power should be 
considered as a “magnet that pulls and draws others to a nation simply because of its powerful 
appeal by example”; thus, it should be a country’s society to attract others rather than the work 
of the government to try to persuade them. According to the author, this is precisely the 
difference between soft power and public diplomacy, with the latter being “an instrument in the 
hand of governments” which will not be as effective if there is a lack of intrinsic soft power 
generated by society (Ibid.).  
As well, it is interesting to note that similarities and differences between the American 
and Chinese views on soft power have been discussed on various occasions by the very creator 
of the soft power concept. In fact, as has been seen, Joseph S. Nye made reference to the case of 
China’s rising power and soft power efforts in various points throughout his 2011 book. First 
and foremost, this denotes a change in the American scholar’s approach to China’s soft power 
in comparison to the past, from which it can be assumed that the improvement of China’s soft 
power development strategies has had an impact on the international debate on soft power as 
well. As noticed by Deng Yong (2009, p. 63), when Nye wrote his 2004 book, China’s soft 
power was not taken very seriously, with just a few pages dedicated to it in the chapter on the 
soft power of Asian countries. As a matter of fact, in the evaluation that Nye proposed, China’s 
soft power was compared to that of India, as both countries were equally envisioned as having 
increasing hard and soft power, following rapid economic growth, but with indexes related to 
the potentiality of soft power resources being far from comparable to those of the United States, 
Europe, and Japan (Nye 2004, Chapter 3). The policies and values promoted by the CPC, 
together with mounting corruption, lack of intellectual freedom, and worrying foreign policies, 
such as the one adopted in the Taiwan case, are all elements that were considered to be harming 
China’s soft power capabilities (Ibid.). These aspects are also addressed in Nye’s 2011 book and 
in other writings by the American scholar. The efforts made by China to increase its soft power 
are discussed both in relation to its attractive traditional culture and the recent advancements 
achieved in the field of global popular culture; the examples provided include, among others, 
the ever-increasing number of Chinese students abroad and foreign students in China, the 
establishment of hundreds of Confucius Institutes worldwide, and the investments in external 
publicity work, with reference to media operations such as those aimed at the expansion of the 
English-language broadcasting of CRI, the increase in internationalization and competitiveness 
of Xinhua News Agency and CCTV, in order to compete with BBC and CNN, and the 
establishment of a 24-hour Xinhua cable news channel created based on the example of Al 
Jazeera (Nye 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b). Emphasis is placed on China’s numerous and 
expensive efforts to win friends abroad by means of soft power, stressing the huge costs of an 
endeavor that is still producing little returns, harmed by the country’s use of culture and 
narrative to create soft power in a way that is nonetheless inconsistent with domestic realities 
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(Ibid.). To name just one example chosen from those proposed by Nye, not long after the 
elaborate organization of the 2008 Olympic Games, China’s domestic crackdown in Tibet and 
Xinjiang, together with the repression of human rights activists, undermined what had been 
gained in terms of soft power (Ibid.). In 2011, in his March 25th article for The Washington Post, 
the publication of which followed a lecture delivered by the American scholar at Beijing 
University, Nye reports the answer given to a student who enquired about the methods China 
could use to increase its soft power: since much of a country’s soft power is generated by its 
civil society, the rigidity of China’s censorship and controls would need to be loosened for 
China to achieve better results in its use of soft power (Nye 2011b). In 2012, Nye reiterated 
these points in an article for the International Herald Tribune in which he once again stressed 
the role of civil society in the effective development of soft power by saying that:  
 
The development of soft power need not be a zero sum game. All countries can gain from finding 
attraction in one anothers’ cultures. But for China to succeed, it will need to unleash the talents of its 
civil society. Unfortunately, that does not seem about to happen soon. 
(Nye 2012a) 
 
In the same year, in an article for The Wall Street Journal, Nye continued to comment on 
his experience lecturing at various Chinese universities on the topic of soft power, reporting that 
at the end of one of his speeches, in which he had highlighted the harm of government 
censorship in fields such as the Internet and art, mentioning the case of Ai Weiwei and films by 
Zhang Yimou。χМ44, a Party official clarified to the students that Chinese soft power should 
focus on culture and not politics (Nye 2012b).  
On balance, it can be argued that, based on the very words of the creator of the concept of 
soft power and on the preceding discussion, China’s soft power is depicted as a controversial 
topic on which the international and domestic audiences do not find consensus. Through the re-
elaboration of the concept of soft power in greater detail presented above, which clarifies the 
distinction between soft power resources and behaviors, it can be implied that there is a gap that 
separates China’s soft power resources from the achievement of their full potential in generating 
desired outcomes. The deployment of more effective soft power development strategies could 
prove beneficial in filling this gap.  
As well, the process of soft power development in China appears to be heavily dependent 
on the government’s guidance, and much less on the performance of a civil society able to 
freely express its many talents. This is made clear by Joseph S. Nye and Wang Jisi when they 
state that China’s soft power has a long way to go to match that of the United States, as the 
former is very much dependent on the work by the government, while the latter is mainly 
generated by the country’s civil society (Nye and Wang 2009a, p. 27).   
Nevertheless, soft power is recognized as a subject that attracts a considerable amount of 
interest. If one considers that, since the 1990s, thousands of essays and articles have been 
published in China on the topic of soft power, with related lectures attracting large audiences 
(Nye 2012b), the doubts and criticism expressed in regard to the theory put forward by the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Zhang Yimou is a Chinese film director who, among many successes, directed the opening ceremony of the 2008 
Beijing Olympics. Here, Nye refers to the fact that Zhang Yimou’s films are always set in the past because, as stated 
by the director himself, the PRC’s censorship would be more likely to target films about contemporary China (Nye 
2012b). 
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American scholar are of little moment. According to Ding Sheng (2008, p. 28), for the Chinese 
political elites, fulfilling the dream of making China a global power rests, in an increasingly 
profound way, on the development of soft power. 
To conclude, this discussion mainly constitutes a preamble to the contents of the next 
section, which will provide insights related to the integration and evolution of the concept of 
soft power within the boundaries of the Chinese context. Before moving on to this task, another 
interesting approach to the examination of the Western discourse on Chinese soft power is 
worth mentioning. It is that provided by a recent paper written by Aukia (2014) in which the 
author divides the body of available international literature on China’s rhetoric of soft power 
into two groups, coining the terms “Dualist” and “Monotist” to define them. Authors that agree 
with a binary approach in analyzing Chinese soft power, by identifying both domestic and 
international applications in it, fall in the first category, while those who only see the Chinese 
thinking on soft power in relation to international relations fall into the second category. The 
author argues that the rhetoric of soft power in China should not be thought of as a mere way to 
generate attraction, but also as a policy tool for a nation still “in search of itself” (Aukia 2014, p. 
72). In the previous chapter, much was said to support the choice of following a binary 
interpretation of the discourse on soft power in China, based on the “holistic” or “inward-
looking and outward-looking” approaches proposed by Glaser and Murphy (2009) and Barr 
(2011) respectively. Having now added to these definitions Aukia’s “dualistic” approach to the 
purpose of the Chinese discourse on soft power – domestic and international (Aukia 2014, p. 
77), a conclusion will also be drawn in Chapter 7 regarding the possibility to define China’s soft 
power as “soft power with Chinese characteristics”, as suggested by Glaser and Murphy (2009, 
p. 20).  
Based on the description provided thus far, the present analysis posits that further 
research is needed to establish a clear definition of the concept of soft power suitable for the 
context of contemporary China. Carrying out this task is made more difficult by the variety of 
approaches that coexist in the analysis of the Western conceptualization of soft power based on 
which it would be possible to develop a Chinese interpretation of the theory. As a matter of fact, 
Chinese scholars engaged in developing an autochthonous Chinese discourse on soft power, 
which at the phase of inception usually draws upon the original theory, have developed a 
discussion that is as much, if not more, vast and variegated.   
 
 
4.3 Chinese discourse on soft power: overview of a local perspective 
 
As a matter of fact, in China, the discussion on soft power started in the early 1990s, 
when the soft power theory made its first appearance in intellectual circles. As will be described 
in Chapter 5, it was presented at first through translations of Nye’s works and discussed from a 
theoretical perspective in scholarly articles. In this early period, the approach towards the 
concept of soft power was quite cautious. According to Deng Yong (2009, p. 65), in the 1990s, 
soft power was considered a “Western privilege” and when it was mentioned in relation to 
China it was usually with regard to the country’s domestic policies. In fact, reference to non-
material power in terms of national cohesion and domestic governance was made on the 
background of the discussion about CNP (Ibid., p. 66). According to Glaser and Murphy (2009, 
p. 11), in the beginning, scholars within Chinese academic circles directed their attention 
towards the question of what soft power meant and what its application would be in the Chinese 
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context. Cho and Jeong (2008, p. 457) note that it was not until the late 1990s that Chinese 
intellectuals started to discuss soft power in relation to the country’s national strategy, at a time 
when the media started to report extensively on global issues, a fact that stimulated the interest 
of the policy elites and general public in these issues and foreign policy. This is also confirmed 
by Breslin (2011, pp. 5-6) who states that with the beginning of the new millennium the topic of 
soft power became a popular subject in Chinese academia, a debated concept on the Internet, 
and an issue discussed in the field of official policy. According to Glaser and Murphy (2009, p. 
12), the attention of the Chinese leadership and the general public for the concept of soft power 
escalated in the mid-2000s, when the discussion moved beyond academic analyses, and 
theorists formulated an extended version of the original soft power theory, which the authors 
define as “soft power with Chinese characteristics”.  
Over the years, interest in soft power increasingly penetrated the policy-making and 
leadership levels and gained the spotlight in the political and public debate. This is confirmed 
by Liu Debin ³ǗɈ (2004) who, writing a decade ago, detected an increase in the interest in 
soft power among Chinese scholars since its first appearance in the American context, testified 
by an upsurge of papers touching upon this topic, so much so that “for some scholars the 
construction of soft power had reached the same level of importance as the success or failure of 
China’s rise” (you xuezhe shenzhi ba ‘ruan shili’ de goujian tisheng dao Zhongguo nengfou 
chenggong jueqi de gaodu ɭţΨ̚ξȉ&ġ‘且ɸÀ’̪ʀƾȪÒ»&ġηăǸÂƕе̪亚
Ƹ). The degree of attention and value attached to the concept of soft power by Chinese scholars 
could therefore be considered even higher than that of any other country, including the United 
States (Ibid.).  
Similarly, Chinese scholar Wang Yiwei (2008, p. 258) highlights the importance of soft 
power in the Chinese context by stating that “few Western international relations phrases have 
penetrated as deeply or broadly into the Chinese vocabulary in recent years”. In Chapter 2, Hu 
Jintao’s reference to China’s cultural soft power in his political report to the 17th National 
Congress of the CPC in October 2007 was expounded upon, and the importance of this 
document was explained in relation to the official inclusion of the soft power theory within 
China’s national strategy. The widespread opinion that this relevant political event represented 
the debut of soft power in the CPC’s official discourse will be discussed in greater detail in the 
second part of this thesis, through the studies carried out by Chinese scholars such as Zhao 
Gang дµ and Xiao Huan αʢ (2010), Hong Xiaonan et al. (2013), and Liu Deding (2013), 
among others. In Western literature, Glaser and Murphy (2009, p. 16), for instance, see Hu 
Jintao’s political report as the “leadership’s official sanction of soft power” and the acceptance 
of the mainstream view that “the core of soft power is culture”. From a terminological point of 
view, the wording “ruan shili” (soft power) was thereafter incorporated into China’s political 
jargon. Nye and Wang (2009a, p. 28) emphasize that, with the 17th National Congress, soft 
power entered China’s official language45. Aukia (2014, p. 76) highlights the impact that the 
CPC had on the expansion of the research on soft power in China. Defining Hu Jintao’s speech 
as a “famous report” that “outlined national soft power goals and strategy”, the author argues 
that the dramatic increase in soft power-related publications following the 17th National 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 There exists a Chinese version of this paper written by Joseph S. Nye (Yuesefu?Nai ΂̙Ň?ō) and Wang Jisi
̏ΜǤ which, in relation to this point, reads: “‘Ruan shili’ ye jinru le guanfang yuhui ‘且ůÀ’3严7ŬɎГʹ” 
(Nye and Wang 2009b, p. 9).  
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Congress bears witness to the fact that China’s study of soft power was greatly affected by the 
launch of the national soft power strategy in 2007 (Ibid.).  
Prior to the leadership’s official sanction of the soft power concept, early examples of its 
increasing popularity include a variety of writings by Chinese scholars, such as: Wang Huning 
̏˃ť (1993), Pang Zhongying ƶ&Ϗ (1997), Liu Debin (2001, 2004), Zhang Zhan 。ǻ and 
Li Haijun ɹ：… (2003), Li Haijuan ɹ：ř (2004), and Liu Qing ³ư and Wang Litao ̏¹
˚ (2007). These and other scholarly approaches will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
This leads the present discussion to briefly introducing some of the most relevant Chinese 
literature analyzed in the course of this research. One of the first and most comprehensive 
assessments of China’s soft power is that provided by well-known Chinese scholar Men 
Honghua in his 2007 edited book Zhongguo: Ruan Shili Fanglüe &ġ且ůÀɎ̤ (China’s 
Soft Power Strategy). In the introduction, the significance of soft power for China’s strategy, the 
purpose behind providing an assessment of China’s soft power, and the scope of investigating a 
way to enhance it are clarified: first, along with soft power increasingly becoming a core 
component of the international standing of a country, placing soft power development at a 
strategic level has become a fundamental demand for the realization of national overall 
objectives; second, carrying out an evaluation of China’s soft power “is not for the purpose of 
competing with other countries” (bushi weile yu qita guojia yi jing duan changɞ)7
QġŶͤ̓҆), but that of “reflecting on oneself” (neisheng ̶), so that China can 
“review its own strategic path” (dui ziji de zhanlüe lujing jinxing fansi żνƞ̪ǻ̤不Ǒ严Ϥ
êǤ); third, China’s amicable intentions are highlighted, as it is pointed out that investigating a 
way to enhance China’s soft power “does not pursue regional or even global expansion” (bushi 
weile diquxing naizhi quanqiuxing kuozhangɞ)7ĩÏǦ,ξ̕Ǧȃ。), “but a hope 
for self-improvement” (ershi xiwang ziwo chongshi Ωɞƣɯνǹů), so as to “find a 
sustainable growth path and establish solid bases for the achievement of the great rejuvenation 
of the Chinese people” (zhao dao ke chixu de zengzhang lujing, wei shixian Zhonghua minzu 
weida fuxing de zhanlüe mubiao dianding jianshi de jichu Ȇ»ôȚΖ̪ķ҆不Ǒ)ů̒&
ÔʴɑańĿ̪ǻ̤̲ʋŐŭĬů̪ĳ͆) (Men Honghua 2007a, p. 1). On balance, China 
is seen as a country that is maturing into a “multi-center of soft power” (ruan shili de duoyuan 
zhongxin且ůÀ̪ł&ǘ), with enormous potential for its development (Ibid.). Following 
the policy of reform and opening-up, the country’s soft power has gained an all-around and 
rapid upgrade, achieving vigorous development that has evolved “from passive to active” (cong 
beidong dao zhudong OϩÅ»*Å) and “from involuntary to voluntary” (cong wuyishi dao 
youyishi OɓǱЋ»ɭǱЋ); similarly, with the transformation of the Chinese society from a 
“closed society” (fengbi shehui ž҈͍`) to an “open society” (kaifang shehui ƿȺ͍`) 
engaging with the outside world, China’s soft power has also taken “a step out of the country’s 
door” (maichu guomen ѐ«ġ҇), exercising “ever-increasing attractiveness and influence at 
home and abroad” (dui guoneiwai de xiyinliyingxiangli yuelaiyue da żġŁ̪ćǂÀ	
ǍđÀ万ɼ万ń) (Ibid.).  
The contributions contained in this edited volume, published almost a decade ago, are 
numerous and include insights regarding the basic assessment of China’s soft power, 
comparisons of China’s soft power with that of the United States and Japan, and strategies 
aimed at enhancing the country’s soft power (Men Honghua 2007b). In one of his contributions 
 81 
to this book, the introduction, Men Honghua recognized that China’s soft power had already 
become an important topic fervently discussed in strategic circles, stressing that, regardless of 
the disagreement among scholars trying to determine the meaning and the extensions of the 
concept of soft power, basic assessments had already been produced (Men Honghua 2007a, p. 
3). On the one hand, the general point of view among strategists was that the “current situation 
and future of China’s soft power are worrisome” (Zhongguo ruan shili de xianzhuang he weilai 
jun lin ren youlü &ġ且ůÀ̪̒̈ĎɳɼīTIǝϟ), as soft power was perceived as being 
“extremely delicate” (ruo bu jing feng ǅ͑于) or similar to “a sword with no point” (you 
jian wu feng ɭ¿ɓ҃); on the other hand, how to transform China’s rising power into effective 
and constructive international influence was still seen as a weak point of China’s strategic plan 
(Ibid.). Based on a critical analysis of Nye’s conceptualization, Men Honghua suggests that, 
when analyzing China’s soft power, this theory should be enriched with “Chinese practice” 
(Zhongguo de shijian &ġ̪ů与), realizing a “local adaptation” or “localization” (bentuhua 
ɵĦÌ) of the concept (Ibid., pp. 10-11). In this regard, the author believes that China’s soft 
power should include five key elements: culture (wenhua), ideas or concepts (guannian ϰǟ), 
development model (fazhan moshi ëƎʞǁ), international institutions or regimes (guoji zhidu 
ġ书¼Ƹ), and international image (guoji xingxiangġ书《С) (Ibid., p. 11). The descriptions 
of these core components of soft power given by Men Honghua are noteworthy and deserve a 
more in-depth analysis. Defining culture as the sum of material and spiritual wealth created by 
humanity in the course of society’s historical process of development, including in particular 
education, literature, art, religion, science, and other spiritual wealth, the author believes that 
culture is perhaps incapable of directly changing the objective world, but it can indeed change 
the people, and it is the people that, according to their own conscience, ultimately transform the 
objective world (Men Honghua 2007a, p. 11). Therefore, culture is the base of a country’s soft 
power because the “persuasive role of soft power” (ruan shili de shuofu zuoyong 且ůÀ̪Жɮ
m̜), its “ability to penetrate” (shentou nengli ˢџηÀ), and its “attractive force” (xiyinli ć
ǂÀ) primarily emerge through culture, making the identification with and influence of cultural 
and political values the core of a country’s soft power (Ibid.). Any culture having a leading role 
is not a closed culture, but one that exercises its international influence and, in tune with the 
trend of international culture, “goes towards the world” (zou xiang shijie 七’̢), in an 
interaction that requires the modernization of traditional culture (Ibid.). Being the focus of the 
discourse on Chinese soft power presented in this dissertation, more will be considered in 
Chapter 5 regarding an assessment of the role of culture, in particular traditional culture, as a 
core element of China’s soft power.  
As far as ideas and concepts (guannian) are concerned, Men Honghua argues that their 
reform is directly linked with the progress of humanity and that, especially in the case of China, 
a country that has entered a “large scale strategic transformation” (daguimo zhanlüe zhuanxing
ńϱʞǻ̤тĮ), this “provides the beacons and roadmap for the exploration of a path of 
modernization” (wei Zhongguo xiandaihua daolu de tansuo tigong zhixiangbiao he luxiantu )
&ġ̒SÌ丹不̪ȤͻȪrț’ʋĎ不΋Ģ), becoming the “main vessel for the promotion 
of China’s soft power”  (Zhongguo ruan shili tisheng de zhu mailuo&ġ且ůÀȪÒ̪*θΒ) 
(Men Honghua 2007a, p. 11).  
The development model (fazhan moshi) is another aspect that belongs to the toolkit of 
China’s soft power, as previously discussed. Citing the definition provided by Yu Keping {ô
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Ʃ (2006), Men Honghua defines the development model as a series of development strategies, 
systems, and ideas with clear-cut characteristics, and states that the development model is an 
important part of a country’s soft power (Men Honghua 2007a, p. 11). He mentions the 
examples of ancient China’s cultural model in East Asia, the industrialization model in Eastern 
Europe after the end of World War II, the so-called “Moscow Consensus” (Mosike gongshiϕ
Ɍ͗Ћ ), and the democratic model of the United States, the so-called “Washington 
Consensus” (Huashengdun gongshi Ô̱争Ћ), which, in spite of its influence in the entire 
world, has recently received questioning by developing countries (Ibid.). After the beginning of 
the policy of reform and opening-up in 1978, China saw the development of a socialist path 
with Chinese characteristics and this led Western scholars to start talking about the so-called 
“Beijing Consensus” (Beijing gongshi ÍFЋ), which, thanks to the rapid and steady 
economic development that has made China the new economic engine of Asia and the entire 
world, is having a “spillover effect” (yichu xiaoying ˫«ȽƳ) in developing countries, in 
contrast to the Washington Consensus (Ibid., pp. 11-12). With symbols such as the theories of 
scientific development and harmonious society, China’s development model consists of both an 
increase in hard and soft power and purses an organic combination of these two sides of power, 
making it one of the most important sources of Chinese soft power (Ibid., p 12).  
Men Honghua also treats the subject of international institutions (guoji zhidu) in a similar 
way to the discussion put forward by Ding Sheng (2008) described in Section 4.1. International 
institutions, which Ding Sheng (2008, p. 55) calls “international regimes”, contribute to 
facilitating the process of agenda-setting. According to Men Honghua (2007a, p. 12), national 
institutions can also be considered a pillar of soft power because they can help a country 
achieve a leading position in international relations, setting the example for other countries and, 
while doing so, allow for a considerable gain in terms of economic and political advantages 
(Ibid.). At the same time, the level of participation in international institutions is also an 
indication of a country’s soft power (Ibid.). As a late-comer in participating in international 
institutions, China has moved from a position of marginal, passive, and inactive participation to 
one of active involvement and creative proactivity, and its interaction with international systems 
has given shape to a “criss-crossed interwoven picture that has gone from weak to strong” (yi fu 
zongheng jiaozhiyou dan zhi nong de huajuan  ƧΈʟC΍	̞˜ξ˓̡̪Þ), making 
the breath and depth of China’s participation in international institutions a universally 
recognized sign of the increase of China’s soft power (Ibid., pp. 12-13).  
Last but not least, Men Honghua treats the subject of a country’s international image 
(guoji xingxiang), which he believes refers to the external and public comprehensive knowledge 
and evaluation of a country’s politics, economy, society, culture, and natural elements, as well 
as the impression that its past conduct and deeds have left on the international community in 
terms of willpower, determination, and abilities, based on which the other members of the 
international community can respond to its actions and predict its future behaviors, especially in 
the context of strategic games (Men Honghua 2007a, p. 13). But a country’s international image 
can also be considered as the extension of domestic politics and general affairs because, when it 
is positive, it can help promote the development of the country’s politics, economy and culture 
domestically, while promoting friendly relationships with other countries internationally (Ibid.). 
Nowadays, international image is considered “one of the most important intangible assets of a 
sovereign country” (zhuquan guojia zui zhongyao de wuxing zichan zhi yi *ɸġŶɫ义ϭ̪
ɓ《ЭD0) and all major countries equally see it, together with its molding, as a core 
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element of soft power (Ibid.). The author further suggests that culture, ideas, and development 
model constitute “inner potentialities” (neigong Â) of soft power, while international image 
represents its “outer potentiality” (waigong Ł), and the two are connected by and interrelated 
with international systems (Ibid., p. 13).  
Moving on, the year 2010 was very prolific in the debate on soft power in China with the 
publication of at least three volumes discussing this topic. Guojia Ruan Shili ġŶ且ůÀ 
(National Soft Power), written by Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan, offers a comprehensive overview 
of the soft power concept, including topics such as: the formation of the theory, its historical 
origins, the components of soft power, the relationship between hard and soft power, the 
methods to assess a country’s soft power, an evaluation of the soft power of global actors, 
including the United States, Russia, and Japan, and an analysis of China’s soft power (Zhao 
Gang and Xiao Huan 2010, foreword, pp. 8-9). The authors define soft power as follows:  
 
ġ̪ɇÌ	Zϰǟ	͍`¼ƸĎëƎʞǁ̪ġ书ǍđÀĎǲóÀɫ亚̲ʋɞů̒ɵġ
ɇÌ	Zϰǟ	͍`¼ƸĎëƎʞǁĨġ书͍`&̪*iÌɫńҘƸĩëȝġŶ̪ġ书Ǎ
đÀ
!
!(Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan 2010, p. 2) 
!
The international influence and appeal of a country’s culture, values, social systems, and development 
model; its [soft power’s] highest target is realizing the topicalization, within the international 
community, of that country’s culture, values, social systems, and development model, developing the 
country’s international influence to the maximum limit.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
The authors further argue that soft power is a key component of a country’s 
comprehensive power that is progressively becoming an important indicator according to which 
one can weigh power changes among countries and evaluate the direction of a country’s foreign 
policy; in line with Nye’s definition, soft power includes culture (wenhua), ideology (yishi 
xingtai ǱЋ《ǡ), foreign policy (waijiao zhengce ŁCȻͭ), and control over international 
institutions (guoji zhidu de zhangkong ġ书¼Ƹ̪ȢȦ) (Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan 2010, p. 
30). Nevertheless, the authors believe that a country’s domestic policies (guonei zhengce ġ
Ȼͭ), system innovation capacity (zhidu chuangxin nengli ¼Ƹ¶ɍηÀ), and the personal 
charm of leaders (lingdaoren de ge ren meili ҺŽI̪%IӌÀ), under certain circumstances, 
can also be transformed into soft power (Ibid.). All of these components are placed in a 
relationship to soft power at different levels: a country’s culture is the “core of soft power” 
(ruan shili de hexin 且ůÀ̪ʐǘ), a country’s ideology represents the “politicization of soft 
power” (ruan shili de zhengzhihua且ůÀ̪Ȼ）Ì), a country’s foreign policy constitutes the 
“expansion of soft power” (ruan shili de kuozhan 且ůÀ̪ȃƎ), and a country’s control over 
international institutions corresponds to the “internationalization of soft power” (ruan shili de 
guojihua 且ůÀ̪ġ书Ì) (Ibid., pp. 30-43). In regard to culture, the authors limit their 
attention to the “spiritual level” (jingshen cengmian ͷ͐ƊҮ), comprising spiritual beliefs 
(jingshen xinyang ͷ͐|X), philosophical systems (zhexue tixi Ēţi͹), ideology (sixiang 
yishi ǤǰǱЋ), values (jiazhi guannian), aesthetic inclinations and interests (shenmei qingqu
ŰΤǮ三), national character (minzu xingge ʴɑǦʒ), and ethics (lunli guannian d̖ϰǟ), 
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among other elements (Ibid.). The other levels that compose a country’s culture include: the 
“behavioral level” (xingwei cengmian Ϥ)ƊҮ), which include elements such as lifestyles 
(shenghuo fangshi ̛ːɎǁ), modes of production (shengchan fangshi ̛DɎǁ), family 
patterns (jiating moshi Ŷƺʞǁ), conduct etiquette (xingwei liyi Ϥ)͌V), and interpersonal 
relationships (renji guanxi I书͹); the “institutional level” (zhidu cengmian ¼ƸƊҮ), 
which include elements such as the form of government (zhengzhi tizhiȻ）i¼), economic 
model (jingji moshi Ώ˒ʞǁ), social organizations (shehui zuzhi ͍`Ό΍), and legal 
institutions (falü dianzhang ˇǔͦ); and the “material level” (wuzhi cengmian ̆ЧƊҮ), 
which refers to the products of the mutual combination of human labor and natural materials 
(renlei laodong yu ziran wuzhi xiang jiehe de chanwu IͳÇÅν˾̆Ч̴ΐû̪D̆), 
comprising clothing and food and beverage, residential conditions, means of transportation, 
work equipment, arts and crafts and technology, and other “objectified manifestations of culture” 
(wuhua de wenhua xianxiang ̆Ì̪ɇÌ̒С) (Ibid.). 
More will be said about the conditions in which culture becomes a resource of soft power 
in Chapter 5, however, it is interesting to note that, with regard to China’s soft power, the 
analysis is carried out in the framework of China’s peaceful rise and takes its lead from two 
assumptions: first, China is both “a country with an ancient civilization and a long history” 
(yongyou youjiu lishi de wenming guguo ȕɭǬ-àö̪ɇəðġ) and “a great socialist 
country in the course of a process of modernization” (chuyu xiandaihua jincheng zhi zhong de 
shehuizhuyi daguoĽ<̒SÌ严͜0&̪͍`*/ńġ); second, China is rich in soft power 
resources (ruan shili ziyuan 且ůÀЭ˪), but there are still many aspects in its soft power 
construction that require improvement and upgrade (Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan 2010, p. 180). 
Moreover, soft power is seen as instrumental for China’s peaceful rise because it helps create a 
positive internal and external environment in regard to two aspects: first, soft power can give a 
radical push to the construction of a harmonious society and help realize a “long period of 
national peace and order” (guojia changzhi jiuan ġŶ҆）-Ũ), satisfying the internal needs 
for China’s peaceful rise; second, from an external point of view, soft power development is 
conducive to pursuing a “good neighborly foreign policy” (mulin waijiao zhengce ̽ѯŁCȻ
ͭ) and eliminating the negative influence of the “China threat theory” (Ibid., pp. 228-229). The 
relationship between soft power and China’s peaceful rise/development was described in 
Chapter 3, while some of the aspects that are taken into consideration in this volume, and that 
will be discussed in greater detail in the course of the present work, are the historical 
vicissitudes of Chinese soft power, the constituents of China’s soft power and its deficiencies, 
and a few individual cases related to soft power, such as the 2008 earthquake in Wenchuan ʼƗ
46, the 2008 Beijing Olympics, and the issue of food safety (Ibid., pp. 180-221). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 In order to understand the approach of the two authors, it is useful to briefly consider the case of the Great Sichuan 
earthquake, the 2008 earthquake in Wenchuan, so as to highlight the relation of such a tragic event with soft power. 
In fact, Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan (2010, pp. 193-203) discuss the domestic construction and molding of soft power 
based on six aspects related to how China reacted to the earthquake that hit the county of Wenchuan (Wenchuan xian 
ʼƗå), in the province of Sichuan (Sichuan sheng ĚƗ̶) on May 12th, 2008: the “leadership’s core” (lingdao 
hexin ҺŽʐǘ), “disaster diplomacy” (zainan waijiao ˶ҡŁC), media (meiti Śi), the construction of legal 
systems (fazhi jianshe ˇ¼ƾЈ), military-civilian relationships (junmin guanxi ¢ʴ͹), and the awakening of 
the citizens’ awareness (gongmin yishi de juexing ʴǱЋ̪ϳ久) as well as the construction of a civil society 
(gongmin shehui de jianshe ʴ͍`̪ƾЈ). 
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An interesting point of view is also that presented by Shu Mingwuρəʩ in his book, 
written in 2010, Zhongguo Ruan Shili &ġ且ůÀ (China’s Soft Power). In the preface, the 
author foresees a future in which China will be the “purest” (zui dunjie ɫΆˌ ), “most honest” 
(zui shanliangɫėσ), “fairest” (zui gongzhengɫʦ), “most perfect” (zui wanmeiɫũΤ), 
“most lovable” (zui ke’aiɫô̂), and “most charming” (zui mirenɫћI) country in the 
world, and to reach this status, the author further argues, every “soft strength” (ruanxing liliang
且ǦÀ之) making up China’s soft power must be given appropriate consideration (Shu 
Mingwu 2010, preface, pp. 1-2). The author elaborates on the status of the research on soft 
power in China, stating that even though good results have been obtained there are still many 
problems (Ibid., foreword, p. 2). Firstly, as a scientific system, soft power is still insufficiently 
analyzed, giving rise to the phenomenon of “only being able to see isolated details, and not the 
bigger picture” (zhi jian shumu bu jian senlin ñϯʌɲϯʛʂ) (Ibid.). This happens, for 
example, in the case of culture, which is excessively valued as a form of soft power, while the 
system of thought (siwei ǤΗ) is overlooked (Ibid.). Secondly, there is still disorder in the 
arguments about the main components of soft power (Ibid.). Thirdly, the research draws too 
much upon Western theories, appearing profound and even abstruse, with the result of being 
difficult to popularize (Ibid.).  
It is interesting to note that, thus far, this seems to be the only approach analyzed that, to 
some degree, tones down the role of culture in the discourse on China’s soft power. Conversely, 
according to the author, the make-up of soft power in contemporary China should be defined as 
a “complete national setup” (wanzheng de guojia tixi ũɆ̪ġŶi͹) composed of “five 
systems which are mutually independent but also organically connected” (xianghu duli er you 
youji lianxi de wu da xitong ̴>̉͢Ωçɭɷέ͹̪?ń͹Δ) (Shu Mingwu 2010, 
foreword, pp. 2-3). The five systems are: 1) China’s new spiritual system (Zhongguo xin 
jingshen xitong &ġɍͷ͐͹Δ), which is the soul and the girder of China’s soft power, 
including, among other elements, the ideals (lixiang ̖ǰ), beliefs (xinnian |ǟ), morals 
(daode 丹Ǘ), enthusiasm (jiqing ˳Ǯ), courage (yongqi Éʵ), determination (yizhi ǱǛ), and 
stamina (yili ʮÀ) of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation; 2) China’s new system of 
thought (Zhongguo xin siwei xitong &ġɍǤΗ͹Δ), which comprises the ways of thinking 
(siwei fangshi ǤΗɎǁ), habitual and new, of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation and 
is the inevitable fruit of China’s new spiritual system, also ensuring that the development of the 
strength of that system receives a solid guarantee; 3) China’s new system of concepts 
(Zhongguo xin guannian xitong &ġɍϰǟ͹Δ), which comprises the new knowledge that 
Chinese people have acquired regarding a series of situations and is the inevitable fruit of the 
first two systems; 4) China’s new cultural system (Zhongguo xin wenhua xitong &ġɍɇÌ͹
Δ), which, referring to culture in a narrow sense (xiayi shang de wenhua ̊/̪ɇÌ), 
comprises Chinese philosophy, science, literature, art, academia, and so on, and derives from 
the evolution, enhancement, and consolidation of the other three systems; 5) China’s new 
system of education (Zhongguo xin jiaoyu xitong &ġɍɁβ͹Δ), which is flesh and blood 
with the systems previously mentioned, but also has a certain independent character (Ibid.).  
It is noteworthy that when discussing China’s new cultural system, the author choses a 
narrow approach to the concept of culture. His focus is on innovation in the field of Chinese 
culture, in the sense of “bringing forth new ideas in relation to the Chinese thought, theories, 
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philosophies, literature, art, and so forth” (Zhongguo sixianglilunzhexuewenxueyishu 
deng fangmian de chuangxin &ġǤǰ	̖Ї	Ēţ	ɇţ	χɶͪɎҮ̪¶ɍ), even 
though he admits that, in a broader sense, China’s new spiritual system, system of thought, and 
system of concepts are a part of China’s new culture, representing its prerequisites, inner details, 
and foundations (Shu Mingwu 2010, p. 168).   
Last but not least, reference must be made to the book written by Zheng Biao, in the same 
year, entitled Zhongguo Ruan Shili &ġ且ůÀ (China’s Soft Power). The author advocates 
innovation on China’s part to create its own soft power theory, as Chinese and Western cultures 
are different (Zheng Biao 2010, p. 108). He further argues that exploring and establishing a 
“Chinese soft power theory” (Zhongguo ruan shili lilun &ġ且ůÀ̖Ї), and, by means of 
powerful ideological and theoretical tools suitable to China’s needs, correctly describing and 
analyzing the structural evolution of the world and the cultural challenges thereby created, are 
tasks that possess a considerably urgent and relevant meaning (Ibid.). Starting from the 
assumptions that, with regard to core values and compared to Western culture, Chinese culture 
has a “moral superiority that is difficult to match” (nanyi bini de daode youshi ҡUʱȔ̪丹Ǘ
_È) and that culture represents China’s “traditional advantage” (chuantong youshi bΔ_È), 
Zheng Biao (2010, pp. 108-109) further argues that, in China, soft power (ruan shili) can also 
be called “cultural soft power” (wenhua ruan shili). In this sense, the necessity to bring forth 
new ideas to establish a theory of soft power more suitable for China’s needs and conditions 
comes from the fact that every country has a different cultural system. The author argues, in fact, 
that different nationalities have different territories, human affairs, histories, systems of values, 
and spiritual worlds; and hence different cultures (Zheng Biao 2010, p. 109). In a similar way to 
the explanation provided by Shu Mingwu (2010) presented above, Zheng Biao provides two 
definitions of culture: culture in a broad sense (guangyi de wenhua Ʈ/̪ɇÌ) and culture in 
a narrow sense (xiayi de wenhua ̊/̪ɇÌ) (Zheng Biao 2010, p. 109). Broadly speaking, 
culture is the “sum of material and spiritual wealth produced in the course of humanity’s 
historical practice” (renlei lishi shijian guocheng zhong suo chuangzao de wuzhi caifu he 
jingshen caifu de zonghe Iͳàöů与я͜&ǽ¶ѥ̪̆ЧХźĎͷ͐Хź̪ǧĎ); in a 
narrow sense, culture is defined as the “social ideology and the systems and structures that 
correspond to it” (shehui yishi xingtai yiji yu zhi xiang shiying de zhidu he jigou ͍`ǱЋ《ǡ
Uè0̴ўƳ̪¼ƸĎɷʀ), and it is used to indicate humanity’s spiritual life as well as to 
make general reference to common knowledge (Ibid.). This definition of culture resembles that 
given by Zhu Majie (2002a, pp. 23-24) provided in Section 3.1, also following a similar 
differentiation between culture (wenhua) and civilization (wenming ɇə): in a broad sense, 
these two concepts can be considered to be interchangeable, but civilization indicates, to a 
greater extent, a certain level of development of a culture, the state a culture has reached, and 
even the society’s stage of development after a period of savagery (Zheng Biao 2010, p. 109).  
Based on this brief introduction to the discourse on soft power presented by Chinese 
scholars, the following chapters will provide a more in-depth analysis of the meaning of culture 
in the Chinese context and in relation to soft power. Thus far, a review of the most relevant 
approaches to the definition of a soft power theory more suitable to China’s current situation 
has shown that the notion put forward by Joseph S. Nye has undergone a great deal of analysis, 
elaboration, and transformation after entering the Chinese context. In a similar way to the 
international discourse on Chinese soft power, both connoted as its intrinsic, theoretical 
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meaning and as a national resource, the Chinese discourse on soft power is rich and variegated, 
and it does not always reach uniform conclusions. In this regard, it is important to note that the 
authors of the contributions presented above come from different fields of research, ranging 
from science and technology and national security, to international security and great power 
strategy, from creativity and innovation to global politics and economics. According to Liu 
Deding (2013, p. 3), who carries out an in-depth study of the concept of “wenhua ruan shili”, in 
China, the study of soft power is currently characterized by “multi-perspective research” 
(duozhong shijiao de yanjiu ł义ϲϴ̪̈́͞), which includes, at least, four macro areas: 1) 
analyses of soft power from the point of view of global politics and international relations; 2) 
analyses carried out from the point of view of the components of cultural soft power, covering, 
for instance, the meaning of soft power, its significance for China, and traditional culture as a 
source of Chinese cultural soft power; 3) analyses of the current state of China’s soft power; 4) 
analyses of the path towards the enhancement of China’s soft power. The author further argues 
that the current research on soft power in China is interdisciplinary (duoxueke łţ͗), with 
cultural soft power being conceived as an issue that concerns both the topics of cohesiveness, 
attractiveness, and inspirational force of Chinese culture in the context of contemporary China 
and how contemporary Chinese culture can coalesce the will of the people internally, while 
establishing an external image (Ibid.). The scope of research involves many disciplines and 
specializations, including philosophy, culture, politics, history, Marxist theory, management 
studies, communication studies, and social studies, because scholars specialized in a variety of 
disciplines all draw soft power into their own research areas (Ibid., p. 4). As will be discussed in 
Chapter 5, with almost all Chinese scholars affirming that culture is an indispensable source of a 
country’s soft power, the origins of the concept of “wenhua ruan shili” are closely related with 
the Western theory of soft power, but also, and even more so, with the Chinese “theory of 
cultural strength” (wenhua li lilun ɇÌÀ̖Ї) (Ibid.).  
As a matter of fact, volumes such as those published recently by Hong Xiaonan et al. 
(2013) and Liu Deding (2013), in addition to the abovementioned study by Zheng Biao (2010), 
testify to the predominance of culture among the sources of China’s soft power. This realization 
gives rise to the question as to why, in the Chinese discourse on soft power, this soft power 
resource has come to prevail over the other resources indicated by Nye, namely political values 
and foreign policies, overlapping, at times, with discussions related to the ideological, moral, 
and spiritual life of the Chinese people. Why is, as mentioned by Zheng Biao (2010, pp. 108-
109), culture considered “China’s traditional advantage” and “soft power” also referred to as 
“cultural soft power”? With the identification of several areas that require further analysis, the 
following pages will expound upon these and other related issues, attempting to dig deeper into 
the Chinese discourse on soft power theory and practice.  
 
 
4.4 Soft power in the Chinese context: schools of thought and ever-growing popularity  
 
Coined in the United States in the post-Cold War era with the aim of describing an 
alternative route for the most powerful Western country to maintain its international hegemony 
in spite of the changing degree of importance of military and economic strengths in the global 
balance of power, the concept of soft power has gradually made its way into the Chinese 
context. In the previous pages, much was taken into consideration regarding Nye’s 
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conceptualization and attention was paid to a number of interpretations put forward by scholars, 
both Western and Chinese, with the aim of enriching the soft power theory and finding an 
answer to a series of issues originally left unsolved. As will be further described, in the course 
of the theory’s conceptual migration to China, the theoretical frame upon which the discourse 
on soft power was built has undergone a process of transformation and expansion, taking on 
characteristics that were originally absent from Nye’s theory. The previous sections focused on 
the abundant international views on China’s soft power, including English-language 
contributions written by both Western and Chinese scholars, and made reference to some of the 
most relevant Chinese-language volumes that testify to the richness and multiformity of the 
current debate on soft power in China. In doing so, a link between an international and a local 
perspective on the discourse on Chinese soft power was provided. Moreover, the brief 
examinations carried out thus far have shown that a high degree of analysis and re-elaboration 
has affected the theory of soft power put forward by Joseph S. Nye in the 1990s once absorbed 
into the Chinese context. Today, the Chinese soft power discourse appears prolific and 
diversified, embracing various perspectives and touching upon different fields of study. It is 
indeed an interdisciplinary research area that does not always present consensus among scholars.  
That being said, as will be shown in the following chapters, the idea that seems to prevail 
is that culture occupies the most prominent position among the soft power resources available to 
China, as embodied by the use of the formulation “wenhua ruan shili” (cultural soft power). In 
this regard, Liu Deding (2013, p. 4) states that almost all Chinese scholars side with the idea 
that culture constitutes an indispensable source of a country’s soft power. The author specifies 
that, after the 17th National Congress of the CPC in 2007 and Hu Jintao’s proposal of the 
formulation “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” (enhance the country’s cultural soft power), that 
of “guojia wenhua ruan shili” (national cultural soft power) became “the most popular school of 
thought” (zui renme de xianxueɫ˼̪҇ɟţ) in China; however, even though scholars began 
to produce numerous analyses regarding the meaning of cultural soft power, its importance, the 
current state of its development in China, and methods to enhance it, based on their own fields 
of research, a unanimous account of what exactly the idea and the connotations of cultural soft 
power are has yet to be formed (Ibid., p. 39). According to the author, the points of view that 
appear to be relatively representative of this intricate discourse include the following aspects: 1) 
cultural soft power is a key component of soft power and its basic content; according to this 
point of view, a country’s culture is generated in conformity with the country’s traditions, 
customs, core values, religious beliefs, ethics, morals, philosophy, system of thought, lifestyle, 
and national character, and it reflects in the choice of the form of government, institutional 
organizations, political values, and ideology orientation, while at the same time penetrating into 
the national willpower, national behavior, and foreign policy, forming the national image as a 
whole; 2) cultural soft power is viewed as opposed to hard power, indicating the cohesive, 
mobilizing, and spiritual force exercised domestically by traditional culture, values, ideology, 
and other cultural factors, as well as the power to permeate, attract, and persuade exercised 
externally; in this sense, the extension of culture is ampler, considering the value and meaning it 
has inside the country; and 3) cultural soft power is the embodiment of a country’s culture and 
knowledge, and the resources, capabilities, and creations of the intellectual system, value 
system, strategic policy, diplomatic methods, and education system are all part of cultural soft 
power; from this point of view, it is easy to see that culture is not only a country’s “external 
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power” (duiwai de quanli żŁ̪ɸÀ), but also the “power of the nationals” (guomin de quanli 
ġʴ̪ɸ¹) (Ibid., pp. 39-40).  
Thus far, two aspects that deserve further consideration can be identified: first, the 
discrepancies between the Chinese discourse on soft power and the Western interpretation of the 
same concept are once again confirmed; and second, the difficulty in finding a unanimous 
opinion regarding the meaning and connotations of Chinese soft power does not seem easy to 
overcome, with the emergence of a variety of schools of thought. Regarding the first point 
raised, in discussing the abovementioned points of view, Liu Deding (2013, p. 40) places 
emphasis on the fact that they represent an unceasing deepening of the knowledge that Chinese 
scholars have of cultural soft power, progressively moving away from the study of Joseph S. 
Nye’s theory, to expand its extensions and enrich its connotations; in spite of the lack of a 
unanimous opinion on the concept, that of cultural soft power possesses an ampler depth and 
scope. In this regard, two points deserve further attention: first, in cultural soft power, “culture” 
is intended as a “wide cultural concept and system” (da wenhua de gainian he xitong ńɇÌ̪
ʝǟĎ͹Δ), including “spiritual elements of the economic base and political superstructure” 
(jingji jichu he zhengzhi shangceng jianzhu zhong de jingshen yaosuΏ˒ĳ͆ĎȻ）Ɗƾ
ͫ&̪ͷ͐ϭͺ) as well as “the spiritual superstructure and its manifestations” (jingshen 
shangceng jianzhu jiqi biaoxian xingshi ͷ͐Ɗƾͫèϧ̒《ǁ); and second, the 
domestic understanding of cultural soft power includes knowing the relationship between hard 
and soft power, considering both as parts of CNP (Ibid., pp. 40-41). In addition, it must also be 
clarified that the existing interpretation of the concept of cultural soft power envisions it as 
rather “passive” (jingtai Ҭǡ) as it places emphasis on the fact that every cultural resource turns 
into a form of soft power or soft power outcome; yet, cultural soft power does not only refer to a 
state already achieved, but what is more important is the process and mechanism through which 
every resource can be turned into actual national soft power (Ibid., p. 41).   
The discussion will now turn to the emergence of different schools of thought amongst 
the debates on soft power conducted by Chinese scholars, based on the classifications proposed 
by Western China-specialists such as Glaser and Murphy (2009) and Shambaugh (2013).  
As previously pointed out, there seems to be widespread agreement among Chinese 
scholars regarding the relevance of culture in the discourse on China’s soft power. Yet, there 
exist deeper layers of analysis that cannot be ignored. Glaser and Murphy (2009, p. 13), for 
instance, note that the majority of Chinese sociologists and philosophers believe that culture is 
the core of soft power; besides this mainstream view, however, there is a smaller cohort of 
intellectuals, in particular international relations experts, that, although not denying the 
importance of culture, believe that the core of soft power is political power. The authors identify 
former director of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies Yu Xintian {ɍŅ as the main 
supporter of the “culture school”, while the second school of thought is represented by 
Professor Yan Xuetong Ҏţѣ (Ibid., p. 13 and p. 17). It is thus interesting to look at the 
opinions of these leading scholars more closely.  
First and foremost, Yu Xintian (2008, pp. 15-16) believes that, when attempting to define 
soft power, among a variety of elements, it should be kept in mind that any concept or political 
value reflects a specific culture and system of values. Thoughts, ideas, principles, as well as 
institutions, strategies, and policies are all part of soft power; the core of soft power is culture, 
with the core of culture, that is values, having the utmost importance (Ibid., p. 16). In contrast to 
Yan Xuetong, Yu Xintian believes that scholars of international politics have for a long time 
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neglected or misunderstood the role of culture, equating it to the Classics or the pure academic 
study of history, literature, and philosophy, and failing to see that cultural values have decided 
our approach and viewpoint in relation to everything that exists in the world. Thus, the author 
states, thoughts, ideas, and principles, that is cultural values, possess “the power of 
manipulation” (caozuoxing shili ȴmǦůÀ) in the same way as political power does (Ibid.). 
In the Chinese context, the “culture” Yu Xintian refers to is “contemporary Chinese culture” 
(dangdai Zhonghua wenhua ǈS&ÔɇÌ), which is reflected in the way of thinking and 
behaving of the present-day Chinese people and is the manifestation of the flow of traditional 
culture until today: it includes “the result achieved through the Sinicization of Marxism – 
socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Makesizhuyi de Zhongguohua de chengguo – 
Zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi lilun  五Ǥ*/̪&ġÌ̪Ǹʃ &ġ̇υ̪͍`*/̖
Ї), “the Western culture already accepted by Chinese people” (yi bei Zhongguo ren jieshou de 
Xifang wenhua ƟΏϩ&ġIǽȥí̪ϬɎɇÌ), which has, for the most part, taken on 
“Chinese features” (Zhongguo tedian &ġ̇˸), and the “revolutionary culture created since 
the foundation of the CPC” (Zhongguo Gongchandang chengli zhihou chuangzao de gemin 
wenhua &ġDǸ͢0‘¶ѥ̪үčɇÌ) as well as the “culture [created] after the 
establishment of the Republic” (Gongheguo jianli zhihou de wenhua Ďġƾ͢0‘̪ɇÌ) 
(Ibid.). In addition, the role of ideology in the soft power discourse, intended as the cultural 
values advocated by a country’s government and used to coalesce the will of the people, should 
not be underestimated: the more the ideology conforms to the trends of times, the more the 
people will approve of it and the country’s soft power will increase as a result (Ibid.).  
Among the scholars belonging to the “culture school”, Glaser and Murphy (2009, p. 14) 
include Chinese Professor Fang Changping, stressing the fact that the view that the core of soft 
power is culture has been supported by the observation of the United States’ behavior. In his 
comparison between American and Chinese soft power, in fact, Fang Changping (2007, p. 25) 
detects a decline in American soft power, due in particular to the government’s choices in the 
field of foreign policy. This decline is thus caused by “what America does” (Meiguo zuo 
shenme ΤġJ.), whereas “what America is” (Meiguo shi shenme ΤġɞJ.) still 
possesses a strong attractive force, which is one of the reasons why the soft power of the United 
States still occupies a position of advantage.  
As previously mentioned, the second school of thought considered here is represented by 
the opinions expressed by Professor Yan Xuetong. Together with his colleague Xu Jin Ǖ严, the 
scholar proposes a method to quantify soft power, according to which China’s soft power, 
measured in terms of “international attractiveness” (guoji xiyinli ġ书ćǂÀ), “international 
mobilization capability” (guoji dongyuan li ġ书ÅĉÀ ), and “domestic mobilization 
capability” (guonei dongyuan li ġÅĉÀ) appears to be, in 2008, a third of that of the 
United States due to the fact that, in regard to international attractiveness, the degree of 
universality of China’s political system and national culture is lower than that of the United 
States, as is the case for the number of  allies China has in the area of international mobilization 
capability, whereas in regard to domestic mobilization capability China appears to be stronger 
(Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin 2008). In greater detail, the area of international attractiveness refers 
to the ability of a country’s charm to attract other countries to voluntarily imitate and follow it, 
and it comes from two sources: the “attractiveness of the national model” (guojia moshi de 
xiyinli ġŶʞǁ̪ćǂÀ) and “cultural attractiveness” (wenhua xiyinliɇÌćǂÀ) (Ibid., p. 
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26). The former occurs when the success of a country’s model makes it possible for that country 
to attract other countries to imitate its system and policies; while the latter includes the affinity 
between countries with a similar culture, which makes it easy for them to stand together in 
international affairs, and the international influence a country’s culture is able to exercise, which 
is based on its international spread and facilitates understanding and acceptance (Ibid.). The 
other two aspects mentioned are, respectively: the influence exercised on other countries 
without the use of coercive methods and the political support a country’s government can obtain 
domestically without the use of mandatory measures (Ibid.). Thus, according to the authors, 
China will only be able to reduce the aforementioned gap provided that the “political investment” 
(zhengzhi touruȻ）ȋ) in the construction of soft power is raised, including: establishing 
guiding principles for the balanced development of the key constituents of the country’s power; 
taking an enhancement of the prestige of China’s international strategy as the starting point; 
taking an increase in the number of strategic allies as the main aim of soft power construction; 
and taking the establishment of social equality and justice as the political basis for soft power 
construction (Ibid., p. 29).    
Similarly to the classification proposed by Glaser and Murphy, Shambaugh (2013, p. 215) 
also discusses the existence of different “camps” in the discourse on soft power in China, 
summarized as “culture”, “politics”, and “economic development” and all with one element in 
common, that is the complaint that China lacks soft power. More specifically, among the 
Chinese scholars that consider culture as the key element in soft power, Shambaugh (2013, pp. 
212-213) identifies two different groups, led by Chinese scholar Men Honghua, who is 
representative of what the author calls the “values as culture” school47, and Yu Xintian, 
respectively. The author agrees with the preceding discussion in identifying Yan Xuetong as the 
main proponent of the thesis according to which the key to China’s soft power is the country’s 
political system, but also proposes the identification of a third cohort of Chinese scholars who 
believe that the core of China’s soft power is the economic growth that has resulted from its 
development, in what has been called the “China Model” (Zhongguo moshi), the “Chinese 
Experience” (Zhongguo jingyan &ġΏӈ), the “Chinese Path” (Zhongguo daolu &ġ丹不), or 
the “Chinese Example” (Zhongguo lizi &ġqś) (Ibid., p. 214). 
As will be expounded upon in the following chapters, the Chinese leadership appears to 
have embraced the thesis according to which culture is the core of China’s soft power, thus 
siding with the culture school. This observation will be corroborated by the examination of the 
process through which the soft power concept has evolved from a theoretical notion studied by 
scholars to a national strategy aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the country’s cultural soft 
power resources, embodied by the formulation “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” officially 
introduced by Hu Jintao in the course of the 17th National Congress in 2007. More specifically, 
Chapter 6 will show how the CPC’s official discourse plays a guiding role, reflected in the 
terminology officially used, in determining the orientation towards which the theory and 
practice of soft power have been evolving in the Chinese context. Reference will thus be made 
to the evolution of the Chinese terms employed in the debate on soft power, focusing on salient 
aspects related to the process through which the expression “wenhua ruan shili” was created on 
the basis of that of “ruan shili” (soft power) borrowed from the West. It must be clarified that, 
although referring to Hu Jintao’s speech to the 17th National Congress as the official event that 
sanctions the acceptance of soft power strategies within the political agenda of the CPC, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 This scholar’s point of view regarding China’s traditional values will be expounded upon in Section 5.2. 
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generally speaking, the Western discourse on Chinese soft power seems to gloss over the 
emphasis the former President places on culture by using the relatively new expression “wenhua 
ruan shili” 48 . This could simply be due to the lack of a real counterpart for this 
conceptualization that cannot find a proper translation in English terminology (Gu Junwei ðx
a 2011, p. 67). Some attentive scholars (among others, Glaser and Murphy 2009; Guo Jiemin
乃ˌȿ 2009, 2012; Aukia 2014; Zappone 2014), however, have noticed this and other 
discrepancies, and the present work will follow their lead in exploring the connotations of “ruan 
shili” and “wenhua ruan shili”, as well as investigating a variety of other derivatives.  
Looking at how the abovementioned expressions appear in the Chinese context, it must 
also be noted that intellectuals and CPC leaders alike opt, by and large, for the term “ruan shili” 
among a variety of possible translations employed to convey the meaning of the English term 
“soft power” in the Chinese language, which include, according to experts in the field (among 
others, Liu Qing and Wang Litao 2007; Cho and Jeong 2008; Glaser and Murphy 2009; Guo 
Jiemin 2009, 2012; Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan 2010; Qu Xiaoying ƌ˰Ǎ 2010), the 
expressions “ruan liliang 且À之”, “ruan quanli 且ɸÀ”, and “ruan guoli”, in addition to 
“ruan shili”49. Constituting part of the intrinsic characteristics of the Chinese interpretation of 
soft power, this issue, which primarily revolves around the translation of the word “power”, will 
be expounded upon in Chapter 7; however, for the present discussion, it will suffice to clarify 
that, besides the schools of thought discussed thus far, the Chinese soft power discourse also 
presents different “theories” based on the very specific interpretation of the concept of “power”. 
Guo Jiemin (2012, p. 17), for instance, stresses that around the concepts of “ruan quanli” and 
“ruan shili”, even though they derive from the same origin, different ranges of application and 
fields of research have developed based on “power” translated as “shili” or “quanli”, and 
forming two different theories which the author defines “shili shuoůÀЖ” (strength theory) 
and “quanli shuoɸÀЖ” (power theory). Even though “strength” is the basis of “power” and 
the two concepts are somewhat connected, it is nonetheless important to understand that “ruan 
shili” and “ruan quanli” do not merely represent two variations in the translation of the 
expression “soft power” (Ibid.).  
In a similar way, Liu Deding (2013, p. 4) elaborates on the discrepancies that emerge in 
the Chinese discourse on soft power, in relation to different academic disciplines and fields of 
research, and uses the example of the advice given by well-known Chinese scholar Pang 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 It is interesting to note that even the father of the soft power theory does not report the complete expression 
“cultural soft power” when referring to the message conveyed in 2007 by then-President Hu Jintao and by President 
Xi Jinping on more recent occasions (Nye 2015).   
49 In the translations proposed, the adjective “ruan 且” corresponds to the English meaning of “soft” or “flexible”. 
Analyzing the various combinations of this adjective with the transpositions for “power”, generally speaking, the 
translation of the word “shili ůÀ” in Chinese-English dictionaries is “actual strength” or “strength”, while the first 
meaning of the word “liliang À之” is “physical strength”, “quanli ɸÀ” is translated as “power” or “authority”, and 
“guoli ġÀ” as “national power” (or strength, might). See: Hanying Cidian (di san ban) ʺϏЍͩ̃- A 
Chinese-English Dictionary (Third Edition). Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 2010, s.v. 
guólìġÀ, lìliangÀ之, quánlìɸÀ, ruǎn且, and shílìůÀ. As well, scholars have detected the existence of 
translations that are peculiar to the Taiwanese discourse on soft power. For instance, Wang Hongying and Lu Yeh-
Chung (2008, p. 426) highlight that, in Taiwan, “soft” has been translated as “rouxing ʈǦ” or “ruanxing 且Ǧ” and 
“power” as “quanli”, “guoli”, and “liliang”. According to Zhang Xiaoming 。Ƃə (2005), one Taiwanese scholar 
has called “soft power” “rouxing guoliʈǦġÀ”. More will be said about these and other related aspects in Chapter 
7.  
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Zhongying, who suggests that the appropriate translations for the term “soft power” are the 
expressions “ruan quanli” and “ruan quanshi 且ɸÈ”50, as they are closer to the meaning 
originally attributed to the concept by Joseph S. Nye when analyzing the decline of American 
hegemony and power reconstruction. As a matter of fact, as there is still no consensus on what 
soft power actually represents for China, Chinese scholars also disagree as to what Chinese 
translation is the most suitable to convey the meaning of this English concept in the Chinese 
context. These considerations are confirmed by Joseph S. Nye and Wang Jisi who state the 
following:  
 
There does not seem to be any official effort in China to define the term soft power, and Chinese 
scholars continue to debate its scope, definition, and application. Moreover, they do not agree with 
one another as to how that phrase in English should be better translated into Chinese, since at least 
three Chinese words—shili, quanli, and liliang —carry meanings similar to power. Different 
translations thus reflect nuanced interpretations of the term soft power.  
(Nye and Wang 2009a, p. 28) 
 
Similarly, Glaser and Murphy (2009, p. 11n5) point out that although former President 
Hu Jintao used the term “ruan shili” in his keynote speech to the 17th National Congress in 2007, 
the appropriateness of the term is still being debated by Chinese scholars. Other Western 
scholars have also joined this debate, presenting, at times, dissimilar points of view. Barr (2011, 
Chapter 2), for instance, states that the term that is most used to refer to soft power in China and 
closest to the Western definition is “ruan shili”, which can be literally translated as “soft 
strength”, implying that “one also has the ability and means to act on that strength”, while the 
other translation equivalents for “power”, “quanli” and “liliang”, mean “having the authority or 
right to do something” and having “physical strength or force” respectively. Conversely, Aukia 
(2014, p. 79) states that the term “ruan shili” corresponds to “soft power”, “ruan quanli” to 
“soft authority”, “ruan liliang” to “soft strength”, and “ruan guoli” to “national soft power”. 
Although these different translations are used in a variety of ways in the Chinese literature, 
according to the author, “ruan shili” fits into the context of cultural construction and presents a 
more pronounced domestic angle, whereas “ruan quanli” presents a more prominent 
international angle, following the global power perspective in which Nye developed his original 
theory (Ibid.).  
Both of the Western authors considered here, supported by a number of Chinese scholars, 
Guo Jiemin (2009, 2012) and Gu Junwei (2011) among others, agree in detecting the presence 
of a variety of “derivatives” (Barr 2011, Chapter 2) or “extended concepts” (Aukia 2014, p. 79), 
which include “wenhua ruan shili”, the fulcrum of the present analysis. Focusing on this 
expression, Chapter 6 will introduce the crux of the problem, that is the certain degree of 
difficulty that scholars, Western and Chinese alike, feel in discussing Chinese soft power, due to 
the lack of a clear-cut definition and unanimous use of a fixed terminology. Gu Junwei (2011, 
pp. 64-65), for instance, states that, “ruan shili”, “ruan quanli”, and “ruan liliang” are not 
synonyms but only “near-synonyms” (jinyici ђ/Ѝ), and that, leaving out the common 
adjective “ruan”, “shili”, “quanli”, and “liliang”, far from being synonymous formulations, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 As will be explained in Chapter 7, the word “quanshi ɸÈ” is translated into English as “power and influence”. 
See: Hanying Cidian (di san ban) ʺϏЍͩ̃- A Chinese-English Dictionary (Third Edition). Beijing: 
Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 2010, s.v. quánshìɸÈ. !
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violate the standard of “monosemy” (danyixing Ö/Ǧ). The author refers in particular to 
standards put in place by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), which, in the 
ISO704:2000 (E) Terminology Work-Principles and Methods regulation, clearly stipulate that 
new terms must have “monosemy” (danyixing) and “mononymy” (danmingxing ÖýǦ); the 
existence of three translation equivalents for the term “soft power” (“ruan shili”, “ruan quanli”, 
and “ruan liliang”) does not respect the aforementioned principles and should be unified (Ibid., 
p. 64). The disregard for the rules of “singleness” (danyixing ÖǦ) and “uniformity” 
(tongyixing ΔǦ), which according to Gu Junwei (2011, p. 64), are advocated by the 
Encyclopedia of Linguistics (Yuyanxue Baike Cidian Г϶ţ̩͗业), is also reflected in the 
use of expressions employed to discuss soft power that are commonly used in Chinese literature 
but rather unknown in the West (Gu Junwei 2011, p. 69). These “derivative terms” (yansheng 
shuyu ϥ̛ɶГ), of which “wenhua ruan shili” is one of many examples, do not have a 
unanimous understanding within the domestic intellectual circles and are unintelligible to 
foreign scholars (Ibid.). Thus, it goes without saying that this rather unclear situation results in 
the emergence of obstacles for the scientific dialogue within the country and with the foreign 
audience.!! 
Nevertheless, perhaps following Hu Jintao’s official choice in his 2007 keynote speech, 
the most common Chinese expression used today to refer to soft power appears to be “ruan 
shili”51. Guo Jiemin (2012, p. 17) goes as far as stating that the term “ruan shili” has become a 
“high-frequency word” (gaopin ci 亚事Ѝ) in the Chinese press and media, being widely seen 
in the spheres of national strategy, local politics, regional economy, company operations, 
cultural construction, and other domains. In this regard, it is important to note that all the 
derivative terms that can be identified in the Chinese discourse on soft power are indeed created 
on the basis of the term “ruan shili”. Focusing on the formulation “wenhua ruan shili” but also 
exploring the ample variety of other derivative terms that pepper the soft power debate in China, 
Chapter 7 will elaborate on the salient features of the terminological aspects described so far. 
The reasons as to why it has been possible, in China, to develop such an articulate soft power 
discourse will also emerge as a consequence of the intrinsic nature of the term “shili”.  
To conclude, according to Wang Hongying and Lu Yeh-Chung (2008, p. 426), in China 
the concept of soft power, translated as “ruan shili”, “ruan liliang”, or “ruan quanli”, “peppers 
academic and policy discussions about world politics, Chinese foreign policy, domestic politics, 
and even corporate governance”. The authors report a search of the China Academic Journals 
database52 showing that the phrase (in all three translations) made its first appearance around 
1997 but then started to become popular in 200153. The saliency of soft power in the Chinese 
discourse is confirmed by other detailed quantitative data. Li Mingjiang (2009b, p. 24), for 
example, reports a search of the CNKI database through which 485 papers with the term “soft 
power” (in the translations “ruan shili”, “ruan liliang”, “ruan guoli”, or “ruan quanli”) in their 
titles, published between 1994 and 2007, were retrieved in the three sections making up the 
database’s journals and periodicals subdivision (liberal arts/history/philosophy, politics/military 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 In this regard, Zappone (2014, p. 416) observes that the primary translation proposed by Chinese online 
encyclopedias and dictionaries, such as Baidu ̩Ƹ and ICIBA, is precisely “ruan shili”.  
52 The China National Academic Journals database is one of the databases of the China National Knowledge 
Infrastructure (CNKI), continuously updated and expanded.  
53 The authors report that, at the time of writing, the China Academic Journals database contained over four thousand 
academic and policy journals published since 1994 (Wang Hongying and Lu Yeh-Chung 2008, p. 426).  
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affairs/law, and education/comprehensive social sciences). Breaking down the results based on 
the period of publication, the same search retrieved 11 articles for the years between 1994 and 
2000, 58 for the years between 2001 and 2004, and 416 for the years between 2005 and 2007, 
with a peak in 2007 when the number of papers rose to 237 from 104 in 2006 (Ibid.). The 
number of entries retrieved is much larger when the search is carried out based on the full text 
of the articles, reaching a total of 1,211 articles in the same three subdivisions of the database 
between 1994 and 2007 (Ibid.). The amounts in this case are: 57 articles from 1994 to 2000, 212 
from 2001 to 2004, 942 from 2005 to 2007, and including 273 in 2006 and 518 in 2007 (Ibid.). 
In the Chinese newspaper section, 509 articles with the Chinese term for “soft power” as part of 
their titles were found for the period between 2000 and 2008 (Ibid.). According to the author, 
these numbers show that the term “soft power” has become popular in many fields in China, 
indicating the growing extent of the interest in the subject in the Chinese context (Ibid.).  
Nowadays, equally astonishing results are obtained when carrying out a similar search of 
the CNKI database. On November 4th, 2015, the database’s three subdivisions, 
literature/history/philosophy, politics/military affairs/law, and education/social sciences, 
contained over five thousand articles with the terms “ruan shili” (in simplified characters) or 
“soft power” in their titles, based on a cross-language search limited to articles published 
between 2008 and 2015. Under the same conditions, over two thousand five hundred, articles 
that contain the expressions “wenhua ruan shili” or “cultural soft power” in their titles were 
found.   
Similarly, a search of the most commonly used search engine in China, Baidu, retrieved 
over 14 million websites by December 2010 containing the term “ruan shili” (Lai Hongyi 2012a, 
p. 11). The same search repeated at the time of writing, using the simplified Chinese characters 
for “ruan shili” in inverted commas, found that there were over 23 million webpages and almost 
two hundred thousand articles in the news section, containing the Chinese term for soft power. 
All of these data uniformly testify to the growing popularity of the concept of soft power in the 
Chinese context in the period from the 1990s to today. According to Lai Hongyi (2012a, p. 11), 
the application of this concept has surpassed the level of the nation to be also applied to 
localities, local government, and enterprises, insofar as in China it has become a “trendy term 
for publicists, scholars, officials, and even entrepreneurs”.  
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5. Origins, historical influences, and first stages of the Chinese discourse on soft power 
  
 
For the sake of clarity, this chapter is divided into three sections: Section 5.1 will attempt to 
investigate the ancient Chinese philosophical thinking with the aim of searching for elements 
related to inter-personal and inter-state relations that, thanks to their similarity to the non-
coercive approach advocated by the soft power theory, have facilitated the absorption into the 
Chinese context of the concept of soft power and the evolution of the related discourse; Section 
5.2 will investigate how China’s traditional value system!has shaped China’s vision of itself and 
state governance, and influenced the structure of the country’s interactions with the outside 
world in the course of history, within the paradigms of culture as a form of power in 
international relations and with particular attention to the legacy of China’s ancient civilization 
in today’s (soft) power relations; Section 5.3 will take into consideration the process through 
which the concept of soft power penetrated the Chinese academic and strategic contexts in the 
years between 1990 and 2007, looking at the translations of Joseph S. Nye’s pioneering works 
and a selection of early scholarly writings that contributed to the understanding and the 
evolution of the soft power theory in China. The discussion posits that besides having been 
adopted in China as a concept of foreign origins, the idea of soft power was very much present 
in China’s ancient philosophical doctrines, in its traditional system of thought, and in values 
rooted in Chinese culture. Blending with the original formulation of the concept, these 
autochthonous Chinese characteristics have allowed for the Chinese discourse on soft power to 
gradually brake away from that of the West. It can be argued that, as far as Chinese scholars are 
concerned, the detection of these characteristics is important in order to soften the foreign nature 
of the concept of soft power and make it China’s own. Thus, it will be shown that the 
emergence of the contemporary Chinese discourse on soft power does not only stem from the 
absorption of a Western concept into the Chinese context but also depends on and intertwines 
with a variety of endemic elements that have facilitated its development and expansion.  
 
5.1 Primordial seeds and autochthonous origins 
In China, are there any elements in the ancient philosophical thinking, traditional system 
of thought, and values embedded in Chinese culture that can be considered to have constituted a 
Chinese autochthonous idea of soft power? Have these elements facilitated the acceptance of the 
role of soft power and culture within the domestic and international dynamics of today’s China? 
In order to answer these questions, a brief examination will be dedicated to the description of 
the autochthonous origins of the idea of soft power in ancient Chinese philosophical thinking. 
Recalling that it is indeed the father of the soft power theory that detects primordial seeds of 
soft power in ancient China, specifically in Laozi’s doctrine (Nye 2011a, p. 81), it is evident 
that the idea behind the concept of soft power was not new to China even long before Nye 
coined the term. According to Barr (2011), Chinese philosophy is rich in examples of how 
rulers and states could use non-coercive tools, such as virtues, morality, law, and cooperation, to 
obtain their desired outcomes. The possibility to detect signs of autochthonous soft power in 
China’s antiquity is confirmed by many sources in English, written by both Chinese and 
Western scholars (among others, Wang Hongying and Lu Yeh-Chung 2008; Wang Yiwei 2008; 
Hunter 2009; Ding Sheng 2010), but it is also made clear by Chinese scholars writing in 
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Chinese for the local audience (among others, Men Honghua 2007a; Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan 
2010; Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013; Liu Deding 2013).  
On balance, scholars unanimously provide an abundance of examples drawn from 
China’s past, so much so that this exploration of Chinese autochthonous origins of soft power 
can go back several thousands of years. For instance, Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan (2010, p. 2) 
state that, although the concept of soft power is quite new, what it refers to has existed for a 
long time. In China, they take the example of the great sage Laozi and, for the West, that of the 
French monarch Luis XIII (1601-1643), choosing these personalities as symbols of the attention 
that the forebears, both Chinese and Western, had for “the soft element in a country’s strength” 
(guojia shili zhong de “ruan” yinsu ġŶůÀ&̪且ϭͺ) (Ibid.). Chinese interest in soft 
power is shown by Laozi’s thought dating back to two thousand five hundred years ago and 
stated in the classic text of Taoism, the Daodejing 丹ǗΏ: “Tianxia zhizhi rou, chicheng 
tianxia zhizhi jian Ņ0ξʈӅӇŅ0ξĬ” means that, despite being the softest thing 
in the world, water can pass through stone and penetrate the hardest thing in the world54. In the 
same way, soft power can achieve many results in the present era. Citing another aphorism 
drawn from the Daodejing, “tian xia mo rouruo yu shui, er gong jianqiang zhe mo zhi neng 
sheng Ņϕʈǅ<ʶΩȹĬǆΨϕ0ηε”55, Liu Deding (2013, p. 31) confirms Laozi’s 
interest in ideas similar to soft power, stating that his intention was to tell rulers that it was 
necessary to develop hard-power aspects such as politics, the economy, and the military, but 
even more to pay attention to the country’s soft power, in terms of “wende jiaohua ɇǗɁÌ” 
(civilization by culture and virtue), because hard power can only subdue people temporarily, 
whereas it is only possible to convince people to comply with the rule for a long time with soft 
power. The origins of what has come to be called “cultural soft power” (wenhua ruan shili) can 
thus be traced back to the Hundred Schools of Thought (Zhuzi Baijia Зś̩Ŷ), which, 
flourishing during the Spring and Autumn period (Chunqiu shidai ɝ͕ɗS, 770-476 BC) and 
the Warring States period (Zhanguo shidai ǻġɗS, 475-221 BC), started a prolonged debate 
around the opposing concepts of “wende jiaohua” and “wugong badao ʩÂҪ丹” (military 
accomplishments and rule by force) (Ibid.).  
Confucianism (Rujia Ŷ) is also permeated by concepts related to soft power, although 
known under different labels. Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan (2010, p. 180) look back to the Spring 
and Autumn period and refer to Confucius (Kongzi Ŝś, 551-479 BC), citing his precept “wei 
zheng yi de, piru beichen, ju qisuo er zhong xing gongzhi )ȻUǗ, ϼœÍы, ƋǽΩ^ɛ
0”, which means that governing by means of virtue and enlightenment is similar to what the 
North Star does, attracting all the stars around itself56. Confucian thinkers strongly advocated 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 A translation of this phrase is provided by the Chinese Text Project (http://ctext.org), an online open-access digital 
library, and reads as follows: “The softest thing in the world dashes against and overcomes the hardest” 
(http://ctext.org/dao-de-jing). Unless otherwise specified, excerpts and translations of pre-modern Chinese texts 
referenced herein are drawn from various pages (indicated in the footnotes) of the pre-Qin and Han section of the 
Chinese Text Project site (Chinese Text Project n.d.). 
55 English translation: “There is nothing in the world more soft and weak than water, and yet for attacking things that 
are firm and strong there is nothing that can take precedence of it” (http://ctext.org/dao-de-jing).  
56 English translation: “He who exercises government by means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, 
which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it” (http://ctext.org/analects/wei-zheng).  
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the “kingly way”57 (wang dao ̏丹) over the “rule by force” (badao Ҫ丹), a fact that 
represents “the ancients’ understanding of soft power” (guren dui ruan shili de renshi ðIż且
ůÀ̪ЀЋ) (Ibid.).  
Largely in line with what has been said so far, Hong Xiaonan et al. (2013, p. 97) affirm 
that the closest idea to the intrinsic quality of soft power is indeed that expressed by Confucius 
with the aphorism “yuan ren bu fu, ze xiu wen de yi lai zhi іIɮ´}ɇǗUɼ0”, 
which can be translated as: “If remoter people are not submissive, all the influences of civil 
culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be so”58. This can be considered “an 
exemplary summary of the so-called strategic culture of the ‘wang dao’ of ancient China and 
diplomatic thinking” (Zhongguo gudai suowei “wangdao” de zhanlüe wenhua yu waijiao 
sixiang de gaodu gaikuo &ġðSǽО̏丹̪ǻ̤ɇÌŁCǤǰ̪亚ƸʝȖ) (Ibid.).  
Attraction can be generated in others by means of culture, an exemplary conduct, and a 
moral behavior. As noted by Ding Sheng (2010, p. 262), Confucianism advocated that a state’s 
leadership should be obtained by setting the example, putting emphasis on the limitation and 
regulation of power instead of its use. In this view, Hunter (2009, p. 379) brings into play 
another foundation of ancient Confucian thinking, the principle of the “heavenly mandate” 
(tianming Ņč), according to which a ruler has the right to rule as long as he shows moral 
excellence. Similarly, Wang Yiwei (2008, p. 263) and Ding Sheng (2010, p. 262) observe that 
Confucius also preached “yi suo bu yu, wu shi yu ren ƞǽʤÊɐ<I”, a precept that 
encourages a person to behave towards others in the same way they would like others to behave 
towards them59. Liu Deding (2013, p. 31) puts emphasis on the aphorism “dao zhi yi zheng, qi 
zhi yi xing, min mian er wuchi, dao zhi yi de, qi zhi yi li, you chi qie ge 丹0UȻӕ0U°
ʴΩɓΫ丹0UǗӕ0U͌ɭΫʒ”60  explaining that it means that using 
government decrees to govern the people and rectifying them by means of law can only save 
them from committing a crime and being punished, yet they will have no sense of honor; but, 
when morality is used to lead the people and the system of rites to assimilate them, they will not 
only have a sense of shame, but also pledge allegiance.     
These few examples show that the idea of changing the agenda of others, attracting them 
to act accordingly to one’s desires rather than forcing them to do so, a core feature of soft power, 
was very much rooted in the most important Chinese doctrines of the past. Other examples 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 This translation is borrowed from Cunningham-Cross and Callahan (2011), an essay that provides insightful 
comments on Yan Xuetong’s volume Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (2011). This book places 
importance on the political philosophy of the pre-Qin era (xian Qin shiqi ͘ɗɱ, before 221 BC) as a tool to guide 
contemporary politics, interpret China’s current rise, and enrich international relations theories (Cunningham-Cross 
and Callahan 2011). In particular, the authors specify that what is translated by Yan Xuetong as “human authority” 
(wang ̏), can better be translated as “kingly way”, in contrast to the concept of hegemony (ba Ҫ) (Ibid., p. 349).  
58 English translation drawn from The Analects (Jishi): http://ctext.org/analects/ji-shi.   
59 Discussing “the golden rule of means”, Ding Sheng (2010, p. 262) translates “yi suo bu yu, wu shi yu ren” as “do 
unto others as you would have them do unto you” or “behave toward others as you would like to have them behave 
toward you”. The aphorism drawn from The Analects can also be translated as “not to do to others as you would not 
wish done to yourself” (http://ctext.org/analects/yan-yuan) or “what you do not want done to yourself, do not do to 
others” (http://ctext.org/analects/wei-ling-gong).   
60 English translation drawn from The Analects (Wei Zheng): “If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to 
be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by 
virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and 
moreover will become good” (http://ctext.org/analects/wei-zheng).  
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include the teachings of Sunzi şś (544-496 BC), Mozi ĸś (470-391 BC), Mencius (Mengzi 
šś, 372-289 BC), and Zhuangzi Ưś (369-286 BC). For instance, as argued by Hunter (2009, 
pp. 378-379), the concept of soft power has also been noticeably present in China’s military 
thinking; Sunzi, the great military strategist who composed the famous The Art of War (Sunzi 
Bingfa şśˇ), believed that military action should constitute one part of “an integrated 
approach to security”, but not the most important one. The philosophy of war proposed by the 
strategist is one in which, in order to win a fight, stratagems and astuteness are considered more 
important and effective than actual fighting (Ibid., p. 379). In addition, Hunter observes that, 
thanks also to the familiarity of generations of Chinese leaders with Sunzi’s strategic thinking, 
many of the phrases introduced by this great military figure are still popular today, such as: 
“war is based on deception” (bing yi zha liUЌ͢), “use gentle means to overcome the hard 
and strong” (yiruo kegangUʈµ), and “avoid the enemy strengths and strike at his weak 
point” (bishi jixu 主ů¬Ϡ) (Ibid.).  
Sunzi’s teaching that even during a time of war it is better to avoid military confrontation 
confirms that the idea of soft power was already contemplated in the ancient Chinese 
philosophy that, emerging in the Spring and Autumn period and the successive Warring States 
period, continued to influence China’s system of thought for thousands of years. According to 
Ding Sheng (2010, p. 262), the idea put forward by Sunzi in his masterpiece that “it is better to 
attack the enemy’s mind than to attack his fortified cities” denotes that there are similarities 
between the sources utilized in military affairs to achieve the “supreme excellence” and soft 
power resources, such as “people’s rationality, morality, values, and aspirations”. In order to 
clarify this point, two of Sunzi’s teachings deserve quoting at length:  
1) “Shigu bai zhan bai sheng, fei shan zhi shan zhe ye; bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing, shan zhi shan 
zhe ye ɞȼ̩ǻ̩εҭė0ėΨ3ǻΩƌI0ė0ėΨ3”, which can be 
translated as follows: “Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; 
supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”61;  
2) “Gu shang bing fa mou, qici fa jiao, qici fa bing, qi xia gong cheng ȼ]Мʡ]C
ʡ]ȹį”, which can be translated as follows: “Thus the highest form of 
generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s 
forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is 
to besiege walled cities”62. 
Wang Hongying and Lu Yeh-Chung (2008, p. 427) state that soft power can be compared 
to the first principle, related to “the power to subdue an enemy without a fight” (bu zhan er qu 
ren zhi bing ǻΩƌI0). Similarly, according to Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan (2010, p. 2), 
even when they had no choice other than to resort to war, in ancient China people held this 
principle high. In fact, despite being known in the world as a military strategist, Sunzi did not 
overestimate the importance of fighting when analyzing military affairs; he advocated that 
solving the contradictions between states should be addressed first without fighting (Ibid.). This 
is a way of thinking that has an extremely important strategic meaning, as it embodies a deep 
understanding of the mutual relations between war and peace, revealing a strategic guiding 
principle with a universal meaning: even though conflict is a contest of military strength, under 
certain circumstances, formulating correct stratagems and fighting effective diplomatic battles 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 This English translation is available at: http://ctext.org/art-of-war/attack-by-stratagem.  
62 Ibid.  
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can reach the purpose of “subduing an enemy without a fight” (Ibid., pp. 2-3).  Consequently, it 
is imperative to do as much as possible to try to obtain victory without resorting to military 
force, but rather through the deployment of strategic operations and diplomatic activities (Ibid., 
p. 3). These thoughts thoroughly show the “soft-power connotation” (ruan shili neihan 且ůÀ
？) of the idea of “yirou kegang” (using softness to conquer strength) peculiar to traditional 
Chinese culture (Ibid.).  
Therefore, according to Liu Deding (2013, pp. 31-32), the highest achievement is giving 
free rein to soft power, including the comprehensive use of resources such as politics, economy, 
culture, and diplomacy, also when there is no choice other than to resort to hard power, as 
indicated by the two precepts reported above. Similarly, Ding Sheng (2010, p. 262) emphasizes 
that the focus on using diplomatic maneuvering, winning over an enemy with culture, and 
winning a battle before fighting permeated China’s ancient military strategies. In a similar way, 
Mozi, the founder of Mohism and the advocate of the principle of non-offense, strongly 
opposed the offensive use of force, which would give rise to prolonged conflicts (Ibid.).  
Benevolent governance was the key to winning support among the people inside the 
country and in foreign lands. According to the teachings of another Confucian thinker, Mencius, 
a benevolent king would be able to win the support of the masses, including the oppressed in 
other countries, without resorting to military force because he would have no rivals in the world 
(Ding Sheng 2010, p. 262). As stated by Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan (2010, p. 2), in terms of 
relations among peoples and countries, thinkers such as Sunzi and Mencius recognized the 
importance of “peaceful coexistence” (hexie gongchu ĎНĽ) and “harmonization of all 
nations” (xiehe wanbang ÕĎ举). The opposition between the “kingly way” and “the rule by 
force” is a key principle contained in Mencius’s philosophy, encapsulated in the precepts “ren 
zhe wu di KΨɓȾ”, which can be translated as “the benevolent has no enemy”, and “yi de fu 
ren UǗɮI”, which means that men are to be subdued with virtue (Zhao Gang and Xiao 
Huan 2010, p. 2; Liu Deding 2013, p. 31). To put it simply, soft power can be compared to the 
“kingly way” advocated by Mencius (Wang Hongying and Lu Yeh-Chung 2008, p. 427). 
Analyzing the precept “yi li fu ren zhe, fei xin fu ye, li bu shan ye; yi de fu ren zhe, zhong xin 
yue er chengfu ye UÀɮIΨҭǘɮ3À一3UǗɮIΨ&ǘǭΩАɮ3”63 
put forward by Mencius, Liu Deding (2013, p. 31) explains that carrying out cruel punishments 
domestically and military conquests externally, as proposed by the School of Law (Fajia ˇŶ), 
would only result in temporary authority, whereas only with education by means of culture and 
worshipping virtues and rites it would be possible to govern the whole world (tianxia Ņ)64, in 
a long-term period of peace and stability; hence the precept “ren ren wu di yu tianxia KIɓȾ
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 English translation: “When one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart. They submit, because 
their strength is not adequate to resist. When one subdues men by virtue, in their hearts’ core they are pleased, and 
sincerely submit” (http://ctext.org/mengzi/gong-sun-chou-i).  
64 According to Zhao Tingyang (2006, p. 30), the term “tianxia”, translated as “all under heaven”, refers firstly to the 
earth or the whole world under heaven, being almost equivalent to “the universe” or “the world” in Western 
languages, and secondly to “the hearts of all peoples” (minxin ʴǘ) or “the general will of the people”. Consequently, 
the idea of “all under heaven” consists of both the earth and the people because, in order to enjoy his empire, an 
emperor not only needs to conquer a land but also receive support from the people on that land (Ibid.). Thirdly, it has 
an ethical and/or political meaning, referring to a utopian world institution, or a universal system for the world, that 
sees the world as one family (Ibid.). In this regard, Ding Sheng (2008, p. 64) notes that the Chinese historically 
referred to their empire as “all under heaven”, while the concept of nation-state (guojia) appeared in the twentieth 
century. 
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<Ņ”, which means that the benevolent man has no enemies65. Resolving disputes by means 
of non-coercive methods meant refuting “the use of one’s strength to bully the weak” (yi qiang 
ling ruo Uǆ¨ǅ) and “engaging in wars of aggression at will” (qiong bing du wu ͟交ʩ) 
(Ibid., p. 30).  
From what has been expounded upon thus far, it is possible to imply that the origins of 
Chinese soft power lie deep in antiquity. According to the ancient teachings discussed, behaving 
morally and leading by example constitute tools to exercise attraction towards others. For a 
ruler or a state, legitimacy comes from a just conduct, reflected in benevolent governance and 
diplomatic maneuvering. As well, cultural refinement is a tool to captivate others. It goes 
without saying that, in order to persuade others to follow suit, one cannot only resort to military 
force, or other material resources, but also needs to master the appeal of civil culture and the 
tools of attraction and enticement, assimilating others through the respect of moral principles 
and honorable deeds. The teachings of the ancient Chinese thinkers presented thus far represent 
what Hong Xiaonan at el. (2013, p. 97) call “China’s valuable native resources for the research 
on cultural soft power” (wenhua ruan shili yanjiu de baogui de Zhongguo bentu ziyuan ɇÌ且
ůÀ̪̈́͞ŮЪ̪&ġɵĦЭ˪), which, “in the dialogue with Western thought, are worth 
considering, summarizing, and passing on” (zhide zai yu Xifang sixiang de duihua zhong yuyi 
renzhen zongjie he chuancheng ǖĨϬɎǤǰ̪żБ&8UЀ̸ǧΐĎbȇ).  
As a matter of fact, as pointed out at the beginning of this section, the predominance of 
culture in the Chinese discourse on soft power, reflected in the use of the expression “wenhua 
ruan shili” (cultural soft power), can also be traced back to the ancient times explored here. 
Reconstructing the origins of the word “culture”, Liu Deding (2013, p. 30) finds that in the 
context of ancient China, culture represented a “strategy to rule the country” (zhiguo fanglüe）
ġɎ̤), namely “cultural civilization” (wenren jiaohua ɇIɁÌ). As early as two thousand 
five hundred years ago, culture was already a synonym for China’s soft power: Chinese thinkers 
had always seen culture as a far better way to govern the country than military force and taught 
the successive generations of rulers how they should adequately bring into play the soft power 
of culture in order to achieve a long period of stability and prosperity (Ibid.). This is why, 
following China’s traditional thinking, enlightened monarchs and virtuous officials attached 
great importance to the country’s soft power, believing that they had to realize the country’s 
will and win other countries’ respect by pursuing the kingly way (wang dao) and refuting the 
rule by force (badao) in order to obtain the understanding and approval of other peoples (Ibid.). 
Hong Xiaonan et al. (2013, p. 97) also focus on cultural soft power stating that, despite the 
novelty of this theoretical thinking, in ancient China the impact of culture and morality on state 
governance was already clear. Reference is again made to the pre-Qin era, in particular to the 
principle “nei sheng wai wang ħŁ̏”, put forward by ancient philosopher Zhuangzi, which 
preached that “in order to be called ‘king’ on the outside, one needs to first reach the state of 
‘sage’ on the inside” (dui wai yao neng cheng “wang”, bi xian zai neibu dadao “sheng” de 
jingjie żŁϭη͛̏ǙĨѲю»ħ̪Ķ̢) (Ibid.). This is a state that does 
not derive from “the deterrence of military force” (wuli de weishe ʩÀ̪ŘǴ), but from a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 English translation: “The benevolent man has no enemy under heaven” (http://ctext.org/mengzi/jin-xin-ii).  
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“strong ability to infuse a sense of belonging into the people” (qiangda de shi min guishu de 
nengli ǆń̪oʴǇƏ̪ηÀ)66. 
To conclude, Liu Deding (2013, pp. 32-33) elaborates on elements of cultural soft power 
which pervaded Confucian thinking starting from the period of the Western Han (Xi Han Ϭʺ, 
206 BC-8 AD): the author analyzes “benevolence” (ren K) as the core political value, “rites” or 
“etiquette” (li ͌) as the core systemic design, and “civilization” (jiaohuaɁÌ) as the core 
management concept, and argues that these elements, together with the traditional concepts of 
“harmony” (hehe Ďû), the “golden mean” (zhongyong &Ƽ), and “integrity” (chengxin А|), 
represented valuable sources of cultural soft power which, still today, posses an important 
inspirational value in the construction of this form of strength. The exploration of traditional 
cultural values as important components of China’s soft power vision will continue in the 
following section. 
This brief journey through China’s traditional philosophy has traced the origins of the 
Chinese view of soft power back to antiquity. The analysis of the non-coercive approach to 
inter-personal and inter-state relations advocated by the thinkers taken into consideration has 
brought into play aspects related to both the very nature of mankind and state governance. 
According to Ding Sheng (2010, p. 262), China’s ancient tradition did not see human nature as 
evil and believed that peaceful and cooperative relations among states were possible, based on 
morality, law, and cooperation. This allows for the establishment of a first concluding remark, 
shedding light on one of most prominent characteristics of the Chinese soft power discourse, 
that is its broader view in comparison to Joseph S. Nye’s original conceptualization. In this 
regard, Wang Hongying and Lu Yeh-Chung (2008, p. 427) elaborate on the fact that, in Chinese 
philosophical thinking, soft power can be applied not only to nations but also regions, 
organizations, and even individuals, making this conception more encompassing than that 
proposed by Nye, as it also includes “the ability to generate compliance in a society by moral 
example and persuasion”, besides the attractiveness a country can use to influence other 
countries. It can be argued that this difference is generated by the enrichment of the original soft 
power theory with autochthonous Chinese characteristics that have allowed for the Chinese 
discourse on soft power to depart from that of the West. The following pages will go on to 
investigate China’s traditional value system and its impact on China’s vision of itself, within the 
structure of the country’s interactions with the outside world in the course of history. It will be 
shown that, in the Chinese context, the paradigms of culture and civilization have always 
constituted a fertile terrain for the growth of soft power, a view reflected in the emergence of 
the concept of cultural soft power.   
 
 
5.2 China’s traditional cultural values and their implications in (soft) power relations  
Through the preceding discussion, the role of culture as a form of soft power in ancient 
China has emerged in relation to individual cultivation, state governance, and international 
relations. The discussion will now focus on China’s ability to leverage culture as a part of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 For the principle “nei sheng wai wang”, Wang Yiwei (2008, p. 263) provides the following translations: “become a 
sage from inside and an emperor from outside” and “ruling others and cultivating himself”.  The phrase, drawn from 
Zhuangzi (Tianxia), and a possible translation read as follows: “ɞȼħŁ̏0丹[…]” - “And thus it was that the 
Dao, which inwardly forms the sage and externally the king […]” (http://ctext.org/zhuangzi/tian-xia).  
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country’s soft power in international relations throughout the history of the Chinese Empire. 
Some observations will also be made in regard to how China’s ancient philosophies and 
traditional value system have influenced China’s vision of state governance and affected the 
country’s own interpretation of power and soft power relations in foreign policy. The role of 
traditional cultural values in the construction of China’s modern society will also emerge, as 
well as their reflection on China’s current relations with the outside world in the context of soft 
power. Chinese culture will thus be confirmed as the most extraordinary source of Chinese soft 
power.  
As a pivotal component of China’s civilization, China’s ancient philosophy set the basis 
for the evolution of a cultural system that is unique in the world for its continuity and 
homogeneity throughout the course of history. Over thousands of years, besides constituting the 
glue that has kept the country as one, that is, until the clash with the West in 184067, the 
inspirational force of Chinese culture has also functioned as a magnet to attract foreign 
populations and neighboring countries. To clarify these points it is necessary to briefly recall the 
meaning of culture, to then bring to light the inspirational force peculiar to Chinese culture. As 
seen in Section 3.1, according to the definition provided by Zhu Majie (2002a, pp. 23-24), in its 
broad sense, “culture refers to the sum of the material and spiritual wealth that has been created 
in the historical practice of human society”; in its narrow sense, “culture is the social ideology 
and its corresponding systems and organizations, including viewpoints and ideas of politics, law, 
ethics, arts, religion, science and compatible systems”. Moreover, culture and civilization can be 
considered as having a similar meaning, but the latter is the product of the former “developed to 
a higher level” (Ibid., p. 24). On this premise, the philosophical concepts discussed above can 
be considered to constitute part of China’s civilization and traditional cultural system. It is 
mostly their appeal that has functioned as a magnet in East Asia throughout the history of the 
Chinese Empire. Ding Sheng (2008, p. 67) quotes John King Fairbank (1968) and his statement 
that “the societies of East Asia…had all stemmed from ancient China and developed within the 
Chinese culture area, the area most influenced by the civilization of ancient China, for example, 
by the Chinese ideographic writing system, the Confucian classical teachings about family and 
social order, the official examination system, and the imperial Chinese monarchy and 
bureaucracy”. Through this reference to the common cultural heritage of East Asia, Ding Sheng 
(2008, pp. 60-68) compares Chinese culture to a “cultural loadstone” which has been 
characterized by an uninterrupted history and the ability to exercise assimilating power. The 
strength of Chinese culture has steadily kept China together for most of its history, while 
providing it with the possibility of relying on a process of “osmosis” when conquering 
neighboring areas, rather than military victory (Ibid.). In fact, as will be further described in the 
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67 Well-known historian John King Fairbank describes the foreign impact on China in the 19th century as follows: 
“[…] China’s nineteenth-century experience […] became a stark tragedy, an unforeseen and certainly enormous 
decline and fall almost without equal in history. This tragedy was the more bitter because it was gradual, inexorable, 
and complete. The old order fought a rear-guard action, giving ground slowly but always against greater odds, each 
disaster followed by a greater, until one by one China’s asserted superiority over foreigners, the central power of the 
emperor at Peking, the reigning Confucian orthodoxy, and the ruling elite of scholar-officials were each in turn 
undermined and destroyed” (Fairbank 1978, p. 3). The acceleration of this process was represented by the Opium 
War of 1840-1842 and followed by a series of foreign aggressions on China, culminating in the expansion of the 
unequal treaty system which, among many other features, saw the number of treaty ports multiply ten-fold from five 
between 1842 and 1911, in a form of imperialism which was perceived as humiliation from which China yearned to 
escape (Ibid., pp. 3-4).  
 105 
following pages, “nothing can be absorbed into the Chinese culture without going through a 
process of ‘localization’” (Ibid., p. 65).  
The matters discussed so far can be taken even deeper. The discussion can touch upon the 
very nature of power, comparing the Chinese to the Western interpretation of this theoretical 
concept. For instance, discussing China’s public diplomacy, Wang Yiwei (2008, pp. 262-263) 
elaborates on the Chinese understanding of the concept of power pointing out its differences 
with the Western understanding and the consequences this has on the Chinese interpretation of 
soft power, an aspect that will be also discussed from a terminological point of view in Chapter 
7. More specifically, Wang Yiwei (2008, p. 262) takes his lead from referring to the Western 
idea of power, which he defines as “the ability of one actor or organization to influence the 
attitude and behavior of another actor or organization”. The author argues that this definition 
focuses on those with power as the subject and those without power as the object; thus, when 
employing the concept of power, Western politics primarily refer to the subject exercising 
power without considering the “extent of acceptance” of the object of power (Ibid.). In Wang 
Yiwei’s opinion, this constitutes an important difference between the ancient Eastern tributary 
system and the modern Western international system (Ibid.). Secondly, the author explains that 
the word “power” is usually translated into Chinese as “quanli”, a term that has two basic 
meanings in traditional Chinese: “steelyard” (noun) or “against scripture while for principle” 
(verb). He further argues that, in Chinese philosophy, the understanding of power is always 
related with morality as shown, for example, by the aforementioned principle of “nei sheng wai 
wang”, which teaches that a good ruler must cultivate the talents and virtues of the sage in the 
inside and exercise benevolent governance towards the outside (Ibid., p. 263). This is another 
way to express the idea that “morality inside brings power outside” (Ibid.). In Chinese 
philosophy, the traditional idea of power is also linked to nature: the great sage Laozi taught his 
acolytes the principle of “wu wei er zhi ɓ)Ω）” (govern by doing nothing that is against 
nature), which indicates that, in other words, power comes from nature (Ibid.).!Wang Yiwei 
summarizes these considerations by stating that in the conventional way of conceiving power, 
traditional Chinese thinking teaches that “power comes from morality and morality comes from 
nature”; this is why the traditional tributary system integrated power and morality and, therefore, 
in antiquity, there was no concept of nation, nation-state, sovereignty, or international system 
but rather the idea of “tianxia” (all under heaven) (Ibid).   
Historically, this view has reflected on China’s relations with the outside world. In this 
regard, Jacques (2012, pp. 294-341) discusses what he calls “the Middle Kingdom mentality” 
and takes a cultural approach to answer the question as to what China will be like as a great 
power. Recalling that China has only quite recently come to refer to itself as a nation-state, the 
author focuses on China as a civilization and argues that to understand China’s behavior in 
inter-state relations it is necessary to first understand how the Chinese people see themselves, in 
terms of history, culture, race, and ethnicity (Ibid.). Chinese people think of themselves as one 
race, the Han Chinese, and the PRC Constitution defines China as a unitary, multi-ethnic state 
(Ibid.). Although very diverse internally, the Han Chinese constitute the main ethnic group, 
encompassing 91% of the population and sharing the same common origin dating back to five 
thousand years ago, the age of the Yellow Emperor, while the remaining 9% is made up of other 
races (Ibid.). This demographic scenario embodies the perception of the “extraordinary 
longevity and continuity of Chinese civilization”, regardless of internal diversities peculiar to 
populous countries (Ibid., p. 297). More will be expounded upon these aspects, in particular 
from a sociolinguistic point of view, in Chapter 8. However, it is important to note, as done by 
 106 
Jacques (2012, pp. 300-301), that these attitudes are reflected in the Chinese idea of “the other” 
and the distinction between “civilization” and “barbarians”, with the latter being seen as inferior 
to the Middle Kingdom and drawn to it due to its superior Confucian culture. Imperial China, 
which, as has been previously mentioned, referred to itself as “all under heaven”, held a 
Sinocentric view of the world order, with a single civilization at the center, China, and 
barbarians all around (Ibid., pp. 304-305). China’s expansion unfolded through “a combination 
of conquest and cultural example”, in the course of an extended process of Sinicization across 
China’s frontiers, which saw absorption and assimilation prevail: “Whatever the role of force, 
[…] there is no brooking the huge power, influence and prestige of Chinese thinking and 
practice” (Ibid., p. 304).      
The power of attraction and influence was at the center of the relations imperial China 
established with neighboring countries in the course of history. In fact, according to Zhao Gang 
and Xiao Huan (2010, pp. 180-181), it was through cultural exchanges that China gradually 
became the center of a “Confucian sphere of cultural influence” (Rujia wenhua quan ŶɇÌ
Ĥ) and of the tributary system (chaogong tizhi ɰФi¼). The former, also known as 
“Sinosphere” (Zhongghua wenhua quan &ÔɇÌĤ), designates countries and societies that 
took Confucianism as the main ideology and system of social values, Chinese characters as the 
main vehicle to transmit culture, and China’s political system as the main political form (Ibid.). 
This sphere included, at the very least, areas comprising ancient Korea, Vietnam, Japan, and 
other countries and societies, while the latter, also known in Chinese as “cefeng tizhi  ži¼” 
or “zongfan tizhi ūϞi¼”, designates a type of international system that took China as the 
core and suzerain (zongzhu ū*), presenting tributes to the emperor and conferring titles as the 
main formalities, and political and trading relations as the essence (Ibid.). The area covered by 
the tribute system exceeded that of the Confucian sphere of cultural influence in East Asia, to 
embrace, in the period of the Ming ə (1368-1644) and Qing ˠ (1644-1911) dynasties, 
countries and peoples in East Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and other regions (Ibid.).  
In his evaluation of China’s soft power, Men Honghua (2007a, p. 15) once again brings 
into play China’s ancient civilization, attributing an “inborn advantage” (xiantian youshi Ņ
_È) to the soft power of China’s culture, embodied not only in the advanced nature of ancient 
Chinese culture, with Confucian civilization (Rujia wenming Ŷɇə) at its core, and its 
immense radiating force towards the periphery, but also in the role Confucian culture played in 
promoting successive tides in the rise of East Asia. Based on its cultural advantage, China was 
able to export its culture through international exchanges, constituting a splendid cultural era 
and constructing a tributary system in East Asia that revolved around culture (Ibid.).  
In a similar vein, Liu Debin (2001, p. 63) argues that soft power is not new as its origins 
can be traced back to ancient times when countries or peoples exercised “attractive force” 
(xiyinli) and “charm” (meili ӌÀ): ancient China, for instance, never sent any troops to occupy 
the surrounding countries, towards which it exercised immense influence, so much so that a 
Confucian sphere of cultural influence was formed with Chinese culture at the center. One 
aspect of this process lied in the high degree of development of China’s material culture, but the 
other aspect was related to the strong attractive force (xiyinli) and “assimilation-type power” 
(tonghua shi liliang —ÌǁÀ之) that Chinese culture and the Chinese way of life had on the 
surrounding peoples and countries (Ibid.). This is also to say that “the visual angle from which 
the Celestial Empire governed was domestic-oriented and did not have wild ambitions of power 
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expansion” (Tianchao zhili de shijiao shi neixiang de, bing wu kuozhan quanli de yexin Ņɰ）
̖̪ϲϴɞ’̪ƫɓȃ。ɸÀ̪Ѻǘ) (Men Honghua 2007a, p. 16). When coming into 
contact with the external world, China would naturally expand its inner ethical order towards 
the outside, relying on the attractiveness of the Chinese ceremonial and on the provision of 
goods in its relations with vassal states (Ibid.). This is why the tributary system, as natural 
extension of the “Chinese ethical order” (Huaxia lunli zhixu Ôŀd̖͙Ʊ), can be considered 
a type of “world order” (tianxia zhixu Ņ͙Ʊ) which surpassed the boundaries of nationality 
and race and represented the Eastern countries’ early practice of global systems and 
international order; China’s efforts to pursue a strategic path seeking moral objectives can also 
be seen as having had profound implications for the construction of the contemporary order of 
East Asia (Ibid.).  
In other words, the tributary system, of which the Chinese Empire constituted the center, 
revolved around the co-optive power of Chinese culture. Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan (2010, pp. 
180-181) emphasize even more the potency of Chinese culture in generating this early form of 
soft power: taking an original approach, they choose the cultural exchanges ancient China 
cultivated with the outside world as an example of soft power at work. Elaborating on historical 
vicissitudes of soft power in China the authors state that throughout the history of the Chinese 
Empire the courts always valued hard power but at the same time placed even more emphasis 
on the cultural element of soft power and engaged in cultural exchanges with the outside world 
(Ibid.). These activities were lively during the heyday of the Han ʺ (206 BC-220 AD) and 
Tang ē (618-907) dynasties, as is shown by the contacts with Central and Western Asia, the 
penetration of Buddhism (Fojiao lɁ) into China, which had a profound impact on its native 
culture in terms of ideas, customs, literature, and art, and the activities held along the Silk Road 
(Sichou zhi lu "Ι0不 ), which gave shape to a cultural structure characterized by a 
bidirectional blend in which Chinese culture both spread towards and received inputs from the 
outside world (Ibid.). In the Ming dynasty, a symbol of these cultural exchanges is the heroic 
undertaking of admiral Zheng He ѱĎ who, with his “voyages to the four Oceans” (Zheng He 
xia si yangѱĎĚˍ), connected China with Southeast Asia, Southern Asia, Western Asia, 
and Eastern Africa (Ibid.). Zheng He’s expeditions did not lead to the conquest of territories, the 
establishment of colonies, or the pillage of other countries’ possessions, as was the case with 
expeditions promoted by Western countries, but were conducted to promote friendship and 
economic and cultural exchanges between China and the rest of the world (Ibid., p. 3). Zheng 
He’s historical legacy is still praised today by the people in East Asia and other places, and it 
represents a typical example of the expansion of Chinese soft power abroad in ancient times 
(Ibid.).  
Discussing these and other historical events in a similar way, Ding Sheng (2008, p. 65) 
confirms that “[i]t is not difficult to find numerous evidences regarding the power and resilience 
of Chinese culture from China’s history”. Thus, it can be argued that throughout history China 
has confirmed its ability to leverage culture as a form of power in international relations. As 
argued by Li Mingjiang (2009b, pp. 25-26), history has indeed demonstrated the advantages of 
China’s cultural soft power. Cultural glory has been a prominent feature of China’s long history, 
with the superiority of China’s cultural grandeur emerging through the influence that China has 
exercised on East Asia for millennia: the merits of Chinese culture are evident, for instance, in 
the positive effect its influence has had on the rise of East Asian countries. Moreover, as 
highlighted by Men Honghua (2007a, p. 15), in the last one hundred years or so, Western 
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civilization has posed enormous challenges to Eastern civilization, but, as symbolized by the 
great accomplishments achieved by China in the process of reform and opening-up and the shift 
of global power towards the Asia-Pacific region, China’s traditional culture is being actively 
promoted, whereas Western civilization is entering a phase of self-reflection and readjustment. 
A new leaf is being turned in the blend of Eastern and Western civilization, with China 
becoming the center of confluence of Eastern and Western culture (Ibid.). Most importantly, 
traditional Chinese culture pursues “peace and harmony” (he) and puts emphasis on the 
principle of “harmony in diversity” (he er bu tong); advocating “equal treatment” (pingdeng 
xiangdai Ʃ̴ͪǒ), “honest cooperation” (chengxin hezuo А|ûm), and  “mutual benefit” 
(huli huhui >¹>ǯ), conflicts between man and nature, man and man, country and country, 
and family and family are thus resolved and the harmonious development among dissimilar 
civilizations can be realized (Ibid., pp. 15-16).  
Nowadays, China can make use of the legacy passed on by the historical influence of its 
civilization and the charm of its traditional culture to enhance its contemporary soft power. Li 
Jie (2007, p. 21), for example, argues that Chinese traditional culture, with concepts such as 
“harmony” (he) and “union” (he û) at its core, is a natural source of soft power unique to China, 
which not only has had a profound impact on the progress of China’s own civilization, but also 
on that of mankind. In times of conflict, Chinese culture emphasizes the principles of “winning 
people over by virtue” (yi de fu ren) and “subduing the enemy without fighting” (bu zhan er qu 
ren zhi bing); in dealing with power, it stresses values such as “good-neighborliness” (mulin 
youhao ̽ѯéŒ) and “harmonious coexistence” (hexie gongcunĎНŞ) (Ibid., p. 22). The 
principles of harmony and unity are reflected in the resilience of Chinese civilization through 
adversities and have forged the Chinese national character: as a result, Chinese people have a 
proclivity for “modestly declining” (qianranРЁ), are “honest and kindhearted” (renhou Kâ), 
and are “tolerant and lenient” (kuanrong Ÿŷ), while the national system of values, with the 
principles of “he wei gui Ď)Ъ”, which can be translated as “harmony is worth more than 
anything”, and “he er bu tong” (harmony in diversity) as its core, advocates “harmony” (hexie 
ĎН), “understanding” (hemu Ď̽), and “cooperation” (hezuo ûm) (Ibid.). These ideas have 
produced a profound and lasting effect not only on the development of China but also on the 
peace and prosperity of the world, while, in particular after the beginning of the process of 
reform and opening-up and following the impetus of the economic development, the charm that 
China’s traditional culture had accumulated over millennia started to arouse deep interest within 
the international community (Ibid.). This is confirmed by Li Mingjiang (2009b, p. 25), 
according to whom traditional Chinese culture has been recognized as the most valuable source 
of Chinese soft power thanks to its long and uninterrupted history and richness in traditions, 
symbols, and textual records. Besides the principles discussed above, traditional Chinese culture 
also places emphasis on values such as “giving priority to human beings” (yi ren wei ben UI
)ɵ) and “harmony between nature and humankind” (tian ren he yi ŅIû) and provides an 
alternative to Western civilization in responding to the many problems which have arisen in 
modern history, thus increasing the Chinese cultural appeal in the context of cultural 
diversification and globalization (Ibid.). As has been discussed in Chapter 3, the alternative 
interpretation of international relations that China offers, embodied by the program of building a 
“harmonious world”, is indeed based on these concepts.  
Within China, the CPC’s leadership is currently promoting a revival of China’s 
traditional culture, leveraging values such as those described above, which appeal to both 
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Chinese people and the international community. This can be inferred from the writings of a 
number of Chinese scholars who, in discussing the construction of China’s soft power, refer to 
the important role a revival of Confucian culture can play inside and outside China (among 
others, Pang Zhongying 2006; Kang Xiaoguang ƻɡ 2007; Li Jie 2007). According to Kang 
Xiaoguang (2007), for instance, the revival of Confucian culture is extremely important for the 
construction of China’s soft power because of the role it plays in the reestablishment of ethics 
and morals (daode), social order (shehui zhixu ͍`͙Ʊ), and political legitimacy (zhengzhi 
zhengdangxing Ȼ）ʦǈǦ), and in regard to the “identification of the Chinese people with 
their nation and ethnicity” (Zhongguo ren de guojia rentong he minzu rentong &ġI̪ġŶЀ
—ĎʴɑЀ—). Abroad, China has already established a foreign policy based on the Confucian 
doctrine; spreading Confucian culture can help proclaim China’s system of values and 
strengthen the legitimacy of the Chinese system, while at the same time exercising a positive 
effect not only in the cultural field but also in the global competition in economy and politics 
(Ibid.). Similarly, Li Jie (2007, p. 23) argues that Chinese culture, with its core consisting of 
Confucian culture, is able to surpass boundaries of space and time to become a link through 
which to further communication and understanding between China and the world. At the same 
time, it is still necessary to take into consideration how to make sure that a glorious culture that 
has lasted for five thousand years, as is the case for China’s traditional culture, can “push out 
the old and bring in the new” (tuichen chuxin ȧҗ«ɍ) and “glow with vitality” (huanfa 
shengji  ˽ë̛ɷ), in order to show the world “a China that has a profound cultural 
background and a distinctive ethnic style, and that is strongly keeping pace with the spirit of the 
times” (yi ge yongyou shenhou wenhua diyunxianming minzu fengge he nongyu shidai 
jingshen de Zhongguo %ȕɭ˞âɇÌƴϝ	Ӎəʴɑ于ʒĎ˓ѰɗSͷ̪͐&ġ) 
(Ibid.).!Pang Zhongying (2006), talks about “exporting” (chukou «ï) Confucian thought in 
relation to the use of soft power and differentiates between exporting Chinese language under 
the name of Confucius, as is being done by the Confucius Institutes, from actually exporting 
Confucian thought. 
On balance, traditional Chinese values are thought to be playing a role in China’s cultural 
construction at home, but also in the impact of China’s behavior on the global stage. Chinese 
scholars writing in English, such as Chen Jianfeng (2009) and Zhang Lihua (2013a, 2013b) also 
confirm this argument. For instance, according to Zhang Lihua (2013a, 2013b), within China, 
traditional values, which, in a nutshell, include harmony, benevolence, righteousness, courtesy, 
wisdom, honesty, loyalty, and filial piety, still play a central role in policymaking. The author 
states that traditional Chinese culture is primarily based on Confucianism, Buddhism, and 
Taoism, with Confucianism having been established as the orthodox philosophy of the Chinese 
state; classes on these subjects are becoming increasingly popular in modern Chinese society, 
testifying to “the spiritual hunger of Chinese people in today’s market economy” (Zhang Lihua 
2013a). Moreover, for traditional Chinese culture to be beneficial to the construction of China’s 
system of values today, traditional values should be complemented with contemporary ones, 
such as freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, and equality, and combined with 
Marxist values (Ibid.). Among the traditional cultural values that “influence the psyche of the 
Chinese people”, harmony is the core tenet: “Modern Chinese society tries to maintain harmony 
between humankind and nature; between people and society; between members of different 
communities; and between mind and body” (Zhang Lihua 2013b).  
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But besides influencing the modeling of China’s modern society, traditional Chinese 
values also affect China’s foreign policy and diplomacy. To briefly summarize this aspect, it 
can be maintained that the core value drawn from traditional Chinese culture that relates the 
most to China’s current foreign policy and diplomacy is once again the concept of harmony 
(hexie) (Zhang Lihua 2013a, 2013b). In brief, this concept provides four key ideas for Chinese 
foreign policy: 1) harmony but not uniformity; 2) mutual respect between countries, big and 
small; 3) “it is lonely at the top” for powerful countries (gao chu bu sheng han 亚ĽεŻ), 
which means that a powerful country should not aim to become a superpower; 4) engage in 
reasonable struggle only if it is necessary (Ibid.). Similarly, Chen Jianfeng (2009) analyzes how 
China can cultivate soft power from a cultural and philosophical point of view, suggesting that 
Chinese leaders should follow the “Doctrine of the Mean” in approaching international issues 
because the balanced wisdom encapsulated by this traditional concept is more acceptable to the 
international community and can increase China’s soft power.  
A system of values and ethics such as the one described here, in which traditional culture 
plays a key role, is thus a vehicle of both domestic and international advantages. As has been 
pointed out, Chinese culture has a “comparative advantage” in the new set-up of international 
relations, which values interdependence and cooperation (Li Mingjiang 2009b, p. 30). This is 
due to its focus on harmony derived from China’s ancient tradition, together with a variety of 
positive features, discussed above, intrinsic to the Chinese system of thought. It is worth 
recalling here that the revival of traditional Chinese culture appeared as one of the methods to 
increase China’s cultural soft power indicated by Hu Jintao in his speech to the 17th National 
Congress in 2007; the former President stressed the importance of knowing China’s traditional 
culture and adapting it to modern civilization, keeping its essence and discarding its dross 
(Xinhua She 2007). Besides stressing the need for this selective process, which, as has been 
described, joins tradition and innovation, Hu Jintao also put emphasis on strengthening cultural 
exchanges, in order to learn from the achievements of foreign cultures and enhance the 
influence of Chinese culture in the world (Ibid.).  
From the aspects analyzed thus far, it is possible to imply that China’s traditional cultural 
values and system of thought have had a long-lasting impact not only on the development of 
China’s view of state governance and international relations in the past, but also on the current 
structure of China’s modern society and (soft) power relations with the outside world. Values 
drawn from ancient philosophical thinking constitute the core of traditional Chinese culture, the 
most appealing elements of which are being revived today to become part of modern culture. 
Chinese culture, a blend of tradition and innovation, becomes the most extraordinary source of 
soft power for China. As can be implied from Hu Jintao’s words, China is determined to 
reestablish the status of great cultural power it once enjoyed in the past, leveraging the appeal of 
its traditional culture but keeping pace with the times. As there is no reason why history should 
not repeat itself, it comes as no surprise that the topic of the re-emergence of Chinese culture is 
gaining ever-increasing popularity. Ding Sheng (2008, pp. 68-73), for instance, argues that, in 
the current globalization era, the development and prosperity of Chinese culture around the 
world can benefit from the trends of multipolarization and pluralization, and refers to traditional 
cultural products, such as acupuncture, feng shui 于ʶ, martial arts, herbal medicine, local 
cuisines, literature, religious practices, and the masterpiece The Art of War, as well-known 
symbols of the global popularity of traditional Chinese culture, while China’s modern arts, 
cinema, pop music, acrobatics, and dance are also attracting new audiences in the Asia-Pacific 
region and in the West. The author also takes into consideration sports, tourism, and 
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technological leadership, as part of the expanded reach of China’s cultural soft power, and goes 
as far as bestowing the title of “exact personification of China’s growing soft power” on 
basketball player Yao Ming (Ibid.). 
Last but not least, as has been pointed out throughout this discussion, the legacy of the 
influence exercised by Chinese civilization in the past is still actively present in today’s world. 
Signs that China is the world’s oldest civilization are visible in the elements of its cultural 
heritage that it shares with other societies in East Asia and Southeast Asia, where China’s 
potential to expand its soft power cannot be compared to that of other nations (Huang Yanzhong 
and Ding Sheng 2006, p. 27). Following Joseph S. Nye’s claim that cultural similarities 
facilitate the wielding of cultural appeal as a resource of soft power (Nye 2004, pp. 15-16), 
China’s civilization can be considered more likely to generate soft power in areas that share 
some elements of the ancient cultural and political systems discussed in this section. This is why 
China is perceived today as having the capacity to take a leading role in establishing the so-
called Asian values, making its civilization “China’s greatest soft power asset” (Cho and Jeong 
2008, pp. 469-470).  
This investigation of China’s traditional cultural values and their influence on China’s 
perception of its role within the structure of the country’s interactions with the outside world, 
over the course of history and today, has shown that, in the Chinese context, the paradigms of 
culture and civilization have never ceased to constitute a fertile terrain for the growth of China’s 
soft power. Traditional culture, with harmony at the core, has been confirmed as the most 
extraordinary resource of China’s soft power. The following pages will take into consideration 
the process through which Joseph S. Nye’s soft power theory generated interest in Chinese 
academic and strategic circles in the years between 1990 and 2007. It will be evident that the 
translations of Nye’s works and early scholarly writings that contributed to the understanding of 
the soft power theory in China have found in China’s own cultural tradition and thought pattern 
a resourceful background upon which to develop a soft power theory that, nowadays, appears 
enriched with Chinese practice.  
 
 
5.3 Translations of Nye’s works and early scholarly approaches 
The policy of reform and opening-up initiated in the late 1970s facilitated contacts 
between the Chinese and Western systems of thought, after a period of closure that saw China 
largely isolated and cut out of international dialogues. The same can be argued regarding the 
study of international relations as a discipline. In fact, it was not until the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s that the translations of some classic Western texts on the topic of international 
relations theories were made available to Chinese scholars (Ding Sheng 2010, p. 263). Yet, 
following the Tiananmen incident in 198968, CPC leaders and officials regarded Western culture 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 Author Andrew Nathan reports that besides a variety of important materials telling the story of the events that 
occurred in Beijing in 1989, from the point of view of the students and citizens, a book that gathers reports and 
minutes from meetings taking place at the decision-making levels of the government and the Party in the PRC, The 
Tiananmen Papers (2001), provides the first overview of how the incident was handled by the authorities (Nathan 
2001). The protests that were started in Beijing by students who demanded economic reform and liberalization did 
not intend to challenge the regime but what made the situation unresolvable was the impossibility to find a 
compromise between the two sides; the turmoil swept China in the spring of 1989 and was ended by force in 
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and political values with a certain degree of aversion, attributing the cause of the turmoil among 
the Chinese people to the spread of “bourgeois political thoughts”, to which the concept of soft 
power also belonged (Ibid., pp. 263-264). Nevertheless, it was not long after Joseph S. Nye 
originated his theory that Chinese scholars, experts of international relations, and policy-makers 
started studying and discussing soft power. As has been previously described, scholars (among 
others, Cho and Jeong 2008; Ding Sheng 2010; Liu Deding 2013) share the widespread view 
that, in China, interest in soft power emerged together with the concept of “zonghe guoli” 
(CNP), as the strengthening of capabilities other than the economic and military ones started to 
be contemplated as a task of crucial importance for building the overall strength of China as a 
global power. In the mid-1990s, Chinese government officials and international relations 
experts had already started to study soft power more objectively, considering it as an 
indispensable component of the strategy aimed at increasing China’s CNP, building on the 
legacy left by China’s traditional culture to regain the status of a great power for the country 
(Ding Sheng 2010, p. 264). This is confirmed by the speech delivered in 2001 by then-President 
Jiang Zeminʻˋʴ at the meeting to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the founding of the CPC, 
which, although not yet containing the term “ruan shili” (soft power), made the importance of 
CNP very clear: “The fundamental task of socialism is to develop the productive forces, 
increase the overall national strength of our socialist country and improve the people’s living 
standards so as to reflect the superiority of socialism over capitalism” (China.org.cn, n.d.).  
It can be argued that, at the turn of the century, China started to pursue soft power in a 
more calculated way. This is confirmed by Deng Yong (2009) in his investigation of how soft 
power was treated in the rhetoric and practice of China’s international strategy in the post-Cold 
War era. The author argues that, when applied to China, the approach chosen by Joseph S. Nye, 
which regarded soft power as a prerogative of a hegemonic power, able to use it to consolidate 
its material supremacy, is “misplaced” (Ibid., p. 64). The inapplicability to the Chinese case of 
the concept as was created in the American context comes from the different status of the two 
countries: the United States was the hegemonic power in world politics, while China, after the 
Tiananmen incident, was struggling for global recognition (Ibid.). Thus, sources, means, and 
objectives of China’s soft power have differed from those of the United States and soft power 
has become for China an integral part of its strategy to achieve the status of a great power in the 
new century (Ibid.).  
In order to explore this argument, the following pages will describe the process through 
which the concept of soft power came to be part of the Chinese intellectual and strategic debate 
in the years between 1990 and 2007, highlighting similarities, differences, and innovation in 
comparison to its American counterpart.  
As a matter of fact, only two years after Joseph S. Nye first spoke about soft power in his 
book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, his work was translated into 
Chinese by He Xiaodong jƂ! et al. and published by China’s Military Translation Press69. 
This paved the way for the popularization in China of Nye’s idea, if not the exact expression 
“soft power” (Wang Hongying and Lu Yeh-Chung 2008, 426n5). As Bound to Lead, Nye’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Tiananmen Square on June 4, a tragic event that, because of its long-lasting consequences, has come to be regarded 
as one of the most significant in the history of the PRC (Ibid.). 
69 [ Τ ] ΂̙Ň·ō: ΤġŭηҺŽ̢”, jƂ! 	̰̎=ͪЎ¢:Ўɇ«͍̃ 1992ƪ̃. Cited, 
among others, in Cho and Jeong (2008), Wang Hongying and Lu Yeh-Chung (2008), Ding Sheng (2010), and Liu 
Deding (2013).   
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successive works also received the attention of Chinese intellectuals. In 2005, two major 
contributions were made to the debate on soft power in the Chinese context: the first was the 
translation of Nye’s book!Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, by Hu Xiaohui 
Ćɡч et al.70, and the second was the compilation of a collection of Nye’s works translated by 
Chinese international relations expert Men Honghua71.! 
Besides the translations of Nye’s works, there is widespread consensus among scholars 
(for example, Li Haijuan 2004; Liu Debin 2004; Cho and Jeong 2008; Glaser and Murphy 2009; 
Li Mingjiang 2009b; Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan 2010; Edney 2012; Lai Hongyi 2012a; Liu 
Deding 2013; Shambaugh 2013; Aukia 2014) in identifying Wang Huning as the first Chinese 
intellectual to have written an article about soft power in China. Currently a member of the 
Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee and director of the Policy Research Office 
of the CPC Central Committee, according to Xinhua News Agency (2012c), in the course of his 
career, Wang Huning has held the position of chief policy advisor to then-President Jiang 
Zemin and former President Hu Jintao and has been a professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University 
(Cho and Jeong 2008, p. 456; Shambaugh 2013, p. 210). In 1993, he contributed to the Journal 
of Fudan University with an essay entitled “Zuowei guojia shili de wenhua: ruan quanli m)ġ
ŶůÀ̪ɇÌ且ɸÀ” (Culture as national power: soft power). According to Zhao Gang and 
Xiao Huan (2010, foreword, p. 3), this article initiated the domestic research on soft power 
through a detailed description and discussion of Nye’s theory and a concrete analysis of all the 
elements that constitute soft power, as well as the differences between soft and hard power. As 
the title of the essay indicates, Wang Huning emphasizes the role of culture as a type of power, 
which he equates to soft power. He argues that considering culture as soft power was, at the 
time, a brand new concept in the field of global politics; people had already started to consider 
political systems, national morale, national culture, economic systems, science and technology, 
and other factors as attributes that constituted a country’s power, but it is indeed the “dispersing 
quality” (fasanxing ëɃǦ) of these elements that allows soft power to have the property of 
power in international relations (Wang Huning 1993, p. 91). Elaborating on culture as a type of 
power that can influence the behavior of other countries, Wang Huning states that the 
standpoint according to which culture functions as a country’s power has been attracting 
consideration for a long time, as all through the ages people have considered intangible 
elements as pillars of national power (Ibid., p. 93). From a broader point of view, among the 
elements that can be included in the scope of culture, Wang Huning enumerates the “political 
system” (zhengzhi xitong Ȼ）͹Δ), “national morale and national culture” (minzu shiqi he 
mingzu wenhua ʴɑĹʵĎʴɑɇÌ), the “economic system” (jingji tizhi Ώ˒i¼), the 
“process of historical development and its legacy” (lishi fazhan jincheng he yiliu àöëƎ严͜
Ď为̣), “science and technology” (kexue jishu͗ţȈɶ), “ideology” (yishi xingtai), and so 
forth (Ibid.). Culture has attracted the highest degree of people’s attention in the new trend of 
contemporary politics and that’s why when discussing a country’s power and strength one 
crucial item to take into consideration is the active role of culture, with soft power nowadays 
gaining as much importance as hard power, if not more (Ibid.). It is nevertheless worth 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 [ Τ ] ΂̙Ň·ō: 且À之: ̢ȻĭǸÂ0丹, ĆɡчͪЎ, ÍF: !Ɏ«͍̃ 2005ƪ̃. Cited in Qu 
Xiaoying (2010). 
71 [ Τ ] ΂̙Ň·ō: ͈ɸÀ且ɸÀ , ҇ˎÔЎ, ÍFńţ«͍̃ 2005ƪ̃. Cited in Qu Xiaoying (2010) 
and Liu Deding (2013).  
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clarifying that, according to Wang Huning, up to that time, the analyses considered had not paid 
much attention to the “force of the dispersing quality” (fasanxing de liliangëɃǦ̪À之) of 
the abovementioned elements, which is what gives them the attribute of power in international 
relations (Ibid., pp. 93-94). Moreover, it is known that hard power and soft power act in a 
different way and achieve results through different methods. Wang Huning also elaborates on 
this aspect: “If a country’s culture and ideological system have an attractive force, others will 
voluntarily follow” (ruguo yi ge guojia de wenhua he yishi xingtai shi xiyinli de, taren jiu hui 
zidong de zhuisui œʃ%ġŶ̪ɇÌĎǱЋ《ǡɞɭćǂÀ̪ QIƆ`νÅĩќҜ) 
and “it [the country] will not have to use hard power, which is highly expensive” (ta jiu mei you 
biyao shiyong daijia gao’ang de ying quanli ŦƆ˂ɭǙϭo̜SZ亚ɘ̪͈ɸÀ) (Wang 
Huning 1993, p. 92).  Perhaps, the key to understanding this approach can be found in a 
statement in Wang Huning’s writing’s introductory abstract: “The strength of soft power comes 
from [its] diffusing nature; only when a culture propagates extensively will soft power give rise 
to formidable strength” (ruan quanli de liliang laizi kuosanxing, zhiyou dang yi zhong wenhua 
guangfan chuanbo shi, ruan quanli cai hui chansheng qiangda de liliang 且ɸÀ̪À之ɼνȃ
ɃǦñɭǈ͖ɇÌƮ，bȲɗ且ɸÀǿ`D̛ǆń̪À之) (Ibid., p. 91).   
It is noteworthy that such an early approach to soft power in the Chinese context already 
recognized the superior position of culture among the resources a country can use to wield its 
soft power, reaffirming the vision inherited from the past that was discussed in the previous 
sections. It can thus be argued that the prevalence of culture in the Chinese discourse on soft 
power was already being determined as the mainstream view among Chinese scholars. In fact, 
the central thesis according to which culture is the main source of a state’s soft power would 
then be followed by Chinese analysts and political leaders, as is visible in a variety of scholarly 
articles and official speeches (Li Mingjiang 2009b, p. 25). It is also interesting to note that, in 
contemporary China, the interest in culture as a type of strength has arisen not only in relation to 
the acceptance of a foreign concept into the Chinese context, but also as an endemic 
phenomenon. Keeping in mind that among Chinese scholars the idea that culture is an 
indispensable source of a country’s soft power predominates, as has been introduced in Section 
4.3, the investigation of the establishment of a concept of soft power in the Chinese context, 
following an interpretation in the Western context, makes it possible to localize the origins of 
“wenhua ruan shili” (cultural soft power) both in the Western theory of soft power and the 
Chinese “theory of cultural strength” (wenhua li lilun) (Liu Deding 2013, p. 4). According to 
Liu Deding (2013, pp. 38-39), the process of development and evolution of the soft power 
concept in contemporary China can be divided into two phases: the first phase, which covers the 
1990s, saw “the concept of soft power and the concept of cultural strength run side by side” 
(ruan shili gainian he wenhua li gainian bingxing 且ůÀʝǟĎɇÌÀʝǟƫϤ), while the 
second phase, starting in the 2000s, was characterized by “the proposal and popularity of the 
concept of cultural soft power” (wenhua ruan shili gainian de tichu he shengxing ɇÌ且ůÀ
ʝǟ̪Ȫ«Ḏ̌Ϥ). In the course of the first phase, Chinese scholars started paying attention 
to the concept of “wenhua li ɇÌÀ” (cultural strength), along with that of CNP, almost at the 
same time when Nye popularized his soft power theory (Ibid., p. 38). While the second phase 
will be analyzed later on, some aspects of the first phase are worth mentioning here. In 
particular, with reference to the concept of “wenhua li”, Liu Deding (2013, pp. 38-39) identifies 
Jia Chunfeng ЬɝƓ as one of its main proponents; in his work Jiaqiang shichang jingji fazhan 
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zhong de “wenhua li” yanjiu ÃǆơĪΏ˒ëƎ&̪ “ɇÌÀ ”̈́͞  (Study on the 
enhancement of “cultural strength” in the development of market economy), published in 1993, 
the author argues that CNP should also include “spiritual culture/civilization” (jingshen 
wenming ͷ͐ɇə), comprising cultural strength. According to Jia Chunfeng, cultural strength 
includes four aspects: “the intelligence factor” (zhili yinsuɥÀĜͺ), including education and 
science and technology, “mental strength/spiritual force” (jingshen liliang ͷ͐À之), including 
morals, values, ideals, etc., the “cultural network” (wenhua wangluo ɇÌΟΒ), including 
libraries, cinema halls, sports centers, and other entertainment facilities, and “traditional culture” 
(chuantong wenhua) (cited in Liu Deding 2013, p. 39). Comparing this approach to that of 
Wang Huning, Liu Deding (2013, p. 39) points out that Jia Chunfeng’s concept of cultural 
strength was largely centered around explaining the relation between culture and economic 
development, whereas Wang Huning was the first in China to place “culture” and “soft power” 
together in a systematic analysis. By stating that culture was a type of soft power and a 
component of national power, Wang Huning’s interpretation represented both a response to 
Nye’s conceptualization and also a different understanding of the concept, making culture 
equivalent to soft power rather than just a part of it (Ibid.). Thus, placing the word “wenhua” 
(culture) in front of “ruan shili” to form the expression “wenhua ruan shili” in the Chinese 
context represents “a rectification of the excessive political use and instrumental nature of the 
Western concept of soft power” (shi dui Xifang de ruan shili gainian guoyu nongzhong de 
zhengzhi shiyong zhuyi he mingxian de gongjuxing de yi zhong jiaozheng ɞżϬɎ̪且ůÀʝ
ǟя<˓义̪Ȼ）o̜*/Ďəɟ̪ƙǦ̪͖͂ʦ) (Ibid., p. 30). This aspect will be 
expounded upon in Chapter 6, while debates regarding the terminology used in relation to soft 
power will be dealt with in Chapter 7.  
Prior to the leadership’s official sanction of the concept of “wenhua ruan shili”, which, as 
will be further described, occurred in the course of the 17th National Congress in 2007, early 
examples of the increasing popularity of the theory of soft power within Chinese intellectual 
circles include an academic paper written in 1997 by Nankai University Professor Pang 
Zhongying entitled “Guoji guanxi zhong de ruan liliang ji qita ġ书͹&̪且À之èŦ” 
(Soft power and others in international relations). According to Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan 
(2010, foreword, p. 3), Pang Zhongying believes that every country should use its own 
resources and turn them into usable soft power in the context of international relations. Besides 
traditional culture, Asian countries can also find an important source of soft power in their 
development model (Ibid.). The definition of soft power that Pang Zhongying provides is worth 
quoting at length:  
 
且À之ôʱ0)&ġðSań̪¢:ǻ̤ŶşʩǽО̪ǻΩƌI	争Ω¹ô
̪À之ĄŦɞ%ġŶżνƞȕɭ̪ҭ̳ȥΏ˒À之Ď¢:À之ͪ且Э˪̪ƿë	o̜Ďb
ȲηÀUĨġ书͹&˦­ɭkю»ůЧÀ之ю»̪̲ʋ
 
 (Pang Zhongying 1997, p. 50) 
 
 
Soft power can be compared to the power that ancient China’s great military strategist Sun Wu [Sunzi] 
called “subduing an enemy without a fight” and “triumphing without losing a soldier”; it is a 
country’s ability to develop, use, and spread its own non-direct economic and military strengths and 
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other soft resources in order to skillfully act in international relations, reaching goals that substantial 
power cannot reach.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
Other contributions to these early stages of the debate on soft power in China are the 
article “Bu neng hushi zengqiang wo guo de ruan shili ηǠϲķǆǹġ̪且ůÀ” (Can’t 
neglect strengthening our country’s soft power), written by American specialist Shen JiruʿӉ
œ, in 1999, and the conference on “The Importance and Influence of Soft Power in U.S. 
Foreign Policy” organized in August 2002 by the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) 
(cited in Cho and Jeong 2008, p. 456).  
As previously pointed out, the interest in soft power in China received a boost at the turn 
of the new millennium. For instance, a scholarly article written by Liu Debin in 2001, calls for a 
new approach to the study of American “sole hegemony” (yi jia dubaŶ̉Ҫ), the prominent 
feature in the structure of global strategy after the end of the Cold War, posing that the Chinese 
research on American supremacy had stopped at the pre-Cold War phase (Liu Debin 2001, p. 
61). The author argues that the analysis of soft power provided a new instrument to dissect the 
characteristics of the hegemony of the United States: being different than hard power, which is 
based on economic and military strengths, soft power is the attractiveness and appeal of a 
system of values, ways of life, and social systems, and the “assimilating power” (tonghua li — 
ÌÀ) and “regulatory force” (guizhi li ϱ¼À) established on these bases (Ibid.). In the age of 
globalization (quanqiuhua ̕Ì) and informatization (xinxihua |ǪÌ), American hegemony 
is not only embodied in its superior position in the economic and military fields, but even more 
in “the influence and infiltration in the entire world” (quan shijie de yingxiang he shentou 
̢̪ǍđĎˢџ)!of its popular culture (dazhong wenhua ń^ɇÌ), values, and ways of life; 
in other words, it is embodied in the rapid expansion and intangible spread of American soft 
power (Ibid., p. 62). The ever-increasing importance of soft power has intensified the 
phenomenon of “Americanization” (MeiguohuaΤġÌ) in the process of globalization, and has 
changed the initial form of American hegemony, while at the same time transforming the modes 
and themes of the competition among dominant countries, posing unprecedented challenges to 
other nations, including those in the West (Ibid.). 
One preliminary consideration can be made based on these first examples: it can be 
argued that, since its first appearance in the 1990s, the concept of soft power has been 
recognized as an important aspect in the measurement of a country’s power, in the West and in 
China alike. Assessing soft power has gradually come to be seen as a new method to interpret 
power relations among countries in the globalization and informatization era. With the 
transformation of the structure of global power, soft power has increasingly gained relevance 
for the evaluation of a country’s standing in international relations, consequently making 
analyses of soft power resources of utmost importance for the development of soft power 
strategies. Given the difference in status between the United States and China, it comes as no 
surprises that the Chinese soft power discourse would soon depart from its American origins.  
In this regard, a scholarly article written in 2003 by Zhang Zhan and Li Haijun is worth 
mentioning here as it attempted to focus on the sources of China’s soft power. The authors 
detect three components making up China’s soft power: “the vitality of the system of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” (Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi zhidu de shengmingli &ġ̇υ͍`
*/¼Ƹ̛̪čÀ), “the appeal and attractiveness of Chinese culture” (Zhonghua wenhua de 
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ganzhaoli he xiyinli &ÔɇÌ̪ǲóÀĎćǂÀ), and “the international influence of the 
independent and autonomous peaceful foreign policy” (duli zizhu heping waijiao zhengce de 
guoji yingxiangli ̉͢ν*ĎƩŁCȻ̪ͭġ书ǍđÀ) (Zhang Zhan and Li Haijun 2003). 
These three components are interconnected, shaping the formidable power of China’s foreign 
politics and producing a positive and profound impact on today’s international politics (Ibid.). It 
is interesting to note that, in their analysis of China’s foreign policy, the authors once again 
place Chinese culture in a prominent position. They posit that the core target of China’s foreign 
politics is safeguarding China’s socialist system and that, in the process to reach this goal, it is 
necessary to “push Chinese culture towards the world” (tuidong Zhonghua wenhua zou xiang 
shijie ȧÅ&ÔɇÌ七’̢); with Chinese culture as the girder, diplomatic methods must be 
adequately put to use, in order to defend world peace and promote common development 
(Zhang Zhan and Li Haijun 2003, p. 45).  
Similarly, in 2004, Li Haijuan published a scholarly writing in the journal Mao Zedong 
Deng Xiaoping Lilun Yanjiu ʲˋ!ѬƂƩ̖Ї̈́͞ (Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng 
Xiaoping Theories) which is worth mentioning here as culture is once again in the spotlight. 
The author’s main argument is that in today’s world “the core of ‘soft power’ competition is the 
competition in cultural strength” (“ruan quanli” jingzheng de hexin shi wenhua li de jingzheng  
“且ɸÀ”ͥ9̪ʐǘɞɇÌÀ̪ͥ9): at present, countries around the world are increasingly 
recognizing the significant role of soft power with culture as the core in the competition in CNP 
and this is why, one after the other, they launch “cultural competition strategies” (wenhua 
jingzheng zhanlüe ɇÌͤ9ǻ̤) (Li Haijuan 2004, p. 50). In addition, the author believes that, 
in the international soft power competition, developed countries take advantage of their 
powerful position to unceasingly expand and propagate their culture and systems of values, 
while developing countries are obviously in a vulnerable position (Ibid., p. 49). China, as a 
developing country occupying a weak position in the soft power competition, must lay stress on 
bringing out the superiority of its traditional culture and participate in international cultural 
exchanges and competitions, enhancing and cultivating national spirit, and never ceasing to 
increase the competitiveness of Chinese culture (Ibid.). The article also suggests ways to 
enhance China’s soft power. In particular, Li Haijuan focuses on a development strategy for 
Chinese culture in the context of the soft power competition (Li Haijuan 2004, p. 52). Although 
having a civilization of five thousand years and having already demonstrated its cultural 
superiority in the course of history, nowadays it is undeniable that China is a developing 
country occupying a vulnerable position in terms of culture (Ibid.). To respond to “the strong 
cultural infiltration and erosion brought about by developed countries” (fada guojia wenhua de 
qiangshi shentou he qinshi ëюġŶɇÌ̪ǆÈˢџĎuϡ), China must make full use of the 
excellent traditions of its national culture and learn from the experiences of others to develop its 
cultural exchanges even further (Ibid.). Once again, the superiority of traditional Chinese culture 
is envisioned as a result of its emphasis on the concept of harmony. The author believes that 
despite being a competition, the soft power contest does not represent “bipolar antagonism in 
which ‘you die I live’ ” (bu shi “ni si wo huo” de liangji duikang ɞ“nʪǹː” ̪#ɿżȍ) 
because peaceful coexistence and common development are possible (Li Haijuan 2004, p. 52). 
Thus, a culture that advocates the realization of harmonious development among different 
civilizations, as is the case for Chinese culture, may occupy a position of comparative advantage 
in a soft power competition of this kind (Ibid.). Nevertheless, the article does not fail to take 
into consideration the risks Chinese culture faces. In fact, in the new context of soft power 
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competition, China finds itself in a situation of cultural vulnerability, running the risk of its 
culture being infiltrated and eroded (Li Haijuan 2004, p. 53). This risk comes primarily from 
two factors: the infiltration of Western culture into Chinese culture and the attack of Chinese 
traditions from the market economy (Ibid.).  
The disproportion between the cultural strength displayed by developed countries and 
that of developing countries is an oft-debated topic of Chinese scholars. In 2004, Liu Debin also 
elaborates on the disadvantages experienced by China’s soft power in relation to the superiority 
of American soft power resources, advocating greater investments in the domestic research on 
soft power, so that China can also reach a leading global position in the field of soft power 
development. Depicting a connection between China’s ancient history and its recent 
transformations, this scholarly writing justifies the relevance placed on soft power in today’s 
China through a brief, yet insightful, historical overview that deserves quoting at length:  
 
ƈͯ΂̙Ňō̪且ɸÀЖѓ˂ɭĨϬɎţɶ̢ϖǖłɅЀ—,fż&ġɼЖÝɭ义ϭ
Ǳ/
Ώя%ł΄̪τώÆÀ&ġΎ<ȯκ7ÓʬʴĩĎÓžƾĽĶ,Ã»ġ
书͍`&ɼ7
Ĩ̲¾ơĪƿȺ	ϰǟɨɍ	͍`тĮĎɇÌ义ĵ两ʏ%̇ʫ̪àöɗɱ
且ɸÀ̪ʀƾż&ġɭƅ)̇ʫ̪义ϭǱ/
&ġɞ̢àö&ĔOðξNƽΖɼ
̪ɇəðġ,&ġɇÌ©ΐĎĵѥ7ő̪яä,3ô主ĩǍđő̪ɳɼ
fɞĨяä%ł
΄ɀBĢŞ̪ȗȭ&ҮżʣΤńġ̪áÀ&ġIʑɵ˂ɭɷ`OŷĩǤΧĎϵ¥两%҉
ҽ
̒Ĩ,Ĩȯκ7ʴɑŞB̪Ûɷ0‘,ĨΤġ且ɸÀ̪ƛń_ÈҮ¾,&ġ̪且ɸÀ
̪ʀƾƟΏǸ)ǈÄ0ǥ
ƅɞ&ġϭů̒ĎƩƕе̪ǻ̤̲ʋMϭɭ͈ɸÀ
̪ľѓǙҷɭɇÌ̪ǍđÀĎǲóÀ,ǙҷĨ且ɸÀ̪ëƎɎҮ七Ĩ̢¾²

两ƆϭʸǹWż且ɸÀӜ̪́͞ȋɨł̪ͷÀ
!
(Liu Debin 2004) 
!
Although Joseph Nye’s soft power theory has not obtained widespread approval within Western 
academic circles, for China it has major significance. After more than a century of hard work, China 
has finally broken away from an unfavorable semi-colonial and semi-feudal situation and has entered 
the international community. At the present time, such a particular historical period in which the 
markets are opening up, old notions are being replaced with new ones, and society is transforming, the 
construction of soft power has an especially particular and important meaning for China. In the 
world’s history, China is the only ancient country whose civilization has continued from ancient times 
until today; Chinese culture solidified and molded her past and it is unavoidable that it will influence 
her future. But in the struggle for survival of the past century, facing the pressure from Western 
powers, the Chinese people did not fundamentally have a chance to calmly discuss and solve this 
problem. Now, having gotten rid of the crisis for which the nation could live or die but facing the 
immense superiority of American soft power, the construction of China’s soft power has already 
become a matter of vital importance. In particular, if China wants to achieve the strategic objective of 
its “peaceful rise”, it is not only necessary to have “hard power” reserves, but also the power to 
influence and inspire that comes from culture; in terms of development of soft power, China must be 
in the world’s front row. This requires us to invest even more energy in the research on the soft power 
theory.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
Based on this brief overview of a selection of studies carried out by Chinese scholars in 
the first stages of the analysis of the soft power theory, it can be argued that the intellectual 
viewpoint has progressively evolved from a basic understanding of the concept in the American 
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context to an interpretation more suitable to China’s situation. Studies have experienced a 
gradual, yet significant, development, detecting the need to develop strategies aimed at 
improving China’s soft power. As previously pointed out, in the last decades, the development 
of soft power has come to take on a strategic significance for China, as it is pursuing the goal of 
reinvigorating the country’s position in the world. In fact, when the soft power concept was first 
introduced, American culture already enjoyed worldwide popularity, while, for China, it was 
imperative to revive the appeal of its own culture, in order make full use of its international 
competitiveness. It is therefore no surprise that, as stated by Liu Debin (2004), the debate on 
soft power among scholars became fervent, perhaps even more so than in the West.  
Even though in the period covering the 1990s and the early 2000s Chinese scholars would 
place attention on the study of soft power from a theoretical perspective, trying to understand its 
function and how it could be applied to the Chinese context, a “made-to-measure” interpretation 
of the soft power theory would soon emerge from the academic and strategic circles, to better 
suit the peculiarities of the Chinese experience. In fact, as stated by Men Honghua (2007a, pp. 
10-11), when analyzing China’s soft power, the theory should be “localized” and enriched with 
“Chinese practice”. The present discussion posits that it is precisely to this end that emphasis is 
placed on culture as a form of national strength in the Chinese discourse on soft power, as the 
rather innovative expression “wenhua ruan shili” shows. Moreover, as has been expounded 
upon in the previous sections, traditional culture becomes a specific tool for China to bring the 
country back on the world stage. This goes hand-in-hand with China regaining the status of 
most influential civilization it once enjoyed in the past. By placing emphasis on the role of 
culture as a resource of soft power, scholars recognize the advantage that the ancient Chinese 
civilization and deep-rooted system of thought represent for China’s ascent, while at the same 
time acknowledging that China’s soft power deployment is still weak in comparison to that of 
other great powers.  
With reference to the examination of soft power as a relatively new theory penetrating the 
Chinese context, another contribution is worth mentioning before moving on to reviewing the 
history of the official discourse on soft power, which converged into the formalization of the 
concept of “wenhua ruan shili” in Hu Jintao’s 2007 speech. As a very thorough appraisal of the 
status of the research on soft power up to 2007, the summary compiled by Chinese scholars Liu 
Qing and Wang Litao takes into consideration four aspects of the research: 1) the origins and 
development of the soft power theory; 2) the translation of the term “soft power” in Chinese; 3) 
the connotations of the soft power concept; and 4) the contributions and deficiencies of the soft 
power theory. In particular, the authors point out that for Chinese scholars committed to the 
research on soft power, the most problematic and controversial aspect has been the task of 
defining its connotations, as there is still no widespread consensus on the definition of soft 
power, its origin, its classification, and its characteristics (Liu Qing and Wang Litao 2007, p. 
39). While the translations of the term “soft power” debated by the scholars will be taken into 
consideration in Chapter 7, attention must be paid here to the connotations of soft power, in 
regard to which the authors raise an interesting point that is in line with the approach chosen by 
the present dissertation, that is a binary interpretation of soft power. The authors debate 
potential “classifications of soft power” (ruan liliang de fenlei 且À之̪®ͳ) highlighting a 
variety of views: some Chinese scholars believe that soft power has an “internal” (neibu Ѳ) 
and “external” (waibu ŁѲ) division, with the former including a country’s system innovation, 
human resources, cultural influence, national cohesion, and affinity, and the latter including a 
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country’s international image, the power to control international systems, and the capability to 
take on international duties (Liu Qing and Wang Litao 2007, pp. 40-41). Others believe that soft 
power can be divided into two types: soft power in a “narrow sense” (xiayi ̊/) and soft 
power in a “wide sense” (guangyi Ʈ/), with the former indicating immaterial, cultural, and 
spiritual aspects, such as the attractiveness exercised towards other countries by values, culture, 
and technology, and the latter indicating the influence of a country’s economy and diplomacy in 
the world (Ibid.). Last but not least, an even newer conception that has emerged is that related to 
the differentiation between “endogenous” (neisheng de ̛̪) and “constructed” (jiangou de 
ƾʀ̪) soft power (Ibid.).  
As has been expounded upon, in the Chinese discourse, it is indeed possible to detect a 
binary interpretation of the concept of soft power, which embraces both domestic and foreign 
factors. Nevertheless, from the writings considered so far, it is also clear that Chinese scholars 
still advocate the need for a more clear-cut definition of soft power and call for the development 
of a soft power theory more suitable for the Chinese context. Greater effort is required to define 
what soft power means for China, how to enhance it, and how culture can be wielded to produce 
soft power outcomes as part of the country’s national power toolkit. These aspect are again 
discussed in one of the earliest and most comprehensive books analyzing China’s soft power: 
China’s Soft Power Strategy, edited by Men Honghua in 2007, to which this dissertation has 
referred on several occasions. As previously mentioned, Men Honghua (2007a, pp. 11-14) 
analyzes China’s soft power based on five elements: culture, ideas, development model, 
international institutions, and international image. Assessing Chinese culture as a source of soft 
power, he highlights the efficient role played by China’s ancient civilization in radiating 
China’s traditional culture and values in East Asia and worldwide (Ibid., pp. 15-16). Apart from 
traditional Chinese culture being one of the mainstream cultures in the world, Men Honghua 
highlights another characteristic of China’s culture, that is its “openness” (kaifangxing ƿȺǦ) 
(Ibid.). He argues that, in the course of history, China has been influenced by foreign countries, 
while its influence has touched not only Asia, but also Europe, especially in the 17th and 18th 
centuries; even when, in the eyes of the West, China was perceived as undergoing a process of 
“Westernization” (XihuaϬÌ), in the course of its reforming and opening-up, for the Chinese 
that was actually a process of confluence and merger between the Chinese and Western 
civilizations, with “harmony in diversity” remaining the future appearance of the world (Ibid., 
pp. 16-17). With China’s rise being in unison with Asia’s rapid economic development, people 
in the world started again to look more closely at the incredible potential of traditional Chinese 
culture with Confucianism as its leitmotiv, reinstating Chinese culture in its strong position 
(Ibid., pp. 17-18). Today, examples such as the operations of the Confucius Institutes, which 
embody an ever-increasing “Chinese fever” (hanyu re ʺГ˼) abroad, testify to a new upsurge 
in interest in Chinese culture worldwide, confirming the massage reiterated by the Chinese 
leadership that “Chinese culture belongs not only to China, but to the whole world” (Zhongguo 
wenhua bu jin shuyu Zhongguo, ye shuyu quan shijie &ġɇÌMƏ<&ġ3Ə<̢) 
(Ibid., p. 18). 
Nonetheless, China’s soft power is still assessed as weak. Discussing methods to promote 
it, Men Honghua (2007a, pp. 51-54) takes his lead from listing all the goals set for China’s 
domestic and international future, following the rapid development in recent years: domestically, 
by 2020, China aims to ensure sustainable economic and social development, complete the 
construction of a middle-class society and the first stages in the creation of a harmonious 
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socialist society, and increase the country’s strength and competitiveness, using the 
achievements of development to benefit the entire people; modernization will be fundamentally 
realized by 2050, making China a “prosperous and powerful, democratic, and civilized socialist 
country” (fuqiang minzhu wenming de shehuizhuyi guojia źǆ	ʴ*	ɇə̪͍`*/
ġŶ). Internationally, China will be closer to becoming a “quasi-world power” (zhun shijie 
daguo §̢ńġ) exercising a leading role in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020, and it will 
develop into a “world power” (shijiexing daguo̢Ǧńġ) by 2050, contributing to the 
establishment of a harmonious world (Ibid.). The implementation of these strategies requires 
soft power to exercise a leading role; China must become a “real global power” (zhenzheng de 
quanqiuxing daguo ̸ʦ̪̕Ǧńġ) and, for this reason, how to make China’s soft power 
superior is a major topic of consideration among policy-makers and strategists (Ibid.). The 
elevation of China’s soft power can thus be seen from different angles: first, since the increase 
in material wealth is the main reason why China’s soft power, and in particular culture, 
ideology, and development model, receive attention, emphasis must still be put on learning how 
to wield hard power, increasing the investment in hard power and reinforcing its “projecting 
ability” (toushe nengli ȋſηÀ); second, no effort must be spared to carry forward China’s 
traditional culture and to transform it into a direct driving force behind Chinese ideas, the 
development model, international institutions, and international image, in order to guide the 
way towards the enhancement of China’s soft power by means of cultural superiority; third, 
China’s development model must be optimized and perfected; fourth, the capacity to participate 
in international institutions must be reinforced, striving to exercise a leading role; and fifth, the 
improvement of China’s international image must be promoted based on the construction of 
China’s domestic image (Ibid., pp. 51-54).  
The second and last points raised by Men Honghua deserve further consideration; the 
following sections, in fact, will elaborate on the idea of enhancing China’s soft power by means 
of cultural superiority, suggested by scholars such as Men Honghua (2007a, p. 52), but also 
elaborated in the CPC’s official discourse on soft power, embodied by the formulation “tigao 
guojia wenhua ruan shili” (enhance the country’s cultural soft power). It will be shown how the 
Chinese leadership has responded to the need of a more clear-cut definition of soft power in the 
Chinese context by means of the formalization of the concept of “wenhua ruan shili” (cultural 
soft power). As well, the project of enhancing culture as part of the country’s cultural soft 
power will appear to be supported by a system of institutional actions, especially in the form of 
cultural policies, elaborated over the course of time and diffused nationwide, with the aim of 
building resources of cultural soft power and enhancing their attractiveness on the global stage. 
Moreover, in regard to the last point mentioned by Men Honghua (2007a, p. 53), the promotion 
of China’s international image based on the construction of China’s domestic image shows that 
building China’s soft power involves both domestic and foreign policy strategies. This once 
again confirms the originality of the Chinese interpretation of Joseph S. Nye’s soft power theory, 
which, as highlighted in Section 5.1, displays a broader view in comparison to the original 
conceptualization. This breadth is also related to the binary approach to soft power mentioned 
above, showing that, in the course of the theory’s conceptual migration to China, the theoretical 
frame upon which the discourse on soft power was built has undergone a process of 
transformation and expansion, based on China’s historical background and experience. The 
relation between China’s domestic and international image that Men Honghua refers to can 
indeed be explained within the frame of these binary and more comprehensive paradigms. 
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According to Men Honghua (2007a, p. 54) international image building depends, to a certain 
extent, on both the domestic and international levels and, generally speaking, soft power puts 
more emphasis on the promoting role of domestic factors. He further argues that, on the 
domestic level, China must accelerate the pace in the construction of a harmonious society, 
synchronously carry out economic development and social progress, ensure political stability 
and cultural prosperity, and implement the democratic rule of law and fair justice, so as to build 
the foundation for China’s “centripetal force” (xiangxinli ’ǘÀ) and “international influence” 
(guoji yingxiangli ġ书ǍđÀ) (Ibid.). In order to become a responsible great power in the 
international community, China must first take responsibilities towards itself and its citizens, 
showing the image of a country that, domestically, is in touch with the people, democratic, 
incorruptible, and efficient, and that vigorously protects the people’s civic rights and interests as 
well as profits abroad (Ibid.). Accordingly, at an international level, China must strive to make 
“harmony” a universal value (Ibid.).   
The “centripetal force” Men Honghua refers to can be thought of as corresponding to the 
“cohesive force” (ningjuli ©ήÀ, or “cohesion”, “cohesiveness”) discussed by Hu Jintao in his 
speech to the 17th National Congress of the CPC in October 2007 (Xinhua She 2007). As a 
matter of fact, such important tasks as those discussed above, could not go unnoticed by CPC 
officials and policy-makers. The next section will investigate the evolution of the Chinese 
leadership’s approach to the soft power theory throughout the years, of which Hu Jintao’s 2007 
political speech, a historical landmark in the Chinese discourse on soft power, represents a 
synthesis. The government’s guidance and involvement in the development of a Chinese 
discourse on soft power, as well as strategies aimed at enhancing the country’s cultural soft 
power, will also emerge through an examination that breaks down the formulation “tigao guojia 
wenhua ruan shili” in order to analyze the connotations of its components.  
 
 
Closing remarks 
 
This chapter has shown how the emergence of the Chinese discourse on soft power has been 
influenced by China’s historical background and traditional thought pattern of which its system 
of values represent a powerful symbol. Historically, culture and civilization have constituted for 
China a wellspring through which to cultivate a unique vision of the individual, state 
governance, and international relations. This vision has affected China’s very own interpretation 
of soft power over the course of history and plays an important role even today. The discourse 
on soft power in contemporary China has arisen from the historical relevance placed on culture, 
which is also reflected in China’s modern theory of cultural strength, and the more 
contemporary concept of CNP. Yet, it cannot be denied that the influence of Joseph S. Nye’s 
theory has been felt in China too. Absorbing and re-elaborating this foreign concept based on 
autochthonous ideas, academic and strategic circles have given rise to a new concept, that of 
“wenhua ruan shili” (cultural soft power). Thus, the Chinese discourse on soft power appears to 
be the result of the efforts made by Chinese scholars and strategists to link China’s tradition 
with contemporary ideas, throughout the early stages of the research. Culture as the 
predominant resource of soft power has been identified as the element that sets Chinese soft 
power apart from its Western counterpart. In this way, enriched with Chinese practice so much 
so as to give rise to a “made-to-measure” interpretation, the soft power theory in China displays 
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peculiar characteristics: it is broader than its original conceptualization, it follows a binary 
approach embracing both domestic and foreign dynamics, and, above all, it places emphasis on 
culture as the most extraordinary source for China’s soft power. The difference in status, 
resources, and strategic purposes between China and the United States, although not preventing 
the mastery in the use of soft power from being equally recognized, in the United States and 
China alike, as an important component in the assessment of a country’s strength and 
international competitiveness in today’s changing world, has, not surprisingly, given rise to the 
development of different interpretations of soft power. Moreover, in China, building soft power 
is envisioned even more as a way to build national strength and Chinese scholars have been 
advocating for a more clear-cut definition of what China’s soft power actually is, a prerequisite 
which is instrumental to define strategies useful to enhance it. In fact, China’s soft power is still 
assessed as being relatively weak, but the emphasis on culture, and especially traditional culture, 
is undoubtedly seen as a powerful resource to develop and project it. By placing culture at the 
core, the Chinese discourse on soft power, represented today by the concept of “wenhua ruan 
shili”, appears to be envisioned in a more comprehensive way, allowing for the deployment of 
strategies that touch upon a betterment of China’s domestic situation, as well as an increase in 
the country’s international competitiveness.!The formulation “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” 
(enhance the country’s cultural soft power), officially adopted into the Chinese political jargon 
in 2007, embodies the leadership’s definition of what soft power represents for contemporary 
China and its current status, and reflects the institutional determination to build and enhance 
(tigao) China’s cultural resources as part of the country’s soft power.  
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6. Official discourse on soft power in contemporary China: culture as a national strategy  
 
 
This chapter will focus on the development of the official discourse on soft power in the 
Chinese context between the early 1990s and 2007 and the related theory and practice in the 
years that followed until 2012. It will be divided into three parts which will explore, from 
different angles, the process through which the soft power concept has evolved from a 
theoretical notion studied by scholars, in the fields of academia and strategic studies, to a 
political formulation embodied in the expression “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” (enhance the 
country’s cultural soft power), officially introduced by Hu Jintao in the course of the 17th 
National Congress of the CPC in 2007, and a national strategy disseminated nationwide and put 
in practice through cultural policies. More specifically, Section 6.1 will provide an introduction, 
exploring the relationship between the academic discourse presented above and the point of 
view expressed by the CPC’s leadership on soft power. Building on the premise that the 
expressions “wenhua ruan shili” (cultural soft power), “guojia wenhua ruan shili” (national 
cultural soft power), and “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” can be considered official political 
formulations, attention will also be paid to the role played by these elements of discourse in the 
language of Chinese politics. The guiding role of the CPC’s official discourse in determining 
the orientation towards which the research on and practice of soft power has been developing in 
the Chinese context will emerge, and how the nature, resources, and purposes of soft power 
strategies peculiar to China are reflected in the terminology officially used will be highlighted. 
This will emerge with even more clarity in Section 6.2, which takes into consideration historical 
vicissitudes of the CPC’s interest in theoretical and ideological aspects that can be linked to the 
contemporary interpretation of soft power. The origins of the Chinese leadership’s discourse on 
soft power will thus be traced back to China’s communist tradition, in particular bringing to 
light a selection of relevant contributions in the years after 1990, but also taking into account 
the heritage left by CPC’s predecessors, and eventually culminating in the formalization of the 
concept of “wenhua ruan shili” in 2007. The salient aspects related to the evolution of this 
concept from that of “soft power” (ruan shili), adopted from the West and progressively 
adjusted to the Chinese context, will also be brought to light, as well as the government’s 
guidance in the development of a Chinese theory of soft power and the determination to turn it 
into a practice aimed at enhancing the country’s cultural soft power, an aspect that will emerge 
through the analysis of the formulation “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili”. The popularization of 
the Chinese view on soft power will make it necessary to also refer, at times, to scholarly 
articles, official documents and speeches, and news reports, often made available through state 
media outlets, in order to draw a picture of the Chinese discourse on soft power that is as 
complete as possible. This type of analysis is even more relevant for the investigation carried 
out in the Section 6.3, which focuses on more recent developments of the theory and practice of 
soft power in the Chinese context in the years between 2007 and 2012. The discussion will take 
into consideration a selection of official speeches, policy documents, and Party-State guidelines, 
disseminated and debated through the media, which will testify to the relevance of cultural 
policies for the enhancement of the country’s cultural soft power. The theoretical framework on 
which the Chinese discourse on soft power is built will thus appear as being supported by an 
action plan to enhance China’s cultural soft power officially promoted at the Party’s and State’s 
levels, in which the country’s institutions and overall society are called to participate in a 
collective effort.  
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6.1 Preliminary observations 
 
In order to fulfill the task of describing, through an overview of the evolution of the 
Chinese leadership’s approach to the concept of soft power over the years between the early 
1990s and 2007, the influence exercised by the CPC’s official view on the shaping of the 
contemporary discourse on soft power in China, as well as the definition of its resources, tools 
to enhance it, and purposes, some preliminary observations must be made. It will be shown that 
there exists a close link between the studies conducted by Chinese scholars and strategists on 
the concept of soft power and the official vision put forward by the Chinese leadership. It will 
also be demonstrated that the formulations adopted by the official discourse guide the ways in 
which political and public debates on soft power are conducted in China. But more importantly, 
it will be discussed how these political formulations are more than just a linguistic phenomenon, 
as they assume even more the function of articulating the guidelines for the definition of what 
soft power represents for China and the development of domestic and foreign strategies aimed 
at its construction and enhancement.  
Firstly, it is necessary to shed light on the relationship between the discourse provided by 
academics and experts presented in the previous section and the Chinese leadership’s point of 
view in regard to soft power. This relationship is somewhat complex due to the fact that, in the 
first place, the discourse on soft power in the Chinese context is rather intricate in itself. As 
previously pointed out, both the discourse on Chinese soft power at an international level and 
the Chinese discourse on soft power at a domestic level are rich and variegated; they do not 
always reach uniform conclusions and display, at times, contradictory points of view. Wuthnow 
(2008, p. 2) describes the Chinese discourse on soft power as the opposite of a “closed system” 
insofar as it does not develop solely within intellectual circles but receives “external inputs”, 
such as: state ideology, Western publications on the topic of soft power and Chinese soft power, 
and developments in Chinese foreign policy itself. These inputs have transformed this discourse 
into “a hybrid of various sources” without impeding, however, the development of an 
increasingly high level of articulation in terms of details, number of participants, and dynamism 
and complexity in the analysis of the topic (Ibid., p. 3). The author also argues that there is a 
correlation between the research carried out and the actions performed by decision-makers 
(Ibid.). This relationship can be described as a “feedback loop through which leaders seek the 
advice of civilian experts, the research of whom is, in turn, constrained by the decisions of 
policy elites” (Ibid.). In the following pages this interdependence will emerge when, for the sake 
of clarity, it will be necessary to refer to theories and hypotheses suggested by intellectuals, 
researchers, and experts in order to better comprehend the CPC’s official discourse.  
Secondly, and in a related way, it is also important to investigate weather or not, and to 
what extent, the official discourse on soft power plays a guiding role in the definition of the 
direction towards which the analysis of this topic has been moving. In other words, the 
argument posed here is that the Chinese leadership’s choice of words has served, and still serves, 
as guidance for the evolution of the ways in which experts, scholars, pundits, and the general 
public in China talk about soft power. In this regard, reference must be made to the role played 
by language in Chinese politics, a point that will also be dealt with, from a terminological point 
of view, in Chapter 7. For the present discussion it will suffice to posit that the fixation of a 
specific “tifa Ȫˇ”, a term that can be generally defined as “the way something is put”, a 
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“formulation”, or “wording”72, in the leadership’s official discourse generally sets the direction 
for the development of policies, research, and public debate. With reference to the filed of 
Chinese politics, and more specifically that of political propaganda, the term “tifa” takes on a 
more profound meaning in comparison to the general one provided above. Brady (2008, p. 100), 
for example, defines these formulations “official definitions of the correct terminology to be 
used in public discourse” and states that in China, since 1949, the year when the PRC was 
founded by Mao Zedong ʲˋ!, employing a “tifa” has been “one of the most powerful means 
of thought control”. The author also provides a more concise definition of “tifa” in the glossary 
to her volume: “politically correct speech” (Ibid., p. 206). A similar view is expressed by 
Schoenhals (1992), who examines formalized language as a form of power, maintaining that in 
contemporary Chinese politics things are done with words. In particular, he believes that 
“formalized language and formalized speech acts help constitute the structure of power in 
China’s political system” (Ibid., p. 1). He further argues:  
 
In some cases the process of policy making is indistinguishable from the process of policy 
formulation. Policy implementation at all levels is affected by concerns with questions like How 
should this be put? What happens if we put it like that? Will putting it like this put people off? What 
do they mean by putting it differently? Can we really let them put it like that?  
(Ibid., p. 3) 
 
It is important to clarify that China is not the only country that employs specific 
formulations in political discourse. Schoenhals (1992, p. 1) writes that “formalization is part of 
politics everywhere”, while Lu Xing (1999, p. 492), focusing on the use of political slogans in 
Communist China from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, argues that “there is nothing new nor 
culture-specific about the use of slogans”. That being said, in the Chinese political system 
specific wordings and formalizations acquire a more profound meaning. As stated by 
Schoenhals (1992, p. 3), in contemporary Chinese politics, language formalization has become a 
“form of power managed and manipulated by the state”, which “has a bearing upon all aspects 
of Chinese politics”.  
First and foremost, in China, the origins of language formalization can be, once again, 
traced back to antiquity. Analyzing how the Chinese contemporary political discourse shares 
some rhetorical features with classical Chinese rhetoric, Lu Xing (2002, p. 100) takes into 
consideration the philosophical concept of “zhengming ʦý ” (rectification of names). 
According to the author, this term was employed in Confucian thinking to indicate that social 
disorder and moral decline were caused by the misuse of words, names, and their meanings 
(Ibid.). The Analects report:  
 
 
If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in 
accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. When affairs cannot be 
carried on to success, proprieties [rites] and music will not flourish. When proprieties and music do 
not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, 
the people do not know how to move hand or foot. Therefore a superior man considers it necessary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Hanying Cidian (di san ban) ʺϏЍͩ̃- A Chinese-English Dictionary (Third Edition). Beijing: 
Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 2010, s.v. tífǎ Ȫˇ. 
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that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out 
appropriately. What the superior man requires is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect. 
 
(Chinese Text Project n.d.) 73 
 
Language appears as a crucial tool to maintain order and avoid chaos, as only by calling 
things with their correct names do people know how to properly act. Lu Xing (2002, p. 100) 
attributes to the rectification of names the function of a “political solution to the problem of 
disorder and moral decline” and sees communication as having a “crucial role in contributing or 
inhibiting social order”. Schoenhals (1992, p. 2) also stresses the extensive study of language 
formalization in pre-modern China, as political philosophers believed that if what is said is not 
reasonable, the affairs of the state will not reach success and the people will have no guidance in 
choosing what is right. Moreover, according to Lu Xing (2002, p. 100), rulers must employ the 
concept of “zhengming” to fix social roles and make sure that everyone performs their role in 
society; sometimes this also requires the creation of new terms. This is demonstrated in The 
Analects by the effort of painstakingly creating and defining moral terms, such as “ren” 
(benevolence), “li” (rites/rules of propriety), “xiao Š” (filial piety), and “shu Ǩ” (reciprocity), 
in order to reshape and redirect Chinese society towards new moral standards and a civilized 
order (Ibid.). In short, one can say that to guide the people to do what is right, it is necessary to 
define names for things and call these things appropriately. Chinese political philosophers of 
pre-modern China understood this very well and regarded language formalization very highly.  
Contemporary Chinese leaders have also learned this lesson. As Schoenhals (1992, p. 14) 
puts it, “to gain access to the agora, PRC citizens must employ as their means of expression 
what in the eyes of the state count as ‘appropriate’ formulations”. Moreover, in her study about 
the use of political slogans in Communist China, Lu Xing (1999) describes these rhetorical 
elements of discourse as a form of persuasion that, by means of a pervasive use, has had a 
strong impact on Chinese culture and altered the thought pattern of Chinese people, and their 
conceptualization as a means to meet changing social conditions and establish control. 
According to Schoenhals (1992, pp. 8-11), although the CPC has yet to develop a clear 
theory about formulations, some of their main characteristics are rather evident: they have to 
“contribute to the attainment of specific goals”; they should be “scientific”; and they should be 
considered “to be politically useful and clever”.!Some accepted formulations are short, even 
amounting to just one single word; others may be considerably longer (Ibid., p. 11)74. 
In brief, a considerable amount of international sources dealing with different aspects of 
China’s foreign policy and soft power supports the thesis according to which language is a tool 
used with mastery by Chinese leaders. Callahan (2007, pp. 786-787), for example, recognizes 
that the use of official phrases to guide political understanding and action, a phenomenon that 
he defines as “language politics”, is common in China’s domestic discourse, and highlights that 
this trend is recently being perfected also in the communication with foreign audiences, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Chinese version: “ýʦ´϶了϶了´:Ǹ:Ǹ´͌1͌1´°Ρ&
°Ρ&´ʴɓǽȨǾ上
ȼ…śý0Ǚô϶3϶0ǙôϤ3
…śɏ϶ɓǽόΩƟ̀
” 
Available at: http://ctext.org/analects/zi-lu.  
74 The author clarifies that according to Chinese usage of the term “tifa” and Western conversation analysis usage of 
the term “formulation”, formulations consisting of a single word and formulations consisting of a string of words can 
be treated in the same way, as the former can be considered a special case of the latter (Schoenhals 1992, p. 6n17). 
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emphasizing “the importance of language politics in Chinese foreign policy”. Language politics 
is thus a field in which shared goals go hand-in-hand with a “shared language”, constituting 
“official language games […] reinforced through persistent and ever-present repetition” (Ibid.). 
An example of this is the use of the expressions “heping jueqi” and “heping fazhan”, thoroughly 
discussed in Chapter 3. As previously mentioned, Scott (2012) analyzes China’s public 
diplomacy lexicon as a tool to reassure the international community and facilitate alliances in 
the age of China’s rise. In particular, the author points out that, in the PRC, language is used 
instrumentally, assuming the role of an “instrument of government and diplomacy” (Ibid., p. 40).  
Based on these premises, it is important to highlight how the official discourse on soft 
power fits into this discussion. The adoption of the concept of soft power within the Chinese 
official discourse was marked by the use of the expression “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” in 
Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th National Congress of the CPC in October 2007. As will 
be discussed in the following pages, the expressions “wenhua ruan shili”, “guojia wenhua ruan 
shili”, and “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” are recognized by many (Renmin Wang 2009; 
Huang Lizhi ӓÀ0 2014; Wang Yiwei ̏/ʕ 2014) as officially sanctioned “tifa”. With the 
use of these formulations in such an important political event as is the 17th National Congress, 
what Cao Qing (2011, pp. 11-12) calls the “culture-based conception of soft power” was given 
strategic meaning not only as an instrument to achieve the desired foreign policy goals but also, 
and more importantly, as a set of “communicative values” aimed at reaching consensus on the 
urgency “to build a strong, coherent national culture and identity as the basis for China’s soft 
power”. This “consensus-building exercise” can be seen as “the mobilisation of a cultural 
campaign”, in a vision of soft power that is both “internally and externally directed”, but 
primarily oriented towards the Chinese nation, advocating a change in domestic priorities and 
practices in order to develop soft power resources (Ibid., p. 12). As will be described in greater 
detail later on, the national project aimed at enhancing culture as part of the country’s soft 
power is clearly depicted in the leadership’s discourse, first and foremost in Hu Jintao’s speech, 
but also in other leaders’ speeches and policy documents. How soft power is envisioned in the 
Chinese government’s official discourse can thus be summarized by a definition provided by 
Cao Qing (2011, p. 10): “it is a set of values that a given community articulates and practices as 
its own foundational principles which might exert some form of appeal at times to members 
outside that particular community”. 
As has been previously pointed out, China’s soft power discourse has both an internal and 
an external dimension. Yet, it can be argued that the internal dimension takes on relatively 
greater relevance, embodying one of the most peculiar characteristics of the Chinese discourse 
on soft power. As Cao Qing (2011, p. 12) points out, in the Chinese official discourse, China’s 
soft power is depicted as a pivotal aspect of the construction of national culture, while its 
external dimension is largely conceived as a reflection of the expected rejuvenation of China’s 
culture: “[…] reviving traditional values, enhancing communication infrastructures, but more 
importantly developing a strong national identity constitute central components, and therefore 
defining characteristics, of the official discourse of soft power”.  
It can thus be implied that this vision is primarily due to the type of discourse adopted by 
the Chinese leadership and the importance attributed to it in setting the guidelines for the 
development of domestic and foreign policies. In this regard, Cao Qing (2011, p. 12) argues that, 
in the hierarchical structure of China’s communication system, “top leaders’ speeches carry 
explicit political validity for a national project, which will be promoted and carried out by 
government departments”. Thus, the popularity of the concept of soft power, the main 
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characteristics of its interpretation in China, with culture and traditional values as its core, and 
the resulting cultural strategies appear to be the consequence of the related official discourse. 
This is evident also because following Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th National Congress 
of the CPC in 2007 discussions on soft power rapidly gained the spotlight in official discourse, 
in relation to both domestic and international issues (Cao Qing 2011, p. 11).  
These aspects will be further demonstrated in the following pages which will take into 
account the development of the Chinese official discourse on soft power in the years after 1990 
and leading up to 2007, offering a critical analysis of the formulation “tigao guojia wenhua 
ruan shili”. The relation between the official terminology used and the orientation of the 
Chinese discourse on soft power will thus emerge, together with the government’s active role in 
defining the Chinese soft power theory, which will then be turned into a series of specific 
strategies aimed at enhancing the country’s cultural soft power.  
  
 
6.2 Developments prior to the 17th National Congress of the CPC in 2007 
 
Even though the present analysis elaborates on the penetration into the Chinese context of 
the concept of soft power as a notion generated in the West, thus taking its lead from the 1990s, 
Chapter 5 highlighted some of the most relevant elements that can be found in the ancient 
Chinese philosophical tradition and applied to the interpretation of soft power in contemporary 
China. In a similar vein, the following pages will trace the origins of the Chinese leadership’s 
discourse on soft power back to China’s past, focusing on the years between 1990 and 2007, but 
also bringing to light the influence of previous communist tradition. Based on the premise that, 
through the official discourse, the Chinese leadership has enunciated a national project aimed at 
enhancing culture as part of the country’s soft power, as stipulated by the formulation “tigao 
guojia wenhua ruan shili” (enhance the country’s cultural soft power), the aim of this section is 
to highlight how interest in national culture-building has been expressed, over the years, by 
successive generations of CPC leaders, eventually culminating in the formal endorsement of the 
concept of “wenhua ruan shili” (cultural soft power) in the course of the 17th National Congress 
in 2007. For this reason, the evolution of the concept of “soft power” (ruan shili), adopted from 
the West and progressively adjusted to the characteristics of the Chinese context, into that of 
“wenhua ruan shili” will also be brought to light, together with the rational behind this choice. 
The discussion posits that an attempt to distinguish between these two concepts and a critical 
analysis of the formulation “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” are crucial to pinpoint not only the 
orientation of the Chinese discourse on soft power in terms of discussed topics, emphasized 
connotations, and highlighted characteristics, but also the government’s involvement in the 
definition of a soft power theory more suitable for the Chinese context and the declared 
determination to take action to build and enhance (tigao) the country’s cultural soft power.  
Chinese authors engaged in the analysis of Chinese soft power often make reference to 
“Sinicized Marxism” (Zhongguohua Makesizhuyi &ġÌ五Ǥ*/) when discussing the 
origins and evolution of cultural soft power. For instance, Zheng Biao (2010, pp. 145-154) 
describes the relation between traditional culture and Marxism, stating that they have to 
“overcome sectarianism” (kefu menhu zhi jian ɮ҇Ǽ0ϯ) and “join hands to forge China’s 
soft power” (lianshou dazao Zhongguo ruan shili έǾȁѥ&ġ且ůÀ).  
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In Hong Xiaonan et al. (2013, pp. 75-96), a “Sinicized Marxist cultural soft power theory” 
(Zhongguohua Makesizhuyi wenhua ruan shili lilun &ġÌ五Ǥ*/ɇÌ且ůÀ̖Ї) is 
proposed. Its development is taken into consideration as evidence that “the CPC has always 
attached importance to cultural construction” (Zhongguo Gongchandang lilai zhongshi wenhua 
jianshe &ġDàɼ义ϲɇÌƾЈ), and that “under the leadership’s guidance and through 
more than 90 years of work, Chinese culture has gradually transformed its form from traditional 
to modern, and achieved great results” (zai dang de lingdao xia, jingguo 90 duo nian de nuli, 
Zhongguo wenhua cong chuantong xingtai zhuanbian wei xiandai xingtai, qude le juda de 
chengjiu Ĩ̪ҺŽΏя 90 łƪ̪ÆÀ&ġɇÌObΔ《ǡ丰ʨтî)̒S《ǡ
ìǖ7ƛń̪ǸƆ) (Ibid.).  
In the eyes of Chinese scholars, the seeds of today’s soft power can thus be found not 
only in China’s ancient traditional values and system of thought, but also in the CPC’s discourse 
on culture-building promoted since the foundation of the Party.  Today’s official discourse on 
China’s cultural soft power is seen as the result of the historical inheritance passed on starting 
from the founding principles of Marxism. In Hong Xiaonan et al. (2013, pp. 75-96), many 
examples are provided to support this thesis. In fact, the “Sinicized Marxist cultural soft power 
theory” is seen as representing “the Marxist cultural thought of the new period” (xin shiqi de 
Makesizhuyi wenhua sixiang ɍɗɱ̪五Ǥ*/ɇÌǤǰ ) and as constituting “the 
inheritance and development of the cultural thought of Marx, Engels, and the three generations 
of CPC collective leadership” (dui Makesi Engesi ji dang de sandai lingdao jiti wenhua sixiang 
de jicheng he fazhan ż五ǤǩʒɌè̪SҺŽңiɇÌǤǰ̪ΕȇĎëƎ) (Ibid., p. 
75). Marx and Engels are seen as the initiators of the “proletarian advanced cultural thought” 
(wuchan jieji xianjin wenhua sixiang ɓDғ΃严ɇÌǤǰ) as they proposed a series of 
guiding principles for the construction of “proletarian advanced culture” (wuchan jieji xianjin 
wenhua jianshe ɓDғ΃严ɇÌƾЈ) which paved the way for the exploration of advanced 
culture carried out by successive Marxists; the successive generations of CPC collective 
leadership attached great importance to cultural construction and its social function, a fact that 
reflects the Party’s cultural awareness in regard to its mission, ensuring that, in any historical 
period, the Party would represent the “progressive orientation of advanced Chinese culture” 
(Zhongguo xianjin wenhua de qianjin fangxiang &ġ严ɇÌ̪¾严Ɏ’) (Ibid.).  
Entering the age of globalization and informatization, as has been previously discussed, 
the role of culture in the international competition for power became more prominent and, in 
China, the early 1990s saw the growing popularity of the concepts of “zonghe guoli” (CNP) and 
“wenhua li” (cultural strength). In the same period, then-President Jiang Zemin advocated the 
construction of “advanced socialist culture” (shehuizhuyi xianjin wenhua) (Hong Xiaonan et al. 
2013, p. 78). The third generation of the CPC collective leadership, with Jiang Zemin as the 
core, connected socialist culture with CNP, further developing the Marxist cultural soft power 
thought and suggesting that culture belonged to CNP, as “spiritual force” (jingshen liliang) also 
belonged to it (Ibid., p. 79). The 15th National Congress of the CPC (Zhongguo Gongchandang 
Di Shiwu Ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui &ġDͩÐ?ʡġSϧń`) in 1997 decreed 
the following:  
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ƾЈɭ&ġ̇υ͍`*/̪ɇÌƆɞU五Ǥ*/)țŽUĲɭ̖ǰ	ɭ丹Ǘ	ɭɇÌ	
ɭ΄ǔ̪ʴ)̲ʋëƎҮ’̒SÌ	Ү’̢	Ү’ɳɼ̪ʴɑ̪͗ţ̪ń^̪͍`*
/ɇÌ
 
(cited in Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013, p. 79) 
 
Building socialist culture with Chinese characteristics means developing, under the guidance of 
Marxism and with the target of cultivating citizens with ideals, morality, culture, and discipline, a 
national, scientific socialist culture for the masses, oriented towards modernization, oriented towards 
the world, and oriented towards the future.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
Moreover, Jiang Zemin also proposed that “culture is an important symbol of 
comprehensive national power” (wenhua shi zonghe guoli de zhongyao biaozhi ɇÌɞΚûġ
À̪义ϭʋǛ) and this gave rise to important new ideas for the development of the theory of 
cultural soft power on the basis of what had been passed on by the predecessors (Hong Xiaonan 
et al. 2013, p. 79).   
Although not yet called “soft power” or “cultural soft power”, the need to make use of 
culture for the purpose of nation-building, identity-building, and the enhancement of national 
cohesion was already clear, as was the necessity to increase China’s competitiveness on the 
global stage by means of cultural undertakings. On one occasion in 1998, Jiang Zemin specified:  
 
%ʴɑ	%ġŶœʃ˂ɭνƞ̪ͷ͐ȶʊƆͪ<˂ɭ˵些Ɔ`Ŋä©ήÀĎ̛čÀ

ɭ˂ɭ亚ɘ̪ʴɑͷ͐ɞϦ之%ġŶΚûġÀǆǅ̪%义ϭƇƸ 
(cited in Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013, p. 79) 
 
If a people, a country, does not have its own moral pillars, which is equal to having no soul, it will 
lose cohesiveness and vitality. Having or not a high national spirit is an important scale to measure if 
a country’s comprehensive national power is strong or week…  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
With the 16th National Congress of the CPC in 2002, the reform of the cultural system 
was for the first time included in the content of a political report of the national congress, 
bringing cultural construction into China’s development strategy (Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013, p. 
81). This is confirmed by the following statement contained in the report:  
 
ǈN̢ɇÌΏ˒ĎȻ）̴>CϢĨΚûġÀͤ9&̪ĩ·Ďm̜万ɼ万͡«
ɇÌ̪
À之˞˞̀乐Ĩʴɑ̛̪čÀ	¶ѥÀĎ©ήÀ0&
 
(cited in Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013, p. 81) 
 
In today’s world, culture blends together with economics and politics and it has an increasingly 
prominent position and role in the competition for comprehensive national power. The force of culture 
is deeply casted in the vitality, creativity, and cohesiveness of the nation.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
Moreover, the strategic policy of “actively developing cultural undertakings and the 
cultural industry” (jiji fazhan wenhua shiye he wenhua chanye ͚ɿëƎɇÌ: ĎɇÌD ) 
was also put forward (Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013, p. 81).  
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It is relevant to note that the 16th National Congress also marked the inclusion of Jiang 
Zemin’s theory of the “Three Represents” (san ge daibiao %Sϧ), into the ideological 
apparatus of the CPC. The Party’s legitimacy was reiterated because of its ability to respond to 
the new historical situations the country was experiencing. The Party was thus called to 
represent the requirements for developing China’s advanced productive forces, the progressive 
orientation of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming 
majority of the Chinese people75. According to Hong Xiaonan et al. (2013, pp. 79-80) this 
shows that the Party’s awareness of the importance of building socialist culture had reached 
new proportions, indicating that “the country’s social development had moved, in terms of 
value orientation, from politics and economics to an all-around progress in politics, economics, 
culture, and society” (woguo de shehui fazhan zai jiazhi quxiang cong zhengzhi	 jingji 
zhuanxiang le zhengzhi jingji wenhua shehui de quanmian jinbu ǹġ̪͍`ëƎĨZì’
OȻ）	Ώ˒т’7Ȼ）Ώ˒ɇÌ͍`̪Ү严ʨ).    
All these examples testify to the fact that the concept of soft power, although not called as 
such, had been present in the history of the CPC for many years, with culture-building 
constantly at the core. As Li Mingjiang (2009b, p. 22) puts it, for the CPC’s top leadership soft 
power was “no longer an alien concept”. This is even more true in regard to the era of Hu Jintao 
and the fourth generation of Chinese leaders, which saw the official definition and formalization 
of the Chinese soft power theory, culminating with the 17th National Congress. It is indeed in 
this period, with 2007 as a cornerstone, that discussions on soft power flourished at all levels. 
According to Cho and Jeong (2008, p. 459) the soft power theory was able to turn into a 
“nationwide trend” due to a greater systematization of the concept at the leadership level, which 
benefited from the proposal of various theories and concepts, such as those of a “peaceful rise”, 
Beijing Consensus, and “harmonious world”, as well as the importance attributed to public 
diplomacy.  
In this regard, the 13th Group Study Session of the Politburo of the CPC Central 
Committee (Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju Di Shisan Ci Juti Xuexi &&ňȻ）ƉͩÐ
ʡңiţ4) held at the end of May 2004, also assumes relevance. According to Lai Hongyi 
(2012a, p. 11) the meeting exposed the Chinese leadership to the concept of soft power. Two 
articles published in the Chinese government weekly, Liaowang ̾ɯ (Outlook), are worth 
mentioning here: “Tisheng Zhongguo ruan shili: jiedu Zhongyang Zhengzhiju Di Shisan Ci Juti 
Xuexi ȪÒ&ġ且ůÀϵИ&ňȻ）ƉͩÐʡңiţ4” (Promoting China’s soft 
power: interpreting the 13th Group Study Session of the Politburo of the Central Committee), 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 According to the People’s Daily Online (2006), as a theoretical tool to strengthen the Party and promote socialism 
in China, the important thought of the Three Represents is a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, 
Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory, reflecting the new demands posed to the work of the Party and 
the State by new developments and changes happening in China and in the world. The thought of the “Three 
Represents” was first proposed by Jiang Zemin in 2000 when he pointed out that: “An important conclusion can be 
reached from reviewing our Party’s history over the past 70-odd years; that is, the reason our Party enjoys the 
people’s support is that throughout the historical periods of revolution, construction and reform, it has always 
represented the development trend of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced 
culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. With the formulation of 
the correct line, principles and policies, the Party has untiringly worked for the fundamental interests of the country 
and the people. Under the new conditions of historic significance, how our Party can better translate the Three 
Represents into action constitutes a major issue that all Party members, especially senior officials, must ponder 
deeply” (Ibid.). 
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written by Yang Taoyuanɽʔ˪, and “Zhongguo xuyao ruan shili &ġҦϭ且ůÀ” (China 
needs soft power), written by Zhao Changmaoд҆ϐ. The first article is a commentary on the 
13th Group Study Session, which, according to Yang Taoyuan (2004), revolved around the topic 
of “advancing and developing China’s philosophy and social sciences” (fanrong he fazhan 
woguo de zhexue shehui kexue ͿϔĎëƎǹġ̪Ēţ͍`͗ţ) and the heated discussion 
within the international public opinion regarding the Chinese model and the Beijing Consensus. 
More importantly, the meeting showed that it was evident that the Chinese leadership intended 
to accelerate the construction of China’s soft power from a strategic height, considering 
philosophy and social sciences as part of the country’s CNP (Ibid.). According to Li Mingjiang 
(2009b, p. 23), Professor Cheng Enfu of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 
who participated in the meeting, commented that the group study session clearly showed that 
the Chinese leaders attached importance to soft power. As well, the second article vigorously 
called for China to build soft power. According to Zhao Changmao (2004), in fact, a country’s 
rise lies fundamentally in an all-around upgrade of its CNP, but in the pattern of 
multipolarization (duojihua) and globalization (quanqiuhua) of today’s world the role of soft 
power in the international competition is becoming increasingly prominent. China’s peaceful 
rise has placed building and strengthening soft power in a crucial position because it is a process 
that not only involves the unceasing upgrading of economic, scientific and technological, and 
military strengths, but also, and even more, the unceasing strengthening of the attractiveness 
(xiyinli), or attractive force, and affinity (qinheli HĎÀ) of culture and ideology, that is “a 
process of unceasing growth and accumulation of soft power” (ruan shili buduan chengzhang 
he jilei de guocheng  且ůÀɋǸ҆Ď͚ͽ̪я͜) (Ibid.). Last but not least, in this process, 
“traditional culture would play a unique role” (chuantong wenhua jiang fahui dute zuoyong b
ΔɇÌƀëȝ̉̇m̜) (Ibid).  
It is evident that the Chinese interpretation of soft power was taking shape in a more 
clear-cut way among the CPC’s elites and gaining momentum in the political discourse. 2006 
was an important year for the formalization of China’s soft power strategy. According to Li 
Mingjiang (2009b, p. 23), reference to the need to increase the country’s international status and 
influence through the use of soft power was made by Hu Jintao at a meeting of the Central 
Foreign Affairs Leadership Group in January and then again at the Eighth National Congress of 
the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles in November. As a matter of fact, the first 
appearance of the Chinese term for soft power (ruan shili) in the Party’s and State’s documents 
is reported to have occurred on this last occasion (Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013, p. 82). In particular, 
Hu Jintao once again stressed the important position of culture in the competition for CNP and 
stated the following:  
 
œjȆ§ǹġɇÌëƎ̪Ɏ·¶ѥʴɑɇÌ̪ɍч˿ķǆǹġɇÌ̪ġ书ͤ9ÀȪÒġ
Ŷ且ůÀɞȯĨǹWҮ¾̪%义ń̒ůЙҽ
 
(cited in Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013, p. 97)  
 
How to seek a direction that allows for the development of the culture of our country, creating a new 
splendor for our national culture, increasing the international competitiveness of our culture, and 
promoting the country’s soft power, is a major practical task set in front of us.    
(Translated by the present author.) 
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Another preliminary step before publicly making soft power an official political strategy 
in the course of the 17th National Congress in October 2007 is represented by the 38th Group 
Study Session of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee (Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Zhengzhiju Di Sanshiba Ci Juti Xuexi &&ňȻ）Ɖͩ 38 ʡңiţ4) held in January 
2007. On this occasion Hu Jintao stressed that building and managing internet culture would 
“be beneficial for an increase in the country’s soft power” (youli yu zengqiang woguo de ruan 
shiliɭ¹<ķǆǹġ̪且ůÀ) (cited in Hong Xiaonan 2013, p. 82). This once again bore 
witness to the fact that the Chinese leadership had become sensitively aware of the importance 
for China of increasing its soft power (Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013, p. 82).  
In the course of 2007 other Chinese leaders spoke about soft power: Li Mingjiang (2009b, 
p. 23), for example, gives relevance to a speech delivered in March by Jia QinglinЬưʂ, at 
the time Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Zhongguo 
Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi&ġIʴȻ）ÕĖ`Ђ, CPPCC) and a member of the CPC 
Politburo Standing Committee (Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju Changweihui &&ňȻ
）ƉƦŖ`), and a special session of the CPPCC National Committee held in July. In the 
course of this latter event, Jia Qinglin is reported to have stressed the importance of the role 
played by soft power and cultural construction as its core in meeting domestic demands and 
enhancing China’s competitiveness in the world (Ibid.). According to Hong Xiaonan et al. 
(2013, p. 97), in fact, the meeting gathered suggestions regarding the issue of building national 
soft power with cultural construction as the main content.  
Just a few months later, on October 15th, the formulation “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” 
made its first official appearance in the Chinese political discourse when Hu Jintao pronounced 
his keynote speech to the 17th National Congress of the CPC. As previously noted, scholars 
(among others, Glaser and Murphy 2009; Nye and Wang 2009a, 2009b; Zhao Gang and Xiao 
Huan 2010; Zheng Biao 2010; Cao Qing 2011; Edney 2012; Liu Deding 2013; Hong Xiaonan et 
al. 2013; Aukia 2014) recognize the importance of this event, which represented a milestone in 
the formalization of the Chinese official view of soft power. For instance, Zheng Biao (2010, p. 
108) comments on the introduction of the expression “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” into the 
political report to the 17th National Congress, stating that to realize the great undertaking of 
China’s rejuvenation it is necessary to have robust hard-power foundations, but even more the 
formidable support of soft power. Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan (2010, p. 232) argue that the use 
of the words “tigao wenhua ruan shili” by Hu Jintao signaled that the concept had been elevated 
to the height of national strategy, pointing out the direction for future cultural construction. In 
Hong Xiaonan et al. (2013, pp. 96-97), “guojia wenhua ruan shili” is reported to have become a 
“hot expression” (remen de ciyu ˼̪҇ЍГ) in recent years, not only representing the center 
of attention in academic circles but also a “core concept” (hexin gainian ʐǘʝǟ) within 
“national political tactics” (guojia zhengzhi celüe ġŶȻ）̤ͭ) and “development strategies” 
(fazhan zhanlüe ëƎǻ̤), “entering into the country’s grand blueprint for future development” 
(jinru dao guojia weilai fazhan de hongwei lantu zhi zhong 严»ġŶɳɼëƎ̪ŪaϛĢ
0&). In this sense, officially including “wenhua ruan shili” in the congress report as a key 
theme made it clear that the Party and the State had already made the task of improving cultural 
soft power a new strategic focus in the strengthening of CNP and in the great rejuvenation of 
the Chinese people (Ibid., p. 97).  
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Although terminological aspects will be expounded upon in the following chapter, a brief 
explanation is needed here to clarify the difference in usage of the two expressions “ruan shili” 
(soft power) and “wenhua ruan shili” (cultural soft power). This difference has emerged 
throughout the entire discussion, but it must be once again stressed that, when referring to Hu 
Jintao’s speech to the 17th National Congress as the official event that marks the entrance of the 
topic of soft power within the political agenda of the CPC, the Western discourse, or discourse 
in English, does not always stress the use by former President Hu Jintao of the relatively new 
expression “wenhua ruan shili”. Generally speaking, talking about “soft power” in the Chinese 
context seems to coincide with “cultural soft power”, with the two terms being used 
alternatively and with no real distinction or clarification. This could simply be due to the lack of 
a real counterpart for “wenhua ruan shili” in the English language. As mentioned before, this 
aspect has been expounded upon by Gu Junwei (2011). The author points out that Chinese 
research on soft power must also give its contribution to global research, through a dialogue 
with scholars from other countries aimed at testing scientific results; however, the introduction 
of the term “soft power” into the Chinese language has given rise to many problems related to 
the misuse of a variety of “derivative terms that do not have a uniform understanding within the 
country” (zai guonei dou meiyou tongyi renshi de yansheng shuyu ĨġѴ˂ɭΔЀЋ̪
ϥ̛ɶГ) (Ibid., p. 67). This impedes the international dialogue among scholars, as is testified 
by the case of “wenhua ruan shili” which does not have a corresponding term in English, or is 
translated as “soft power” in the same way as “ruan shili” (Ibid.) By taking the example of the 
Wikipedia page related to soft power, which cites Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th National 
Congress glossing over the use of the correct expression “wenhua ruan shili”, Gu Junwei (2011, 
p. 67) raises a good point: the difficulty for international academic circles to comprehend the 
terminology used by Chinese scholars. This aspect will be expounded upon in Chapter 7, 
however, looking at how the lack of a fixed and precise English translation for the expression 
“wenhua ruan shili” somehow jeopardizes the correct transposition of the formulation 
employed by Hu Jintao in his speech to the 17th National Congress shows that, at times, the 
discrepancies between Chinese and English terminology and the difficulty in translating across 
these two languages without loosing important nuances of meaning can affect the Western 
perception of Chinese concepts, as is the case for Chinese soft power.  
Following the lead of Glaser and Murphy (2009), Aukia (2014), and Zappone (2014), 
attentive Western scholars who, among others, have noticed these terminological discrepancies, 
the present analysis has aimed to explore the connotations of “ruan shili” and “wenhua ruan 
shili” more profoundly, as well as investigating a variety of other derivatives in Chapter 7. In 
fact, the argument has been that it must always be kept in mind that the complete expression Hu 
Jintao used with reference to China’s soft power in his 2007 political report is indeed the 
formulation “guojia wenhua ruan shili”, a collocation that, as has been previously pointed out, 
sees the juxtaposition of the words “guojia” (“country”, sometimes corresponding to “China” or 
“nation” in English translations) and “wenhua” (culture), to the term “ruan shili”. The official 
English version of the speech, reported in Chapter 2, offers the translation “culture as part of the 
soft power of our country”. As previously explained, “culture as part of the country’s soft power” 
would be considered an appropriate alternative for Hu Jintao’s words. The collocations “cultural 
soft power” and “national cultural soft power” are nonetheless also very common in English 
texts, and in the present analysis, a conscious effort has been made to distinguish between “soft 
power” and “cultural soft power” when necessary and respecting the consistency with the 
sources analyzed. With the argument being that, by employing a somewhat innovative 
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expression (wenhua ruan shili) in the 2007 political report, culture was placed at the core of the 
Chinese discourse on soft power following a specific rational, the present analysis maintains 
that an attempt to distinguish between the concepts of “ruan shili” and “wenhua ruan shili” is 
pivotal to a better understanding of the Chinese narrative of soft power. As seen in the previous 
sections, in China, the soft power discourse displays a series of peculiar characteristics, and this 
is evident in the juxtaposition of the word “culture” before “soft power” in the formulation 
officially adopted in the Chinese political discourse. It is a choice which is not casual, but serves 
a series of purposes: it embodies the characteristics of the “made-to-measure” interpretation of 
soft power in the Chinese context; it sets the Chinese discourse on soft power apart from its 
Western counterpart, toning down the political nature of the latter and highlighting the nation 
and culture-building purposes of the former; and, by placing culture, and especially traditional 
culture at the core, it opens up new spaces for a use of soft power which aims at the 
achievement of an all-around betterment of China’s domestic and international realities in the 
age of China’s rise.  
Zappone (2014, p. 417n7), for instance, clearly states that the creation of the concept of 
cultural soft power reflects the leadership’s intention to place culture at the center of the 
Chinese discourse on soft power. The extract that focuses on soft power drawn from the 17th 
National Congress has been inserted in Chapter 2, in order to provide an explanation of the 
main assumptions proposed in this work. For the sake of clarity, the points considered relevant 
to the present discussion were also summarized and explained in great detail, in order to present 
the parameters of this research. Consequently, it was highlighted how the placement of culture 
at the core of the Chinese discourse on soft power reflected the choice of this resource as the 
basis for Chinese soft power and attention was paid to the former President’s statement that 
“culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a 
factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength” (wenhua 
yuelaiyue chengwei minzu ningjuli he chuangzaoli de zhongyao yuanquanyuelaiyue chengwei 
zonghe guoli jingzheng de zhongyao yinsu ɇÌ万ɼ万Ǹ)ʴɑ©ήÀĎ¶ѥÀ̪义ϭ˪ˆ	
万ɼ万Ǹ)ΚûġÀͤ9̪义ϭĜͺ) (Xinhua She 2007; Xinhua News Agency 2007). 
Based on this description, it is easy to see that in the Chinese context soft power is envisioned 
as serving both domestic and international needs because culture, placed at the core of Chinese 
soft power at the behest of the leadership, plays an important role in both directions. Thus, as 
argued by Zappone (2014, p. 417n7), cultural soft power embraces both aspects related to 
domestic politics and aspects related to foreign politics, with an increase in cultural soft power 
being both crucial to the achievement of a new international identity and status, but also to the 
development of a more equal society characterized by renewed values that, in line with 
innovation but also with China’s communist tradition, can once again bestow political 
legitimacy onto the Party, the historical guarantor of national morality.  
Chinese scholars have also elaborated extensively on the relation between “ruan shili” 
and “wenhua ruan shili”. As previously discussed, Liu Deding (2013, pp.!38-39) proposes that 
the process of development and evolution of the soft power concept in contemporary China can 
be divided into two phases: while the first phase saw the simultaneous development of the 
concepts of cultural strength and soft power, the second phase was characterized by the proposal 
of the concept of cultural soft power and its increasing popularity. In this sense, the proposal of 
the formulation “wenhua ruan shili” can be seen as merging these two concepts into an 
expression that takes on innovative connotations in comparison to its Western counterpart. 
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According to Liu Deding (2013, pp. 2-3), in the course of the process of borrowing from the 
Western theory of soft power and the Chinese theory of cultural strength, Chinese scholars have 
also actively developed research on cultural soft power, with literary works regarding the 
interpretation and analysis of “wenhua ruan shili” and research papers unceasingly emerging in 
large numbers. The author identifies a dissertation compiled in 2004 by a graduate student 
named Gao Yan ̬φ as the earliest document attempting to discuss China’s national soft 
power: from that point onward the publication of Chinese research treatises on cultural soft 
power took off, making the topic a focal point in the cultural domain (Ibid., p. 3).   
To explain this process, Liu Deding (2013, p. 38) takes its lead from an explanation of the 
main difference between the Western and the Chinese interpretation of soft power. The author 
takes into consideration the lack of a completely unanimous theoretical understanding and 
explanation of the concept of soft power after its penetration into China, which, nonetheless, has 
not impeded the emergence of some variations: for instance, even though the origins of the 
expression “guojia ruan shili ġŶ且ůÀ” (national soft power) can be traced back to Joseph S. 
Nye’s soft power theory, “this formulation and enunciation has already been assigned 
connotations that are different from its original meaning” (zhe yi tifa yu biaoshu yijing bei fuyu 
le yu qi yuanyi butong de neihan 两Ȫˇϧ个ƟΏϩЮ87ã/—̪？) (Ibid.). 
To a certain extent, the deep rooted relation to the “theory of power” (quanli lilun ɸÀ̖Ї) 
present in the Western concept of soft power has been eliminated, shifting from the search for 
hegemony to the goal of better satisfying the people’s demands and basic interests, more 
vigorously assuming international responsibilities, and promoting global justice, thus 
incarnating the fundamental difference with Western soft power (Ibid.). This is why, placing the 
word “wenhua” in front of “ruan shili” to form the expression “wenhua ruan shili” can be said 
to represent an attempt to soften the close link with the reality of power politics of the Western 
concept of soft power, in contrast to a more comprehensive, perhaps less confrontational, view 
which focuses on domestic practices without neglecting the sphere of foreign politics. As has 
been previously pointed out, this represents the process that Liu Deding (2013, p. 38) defines “a 
rectification of the excessive political use and instrumental nature of the Western concept of soft 
power” (Ibid.).  
In regard to the expression “wenhua ruan shili”, Liu Deding (2013, p. 39) points out that 
its first appearance occurred in 2005, in an news report in the newspaper Guangming Ribao 
əɕȏ (Guangming Daily) entitled “Wenhua ruan shili chengwei Zhejiang zonghe jingzhengli 
de zhongyao bufen ɇÌ且ůÀǸ)˔ʻΚûͤ9̪义ϭѲ®” (Cultural soft power becomes 
an important part of Zhejiang’s comprehensive competitiveness). In a similar way, the use of 
“wenhua ruan shili” in academic circles could be found in contexts related to the reform of the 
cultural system in various areas, as a component of regional competitive strength in terms of 
cultural undertakings and cultural industries (Ibid.). Conversely, it was indeed from 2007 that 
the research on cultural soft power started to be more related to national power (guojia shiliġ
ŶůÀ), and in particular after Hu Jintao explicitly talked about enhancing the country’s 
cultural soft power, that of “guojia wenhua ruan shili” (national cultural soft power) became the 
most popular school of thought76. Nevertheless, although a great number of analyses regarding 
the connotations of cultural soft power, its importance, its current development, and its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 The various schools of thought which have arisen in China in relation to soft power were discussed in Section 4.4.  
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enhancement have been produced by many scholars, based on their own fields of research, the 
exact meaning of this concept has yet to find a unanimous explanation (Ibid.).   
Notwithstanding the lack of widespread consensus on the nature of cultural soft power, 
after 2007, following the acceptance of the expression “wenhua ruan shili” into the CPC’s 
political jargon, there was an escalation in the popularity of anything related to the topic of soft 
power, not only in the official discourse of the Chinese leadership but also in the Chinese media. 
As previously mentioned, Guo Jiemin (2012, p. 17) states that the term “ruan shili” has become 
a “high-frequency word” (gaopin ci) in the Chinese press and media, while Liu Deding (2013, p. 
2) points out that following the 17th National Congress the expression “wenhua ruan shili” has 
been constantly appearing in the cultural sphere and in news reports, increasingly attracting the 
attention of academics and politicians.  
Chapter 7 will look more closely at the variety of derivatives, which, created on the basis 
of “ruan shili”, populate current discussions on soft power at all levels. Before moving on to the 
following section, which will introduce developments in the theory and practice of soft power in 
the years between 2007 and 2012, further investigating the relation between “ruan shili” and 
“wenhua ruan shili”, it is interesting to look at some examples drawn from the media which 
testify to the acceptance of the expression “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” into the realm of 
official formulations (tifa) populating the Chinese political jargon.  
The first example is a newspaper article written by Chinese scholar Wang Yiwei and 
issued in the People’s Daily Overseas Edition (Renmin Ribao Haiwaiban Iʴɕȏ：Ł̃) on 
December 27th, 2014, which testifies to the fact that Chinese views on soft power have also 
reached the communities of overseas Chinese. The author corroborates what is expressed by the 
formulation “wenhua ruan shili”, which integrates soft power and culture, with a comment on a 
visit to Qufu (ɧ习, the hometown of Confucius) by the father of the soft power theory, Joseph 
S. Nye, who, according to the article, stated that “China’s outstanding traditional culture is 
China’s most important soft power” (Zhonghua youxiu chuantong wenhua shi Zhongguo zui 
zhongyao de ruan shili &Ô_͔bΔɇÌɞ&ġɫ义ϭ̪且ůÀ) (Wang Yiwei 2014).  
The second example is drawn from the scholarly literature made available to the public 
through media outlets. It is a journal article written by Huang Lizhi in 2014 for the journal Mao 
Zedong Deng Xiaoping Lilun Yanjiu ʲˋ!ѬƂƩ̖Ї̈́͞ (Studies on Mao Zedong and 
Deng Xiaoping Theories) and published, in the same year, on the website of the Central 
Compilation and Translation Bureau (Zhonggong Zhongyang Bianyi Ju &&ňΝЎƉ). The 
article, which focuses on the relation between cultural soft power and China’s system of values, 
opens with the following indicative statement:  
 
O 2007 ƪ̪Ðń» 2012 ƪ̪Ðń,Ȫ亚ǺķǆġŶɇÌ且ůÀ̪Ȫˇ¡)
̪Ȼ）ȏĈǽЀô
两ǱČ̺ɇÌ且ůÀƾЈƟΏ严&ġġŶǻ̤ʀǰ
 
(Huang Lizhi 2014) 
 
From the 17th National Congress of the CPC in 2007 to the 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012, 
the formulation “enhance” or “strengthen” the country’s cultural soft power has been approved, again 
and again, by the Party’s political reports. This signifies that building cultural soft power has already 
entered the conceptualization of China’s national strategy.  
(Translated by the present author.)  
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Besides confirming the formalizing role of political reports, which, as discussed, have 
officially inserted cultural soft power into the CPC’s political toolkit, this article also testifies to 
the strategic relevance of building cultural soft power. In particular, it highlights the relevance 
of the words “enhance” (tigao) and “strengthen” (zengqiang ķǆ) in China’s official discourse 
on soft power.  
Thus, to conclude, it is important to recall that in the Chinese leadership’s vision, 
enhancing cultural soft power is indeed seen as a process in which soft power and its resources 
have to be built and promoted intentionally. Differently from Western countries, as was 
discussed in the previous chapter, China needs to build its soft power in order to regain the 
status of great power it enjoyed in the past, and bring China’s culture back on the atlas of the 
most influential civilizations in the world; hence, the use of words belonging to the semantic 
field of “enhance”, “increase”, and “strengthen” in the official formulations. In this sense, one 
of the main characteristics of Chinese soft power is the active role of the government in building 
and promoting it. This role emerges not only in relation to the provision of a correct vocabulary 
to talk about soft power in the Chinese context, but also in executing the function of an involved 
and aware actor in the enhancement of soft power resources and the development of soft power 
projection strategies. The following section will continue to elaborate on these aspects. 
 
 
6.3 From theory to practice: from the 17th National Congress of the CPC to 2012  
 
The aim of this section is to continue the analysis presented in the preceding parts and 
outline even more clearly the characteristics that, thus far, have been designated as peculiar to 
the Chinese discourse on soft power, focusing on the years between 2007 and 2012. The 
Chinese leaders’ determination to “enhance the country’s cultural soft power” will appear to be 
supported by an articulated system of cultural reforms and development programs, declared in 
programmatic documents and discussed in state media reports and commentaries. Attention will 
be paid to the dissemination of the Chinese leadership’s discourse on the cultural soft power 
theory among the general public, while, through the analysis of an increasingly complex and 
sophisticated panorama of official speeches, policy documents, and Party’s and State’s 
guidelines, it will be shown how this discourse has evolved from theory into practice, 
specifically taking the form of cultural policies affecting Chinese society in its entirety. 
This discussion will take its lead from an article, briefly mentioned in Section 3.2 as well, 
which was published on the website Friends of Party Members and Cadres in July 2007, thus 
slightly prior to the 17th National Congress. Its relevance here lies in the fact that it not only 
speaks loudly about the role of culture in China’s soft power discourse but also about the role of 
the government in terms of taking actions to turn the theory of cultural soft power into practice. 
Some extracts drawn from the paragraph that focuses on the belief that “in promoting soft 
power, culture leads the way” (tisheng “ruan shili”, wenhua xianxing ȪÒ且ůÀɇÌ
Ϥ) are reported below as they provide a detailed description of the value that culture-
building holds for China’s present and future development:  
 
Κϰ̢[j%ġŶϭǰķǆ且ůÀɓqŁĩҦϭɭ%ǆń̪ɇÌD ĳ͆

ëƎɇÌD ɞȪÒǹġ且ůÀ̪Ǚ̞0不
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ɇÌD ϩ͛0)ɓ˻D ɭh；Ϊ	亚ěȏĎΏ˒ˉèȽƳń	żŁщ«ɚD̛
Ȱȵͪ̇˸żôUˬ上IWɕ̮ķ̪҆ͷ͐ɇÌҦʸ义ȘɕˡћŊ̪bΔZϰ<
ŁôUbȲɵġ_͔ɇÌʌ͢ɇəðġ于ϑǌɟɇÌZќʸɎҮ̪ʸ—Şǀ
 
ƳВЖ&ġƫΞƃȪÒ且ůÀ̪ɇÌЭ˪
5000 łƪ̪&Ôɇə上UTǈN̢
[j%ɇÌńġ)0t̲
 
(Dangyuan Ganbu zhi You 2007) 
 
Looking at the world, any country that wants to increase “soft power” must have, with no exception, a 
strong cultural industry at the base. Developing the cultural industry is the road China must follow to 
increase its “soft power”.  
The cultural industry can be defined as a “non-smoking industry”, it possesses characteristics [such as] 
low consumption and high returns, a large economic ripple effect, and external exports that hardly 
produce any friction; domestically, it can satisfy the people’s increasingly growing spiritual and 
cultural demands and revive the traditional values that are going lost with each passing day; externally, 
it can disseminate the excellent culture of the country, establish the demeanor of a country with an 
ancient civilization, and manifest the search for common ground while holding back differences in the 
pursuit of cultural values.  
It must be said that China does not lack cultural resources to upgrade its “soft power” at all. China’s 
civilization is more that five thousand years old, enough to shock any cultural great power in today’s 
world.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
Thus far, the development of the cultural industry appears to be identified as the main 
practical way to enhance the country’s cultural soft power. This is an aspect that is in line with 
the necessity to build and strengthen soft power resources at home, by means of a strategic plan 
promoted by the government, in order to enhance their projection in the world. The following 
pages will show in greater detail how this strategic plan has been reiterated by the CPC’s 
leaders on different occasions and put in practice through cultural policies.  
Although praising China’s achievements on the global stage, mentioning that following 
the positive development of the country’s diplomatic work, China’s international image has 
gradually improved, as has its influence worldwide, with the international community 
approving of its efforts in maintaining peace in Asia and its theories related to the path of 
economic development and the creation of a harmonious society, the abovementioned article, 
reminds the audience that China must maintain a “sober awareness” (qingxing de renshi ˠ久̪
ЀЋ):  
 
Ɔ̲¾Ǯ¦ɼЄ&ġɓЇɞĨ̠Ǎ	ҳ1	Ǟ云	且YҺİѓɞĨZϰ	ǱЋ《ǡ	͍
`¼Ƹϩ̢ȥí̪͜ƸĎȕɭ̪ǍđÀѴœʆAëюġŶ
 
(Dangyuan Ganbu zhi You 2007) 
 
Considering the current circumstances, no matter if in the field of television, music, fast food, and 
software, or in regard to values, ideology, and social system, the degree by which China is accepted 
by the world and the influence it possesses are not as good as any developed country.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
As pointed out in Section 3.2, the betterment of China’s cultural industry, still considered 
as underperforming, becomes an urgent task that requires a collective effort, involving the 
government’s promotion and the participation of the entire population (Dangyuan Ganbu zhi 
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You 2007).  It can thus be implied that, for such a strategic plan to be effectively turned into 
actions, its general orientation and detailed steps must not only be indicated in the government’s 
guidelines but also disseminated among the general public.  
As a matter of fact, the considerations made in the preceding discussions regarding the 
evolution of a Chinese soft power theory in the intellectual circles and the formation of an 
official discourse on soft power at the CPC’s leadership level have had an influence also on the 
development of the related public discourse in China. Li Mingjiang (2009b, p. 23), for example, 
highlights how Hu Jintao’s call to build China’s cultural soft power in order to meet domestic 
needs and enhance international competitiveness gave rise to “a new round of interest in soft 
power throughout China”, which saw discussions on China’s cultural soft power being held at 
the local government and community levels and the terms “soft power” and “culture” featured 
in many newspaper headlines in the period following the 17th National Congress. Similarly, 
according to Cao Qing (2011, p. 17), Hu Jintao’s keynote speech, as a “primary policy 
document”, received a great deal of attention by state media outlets and served as a provision of 
guidelines for soft power development. It is interesting to note that, without diminishing the 
important function of state media, such as the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) and CCTV, in 
propagating official formulations related to the soft power discourse, Cao Qing also elaborates 
on the increasing role of wider media outlets in participating in a more open discussion on soft 
power in recent years (Ibid.). According to the author, the web has become the place where the 
concept of soft power has been disputed the most, displaying diverse opinions which, at times, 
contest the predominant official interpretation77  (Ibid., pp. 17-19). Besides deriving from 
dynamics related to the Internet market, which is experiencing a rapid increase in the number of 
netizens, this has also been due to the operations undertaken by state media, which, in order to 
involve the general public, and thus giving voice to issues that not always appear in the print 
media, have opened online discussion forums, such as the Great Power Forum (Qiangguo 
Luntan ǆġЇĭ)78, and to the participation of other websites, such as the intellectual Ai 
Sixiang ̂Ǥǰ (Love Thinking), which can be thought of as manifesting the ever-growing 
relevance of what the author calls the “people’s character” of Chinese mass media (Ibid.).  
In regard to the CPC’s online mouthpiece, the Renmin Wang (People’s Daily Online), an 
article drawn from the Renmin Ribao was published just a short time after the 17th National 
Congress, in which the necessity to “enable the country’s cultural soft power to have a large 
increase, while at the same time expanding economic power and science and technology 
strengths and reinforcing the force of national defense”! (bixu zai zhuangda jingji shilikeji 
shili he jiaqiang guofang liliang de tongshi, shi guojia wenhua ruan shili you yi ge da de tigao!
ǙҷĨĺńΏ˒ůÀ	͗ȈůÀĎÃǆġ乡À之̪—ɗoġŶɇÌ且ůÀɭ%ń̪
Ȫ亚)! was proclaimed as a means for China to gain initiative in the intense international 
competition!(Renmin Ribao 2007). Moreover, the characters for “ruan shili” were used 20 times 
in a relatively short commentary published on the same website and drawn from Qiushi  ʸɞ 
(Qiushi Journal, “Seeking Truth”, organ of the CPC Central Committee), and in 14 instances 
the term appeared collocated with the word “wenhua” (culture) (Qiushi 2008). Both these 
articles employ the exact formulation used by Hu Jintao, namely “tigao guojia wenhua ruan 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 This view was also articulated in Section 4.4, which discussed the presence in China of various schools of thought 
in relation to soft power.  
78 The forum is accessible from the homepage of the website Renmin Wang (People’s Daily Online), sponsored by 
the Renmin Ribao: http://bbs1.people.com.cn/boardList.do?action=postList&boardId=1.  
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shili”, as their title. The latter provides a description of the concepts of “ruan shili” and 
“wenhua ruan shili” that deserves quoting at length:  
 
œʃǹWȉ̞¢:À之ĎΏ˒ůÀΌǸ̪ġŶÀ之͛m͈ůÀ̪Бѭ.ѣяȻ）Zϰ	
ŁCȻͭĎɇÌ¶ѥͪi̒«ɼ̪ġŶÀ之ƆôU͛mġŶ̪且ůÀΩɇÌɎҮ̪ġŶ
且ůÀƆɞġŶɇÌ且ůÀ
 
(Qiushi 2008) 
 
If we call “hard power” the national power that is made up of military power and economic strength, 
then the national power that reflects through political values, foreign policy, and cultural creations can 
be called the country’s “soft power”, and national power on the cultural side is indeed “the country’s 
cultural soft power”.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
Moreover, the article continues:  
 
Ȼ）ZϰĎŁCȻ̴ͭʱɇÌm)ġŶ̪且ůÀɭôɪS̪义ϭm̜
ɇÌɞʴ
ɑ¶ѥÀ̪义ϭ˪ˆ%ʴɑǽ¶ѥ̪ɇÌǸʃM'ź7ɵʴɑ̪ɇÌŮƲ3)Iͳ
ɇÌķ˟7υ》M)ɵʴɑǽE̜3)Qʴɑǽ®E
%ɇÌ¶ѥÀ世ǆ̪ʴɑ
ɨŷɚбǖQʴɑĨϰǟ̪Ɓ义	Ǯǲ̪Hђ	ϤÅ̪ȶȚ
两͖oQʴɑƁ义	
HђĎȶȚ̪ηÀƆɞɇÌ且ůÀΩɇÌ¶ѥÀ´ɞ&义ϭ̪ΌǸѲ®
 
(Qiushi 2008) 
 
Compared with political values and foreign policy, culture as the country’s soft power has an 
important role that cannot be substituted. Culture is an important source of a nation’s creativity and 
the cultural achievements brought about by a nation not only enrich that nation’s cultural treasury, but 
also add flavor to the culture of mankind; [they are] not only enjoyed by that nation, but also shared 
with the other nations. A nation with relatively strong cultural creativity more easily gains the respect 
of other peoples in terms of ideology, their closeness in terms of emotions, and their support in terms 
of actions. This kind of ability to make other nations respect, feel close to, and support is indeed 
“cultural soft power”, while cultural creativity is [one of] its important components.  
(Translated by the present author.)  
 
The role of state media in disseminating and explaining institutional views on China’s 
soft power is thus evident. In the aforementioned report, the goal of enhancing cultural soft 
power is also described as being related to three main aspects: the “international affinity (or 
approachability) of the country’s image” (guojia xingxiang de guoji qinheli ġŶ《С̪ġ书H
ĎÀ), the “international influence of Chinese culture (Zhonghua wenhua de guoji  yingxiangli 
&ÔɇÌ̪ġ书ǍđÀ), and the “international competitiveness of the cultural industry” 
(wenhua chanye de guoji jingzhengli ɇÌD ̪ġ书ͤ9À) (Qiushi 2008). In today’s world, 
which is still characterized by the existence of hegemony and power politics, the article 
continues, it is necessary to attach great importance to the reinforcement of hard strengths such 
as the economy and national defense, in order to defend national sovereignty and safeguard 
internal development, but at the same time it is also necessary to give free play to the role of 
culture in regard to national cohesion, and work hard for the construction of cultural soft power 
(Ibid.).  
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These considerations, together with the ones conveyed by Hu Jintao’s speech, speak 
clearly in terms of how soft power is envisioned by the Chinese leadership, their action plan for 
its development, and the objectives of its enhancement, domestically and internationally.  
Another example of the kind of official endorsement the soft power discourse has 
received in China is provided by the website Zhongguo Ruan Shili Luntan &ġ且ůÀЇĭ79 
(China’s Soft Power Forum), a platform entirely dedicated to the discussion of China’s soft 
power. Although having recently fallen out of use, the website is still online and continues to 
constitute a very useful archive that allows for the analysis of a variety of topics presented in 
contributions that include speeches delivered by members of the leadership, analyses carried out 
by experts, and relevant news. For instance, a series of articles issued in 2008 by the Research 
Group on China’s Soft Power (Beijing Daxue Zhongguo Ruan Shili Keti Zu ÍFńţ&ġ且ů
ÀЙҽΌ) can be retrieved through the Forum, or on the website Renmin Wang in the section 
“lilun pindao ̖Ї事丹” (Theory). According to the Renmin Wang (2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 
2008d), the series, entitled “Ruan shili zai Zhongguo de shijian 且ůÀĨ&ġ̪ů与” (Soft 
power in China’s practice), gathers the reflections produced as a result of the work carried out 
by the Group and is intended as an introduction to the topic of soft power for theorists and 
internet users who are also invited to take part in the discussion. It includes four parts covering 
the topic of “soft power” (ruan shili) (Renmin Wang 2008a), “national soft power” (guojia ruan 
shili) (Renmin Wang 2008b), “regional soft power” (quyu ruan shili Ïİ且ůÀ) (Renmin 
Wang 2008c), and “cultural soft power” (wenhua ruan shili) (Renmin Wang 2008d). The 
definitions of these formulations are provided in the articles’ openings and, apart from “ruan 
shili” and “wenhua ruan shili”, here extensively debated, deserve quoting at length:  
 
且ůÀʝǟ̪互¶ΨΤġĐlńţɁȡ΂̙ŇōɁȡ*ϭĨġ书Ȼ）ҺİЛЇ且ů
À3ƆɞЖQǽО̪且ůÀɞUġŶ)*i̪3ƆɞġŶ且ůÀ
 
(Renmin Wang 2008b) 
 
The creator of the concept of “soft power”, US Harvard University Professor Joseph Nye discusses 
“soft power” mainly in the sphere of international politics, that is to say that what he calls “soft power” 
takes the country as the subject, i.e. national soft power.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
œʃUÏİ)żСɼЛЇ且ůÀƆǖ»%ɍ̪ʝǟ  Ïİ且ůÀ
两么̪Ïİț̪ɞ
—%ġŶѲ̪—ĩÏ

(Renmin Wang 2008c) 
 
If soft power is discussed taking a region as the target, what is obtained is a new concept – regional 
soft power. Here, the region indicates different areas within the same country.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
Together with “wenhua ruan shili”, these expressions constitute derivative terms created 
in the Chinese context on the basis of “ruan shili”. Chapter 7 will explore their process of 
formation, evolution, and connotations. It is interesting to note that in regard to cultural soft 
power, the series of articles analyzed does not provide a clear-cut definition, but elaborates on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/166866/.  
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this formulation from different points of view. In this sense, it raises an interesting point that 
deserves quoting at length:  
 
ƳВЖɇÌ且ůÀʝǟɞOɇÌǍđÀ	ɇÌǲóÀ	ɇÌͤ9À两Aȩ
个ǦГЍ&Ìɼ̪
fɇÌ且ůÀm)%ʝǟΩϩʦǁȪ«ɼÝɞÐńȏĈ
νʧ
UɼɇÌ且ůÀʝǟƆҁŅ̰ĩ<ȏΉ	̠ϲ	ƮȲ	ΟΒ	ЄБ	ȏĈ	ɇͦ0&
f̳»̒Ĩ两%òđ̪̕ʝǟMMɞ%ˬŅҿ̪ïøƫ˂ɭϖǖ[jůЧ̪？	
ŁƽǺʀǸ	Âηŭ·
  
(Renmin Wang 2008d) 
 
It must be said that the concept of “cultural soft power” has derived from the descriptive terms 
“cultural influence”, “cultural appeal”, and “cultural competitiveness”. But it was the report to the 17th 
National Congress to officially propose “cultural soft power” as a concept. Since then the concept of 
“cultural soft power” has been omnipresent in newspapers, television, radio, the Internet, speeches, 
reports, and articles, but right up to the present this well-known idea is only a slogan that has been 
present everywhere, without receiving any substantial localization in terms of connotations and 
extensions or composition and function.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
As can be seen, although recognizing the need for a more clear-cut definition of its 
meaning, this article speaks very highly of the relevance of the concept of cultural soft power, 
so much as to define its pervasive use in the public discourse with the idiom “putian gaidi ҁŅ
̰ĩ”, which can be literally translated as “hiding the sky and covering the earth”. The interest 
shown by research centers and universities across China in hosting or sponsoring conferences 
related to the topic of soft power is also a clear indicator of the booming attention paid to the 
subject by Chinese intellectuals and policy-makers, indicating its ever-increasing dissemination 
among the general public. The China Foreign Languages Bureau in Beijing, the International 
Public Relations Research Center at Fudan University, the China Institute of Contemporary 
International Relations, the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Central Party School, and other 
prestigious universities, such as Tsinghua University, Beijing University, and China Foreign 
Studies and Culture University, have all been involved in the organization of forums and 
symposia on soft power (Li Mingjiang 2009b, pp. 23-24; Shambaugh 2013, p. 210).  
At the time of writing, a search in the website Renmin Wang reveals the presence of over 
80 thousand articles with the expression “ruan shili” in their texts, more than 18 thousand of 
which are published in the section “Zhongguo Gongchandang xinwen&ġDɍҋ” (News 
of the CPC). A search for the formulation “wenhua ruan shili” produces 30,448 and 9,182 
results respectively. Special areas of soft power research featured on the website include topics 
ranging from the very popular “wenhua ruan shili” to “quyu ruan shili” (regional soft power), 
or also “kexue fazhan yu ruan shili ͗ţëƎ且ůÀ” (scientific development and soft 
power), and bear evidence to the fact that the Chinese discourse on soft power has become 
increasingly varied and sophisticated, an aspect that will be further investigated in Chapter 7.  
Turning now to a more in-depth analysis of the government’s involvement in the 
definition of cultural policies aimed at putting the Chinese theory of soft power into practice, in 
Hong Xiaonan et al. (2013, pp. 82-83) it is highlighted how “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” 
has become an important cultural development strategy, with “wenhua ruan shili” featuring 
many times as a popular subject of discussion among the members of the National People’s 
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Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (liang hui#`) from 
2007 to 2009, thus marking the incessant development and refinement of the Party’s cultural 
soft power theory as part of a series of important cultural strategies, and officially making soft 
power a new effort in terms of national development strategies. According to this volume, the 
ultimate goal of building cultural soft power is the realization of “cultural awareness” (wenhua 
zijue ɇÌνϳ), which means that the people that live within a determined culture must have 
“self-knowledge” (zizhi zhi ming ν́0ə), understanding their own culture’s history, process 
of formation, characteristics, and development orientation (Ibid.).    
In this sense, another contribution worth mentioning is Hu Jintao’s discussion with the 
participants in the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference (Quangguo Xuanchuan 
Sixiang Gongzuo Huiyi  ġŲbǤǰƙm`Ђ) on January 22nd, 2008, which linked 
propaganda work to cultural soft power. In his important speech, the leader stressed the need to 
promote the development and prosperity of socialist culture even more consciously and actively, 
raise a new wave in socialist culture construction, and enhance the country’s cultural soft power, 
in order to better safeguard the basic cultural rights of the people, make the cultural life of the 
society more rich and colorful, and elevate the spiritual ethos of the people even more (Xinhua 
Wang 2008). Moreover, Hu Jintao highlighted how this would fully reflect the “accurate grasp” 
(zhunque bawo §͉ȉȬ) of the Party on the current development trend, international and 
domestic, and the status of China’s cultural construction, also posing new demands to the 
propaganda and ideology work (Ibid.). In order to implement the blueprint portrayed by the 17th 
National Congress, the propaganda and ideology work is thus called to “unify ideology” (tongyi 
sixiang ΔǤǰ) and bring into play the “force of aggregation” (ningju liliang ©ήÀ之), of 
which it bears responsibility (Ibid.).  
Another important contribution is an interview with then-Minister of Culture Cai Wu, 
held on June 18th, 2009, during the Publicity Department and China Central Television Joint 
Forum (Zhongxuanbu yu Zhongyang Dianshitai Lianhe Jiangtan &ŲѲ&ň̠ϲõέûЄ
ĭ). On this occasion the political leader spoke about soft power answering the questions asked 
by a host. Elaborating on the enquiry as to what the concrete meaning of cultural soft power is, 
Cai Wu explained that an example of soft power is the way in which the Chinese cultural 
content of the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2008 Olympic Games conquered the entire 
world (Renmin Wang 2009). To understand what cultural soft power is, he continued, one needs 
to first grasp the meaning of Joseph S. Nye’s “soft power”; after becoming a topic of research 
and discussion in Chinese academic circles, the soft power concept also penetrated into the 
policy decision-making levels, especially after the CPC Central Committee put forward the 
principle of “Scientific Outlook on Development” (Ibid.). Cai Wu also provided a very useful 
explanation of the relationship between the concept of soft power and that of cultural soft power 
by means of an image schematically represented by the present author in Figure 1 below.    
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Figure 1: San ge tongxin yuan %—ǘģ - Three concentric circles. 
  
 
Cai Wu explained that in the Chinese theoretical system the three formulations (tifa) 
“ruan shili”, “guojia ruan shili”, and “guojia wenhua ruan shili” are like “three concentric 
circles” (san ge tongxin yuanģ), where “ruan shili” is the most external and biggest 
circle, “guojia ruan shili” is the middle circle, and “guojia wenhua ruan shili” is the most 
internal circle that shares the center and some connotations with the other two; their conceptual 
extensions, however, are different, as “ruan shili” is the most general of the three concepts and 
does not necessarily refer to the country’s soft power, covering a wider scope (Renmin Wang 
2009). National soft power (guojia ruan shili) is specific and includes both cultural soft power 
and those aspects of soft power that cannot be defined as such, for example the capability to 
govern of a country’s leadership, its model, and its efficiency (Ibid.). Conversely, a country’s 
cultural soft power (guojia wenhua ruan shili) includes its national image, national spirit, 
system of core values, political institutions, development model, and “cultural creations in a 
narrow sense” (xiayi de wenhua chuangzao ̊/̪ɇÌ¶ѥ), all elements that are embodied 
in “national cohesion” (minzu ningjuli  ), “creativity” (chuangzaoli ¶ѥÀ ), 
“development power” (fazhan li ë), and “the vitality of the nation” (minzu de shengmingli 
	) domestically, and the “influence” (yingxiangli 
), the “appeal” or “power 
to inspire” (ganzhaoli ), and the “power to rally supporters” (haozhaoli ) 
internationally (Ibid.).   
Another important point raised by the then-Minister of Culture is the relevance of 
traditional culture and values that emerges from the cultural revival triggered by the country’s 
soft power strategy. Echoing some of the viewpoints presented in the preceding discussions, Cai 
Wu called for enhancing the internationalization of Chinese culture and its power to exercise 
influence in the international arena by actively propagating Chinese traditional, but also 
modern, culture abroad; this part of his interview is worth quoting at length:  
   
ǹWżbΔɇÌϭȐ͖J.ʏ̪ǡƸĊbΔ̪ɇÌɞǹW两%ʴɑЯƯŞ	ƽΖ	ǹ
W两%ɇəëƎbȇ̪˪ˆ	ʑ˪3ɞΗ͹ǹW两%ʴɑ̪ɫ义ϭ̪ͷ͐Ίƥ两ɞʳɓ̥
҉̪
&Ôʴɑ0ǽUǸ)&ÔʴɑƆɞĜ)ǹW?Ñƪ̚ξɨ҆àö̪两͖ɇÌȉǹWΗ
͹Ĩе
ńʝ&Ôɇəɞ̢ªńðSɇə&ҊĔ%˂ɭ&ɋΩbȇɼ̪
Q
ǽɭ̪ðSɇÌѴ&ɋ7ðΠ五	ðƣλ̪ɇÌ	Ơʱd̪ɇÌ	ÚƸ̪ɇÌ	̐ҢɇÌ	
guojia'wenhua'
ruan'shili
ġŶɇÌ且ůÀ!
guojia'ruan'shili
ġŶ且ůÀ!
ruan'shili'且ůÀ!
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ҕɌǚɇÌ两AɇÌѴ&ɋ7àöѴ&ɋ7fɞñɭǹW&ÔɇÌ̇ºɞɭɇŝЃх
UɼǹW̪ɇÌɞθ̴ȇbɼ̪ɞҭƦ'â̪两ɞǹWʴɑ©ήÀ̪%ɫ义ϭ̪
Ĝͺ	˪ˆ
!
(Renmin Wang 2009) 
 
What kind of attitude should we have towards traditional culture? Traditional culture is the 
fountainhead and source upon which our nation has relied to exist and last, and develop and pass on 
our civilization; it has also been the most important spiritual bond to hold together our nation, and this 
is unquestionable. The reason why Chinese people have become the Chinese people is because this 
culture, with a history of five thousand years or more, has kept us together. The Chinese civilization is 
probably the only one among the world’s ancient civilizations that has not been interrupted and has 
been passed on. All the other ancient civilizations have been broken off, ancient Rome and ancient 
Greece, Babylon, India, the Maya, and the Aztec people, all these civilizations were cut short, their 
history has been cut short; but our Chinese culture, especially passed on in writing, is a culture 
inherited from the same origin, an extraordinarily ample culture, and this is an important factor and 
source for our national cohesion.  
(Translated by the present author) 
!
 Cai Wu also focuses on the process behind the formation of the Chinese system of 
values:  
!
Zϰ̇ºɞ%ġŶĎ%ʴɑ̪ʐǘZϰŦɞ%ġŶĎʴɑĨ҆ɱ̪àöëƎ̪
я͜&Ҋ《Ǹ̪ËȖǤǰ丹ǗËȖ̖ǰ|ǟͪ͹²̪两͖ϰǟ两͖ǧ´̪%Κû
Ŧ˪<Iʴ̪͍`̛ːĎ͍`ů与Ŧi̒ĨƽΘΓ̪bΔɇÌ&Ҋ
ǽUʐǘZϰɞɇ
Ì且ůÀ̪ʐǘŷ
!
(Renmin Wang 2009) 
 
Values, and in particular the system of core values of a country and a people, are formed, over a long 
period of time, in the course of their process of historical development; they include ideology and 
morality, ideals and beliefs, and a series of this kind of notions. This type of comprehensive synthesis 
finds its origins in the people’s social life and practice, and is reflected in the continued and 
uninterrupted extension of traditional culture. Therefore, the system of core values is the core content 
of cultural soft power.   
(Translated by the present author.) 
  
In the years following the 17th National Congress suggestions on how to treat China’s 
enduring culture and traditions continued being inserted in political documents. For instance, 
the “Proposal for the Formulation of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for the Development of the 
Citizens’ Economy and Society” promulgated by the Central Committee of the CPC 
(Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Zhiding Guomin Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Di Shi’er Ge Wunian 
Guihua de Jianyi &&ň<¼ŭġʴΏ˒Ď͍`ëƎͩÐ;%?ƪϱ±̪ƾЂ) for the 
period between 2011 and 2015 included an article specifically dedicated to the great 
development and prosperity of culture and the promotion of cultural soft power (Xinhua She 
2010a). Article 9, in fact, largely reiterated the concepts put forward by Hu Jintao in 2007, 
recapping the strategies required to take full advantage of the potential of Chinese culture, in 
order to strengthen China’s cultural soft power, including: improving the ethical quality of the 
whole nation; promoting cultural innovation; and prosperously developing cultural undertakings 
and cultural industries (Ibid.). More specifically, the first strategy included reference to the 
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construction of a code of conduct and ethics that can pass on China’s traditional virtues, 
conform to the demands of socialist spiritual culture, and adapt to socialist market economy 
(Ibid.). The relevance of cultural policies was described as follows:  
 
ɇÌɞ%ʴɑ̪ͷ͐Ď˵些ɞġŶëƎĎʴɑȞ̪ǆńÀ之ǙҷĬȚ͍`*/严ɇ
Ì¾严Ɏ’、Ȅ&ÔɇÌƾЈĎНɇÌëƎɇÌ: ĎɇÌD ˬ上IʴΥ^ɋķ
̪҆ͷ͐ɇÌҦʸ®ëȝɇÌǂŽ͍`	ɁβIʴ	ȧÅëƎ̪ÂηƾЈ&Ôʴɑɭ
ͷ͐ŶĞķǆʴɑ©ήÀĎ¶ѥÀ
 
(Xinhua She 2010a) 
 
Culture is a nation’s spirit and soul, it is a powerful force for the development of the country and the 
revival of the people; it is necessary to persevere with the progressive orientation of the advanced 
socialist culture, promote Chinese culture, build a culture of harmony, develop cultural undertakings 
and the cultural industry, satisfy the ever-growing spiritual and cultural needs of the masses, 
adequately bring into play the capability of culture to guide society, educate the people, and push 
forward development, and build a common spiritual home for the Chinese people, strengthening 
national cohesion and creativity.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
The Twelfth Five-Year Plan would then be approved in March 201180. 
The leadership’s action plan to boost China’s cultural soft power was once again 
reiterated during the Sixth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee of the CPC (Zhongguo 
Gongchandang Shiqi Jie Liu Zhongquanhui &ġDÐƍ&`) in October 2011 
which ended with the adoption of specific guidelines for cultural reform contained in the 
“Central Committee’s Resolutions on the Important Issues of Deepening the Reform of the 
Cultural System and Promoting the Great Development and Great Flourishing of Socialist 
Culture” (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Shenhua Wenhua Tizhi GaigeTuidong Shehuizhuyi 
Wenhua Da Fazhan Da Fanrong Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding &&ň<˞ÌɇÌ
i¼ȸү	ȧÅ͍`*/ɇÌńëƎńͿϔύƨ义ń҉ҽ̪¥ŭ). This policy document 
confirms that, especially since 2007, cultural development has been conceived as a means to 
strengthen the nation and project China’s cultural soft power internationally:   
 
&ġDͩÐƍ&ňŖĉ`ͩʡi`ЂҮ®ʁ《ÈĎ[ÄЀ)ǧΐǹġɇÌȸү
ëƎ̪'źů与ĎŮЪΏӈ̈́͞ѲΣ˞ÌɇÌi¼ȸү	ȧÅ͍`*/ɇÌńëƎńͿϔ
严ʨе͍`*/ɇÌƾЈɍ亚˱żŌìҮƾЈƂƻ͍`ɍε¹	ƿ¶&ġ̇υ͍`*
/: ɍƉҮ	ů̒&ÔʴɑańĿɭ义ńΩ˞і̪Ǳ/
  
(Xinhua She 2011) 
 
The Sixth Plenum of the 17th CPC Central Committee, having comprehensively analyzed 
circumstances and tasks, believes that summing up the rich practice and valuable experience in the 
development of China’s cultural reform, studying the implementation of the intensification in the 
reform of the cultural system and the promotion of the great development and flourishing of socialist 
culture, and taking the upsurge in the construction of socialist culture one step higher posses an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guomin Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Di Shi’er Ge Wunian (2011-2015) Guihua 
Gangyao &ÔIʴĎġġʴΏ˒Ď͍`ëƎͩÐ;%?ƪ (2011—2015 ƪ )ϱ±·ϭ , available at: 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-03-17/055622129864.shtml.  
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important and far-reaching meaning for the attainment of a new victory in the overall construction of a 
moderately prosperous society, the launch of a new phase in the cause of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, and the achievement of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
The “Central Committee’s Resolutions” are presented as the result of the work of the 
Party and suggest that the cultural reforms already put in place in China have markedly 
increased the ideological and moral, as well as the scientific and cultural, inner qualities of the 
entire nation and promoted the people’s overall development, significantly increasing the 
country’s cultural soft power and providing a formidable spiritual force for the preservation and 
development of socialism with Chinese characteristics (Xinhua She 2011). The document 
advocates persistence on the path towards the development of socialist culture with Chinese 
characteristics and working hard for the construction of a “socialist cultural great power” 
(shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo ͍`*/ɇÌǆġ) (Ibid.). Commenting on the Sixth Plenum, 
Hong Xiaonan et al. (2013, p. 84) state that the meeting represented the first time for the Party 
to specifically discuss issues related to the development of cultural reform during a plenary 
session, the first time that dispositions about the topic were made in the form of resolutions, and 
the first time that such a grand goal and strategic task as building a “socialist cultural great 
power” was proposed, indicating the “organic blending” (youji de ronghe ɭɷ̪Ϣû) of 
cultural and economic building, and pushing the construction of socialism with Chinese 
characteristic towards a new historical phase.  
The Sixth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee of the CPC received a great deal of 
attention from the media. According to a Xinhua News Agency’s report, the leaders’ 
discussions in the course of the plenary session focused on topics related to the deepening of the 
reform of China’s cultural system, including issues such as improving the work of China’s 
cultural industry and protecting China’s “cultural security” (wenhua anquan) by means of 
enhancing the country’s own soft power and the international influence of its own culture  
(Xinhua News Agency 2011). Emphasis was also placed on the fact that since culture was 
emerging as an important part of China’s comprehensive competitiveness, it was imperative for 
the country to not only take care of its people’s material life, but also provide a healthy and rich 
cultural life while improving the Chinese citizens’ sense of identity and confidence in Chinese 
culture (Ibid.). 
The guidelines put forward on this occasion were also commented by Li Junru ɹ…œ, 
former vice-President of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC (Zhongyang 
Dangxiao&ňʍ), in an interview published in December 2011 on the website Zhong Zhi 
Dang Jian Wang &̳ƾΟ, sponsored by the Renmin Wang. Once again the ties between 
spiritual and cultural needs, between domestic and international needs, and between ancient and 
modern China emerge. Li Junru discusses the increasingly fervent desire of the Chinese people 
for a rich spiritual and cultural life, as culture is not only “the nation’s blood and soul” (minzu 
de xuemai he linghu ʴɑ̪ϣθĎ˵些) but also an “important support for the economic and 
social development” (jingji shehui fazhan de zhongyao zhicheng Ώ˒͍`ëƎ̪义ϭȶȱ), 
and explains how the emphasis on cultural awareness and cultural confidence, on the reform of 
the cultural system, and on the initiation of a new phase of cultural construction is not only 
aimed at solving the problem of domestic cultural construction, but also at further increasing the 
role of culture in China’s soft power within the scope of the global competition for overall 
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national strength, transforming China from a country with ancient culture and a cultural power 
to a “socialist cultural great power” (Zhong Zhi Dang Jian 2011). The Renmin Ribao joined this 
discussion as well, with an editorial, also mentioned in Section 3.1, which, besides identifying a 
strong culture as a lever to “stand straight within the world’s forest of nations”, greatly praised 
the work of the Party members involved in the Sixth Plenum, defining the “Central 
Committee’s Resolutions” as a symbol of the Party’s profound grasp of the historical mission it 
bears, its scientific assessment of domestic and international circumstances, and its high degree 
of awareness in culture-building, fully reflecting the common desires of all nationalities in 
China and establishing itself as the “programmatic document” (ganglingxing wenjian ·ҺǦɇ
Y) to guide China’s cultural reform and development today and in the times ahead (Renmin 
Wang 2011).   
Finally, one China Media Project observer in Hong Kong, notes that the “Central 
Committee’s Resolutions” also marked the entrance of the expression “shehuizhuyi wenhua 
qiangguo” (socialist cultural great power) into the CPC’s political discourse and goes as far as 
stating that the phrase, which did not appear in Hu Jintao’s 2007 political report, can be seen as 
representing the Party’s view on media and culture, namely “a country that is culturally strong 
and vibrant in a way that serves the Party’s own political objectives” (Bandurski 2012).     
Before moving on to more recent times, the issuing of three other specific policy 
documents deserves attention. In 2012, the Ministry of Culture published important directives 
regarding the reform and development of China’s cultural system: the “Ministry of Culture’s 
Plan for Doubling Cultural Industries during the Twelfth Five-year Plan Period” (Wenhuabu 
“Shi’er Wu” Shiqi Wenhua Chanye Beizeng Jihua ɇÌѲÐ;?ɗɱɇÌD ķϿ±) 
and the “Ministry of Culture’s Program for Cultural Reform and Development during the Five-
year Plan Period (Wenhuabu “Shi’er Wu” Shiqi Wenhua Gaige Fazhan Guihua ɇÌѲÐ;
?ɗɱɇÌȸүëƎϱ±)” (cited in Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013, pp. 84-85). The second 
document, in particular, by means of a detailed explanation of the rationale, goals, and tasks of 
the cultural development program, aimed at thoroughly implementing the spirit of the Sixth 
Plenum, in order to deepen the reform of the cultural system, promote the great development 
and great flourishing of socialist culture, and incessantly increase the country’s cultural soft 
power (Ibid., p. 85). A third document was also issued in 2012: the “Outline for the National 
Program of Cultural Reform and Development during the Five-year Plan Period” (Guojia 
“Shi’er Wu” Shiqi Wenhua Gaige Fazhan Guihua Gangyao ġŶÐ;?ɗɱɇÌȸүë
Ǝϱ±·ϭ), published by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee (Zhonggong 
Zhongyang Bangongting &&ňÁß) and the General Office of the State Council 
(Guowuyuan BangongtingġÄҙÁß), which, revolving around the grand goal of building 
a “socialist cultural great power” and the disposition of the overall completion of cultural 
reform and development by 2020, enumerated the goals to be reached by 2015 in the field of 
cultural reform and development (cited in Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013, pp. 84-85). According to a 
news article, the “Outline” represented the Party’s intention to build for China a modern cultural 
industry system, which would also entail the transformation of the industry’s development 
mode and a series of market actions aimed at improving production and consumption of cultural 
products, such as support for medium and small cultural enterprises and subsides and price-cuts 
for local communities (Xinhua News Agency 2012a).  
On balance, it has been shown how the cultural policies proposed after 2007, and which 
were to be implemented in particular during the five-year period 2011-2015, manifested the 
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Chinese leadership’s intention to build a modern cultural industry system able to become a key 
contributor to the country’s overall growth and increase cultural soft power. It has been 
highlighted how culture has been envisioned as the “spirit and soul” of the nation, but also as a 
“non-smoking industry” that can be exploited for internal and external purposes. Criticism has 
sometimes been expressed in regard to the extreme economization of these cultural programs. 
For instance, an article published in Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post after the approval 
of the Twelfth Five-year Plan in March 2011, compared the Chinese leadership’s plan to 
transform the cultural industry into a “pillar industry”, an operation that, according to the article, 
is aimed at boosting economic development but also at making Chinese culture known to the 
world, thus improving the country’s attractiveness and, consequently, its ability to wield soft 
power, with the views of some critics on this cultural campaign, which they feared would entail 
massive investments, yet failing to produce the desired outcomes, leading to a large waste and 
essentially constituting a “Great Leap Forward in culture” (Jiao 2011). 
To conclude, the analyses presented in this chapter have attempted to delineate the 
process through which the leadership’s discourse on China’s soft power has progressively 
reached a higher level of complexity and sophistication so much so as to turn the soft power 
theory into detailed practice. It has been shown how the active role of government directives, 
one of the main characteristics of Chinese soft power, has helped create the foundations upon 
which to build and promote cultural soft power. As pointed out by Hong Xiaonan et al. (2013, p. 
85), the CPC has developed an increasingly clear and profound knowledge of the power of 
culture, and culture has become an important method to “govern the country” (zhili guojia ）̖
ġŶ); from the point of view of the “Scientific Outlook on Development”, this responds to the 
search for an even more scientific path of development. The Chinese Marxist theory of cultural 
soft power, of which the political report to the 17th National Congress is the “synthesizer” 
(jidachengzhe ңńǸΨ), is unceasingly developing and improving, and has provided “an 
important theoretical support and practical orientation” (zhongyao de lilun zhicheng he shijian 
daoxiang 义ϭ̪̖ЇȶȱĎů与Ž’) to the development of China’s economy, politics, 
society, and culture (Ibid., pp. 85-86).  
It can thus be implied that, in the course of the evolution of the Chinese soft power theory 
prior to 2007, and even more so in the years between 2007 and 2012, the Party and the State 
have not only actively engaged in the definition of a theoretical framework supporting their 
intention to “enhance the country’s cultural soft power”, but also committed to the development 
of a system of actions aimed at reaching the desired goals. State media and the general public 
have also joined the discussion and contributed to the dissemination of increasingly important 
cultural policies, in a collective effort involving Chinese society in its entirety. Chapter 7 will 
continue to elaborate on theoretical and practical aspects of the Chinese soft power discourse 
and its diffusion in the years after 2012 and up to 2015.  
 
 
Closing remarks 
 
This chapter has explored the evolution of the soft power theory into a national project, 
promoted by the Chinese leadership, popularized nationwide, and implemented through cultural 
policies in the contemporary Chinese context. Focusing on the period between 1990 and 2007, 
but also tapping into China’s communist tradition, the analysis has explored the process through 
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which the formulation “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” (enhance the country’s cultural soft 
power), formally sanctioned by Hu Jintao in the course of the 17th National Congress in 2007, 
was conceptualized and progressively outlined. It has been explained that the discourse adopted 
by the Chinese leadership has set the boundaries for the definition of what soft power is in the 
Chinese context, carrying out its function of political authority in guiding the orientation of the 
related debate and defining the implementation of the related policies. This task has been carried 
out by breaking down this political expression into its components and analyzing them from 
different angles. By examining the evolution of the concept of “ruan shili” (soft power) into that 
of “wenhua ruan shili” (cultural soft power) it has been demonstrated that the theory of soft 
power, although having been adopted from the West, has been progressively adjusted to the 
characteristics of the Chinese context based on a specific rational. Placing “culture” in front of 
“soft power” has, first and foremost, detached the Chinese discourse on soft power from its 
Western origins, showing how this theory can be considered the inheritance of the relevance 
always placed on culture-building in China’s communist tradition. The “made-to-measure” 
interpretation of soft power in the Chinese context, also outlined in the previous chapter, is thus 
confirmed, with culture, and especially traditional culture, being placed at the core. This aspect 
is relevant because it has been shown that, by opening up new spaces for a use of soft power 
through its culture-building focus, the ultimate aim of China’s cultural soft power becomes the 
achievement of an all-around betterment of China’s domestic and international conditions in the 
age of China’s rise. Progressively moving from theory to practice, it has been shown how this 
process of culture-building, which can also be interpreted as identity-building, through the 
enhancement of cultural soft power, is not only supported by a theoretical framework provided 
by the leadership’s official discourse on cultural soft power, but also by a system of policies 
aimed at reaching the goal of enhancing culture as part of the country’s soft power. In fact, 
identifying the need to “enhance” (tigao) China’s cultural soft power, the Party and the State 
have put forward a series of cultural policies primarily aimed at reinforcing China’s national 
identity and cohesion and fulfilling the spiritual and cultural needs of the people, through the 
reform and development of the cultural industry. This, in turn, stimulates the contribution of 
cultural resources to the country’s economic strength, as well as the competitiveness of Chinese 
culture worldwide. Through the analysis of official speeches, policy documents, and Party’s and 
State’s guidelines, and their popularization through state media, it has been shown how the task 
of building and enhancing China’s cultural soft power is envisioned as a collective effort which 
involves the Party’s leadership, government departments, media, and general public.  
It can thus be concluded that, although not completely independent from the Western 
interpretation and still negotiating a clear-cut definition of connotations and resources suitable 
for the context of contemporary China, the Chinese discourse on soft power offers an original 
vision, encapsulated in the formulation “wenhua ruan shili”. Autochthonous approaches to soft 
power have claimed distance from the Western conceptualization, while elements representing 
the presence of interest in national culture-building in both China’s ancient doctrines and the 
official discourse of successive generations of CPC leaders have contributed to reclaiming 
propriety on a foreign concept progressively “made Chinese” and enriched with Chinese 
experience. Confusion between the concepts of “ruan shili” and “wenhua ruan shili” can lead to 
a misreading of the Chinese discourse on soft power, and consequently to a misuse of the 
relevant distinction between this and the discourse on Chinese soft power at an international 
level. Chapter 7 will take this analysis a step further by looking at how the considerations made 
above are in line with the imperative to give China the right to construct its own narrative. 
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7. Current approaches to China’s cultural soft power  
 
 
This chapter, divided into three sections, will examine the latest developments in the Chinese 
discourse on cultural soft power, focusing on the period between 2012 and 2015 and making it 
possible to draw some conclusions on the peculiar characteristics of the topic of this research. 
Section 7.1 will take its lead from an examination of the keynote speech delivered by former 
President Hu Jintao to the 18th National Congress of the CPC in November 2012 and will allow 
for a comparison of this policy document with the preceding speech in 2007. The 18th National 
Congress represents a crucial political event for China as it marked Hu Jintao’s departure from 
his posts and the installment of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders, led by Xi Jinping. 
Examining a selection of speeches delivered by the current President and Party General 
Secretary, further evolutions in the CPC’s vision of China’s cultural soft power will emerge in 
Section 7.2, reflected in the rather newly-set goal of making China a “socialist cultural great 
power” (shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo). Throughout the chapter, attention will also continue to 
be paid to the deployment of cultural policies aimed at enhancing China’s cultural strength and 
cultural soft power. Moreover, by looking at a selection of media commentaries and recent 
scholarly writings, the analysis will stress the progressive complexity and originality of the 
Chinese discourse on soft power, in an attempt to find an answer to the question as to whether 
or not it is possible to talk about “soft power with Chinese characteristics”. Section 7.3 will 
examine this aspect from a terminological point of view, shedding light on how the peculiar 
features of Chinese soft power are reflected in the terminology used in the related intellectual 
and political discourse, and thus finding a positive answer for the abovementioned question. 
The choice of the formulation “ruan shili” as the most suitable Chinese translation equivalent 
for the English expression “soft power” will thus be supported by the description of the intrinsic 
connotations of the term “shili”, which will appear to be in line with the objectives China 
intends to achieve through the use of soft power. The formulations “ruan shili” and “wenhua 
ruan shili” will thus be portrayed as the most efficient terminological vehicles for expressing 
the connotations of “soft power with Chinese characteristics”. 
 
 
7.1 Cultural soft power in today’s China: ever-growing awareness of and confidence in Chinese 
culture 
 
To open this section, it is once again necessary to take into consideration a government 
document, namely the political report delivered by Hu Jintao to the 18th National Congress of 
the CPC in November 2012. The first excerpt that requires attention is contained in the third 
section of the former President’s keynote speech, entitled “Quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui 
he quanmian shenhua gaige kaifang de mubiao ҮƾǸƂƻ͍`ĎҮ˞ÌȸүƿȺ̪̲
ʋ” – “The Goal of Completing the Building of a Moderately Prosperous Society in All 
Respects and Deepening Reform and Opening Up in an All-Around Way”, in which the grand 
objective of completing the overall building of a “moderately prosperous society” (xiaokang 
shehui) is set for 2020 (Xinhua She 2012; Xinhua News Agency 2012d). Five years after he 
sanctioned the debut of the concept of “wenhua ruan shili” (cultural soft power) in the Party’s 
political discourse, Hu Jintao inserts the notable increase in the status of China’s cultural soft 
power among the “new requirements that, according to the reality of China’s social and 
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economic development, need to be realized with great effort, on the basis of the objectives 
established by the 16th and 17th National Congresses for the overall completion of the 
construction of a moderately prosperous society” (genju woguo jingji shehui fazhan shiji, yao 
zai shiliu dashiqi da queli de quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui mubiao de jichu shang nuli 
shixian xin de yaoqiu ʑȠǹġΏ˒͍`ëƎů书ϭĨÐń	Ðń͉̪͢ҮƾЈ
Ƃƻ͍`̲ʋ̪ĳ͆ÆÀů̒ɍ̪ϭʸ) (Xinhua She 2012). The passage related to 
cultural soft power drawn from this section of the speech reads as follows:  
 
ɇÌ且ůÀɟϙķǆ
͍`*/ʐǘZi͹˞IǘʴɇəͺЧĎ͍`ɇə͜ƸəɟȪ
亚
ɇÌDďɨÃ'źɇÌɮÄi͹ĳɵƾǸɇÌD Ǹ)ġʴΏ˒ȶʊǦD &
ÔɇÌ七«äѐ«ɨńʨ]͍`*/ɇÌǆġƾЈĳ͆ɨÃĬů
 
(Xinhua She 2012)  
 
The English version of the extract reads:  
 
The country’s cultural soft power should be improved significantly. Core socialist values should take 
root among the people, and both the level of civility of citizens and the moral and ethical standards of 
the whole society should be significantly raised. More cultural works should be created; a system of 
public cultural services should be basically in place, and the cultural sector should become a pillar of 
the economy. Even greater progress should be made in taking Chinese culture to the global stage. By 
taking these steps, we will lay a more solid foundation for developing a strong socialist culture in 
China.  
(Xinhua News Agency 2012d)  
 
The blueprint suggested to increase the effectiveness of China’s cultural soft power 
emerges in a rather clear way: for China to achieve the goal of becoming a “socialist cultural 
great power” (shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo) the key lies in a formula that sums together the 
“system of socialist core values” (shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi) as the basis to upgrade the 
character of the nation, in terms of civil, moral, and ethical standards, a thriving domestic 
cultural environment as a prerequisite to make culture a “pillar industry of the economy” (jingji 
zhizhuxing chanye Ώ˒ȶʊǦD ), and an upgrade in the level of appeal and influence that 
Chinese culture can exercise in the international arena as a foreign policy strategy. How to make 
these components work together is explained in greater detail in the sixth section of Hu Jintao’s 
political report which, with the title “Zhashi tuijin shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo jianshe Ȁů
ȧ严͍`*/ɇÌǆġƾЈ” – “Developing a Strong Socialist Culture in China”81, forms the 
core of the leader’s guidelines regarding cultural strength and cultural soft power. As was the 
case for Hu Jintao’s 2007 speech, given the length of the section drawn from the political report 
and considered here, the full transcription, both in Chinese and English, will be provided as an 
Appendix to this work. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, a summary of the most salient 
topics addressed by the Chinese leader in the part of the speech examined will be presented 
below. The introduction to the section is worth quoting at length: 
   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 This title includes the expression “shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo” and the English translation indicated is “a strong 
socialist culture in China”. The present author, however, opts for the wording “socialist cultural great power”.   
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ɇÌɞʴɑ̪ϣθɞIʴ̪ͷ͐ŶĞ
ҮƾǸƂƻ͍`ů̒&ÔʴɑańĿǙҷȧ
Å͍`*/ɇÌńëƎńͿϔе͍`*/ɇÌƾЈɍ亚˱Ȫ亚ġŶɇÌ且ůÀëȝɇ
ÌǂҺ于Ƅ	ɁβIʴ	ɮÄ͍`	ȧÅëƎ̪m̜
 
 
(Xinhua She 2012) 
 
The English version of the speech reports the following translation:   
 
Culture is the lifeblood of a nation, and it gives the people a sense of belonging. To complete the 
building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects and achieve the great renewal of the 
Chinese nation, we must create a new surge in promoting socialist culture and bring about its great 
development and enrichment, increase China’s cultural soft power, and enable culture to guide social 
trends, educate the people, serve society, and boost development.  
(Xinhua News Agency 2012d) 
 
First and foremost, it is evident that many of the aspects discussed in the previous 
chapters, regarding, in particular, the representation of the role of culture in the official 
discourse on soft power, are reiterated in the extracts considered here. For instance, the 
“Proposal for the Formulation of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for the Development of the 
Citizens’ Economy and Society”, promulgated in 2010 by the Central Committee of the CPC 
for the period between 2011 and 2015, and the “Central Committee’s Resolutions on the 
Important Issues of Deepening the Reform of the Cultural System and Promoting the Great 
Development and Great Flourishing of Socialist Culture”, adopted following the Sixth Plenum 
of the 17th Central Committee of the CPC in 2011 as an action plan to boost China’s cultural 
soft power, both represented culture as China’s spirit, blood, and soul as well as an important 
trigger of economic and social development. In particular, in the first document, Article 9 was 
specifically dedicated to the great development and prosperity of culture and the promotion of 
cultural soft power, and defined culture as “a nation’s spirit and soul” and “a powerful force for 
the development of the country and the revival of the people” (Xinhua She 2010a). Similarly, 
the second document stated as follows:  
 
ɇÌɞʴɑ̪ϣθɞIʴ̪ͷ͐ŶĞ
Ĩǹġ?ÑłƪɇəëƎà͜&úɑIʴͼŹĝΐ	
νǆǪ—¶ѥ«˪іˑ҆	Øńͷ˞̪&ÔɇÌ)&ÔʴɑëƎĺńȪr7ǆńͷ͐
À之)Iͳɇə严ʨm«7ô͊˴̪义ńФ̌
 
(Xinhua She 2011) 
 
Culture is the lifeblood of a nation, it is the spiritual home of the people. In the process of 
development of China’s civilization, which is more that five thousand years [long], the inseparably 
close unity and unremitting self-improvement of all ethnic groups have jointly produced a well-
established and broad and deep Chinese culture, providing a formidable spiritual force to the 
development and strengthening of the Chinese people and offering an indelible major contribution to 
the progress of human civilization. 
(Translated by the present author.)  
 
Moreover, this document advocated persistence on the path towards the development of 
socialist culture with Chinese characteristics and encouraged working hard for the construction 
of a “socialist cultural great power” (shehuizhuiyi wenhua qiangguo). As previously pointed out, 
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China observers have noticed how building a “socialist cultural great power” is a new concept 
which was not employed in Hu Jintao’s 2007 political report, but used for the first time in the 
abovementioned “Central Committee’s Resolutions” (Bandurski 2012). Similarities have indeed 
been found between the statements dedicated to culture and cultural soft power in Hu Jintao’s 
political report to the 18th National Congress and the contents of the 2011 “Central Committee’s 
Resolutions”, with the former nevertheless representing “nothing fresh or surprising” in 
comparison to the 2007 political report (Ibid.).  
That being said, it is noteworthy that, in 2012, Hu Jintao reiterated the relevance of the 
goal of building a “socialist cultural great power”, a fact that, the present discussion posits, 
signals a certain degree of innovation in the development of the Chinese discourse on culture-
building and cultural soft power. As well, the action plan aimed at reforming and further 
developing the Chinese cultural system, which, as discussed in the previous chapter, translates 
into the outlining of concrete cultural policies and their implementation by government 
departments, is once again stressed through Hu Jintao’s proclamation of the leadership’s 
intention to transform the cultural industry into a “pillar industry” (zhizhuxing chanye ȶʊǦD
 ) (Xinhua She 2012). This intent had in fact been expressed in the 2011 “Central Committee’s 
Resolutions” which called for accelerating the development of the cultural industry and pushing 
its transformation into a pillar industry for the nation’s economy (Xinhua She 2011). In 
particular, developing the cultural industry was equated to an “important way to meet the 
people’s diversified spiritual and cultural demands” (manzu renmin duoyanghua jingshen 
wenhua xuqiu de zhongyao tujing ˬ上IʴłʏÌͷ͐ɇÌҦʸ̪义ϭѡǑ), making it a 
“new point of economic growth” (xin de jingji zengchang dian ɍ̪Ώ˒ķ҆˸ ), an 
“important fulcrum in the strategic adjustment of the economic structure” (jingji jiegou 
zhanlüexing tiaozheng de zhongyao zhidian Ώ˒ΐʀǻ̤ǦКɆ̪义ϭȶ˸ ), and an 
“important acting point in the transformation of the economic development mode” (zhuanbian 
jingji fazhan fangshi de zhongyao zhuoli dian тîΏ˒ëƎɎǁ̪义ϭ̺À˸) (Ibid.).  
Thus, the cultural industry appears to have been envisioned as being able to provide a 
major contribution to China’s economic growth in a more sustainable way. In search of a more 
sustainable path to development, the Chinese leadership has started to consider the cultural 
sector as a means to “provide major support to the promotion of scientific development” (wei 
tuidong kexue fazhan tigong zhongyao zhicheng )ȧÅ͗ţëƎȪr义ϭȶȱ) (Xinhua She 
2011). This is an aspect that is in line with the vision of the cultural sector embodied in the 
metaphor that compares it to a “non-smoking industry” (wuyan chanye ɓ˻D ) that can be 
exploited for internal and external purposes, as previously described (Dangyuan Ganbu zhi You 
2007).  
Based on these premises, it is thus possible to briefly compare Hu Jintao’s approaches to 
cultural soft power in 2007 and 2012 by looking at the culture-related rhetoric employed in the 
introductions to the sections of the two keynote speeches analyzed. From being described as an 
increasingly important source of national cohesion and creativity, a factor of growing 
significance in the competition for overall national strength, and a response to the growing 
demands of the Chinese people for a richer spiritual and cultural life (Xinhua She 2007; Xinhua 
News Agency 2007), culture seems to assume an even more profound meaning in the 2012 
speech: its concrete shape as the “lifeblood of a nation” (minzu de xuemai ʴɑ̪ϣθ) and 
“spiritual home for the people” (renmin de jingshen jiayuan Iʴ̪ͷ͐ŶĞ), already 
expressed in 2011, is reiterated; its function is enhanced as Hu Jintao calls for giving free rein to 
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its capacity to “guide social trends” (yinling fengshang ǂҺ于Ƅ), “educate the people” (jiaoyu 
renmin ɁβIʴ), “serve society” (fuwu shehui ɮÄ͍`), and “boost development” (tuidong 
fazhan ȧÅëƎ); and “increasing the country’s cultural soft power” (tigao guojia wenhua 
ruan shili), together with the further development of “socialist culture” (shehuizhuyi wenhua ͍
`*/ɇÌ), becomes a way to complete the overall building of a moderately prosperous 
society and achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Zhonghua minzu weida 
fuxing). 
Throughout the text of Hu Jintao’s 2012 speech, emphasis is placed on the development 
of socialist culture, as was the case in 2007, but this time with the aim of making China a 
“socialist cultural great power” (shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo). This aspect is repeatedly 
reiterated and requires following the path of “socialist cultural development with Chinese 
characteristics” (Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi wenhua fazhan &ġ̇υ͍`*/ɇÌëƎ) and 
“enhancing the vitality of the cultural creativity of the whole nation” (zengqiang quan minzu 
wenhua chuangzao huoli ķǆʴɑɇÌ¶ѥːÀ); in this way, “the basic cultural rights and 
interests of the people will be better ensured” (renmin jiben wenhua quanyi dedao geng hao 
baozhang IʴĳɵɇÌɸ̮ǖ»ɨŒzҠ), “the ideological and moral qualities of the 
people as well as their scientific and cultural qualities will be fully upgraded” (renmin sixiang 
daode suzhi he kexue wenhua suzhi quanmian tigao IʴǤǰ丹ǗͺЧĎ͗ţɇÌͺЧҮ
Ȫ亚 ), and “the international influence of Chinese culture will continuously increase” 
(Zhonghua wenhua guoji yingxiangli buduan zengqiang &ÔɇÌġ书ǍđÀɋķǆ) 
(Xinhua She 2012). Among the methods to reach these goals Hu Jintao suggests the following, 
as reported online:  
 
1. “Strengthening the construction of a system of socialist core values” (jiaqiang shehuizhuyi 
hexin jiazhi tixi jianshe Ãǆ͍`*/ʐǘZi͹ƾЈ): recognizing the importance of 
socialist core values as a system that represents the “soul invigorating the country” 
(xingguo zhi hun ġ0些) and decides the “orientation for the development of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” (Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi fazhan fangxiang &ġ̇υ͍`
*/ëƎɎ’), they should be used to “guide the society’s way of thinking and aggregate 
social consensus” (yinling shehui sichaoningju shehui gongshi ǂҺ͍`Ǥ˱	©ή͍
`Ћ); the study of and education in the system of socialist core values should be 
thoroughly developed as they should be spread through the people, in order to unite and 
rally them under the “great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Zhongguo 
tese shehuizhuyi weida qizhi &ġ̇υ͍`*/ańɒƤ). In order to cultivate and 
respect core socialist values, “wealth and power” (fuqiang źǆ), “democracy” (minzhu ʴ
*), “civility” (wenminɇə), and “harmony” (hexie) should be promoted, “freedom” 
(ziyou ν̞), “equality” (pingdeng Ʃͪ), “justice (gongzhengʦ), and “the rule of law” 
(fazhi ˇ）) upheld, “patriotism” (aiguo ̂ġ), “dedication to work” (jingye Ʉ ), 
“integrity” (chengxin А|), and “friendship” (youshanéė) advocated.  
 
Regarding this first point, it is interesting to note that there has been a change in the 
wording employed: while in 2007 Hu Jintao called for “building up” (jianshe ƾЈ) the system 
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of socialist core values, in 2012 he advocates the “strengthening” (jiaqiang Ãǆ) of their 
construction (Xinhua She 2007; Xinhua She 2012). It could thus be implied that this process is 
envisioned as having already begun, but continues to require attention. The report continues:  
 
2. “Fully improving the inner quality of civic morality” (quanmian tigao gongmin daode 
suzhi ҮȪ亚ʴ丹ǗͺЧ): this task, which is the basis for strengthening socialist 
virtues, focuses on educating the people to conduct their lives in a moral and ethical way, 
promoting “traditional Chinese virtues” (Zhonghua chuantong meide &ÔbΔΤǗ) and 
the “new trends of the time”  (shidai xinfeng ɗSɍ于). By doing so, people will be able 
to “exalt the true, the good, and the beautiful and reject the false, the evil, and the ugly” 
(hongyang zhen shan mei bianchi jia en chou 、Ȅ̸ėΤ	ШɊǫ); “good 
customs of knowing honor and disgrace, practicing integrity, encouraging dedication, and 
promoting harmony” (zhi rongru jiang zhengqi zuo fengxiancu hexie de lianghao 
fengshang ́ϔ东	Єʦʵ	mŎ̌	wĎН̪σŒ于Ƅ) should be cultivated, also 
following the examples of models of virtue.  
3. “Enriching people’s spiritual and cultural lives” (fengfu renmin jingshen wenhua shenghuo 
'źIʴͷ͐ɇÌ̛ː): in order to complete the building of a moderately prosperous 
society in an all-around way, “more and better nourishment for the mind” (genghao geng 
duo jingshen shiliang )IʴȪrɨŒɨłͷ͐ӀͶ) should be provided for the people. 
This can be done by providing a variety of cultural services, which will include building a 
system able to pass on the excellence of traditional culture and promote outstanding 
traditional Chinese culture; the “use of the country’s common language and script should 
also be popularized and standardized” (tuiguang he guifan shiyong guojia tongyong yuyan 
wenzi ȧƮĎϱϑo̜ġŶѣ̜Г϶ɇŝ).  
4. “Reinforcing the overall strength and competitiveness of culture” (zengqiang wenhua 
zhengti shili he jingzhengli ķǆɇÌɆiůÀĎͤ9À): recognizing the relevance of 
cultural strength and competitiveness as an “important symbol of the country’s wealth and 
power as well as of national renewal” (guojia fuqiang minzu zhenxing de zhongyao biaozhi 
ġŶźǆʴɑȞ̪义ϭʋǛ), it is imperative to promote the all-around flourishing of 
cultural undertakings and the rapid development of the cultural industry, and persist on 
both social and economic benefits, but placing priority on the former. The cultural sphere 
should open up even further to the outside world and actively draw on cultural 
achievements attained by foreign countries. 
 
 The ultimate purposes indicated by Hu Jintao’s guidelines are those of “persevering 
with the progressive orientation of advanced socialist culture” (jianchi shehuizhuyi xianjin 
wenhua qianjin fangxiang ĬȚ͍`*/严ɇÌ¾严Ɏ’), “establishing a high level of 
cultural awareness of and confidence in culture” (shuli gaodu de wenhua zijue he wenhua zixin 
ʌ͢亚Ƹ̪ɇÌνϳĎɇÌν|), and striving to achieve the “grand objective of building a 
socialist cultural great power”  (jianshe shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo hongwei mubiao ƾЈ͍
`*/ɇÌǆġŪa̲ʋ) (Xinhua She 2012).        
All in all, the contents of Hu Jintao’s 2012 speech appear to be following the discourse 
initiated in 2007. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi) 
continues to receive attention, in particular in relation to the development of a system of 
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socialist core values which adapts Marxism to China’s conditions in current times. The same 
can be said for the case of traditional Chinese culture and morals and ethics inherited from the 
past. Emphasis continues to be placed on the complete development of the spiritual and cultural 
spheres of the people’s lives, this time also including aspects related to the overall personal 
wellbeing, such as fitness activities (jianshen yundong рёÅ) and “recreational and 
competitive sports for the masses” (qunzhong tiyu he jingji tiyu Υ^iβĎͤȈi) (Xinhua 
She 2012). Language standardization and promotion at the national level is also taken into 
consideration as a fundamental need to upgrade the people’s intellectual and cultural life82.  
According to Bandurski (2012), if one focuses on the role of media and culture in Hu 
Jintao’s 2012 political report, three main points can be considered when summarizing the 
considerations presented above, which appear to be very similar to the contents of the 2007 
political report: media and culture can raise “the ‘civilized’ conduct and character of the nation 
generally”, contribute to economic growth because culture is seen as a “new ‘pillar’ industry”, 
and increase “China’s cultural profile internationally”, with soft power being officially viewed 
as “a critical component of the country’s comprehensive national strength”. In regard to the last 
point mentioned here, the present analysis posits that, by equating the role of cultural strength 
and competiveness to a symbol of China’s “wealth and power” (fuqiang) and the “renewal” 
(zhenxingȞ)83 of the Chinese nation, Hu Jintao’s 2012 keynote speech emphasizes the reach 
of cultural soft power with even more force than in 2007. While on the former occasion the call 
to enhance culture as part of China’s soft power stemmed from the realization that culture was 
an increasingly important source of national cohesion and creativity, occupying ever-growing 
space in overall national strength, culture is now a concrete indicator of the level of “wealth and 
power” that China displays and a symbol of the revitalization of the Chinese nation’s prosperity.   
Moreover, in the fourth point raised by Hu Jintao, an enhancement of cultural strength 
and competitiveness is associated to the development of cultural undertakings and the cultural 
industry as a whole, including philosophy and social sciences, the press and publishing, radio, 
television, and films, and literature and art. These aspects are considered in relation not only to 
economic but also to social benefits, as the betterment of China’s cultural market is seen as a 
means to favor both the people’s intellectual and material lives. In this way, persisting on the 
path of socialist cultural development with Chinese characteristics fits well within the 
leadership’s domestic policy of scientific development which, as previously discussed, 
advocates for a more balanced and all-around development, while producing positive effects for 
the role of Chinese culture on the global stage. Culture can “boost development” (tuidong 
fazhan), as stated by Hu Jintao (Xinhua She 2012) because, according to an article published on 
the website of the Xinhua News Agency on the occasion of the 18th National Congress, China’s 
economic prosperity and social stability have been continuing for more than 30 years but the 
country is now facing a conflict between resources and development (Xinhua News Agency 
2012b). Paying more attention to culture, heritage, and art allows for leveraging the cultural 
industry as a “natural focus for economic transition”, as it uses fewer sources while generating 
bigger profits (Ibid.). In 2013, the “Ministry of Culture’s Outline for Implementing the 
Construction of the Public Cultural Service System during the Five-year Plan Period” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Constituting the case study of the present analysis, this aspect will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
83 As discussed in Chapter 2, reconstructing the origins of the word “fuxing” (rejuvenate), Schell and Delury (2013, 
Chapter 15) report that the similar word “zhenxing” dates back to Sun Yat-sen’s call in 1894 to “reinvigorate” the 
country.  
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(Wenhuabu “Shi’er Wu” Shiqi Gonggong Wenhua Fuwu Tixi Jianshe Shishi Gangyao ɇÌѲ
Ð;?ɗɱɇÌɮÄi͹ƾЈůɐ·ϭ) was officially issued with the aim of proposing 
even more clearly the target of building a public cultural service system which would “cover the 
city and countryside and with a rational structure, robust capabilities, and practical efficiency” 
(fugai chengxiang 	jiegou heli gongneng jianquan shiyong gaoxiao Ϯ̰į5	ΐʀû
̖	Âη	ů̜亚Ƚ) (cited in Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013, p. 85). This fully reflected the 
importance attached by the State to the construction of a public cultural service system, making 
clear how important of a meaning this aspect held in regard to the construction of a “great 
cultural power” (wenhua qiangguo ɇÌǆġ) (Hong Xiaonan et al. 2013, p. 85). Together with 
the other plans and programs discussed in the previous chapter and summarized here, this 
document once again testifies to the determination of the Chinese leadership to turn the 
discourse on cultural soft power from theory into practice. As stated by Hong Xiaonan et al. 
(2013, p. 86), in fact, from Deng Xiaoping proposing that “socialist material and spiritual 
culture must be both addressed at the same time and attached the same importance to” 
(shehuizhuyi wuzhi wenming he jingshen wenming “liang shou zhua liang shou dou yao ying” 
͍`*/̆ЧɇəĎͷ͐ɇə“#ǾȊ	#ǾѴϭ͈”), to Jiang Zemin stressing that 
socialist culture with Chinese characteristics is an important sign of CNP, and Hu Jintao 
considering the important role and effect of culture from a strategic height, the Party has firmly 
taken the initiative of cultural development and elucidated “cultural programs and struggle 
objectives in keeping with the times”  (yushijujin de wenhua gangling he fendou mubiao ɗ
~严̪ɇÌ·ҺĎŏɉ̲ʋ) and embodying a “profound cultural awareness” (shenke de 
wenhua zijue ˞½̪ɇÌνϳ).  
Thus far, through a brief comparison of Hu Jintao’s keynote speech to the 18th National 
Congress in 2012 to the preceding 2007 policy document and further examining examples 
drawn from the system of cultural policies aimed at enhancing China’s cultural soft power, it 
has been shown that there have been additional evolutions in the related discourse, with the goal 
now being the construction of a socialist cultural great power and cultural strength becoming a 
symbol of China’s domestic triumph and ever-growing international competitiveness. The 
discussion will now continue with the analysis of even more recent developments in the 
discourse on and practice of cultural soft power in the Chinese context, focusing in particular on 
contributions by incumbent President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. 
 
 
7.2 Views on cultural soft power in the Xi Jinping era  
 
The first speech delivered by Xi Jinping considered here was given at the 12th Group 
Study Session of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee (Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Zhengzhiju Di Shi’er Ci Jiti Xuexi &&ňȻ）ƉͩÐ;ʡңiţ4) on December 30th, 
2013, a meeting entirely dedicated to the study of the topic of enhancing China’s cultural soft 
power (Xinhua Wang 2013). On this occasion, the President and Party General Secretary 
stressed the relation between building a socialist cultural great power and striving to enhance 
China’s cultural soft power, reiterating many of the points raised by Hu Jintao’s political report 
to the 18th National Congress, but highlighting with even more force that enhancing the 
country’s cultural soft power is linked to the achievement of the “Two Centenary Goals” 
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(“liang ge yi bai nian” fendou mubiao “#%̩ƪŏɉ̲ʋ)84 and the fulfillment of “the 
Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing 
Zhongguo meng &ÔʴɑańĿ&ġʘ) (Ibid.). In order to enhance China’s cultural soft 
power, four requirements must be stressed: the need to “build a solid foundation for the 
country’s cultural soft power” (hangshi guojia wenhua ruan shili de genji ŉůġŶɇÌ且ů
À̪ʑĳ); the need to “propagate contemporary Chinese values” (chuanbo dangdai Zhongguo 
jiazhi guannian bȲǈS&ġZϰǟ); the need to “display the unique charm of Chinese 
culture” (zhanshi Zhonghua wenhua dute meili Ǝ͋&ÔɇÌ̉̇ӌÀ); and the need to 
“enhance international discourse power” (tigao guoji huayu quan Ȫ亚ġ书БГɸ) (Ibid.). Xi 
Jinping thoroughly discussed methods to respond to these requirements, including “persevering 
on the path of socialist cultural development with Chinese characteristics” (jianchi zou 
Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi wenhua fazhan daolu ĬȚ七&ġ̇υ͍`*/ɇÌëƎ丹不), 
“deepening the cultural system reform” (shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige ˞ÌɇÌi¼ȸү), and 
“thoroughly developing the study of and education in the system of socialist core values” 
(shenru kaizhan shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi xuexi jiaoyu ˞ƿƎ͍`*/ʐǘZi͹ţ
4Ɂβ), among other aspects (Ibid.). Attention must also be paid, according to the Chinese 
leader, to the “shaping of China’s national image” (suzao woguo de guojia xingxiang ĵѥǹġ
̪ġŶ《С), focusing on portraying the image of a civilized power with a rich history, ethnic 
unity, and harmonious cultural diversity, as well as that of an Eastern power with a well-ordered 
government, developed economy, cultural prosperity, national unity, and beautiful mountains 
and rivers (Ibid.). In order to do so, China’s “discourse power” (huayu quan БГɸ) in the 
international arena must be increased, as indicated by the following statement: 
 
ϭÃǆġ书bȲηÀƾЈͷǘʀƾżŁБГi͹ëȝŒɍŚim̜ķǆżŁБГ̪¶
ѥÀ	ǲóÀ	|ÀЄŒ&ġȼ:bȲŒ&ġĻҳ也ѷŒ&ġ̇υ
 
(Xinhua Wang 2013) 
 
It is necessary to reinforce the construction of international communication capabilities, build with 
utmost care an external discourse system, bring into play the role of the new media, increase the 
creativity, appeal, and credibility of the external discourse, tell the stories of China well, spread the 
voices of China well, and explain Chinese characteristics well.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
It is interesting to note that Xi Jinping raises an important point when discussing the 
construction of China’s national image, that is the concept of “huayu quan”, translated by the 
present author with the expression “discourse power”. This is a rather new, oft-debated topic in 
Chinese intellectual and strategic circles that fits well within the discussion on China’s soft 
power. Zhang Zhongjun 。ǜ¢ (2012, p. 56), for instance, explains that, following the increase 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 According to the website China.org.cn (2014), the 18th National Congress of the CPC called for achieving the 
“Two Centennial Goals” (or “Two Centenary Goals”) in order to build “a comprehensively moderate prosperous 
society and accelerate socialist modernization”. The goals are: “to complete the building of a comprehensively 
moderate prosperous society and double China’s 2010 GDP and per capita income for both urban and rural residents 
by the time the CPC celebrates its centenary in 2021”; and “to build China into a modern socialist country that is 
prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious and reach the level of moderately developed 
countries by the time the People’s Republic of China celebrates its centenary in 2049” (Ibid.).  
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in China’s CNP since the promulgation of the policy of reform and opening-up, although 
China’s international influence has been increasing steadily, China’s national image has been 
improving distinctly, and China’s “international discourse power” (guoji huayu quan ġ书БГ
ɸ) has had a certain degree of promotion, there is still a gap between these aspects and China’s 
CNP, its international status, and the need to protect national interests. The issue of how to 
improve the country’s international discourse power needs to be addressed if China wants to 
respond to international competition and protect its national interests (Ibid.). The definition of 
“huayu quan” provided by this author deserves quoting at length:  
 
БГɸɔɞ͖ЖБ̪ɸ¹right3ɞ͖ЖБ̪ɸÀpower
m)ɸÀ
Ǳ/̪БГɸMɞțɭЖБ̪ɸ¹ΩɞțηŃѣяГ϶̪ё̜oνƞ̪̖ǟĎ*
。ǖ»QI̪Ɓ义ĎЀôUҭɦÀ	ҭǆ¼̪ɎǁȸîQI̪ǤǰĎϤ)
 
(Zhang Zhongjun 2012, p. 56) 
 
Discourse power is both a kind of “right” to speak and a kind of “power” to speak. Discourse power in 
the sense of “power” does not only indicate having the right to speak but also being capable of making 
one’s own ideas and viewpoints obtain the respect and approval of others by means of the use of 
language, and change the way of thinking and behaviors of others with non-violent, non-coercive 
manners.   
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
It is evident that many of the ideas expressed by Zhang Zhongjun are similar to the main 
features of the soft power theory. In fact, the author continues, discourse power is an important 
component of both a country’s soft power and CNP, and having discourse power means 
possessing the “comprehensive capacity of setting up topics of discussion, drawing up standards 
and regulations, and decide right or wrong in international affairs” (zai guoji shiwu zhong shezhi 
yiti	 zhiding biaozhun he guize yiji pingpan shifeiquzhi de zonghe nengli Ĩġ书:Ä&Ј΢
Ђҽ	¼ŭʋ§Ďϱ´UèЊ¸ɞҭɧ̳̪ΚûηÀ), “guiding the trend of public opinion” 
(yindao yulun zouxiang ǂŽοЇ七’), and “shaping a good national image” (suzao lianghao 
guojia xingxiang ĵѥσŒġŶ《С) (Zhang Zhongjun 2012, p. 56).   
In regard to the topic briefly discussed here, also of note are the opinions recently 
expressed by Zhang Weiwei, Professor of Politics at Fudan University and Director of the 
Center for China Development Model Research, published on the online Chinese page of The 
New York Times. The article reports extracts of an interview in which Zhang Weiwei elaborates 
on the question as to why it is imperative for China to “craft its own ‘huayu quan’”: China’s 
“huayu quan” is the “Chinese discourse” or “Chinese narrative,” also corresponding, in certain 
contexts, to the “Chinese political narrative”, and it indicates that “there is a rightful place for 
Chinese discourse in the world” (Tatlow 2015). A country that is rising as rapidly as is the case 
for China must learn to “explain itself clearly and confidently to its own people and to the 
outside world”, a demand that requires new narratives,!which must be comprehensive, thorough, 
robust, international, and understandable to both Chinese people and the foreign audience, in 
order to overcome the barrier of an official political discourse that is not always easy to grasp 
and, ultimately, offset the ideological bias of Western media (Ibid.). This has been understood 
by President Xi Jinping who has personally taken the initiative in changing the style of 
communication with the people (Ibid.).  
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Apart from the topic of “huayu quan”, in the abovementioned speech delivered by Xi 
Jinping in 2013, another aspect emerges: the relevance of the system of socialist core values. As 
explained in Chapter 1, the construction of a system of socialist core values has been advocated 
since the 17th National Congress in 2007 as a set of “common moral pillars” (gongtong de 
jingshen zhizhu —̪ͷ͐ȶʊ) constituting a vast, yet firm and substantial, ideological basis 
for the perseverance with and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics (Xu 
Zhigong 2008). In his 2012 political report to the 18th National Congress, Hu Jintao reiterated 
the importance of “strengthening the construction of a system of socialist core values” (jiaqiang 
shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi jianshe), making socialist core values “enter deeply into the 
people’s hearts” (shenru renxin ˞Iǘ) (Xinhua She 2012). As reported by the state media, 
strengthening socialist core values “has evolved into a national campaign to rebuild faith amid 
concerns that the world’s second-largest economy has lost its moral compass during its three-
decade economic miracle” (Xinhua News Agency 2014a). In 2013, Xi Jinping’s statement that 
the study of and education in the system of socialist core values needed to be thoroughly 
developed reiterates the message previously communicated by Hu Jintao, which appeared as 
follows:  
 
ȧ严五Ǥ*/&ġÌɗSÌń^ÌĬȚǶ̜&ġ̇υ͍`*/̖Їi͹ʩϪ	Ɂβ
Iʴ˞ůɐ五Ǥ*/̖Ї̈́͞ĎƾЈƙ͜ƾЈĒţ͍`͗ţ¶ɍi͹ȧÅ&ġ̇υ
͍`*/̖Їi͹严Ɂɺ严ЙĴ严ŋι
[…] ńÀ、Ȅʴɑͷ͐ĎɗSͷ͐˞ƿƎ̂ġ*
/	ңi*/	͍`*/Ɂβ'źIʴͷ͐̢ķǆIʴͷ͐À之
 
(Xinhua She 2012) 
 
We should continue to adapt Marxism to China’s conditions in keeping up with the times and increase 
its appeal to the people, work hard to equip the whole Party with the system of theories of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics and educate the people in these theories. […] We should vigorously 
foster China’s national character and promote the underlying trend of the times, intensify education in 
patriotism, collectivism and socialism, and enrich people’s cultural life and enhance their moral 
strength. 
(Xinhua News Agency 2012d) 
 
According to media reports (Ng and Li 2013; Xinhua News Agency 2013), in December 
2013, the General Office of the CPC Central Committee issued guidelines that called for the 
inclusion of socialist core values into the national education plan. As was briefly introduced in 
Chapter 2, socialist core values can be divided into three groups including national, social, and 
individual values: prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony; freedom, equality, justice, and 
the rule of law; patriotism, dedication, integrity, and friendship (Xinhua News Agency 2013). 
The state media reported on the incorporation of these values into the school curriculum as a 
way of “pooling positive energy to realize the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation” and a 
factor that will play an important role in the enhancement of China’s soft power, and 
highlighted the collectivity of such an endeavor which involves all sectors of society in the 
diffusion and promotion of the socialist core value system, including the media, the news and 
publishing sectors, radio and television, and the Internet, but also activities such as “red tourism” 
(Xinhua News Agency 2013). Nevertheless, the reaction of other commentators was somewhat 
less positive, with the South China Morning Post, for instance, describing the inclusion of 
socialist core values into the education system as a “sweeping Marxist education campaign” 
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aimed at filling a moral void left by decades of rapid economic development and reinvigorating 
the Chinese society’s faith in the CPC (Ng and Li 2013).   
Another concrete example of the implementation of the study of and education in 
socialist core values among the people is the speech delivered by Xi Jinping at Beijing 
University on May 4th, 2014. The relevance of this date, which marked the 95th anniversary of 
the May Fourth Movement (Wusi Yundong?ĚёÅ)85, is the first aspect addressed by the 
Chinese leader who highlights that with said movement the patriotic, progressive, democratic, 
and scientific spirit were lunched, promoting the foundation of the CPC (Renmin Wang 2015c). 
In a similar way, Beijing University is praised as the heart of the New Culture Movement (Xin 
Wenhua Yundong ɍɇÌёÅ)86, the place of origin of the May Fourth Movement, and the 
“witness of this glorious historical period” (zhe duan guangrong lishi de jianzheng zhe 两ʭ
ϔàö̪ϯЉΨ) (Ibid.). In brief, Xi Jinping calls the youth attending the conference to 
conscientiously put into practice socialist core values. Every era has its own spirit and its own 
system of values; but to what core values should contemporary China adhere? Xi Jinping’s 
following statements answer this question:  
 
ΏяêĿǐʸǱϯΚûúɎҮЀЋǹWȪ«ϭŽźǆ	ʴ*	ɇə	ĎНŽν̞	
Ʃͪ	ʦ	ˇ）Ž̂ġ	Ʉ 	А|	éė͚ɿĲβĎ与Ϥ͍`*/ʐǘZϰ
ź
ǆ	ʴ*	ɇə	ĎНɞġŶƊҮ̪Zϭʸν̞	Ʃͪ	ʦ	ˇ）ɞ͍`ƊҮ̪Zϭ
ʸ̂ġ	Ʉ 	А|	éėɞʴƊҮ̪Zϭʸ
两%ʝȖů书ěͬ7ǹWϭƾЈJ
.ʏ̪ġŶ	ƾЈJ.ʏ̪͍`	ĲβJ.ʏ̪ʴ̪义ń҉ҽ
 
(Renmin Wang 2015c) 
 
Through repeatedly soliciting ideas and summing up all aspects, we propose that we should advocate 
for wealth and power, democracy, civility, and harmony; advocate for freedom, equality, justice, and 
rule of law; advocate for patriotism, devotion to work, integrity, and friendship; and actively exercise 
and put into practice socialist core values. Wealth and power, democracy, civility, and harmony are 
values demanded at the national level; freedom, equality, justice, and the rule of law are values 
demanded at the social level; patriotism, devotion to work, integrity, and friendship are values 
demanded at the citizens’ level. This sum, as a matter of fact, answers the important questions as to 
what type of country we should build, what type of society we should construct, and what type of 
citizens we should cultivate.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 As stated by Furth (1983, pp. 322-323), the May Fourth demonstrations that erupted in 1919 symbolized an 
“intellectual campaign for a totally ‘new culture’” and targeted the traditional moral and social order in the aftermath 
of the reform movement of 1898, which had been aimed at remodeling the inherited political order. While this first 
attempt at an institutional change had led to modernizing efforts in the last phase of the Qing dynasty, and eventually 
its collapse in 1911, the May Fourth Movement was triggered by the desire of students and intellectuals, educated 
within the new, modernized system of schools and universities, to establish a scientific and democratic “new culture”, 
markedly detaching themselves from traditional core values, progressively accepting foreign models and ideas, and 
ultimately standing outside political power (Ibid.). 
86 The New Culture Movement is part of the background of the May Fourth Movement insomuch as it was 
inaugurated by the foundation of the magazine New Youth (Xin Qingnian ɍҫƪ) in 1915, through which 
intellectuals advocated science, democracy, and literary revolution (Furth 1983, pp. 396-397). The mobilization 
against foreign imperialism and the warlord government in Beijing gave rise to the May Fourth demonstrations in 
1919, reflecting the strengthening of a “progressive political force” (Ibid.).    
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Even though, on this occasion, Xi Jinping does not specifically bring up the topic of 
cultural soft power, the link between this and socialist core values has appeared in many other 
instances. For example, in a speech delivered on February 24th, 2014, during the 13th Group 
Study Session of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee (Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Zhengzhiju Di Shisan Jiti Xuexi &&ňȻ）ƉͩÐʡңiţ4), Xi Jinping stressed that 
core values are the “soul of cultural soft power” (wenhua ruan shili de linghunɇÌ且ůÀ̪
˵些) and a “focal point” (zhongdian 义˸) in its construction, constituting the “deepest factor 
in deciding the nature and orientation of culture” (jueding wenhua xingzhi he fangxiang de zui 
shencengci yaosu ¥ŭɇÌǦЧĎɎ’̪ɫ˞Ɗʡϭͺ) (Xinhua Wang 2014a). A country’s 
cultural soft power depends on the “vitality” (shengmingli ̛čÀ), “cohesiveness” (ningjuli), 
and “appeal” (ganzhaoli) of the system of core values and, for China, “cultivating and 
promoting a system of socialist core values should be based on China’s outstanding traditional 
culture” (peiyu he hongyang shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan bixu lizu Zhonghua youxiu chuantong 
wenhua ĲβĎ、Ȅ͍`*/ʐǘZϰǙҷ͢上&Ô_͔bΔɇÌ) (Ibid.).   
Before moving on to the final stage of this analysis, that is the attempt to answer the 
question as to whether or not it is possible to talk about “soft power with Chinese characteristics” 
from a terminological point of view, it is interesting to briefly examine one of the socialist core 
values discussed by Chinese top leaders on several occasions, including both Hu Jintao’s 
political report to the 18th National Congress and Xi Jinping’s 2014 speech at Beijing University: 
the concept of “fuqiang” (wealth and power). In Western literature, this two-character 
expression gives the title to a seminal work by Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and 
Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-first Century. This volume depicts China’s journey 
from poverty, backwardness, and humiliation to prosperity, renewal, and triumph. It traces the 
long road to “rejuvenation” (fuxing), following the yearning for “wealth and power” (fuqiang). 
In doing so, the book constitutes a “historical reflection on the backstory to China’s ‘economic 
miracle’ […] emphasizing the perspectives of the Chinese themselves” (Schell and Delury 2013, 
Chapter 1). The authors explain that the origins of the term “fuqiang” can be traced back to the 
Warring States period when the expression “fuguo qiangbing źġǆ” was coined with the 
meaning “enrich the state and strengthen its military power” (Ibid.). As a result, the term 
“fuqiang”, an abbreviation of said expression, is mostly translated in the English language as 
“wealth and power”, with another possible translation being “prosperity and strength” (Ibid.). 
The phrase, in fact, which was revived in the course of the 19th century, when China saw the 
decline of its empire and was faced with the aggression from the West, lost the “sense of 
aggressiveness” it had in antiquity and came to reflect the desire of Chinese reformers for a 
restoration of the preeminence the country enjoyed in the past (Ibid.). When the term appears 
translated into English in the Chinese state media, different versions coexist, for example 
“power and prosperity” (Xinhua News Agency 2012d) or just “prosperity” (Xinhua News 
Agency 2013; Xinhua News Agency 2014a). In each individual translation proposed by the 
present author, Schell and Delury’s definition and wording as “wealth and power” has been 
employed.   
On different occasions, it has been shown that, at the present time, the concept of 
“fuqiang” vividly re-emerges in Chinese top leaders’ speeches, in a historical conjuncture that 
sees China as being on the cusp of achieving the goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation. In his speech to the students of Beijing University in 2014, Xi Jinping praises the 
achievements reached in pursuing this goal, to which the country has never been so close in any 
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other historical period, having more confidence and capability than ever before (Renmin Wang 
2015c).  
On balance, as stated in an editor’s commentary published on the website Renmin Wang 
in June 2015, “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” (enhance the country’s cultural soft power) is a 
“major strategic task for the Party and the State” (dang he guojia de yi xiang zhongda zhanlüe 
renwu ĎġŶ̪ҵ义ńǻ̤[Ä) and constitutes an important aspect within Xi Jinping’s 
ideological system of governance (Renmin Wang 2015b). Soft power expert Zhang Guozuo 。
ġ͏87 makes this clear in a scholarly article, which can be retrieved from the webpage Renmin 
Wang, in which he explains that while the proposal of the concept of cultural soft power in the 
course of the 17th National Congress represented an important sign that China’s soft power had 
developed its own characteristics, manifesting the relevance of culture, the important 
contributions offered by Xi Jinping after the 18th National Congress embody the fact that, for 
China, building cultural soft power “is based on me and is for me to use” (yi wo wei zhu, wei wo 
suo yong Uǹ)*)ǹǽ̜); this means that, all in all, China’s cultural soft power 
represents a “substantial transformation and innovation of Western soft power” (dui Xifang ruan 
shili de shizhixing gaizao he chuangxin żϬɎ且ůÀ̪ůЧǦȸѥĎ¶ɍ) (Renmin Wang 
2015a).  
This brings the present discussion to the final stage of the analysis of the evolution of the 
Chinese discourse on soft power which, in particular throughout Chapters 5 and 6, has described 
the process through which Joseph S. Nye’s soft power theory has been enriched with Chinese 
practice, in order to construct a vision which has been progressively shaped according to 
China’s conditions, to almost completely break away from its Western counterpart. What has 
been developed in a relatively short period of time, less than three decades between 1990 and 
2015, can be thought of as the embodiment of what has been called, by at least one Western 
scholarly article (Glaser and Murphy 2009), “soft power with Chinese characteristics”, of which 
the development of the innovative concept of “wenhua ruan shili” is a powerful symbol. Taking 
into consideration the observations made by Zhang Guozuo in the abovementioned contribution 
allows for the confirmation of this view. The scholar affirms that after having been 
disseminated in China, just as “the tasty orange, grown in Southern China, would turn sour once 
it is grown in the North” (ju sheng Huai nan ze wei ju, sheng yu Huai bei ze wei zhi  ʠ̛˝×
´)ʠ̛<˝Í´)ʄ)88, soft power has absorbed “the water and soil, and sunshine and 
rain of Chinese culture” (Zhonghua wenhua de shuitu he yangguang yu lu&ÔɇÌ̪ʶĦĎ
ҒҤҩ), a fact that not only has allowed for it to live on but also to manifest “distinct 
Chinese characteristics” (xianming de Zhongguo tese Ӎə̪&ġ̇υ) and form its own 
“unique force” (dute liliang ̉̇À之) (Renmin Wang 2015a). Zhang Guozuo explains in great 
detail what these characteristics are, but specifies that this absolutely does not mean “artificially 
posing a narrow-minded nationalistic boundary” (renwei de huading yi tiao xia’ai de 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Zhang Guozuo is reported to be the director of the Research Center on China’s Cultural Soft Power (Zhongguo 
Wenhua Ruan Shili Yanjiu Zhongxin &ġɇÌ且ůÀ̈́͞&ǘ) (Renmin Wang 2015a). Another research center 
with a similar name, Guojia Wenhua Ruan Shili Yanjiu Zhongxin ġŶɇÌ且ůÀ̈́͞&ǘ (Center for Soft Power 
Studies Peking University, http://www.softpower.pku.edu.cn/) was established in September 2014 at Beijing 
University’s Institute of International Relations with the aim of creating a think tank for the study and dissemination 
of cultural soft power, in order to propagate Chinese culture and contemporary core values (Xinhua Wang 2014d). 
88 Translation drawn from CIPG Training Center (http://www.cipgtraining.org/).  
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minzuzhuyi jiexian I)ĩ±ŭɻ̊Ҟ̪ʴɑ*/̢Ҙ) to the concept of soft power (Ibid.). 
The most relevant excerpts explaining the nature of the peculiar characteristics of Chinese soft 
power are reported below, while, given its relevance, the original transcript of Zhang Guozuo’s 
article is provided as an Appendix to this work.   
 
ȸî7且ůÀ̪ūɖ
Τġȉ且ůÀm)ȧϤҪɸ*/ĎǆɸȻ）̪%义ϭǾʭ
&ġ´ȉ
Ȫ亚ɇÌ且ůÀm)ķǆΚûġÀĎġ书ǍđÀ̪义ϭѡǑżɞ)7Ãǆ͍`*/ʐǘ
ZϰƾЈ、Ȅ&Ô_͔bΔɇÌĲβ亚ƄǤǰ丹Ǘķǆ	¢	ġIʴ̪©ή
ÀżŁɞ)7bȲ&ġ̪͢ĪĎĻҳʌ͢σŒ̪ġ书《СϗѥσŒ̪ġ书̑ĶȧÅ
ʀƾĎƩ	ĎН	ûm̪̢
  
(Renmin Wang 2015a) 
 
The objectives of soft power have been transformed. The United States views soft power as an 
important method to put into effect hegemony and power politics. On the contrary, China views the 
enhancement of cultural soft power as an important way to increase comprehensive national power 
and international influence: domestically, it serves the purpose of strengthening the construction of 
socialist core values, promoting China’s outstanding traditional culture, cultivating noble ideology 
and ethics, reinforcing the cohesiveness of the Party, the military, and the people; externally, it serves 
the purpose of disseminating China’s standpoint and voice, establishing a positive international image, 
constructing a favorable international environment, and promoting the construction of a peaceful, 
harmonious, and cooperative world.      
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
This extract is a succinct yet insightful summary of the considerations made throughout 
this work and fully confirms the overall assumption made by the present author that the Chinese 
discourse on soft power is original and innovative. The other aspects discussed by Zhang 
Guozuo are that the connotations of soft power have been expanded and a new theoretical 
system has been built; in regard to the first aspect, the author clarifies that, in the Chinese 
context, soft power is not only limited to the attractiveness of culture, institutions, and system of 
values and the capacity to master international discourse, but covers all elements related to 
“spiritual, intellectual, and emotional strengths” (jingshen	zhihui	qinggan de liliang ͷ͐	
ɥǵ	Ǯǲ̪À之) (Renmin Wang 2015a). And, of course, in regard to the second aspect, 
emphasis is once again placed on the role of culture:  
 
&ġ¡ςĩЛЇ且ůÀΩɞĨ且ůÀ¾Ү£UɇÌ;ŝoɇÌǸ)且ůÀ̪ʐǘЍ
¡ȉɇÌ—ʀǸ且ůÀ̪Qϭͺƫ²Ωɞ͉͢ɇÌĨ且ůÀ&ɫ亚Ɗʡ̪ŭ·ǆКɇ
Ìż且ůÀQϭͺ̪ǂҺm̜
两ɞĜ)¼Ƹ	Zϰ	ȢȬġ书БГɸ	ŁCМ̤ͪ且ů
Àϭͺɓ˞íɇÌ̪¼΂ĎǍđ
 
(Renmin Wang 2015a) 
 
China no longer talks about soft power in a general way, but places the two characters for wenhua in 
front of soft power, making culture become the core word of soft power; it no longer juxtaposes 
culture together with the other components constituting soft power, but allocates to culture the highest 
level in soft power, emphasizing the leading role of culture towards the other constituents. This is 
because institutions, systems of values, control of international discourse, and foreign strategies all 
receive, without exception, the restrictions and influence of culture.      
(Translated by the present author.) 
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In China, culture plays a superior role in the soft power discourse. While Western 
scholars describe soft power as culture, system of values, institutions, policies, and the capacity 
to master international discourse power, Chinese people believe that culture occupies an 
“irreplaceable special position” (buke tidai de teshu diwei ôɪṠ̪ʫĩ·) in soft power: 
“it is the soul and longitude and latitude of soft power” (shi ruan shili de linghun he jingwei ɞ
且ůÀ̪˵些ĎΏ΅) and “must not be juxtaposed to the other factors” (bu ying he qita yaosu 
binglie ƳĎQϭͺƫ²)! (Renmin Wang 2015a). As the soul, the value orientation of 
culture dictates the direction of the development of soft power, its objectives, and reasoning, 
while its function as the longitude and latitude means that cultural elements penetrate every 
aspect, every segment, and every “logic chain” (luoji liantiao ѧш҂ɻ) of soft power (Ibid.). 
Traditional culture is the most profound foundation of China’s cultural soft power, with many 
features that possess a value and meaning that can surpass the boundaries of space, time, and 
nationality (Ibid.). In leveraging the power of traditional culture it is nonetheless important to 
pick and choose what is best and most suitable for the modern Chinese society: “It is clear that 
thoroughly exploring, sorting out, refining, sublimating, and promoting the excellent traditional 
Chinese culture are indispensable major tasks in the enhancement of China’s cultural soft power” 
(Ke jian, shenru fajueshuli tilianshenghuahongyang Zhonghua youxiu chuantong 
wenhua, shi tigao Zhongguo wenhua ruan shili bukehuoque de zhongyao renwu ôϯ˞ë
ȣ	ʙ̖	Ȫ˹	ÒÔ	、Ȅ&Ô_͔bΔɇÌɞȪ亚&ġɇÌ且ůÀôǺΞ̪义
ϭ[Ä) (Renmin Wang 2015a). Moreover, in China, soft power is defined as every “strength 
that is intangible, hard to quantize, and non-coercive” (wuxing de	 nanyi lianghua de	 fei 
qiangzhixing liliang de shili ɓ《̪	ҡU之Ì̪	ҭǆ¼ǦÀ之̪ůÀ), and that results in 
attracting (xiyin ćǂ), cohering (ningju ©ή), rallying (ganzhao ǲó), mobilizing (dongyuan 
Åĉ), persuading (shuofu Жɮ), inducing (youdao ЕŽ), affecting (ganran ǲʇ), resonating 
(gongming Ӑ), assimilating (tonghua —Ì), and influencing (yingxiang Ǎđ) the “will of 
the people” (renxin Iǘ) (Ibid.). All these can be thought of as keywords in the Chinese 
discourse on soft power.  
Last but not least, another aspect discussed by Zhang Guozuo that requires a more in-
depth examination is the binary approach to soft power. This characteristic of the Chinese 
discourse on soft power has been thoroughly discussed throughout this work in order to support 
the thesis, put forward by many scholars, that, in the Chinese context, soft power embraces two 
different yet related dimensions, one internal and one external. Scholars have thus defined 
Chinese soft power as “holistic” (Glaser and Murphy 2009, p. 20), “inward-looking and 
outward-looking” (Barr 2011), and “both internally and externally directed, focusing primarily, 
however, on changing domestic priorities and practices to develop soft power resources” (Cao 
Qing 2011, p. 12), while its purpose has been defined as “dualistic” (Aukia 2014). In this sense, 
Zhang Guozuo’s statements regarding the binary interpretation of soft power deserves quoting 
at length:  
 
&ġëƎ且ůÀf̺̹Ĩġ书ʌ͢σŒ《С	ȢȬġ书БГɸɨ̺̹ĨġΔǤǰ	
©ήIǘ	Ĭŭ̖ǰ|ǟ	ʌ͢σŒ丹Ǘ	Ȫ亚ʴɑͺЧ	、ȄϔbΔ	Ž̂ġ*/ͪ
ɭ̺ɨ)'ź̪ǻ̤̲ʋ
 
(Renmin Wang 2015a) 
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In China, soft power development focuses not only on establishing a positive image and controlling 
international discourse power on the global stage; it focuses even more on unifying ideology, 
aggregating the will of the people, strengthening ideals and beliefs, establishing good virtues, 
enhancing the inner qualities of the nation, promoting glorious traditions, and advocating for 
patriotism domestically, which has an even richer strategic objective.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
Zhang Guozuo concludes his examination by encouraging Chinese people to have more 
confidence in China’s own path, theories, institutions, and system of values, as well as in the 
fact that, in the field of soft power, China’s cultural soft power has already tentatively given 
shape to its own distinctive characteristics and force: “In recent years, Western scholars who 
research China and are amicable to China are more and more, but Chinese people must be asked 
more how they consider, how they define Chinese affairs” (jinnian lai, yanjiu Zhongguo qie dui 
Zhongguo youhao de Xifang xuezhe yuelaiyue duo, dan Zhongguo de shi hai dei duo wen 
Zhongguo ren zenme kan zenme shuo ђƪɼ̈́͞&ġż&ġéŒ̪ϬɎţΨ万ɼ万
łf&ġ̪:ѓǖł҉&ġIǢ.̷	Ǣ.Ж) (Renmin Wang 2015a). This is precisely 
the reason why the following section will discuss the concept of soft power in the Chinese 
context from a terminological perspective, in an attempt to give voice to Chinese sources and 
show even more how the intrinsic peculiarities of the related discourse are, in the first place, 
embedded in the terminology used.   
 
 
Figure 2: 24 zi shehuizhuyi hexin 
jiazhiguan – zhongyingwen ban 24ŝ͍`
*/ʐǘZϰ – &Ϗɇ̃ (The 24-
character socialist core value system – 
Chinese-English version). The caption 
reads: “Today, the General office of the 
CPC Central Committee has issued the 
‘Suggestions regarding the cultivation and 
implementation of socialist core values’. 
The socialist core value system includes 12 
words and a total of 24 characters, and its 
goals, value orientation, and standards are 
put forward on the basis of the three 
different levels of the nation, the society, 
and the individual citizen. Below is the 
Chinese-English parallel text of the 
socialist core values, for the netizens’ 
reference” (People’s Daily Online 2013). 
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7.3 Translating “soft power”  
 
Supporting the thesis according to which the term “ruan shili” and its related collocations 
have become part of the “high-frequency” (Guo Jiemin 2012, p. 17) and “hot” (Hong Xiaonan 
et al. 2013, p. 96) vocabulary used in China’s academic, political, and media circles, the 
preceding chapter described a search on the website Renmin Wang, carried out at the time of 
writing, that reveals the presence of over 80 and 30 thousand articles with the expression “ruan 
shili” and “wenhua ruan shili” in their texts respectively. Besides the very popular “wenhua 
ruan shili”, other topics featured on the website include “guojia ruan shili” (national soft 
power), “quyu ruan shili” (regional soft power), and even “qiye ruan shili \ 且ůÀ” 
(enterprise soft power). These constructions, which juxtapose an attribute in front of the term 
“ruan shili”, belong to the ample range of derivative terms that have emerged in the Chinese 
discourse on soft power conveyed by means of the Chinese language. This variety bears 
evidence to both the originality of the Chinese interpretation of soft power, which already came 
through in the description of the vicissitudes concerning the creation of the concept of “wenhua 
ruan shili” presented in the preceding chapters, and also the increasing complexity of the related 
discourse, which, at times, can bring about ambiguities and misinterpretations.   
It is indeed important to note that the degree of innovation displayed in the Chinese 
discourse on soft power is not always regarded as a positive aspect. In Section 4.4 and Chapter 6, 
the examination carried out by Chinese scholar Gu Junwei (2011) was presented in order to 
explain how the lack of “singleness” and “uniformity” in the use of the terminology employed 
to talk about soft power in the Chinese context, together with the creation of derivative terms on 
the basis of the expression “ruan shili”, not only violates the rules of monosemy and mononymy 
but also impedes the smooth development of scientific dialogue. The type of “creative 
restlessness” (chuangxin de zaodong ¶ɍ̪пÅ) shown by some Chinese scholars, who strive 
for the fulfillment of the need for “localization” or “local adaptation” (bentuhua) in the 
translation process, does not correspond to any kind of breakthrough in regard to the conceptual 
system of the original idea, and “there is indeed nothing that can be said to be innovative” 
(meiyou shenme chuangxin ke yan!˂ɭJ.¶ɍô϶)!about it (Gu Junwei 2011, p. 67). The 
“‘ruan shili’ shuyu ‘且ůÀ’ɶГ” (soft-power terminology) pinpointed by Gu Junwei include, 
besides “wenhua ruan shili”, collocations such as “jingji ruan shili Ώ˒且ůÀ” (economic 
soft power), “junshi ruan shili ¢:且ůÀ” (military soft power), and “chengshi ruan shili į
ơ且ůÀ” (urban soft power) (Ibid.). 
This issue is also addressed in an article from Shanghai’s news outlet Wenhui Bao ɇʹ
ȏ (Wenhui News) which discusses an interview with Joseph S. Nye, carried out following a 
lecture given by the Professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University in December 2010 and reported 
on the website Xinhua Wang. The existence of “too many misunderstandings and misuses” (tai 
duo de wujie he lanyong ņł̪ДϵĎ˭̜) in approaching the topic of soft power is 
examined in relation, in particular, to the expressions “quyu ruan shili”, “jingji ruan shili”, and 
“wenhua ruan shili” (Ji GuibaoŢʓz and Tian Xiaoling̝ɡ̓ 2010). The article posits that 
“quyu ruan shili” seems to be in contrast with the concept of soft power proposed by Nye’s 
works, which is centered around the attractiveness that a country’s shared system of values can 
generate, with a system of core values and a guiding ideology being necessary at the national 
level; “jingji ruan shili” represents what the journalists writing the article call “a neologism that 
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is neither fish nor fowl” (“feilüfeima” de xinciҭӆҭ五̪ɍЍ) as it confuses hard and 
soft power, an aspect that Nye is reported to have explicitly discussed in the course of the 
interview, specifying that even though economic wealth can generate both hard and soft power, 
the economy is not part of soft power because, while hard power is strongly supported by the 
economy, soft power is the power of attraction and persuasion, which can at times be 
corroborated by economic wealth; and, finally, “wenhua ruan shili” can be seen as a rather 
problematic expression as it runs the risk of equating cultural soft power to the cultural industry, 
while Nye specifies in the interview that culture can indeed produce influence but can also be of 
no use if it fails to help a country generate attractive force and a favorable impression in others, 
which is an entirely different thing from providing cultural products that are appreciated by the 
public (Ibid.).   
Looking more closely at the multiformity of the Chinese soft power terminology, another 
contribution is worth mentioning. It is a scholarly article written by well-known researcher Guo 
Jiemin, a member of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, in which the author confirms 
the breadth of the discourse on soft power which emerged through the preceding considerations 
by making reference to the effects of a so-called phenomenon of “generalization” (fanhua ，Ì): 
accompanying the progressive re-elaboration and expansion of the theoretical system of soft 
power in the Chinese context, this phenomenon has resulted in the current use of the term “ruan 
shili” as a slogan in every area of Chinese society and in every branch of the State (Guo Jiemin 
2012, p. 17). This is evidenced by the existence of expressions such as “wenhua ruan shili”, 
“guojia ruan shili”, “guojia wenhua ruan shili”, “quyu ruan shili”, “qiye ruan shili”, “junshi 
ruan shili”, “zhengzhi ruan shili Ȼ）且ůÀ” (political soft power), and even “siwei ruan shili 
ǤΗ且ůÀ” (thought soft power), as well as news titles such as “Zhongcan ye shi ruan shili &
云3ɞ且ůÀ” (Chinese food is also soft power) and “Chengguan bainian tixian ruan shili į
ͯȓƪi̒且ůÀ” (The city management’s New Year’s greetings embody soft power) (Ibid.). 
As will be further explained, this indicates that “ruan shili” is a different concept from Nye’s 
idea and that it also presents differences from the concept of “ruan quanli”, one of the 
alternative translations for the expression “soft power” (Ibid.) 89.  
In a similar vein, the present author has also detected the existence of another collocation, 
that is “yuyan ruan shili Г϶且ůÀ” (language soft power), featured in the title of a scholarly 
article written by Wang Yue ̏万 and Lü Meijia “ΤĘ in 2011, in which the authors describe 
language as a vehicle and important constituent of culture, representing one of the major 
indicators to measure a country’s soft power. Due to the relevance of this topic in the analysis of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 The various Chinese translations of the expression “soft power” were introduced in Section 4.4 and will be further 
expounded upon in this section. It is interesting to note that, in a preceding scholarly article written by the same 
author, other examples drawn from the media were also reported in order to bear witness to the difference existing 
between the intrinsic characteristics of national power connoting Nye’s concept and those of “ruan shili”, proving 
that “ruan shili” and “ruan quanli” are more than just different translations of the same term and pertain to different 
situations (Guo Jiemin 2009, p. 13). The news titles mentioned include: “Chongsu Guangdong de ruan shili义ĵƮ
!̪且ůÀ” (Reconstructing Guangdong’s soft power), “Meiti shi yi zhong zhongyao de ruan shili bŚɞ͖义
ϭ̪且ůÀ” (The media is an important type of soft power), “Guanzhu jiaoyu ‘ruan shili’ ˊɁβ‘且ůÀ’ ” 
(Paying attention to cultivating “soft power”), “Qiye ruan shili: pinpai shengyu he fuwu\ 且ůÀď̄	Ļ
ϸĎɮÄ” (Enterprise soft power: brands, reputation, and service), and “Ruan shili: Zhongguo qiye de yi ge 
yingzhang 且ůÀ&ġ\ ̪%͈R” (Soft power: a tough battle for China’s enterprises) (Ibid.). The 
relevance of these extended concepts is also noted by Western scholars, such as Aukia (2014) and Barr (2011). 
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the case study proposed in this thesis, this contribution will be further discussed in the following 
chapter.  
In her scholarly article “Cong guojia ‘ruan shili’ dao guoji ‘ruan quanli’ OġŶ‘且ůÀ’
»ġ书‘且ɸÀ’” (From national “soft power” to international “soft power”), Guo Jiemin (2012) 
elaborates on the different terms used to translate “soft power” in the Chinese context and 
proposes a potential distinction between what can be envisioned as “national soft strength” 
(guojia ruan shili) and “international soft power” (guoji ruan quanli). Guo Jiemin’s analysis 
draws upon a thorough examination of the terminology used to talk about soft power in China, 
which delineates a picture that is almost immediately clear to a well-informed Mandarin-literate 
audience, thanks to the different Chinese characters used, but loses its acuteness in the English 
translation which would normally be proposed for the aforementioned title. In order to 
understand this assumption, it is important to reiterate that there exist a number of possible 
translations employed to convey the meaning of the English term “soft power” in the Chinese 
language. According to a number of scholars (Liu Qing and Wang Litao 2007; Cho and Jeong 
2008; Glaser and Murphy 2009; Guo Jiemin 2009, 2012; Qu Xiaoying 2010; Zhao Gang and 
Xiao Huan 2010, among others), they include: “ruan shili”, “ruan quanli”, “ruan liliang”, and 
“ruan guoli”, as well as Taiwanese variations such as “rouxing” and “ruanxing” for “soft”, 
“quanli”, “guoli”, and “liliang” for “power” (Wang Hongying and Lu Yeh-Chung 2008, p. 426). 
Generally speaking, all the terms used on the mainland are translated into English as “soft 
power”, which is why the acute observation Guo Jiemin makes in the title of her paper, 
opposing the expressions “ruan shili” and “ruan quanli”, is not evident in English. Moreover, as 
will be further expounded upon, the crux of the problem lies in the specific interpretation of the 
concept of power and the word chosen to translate it among the prevalent options “shili”, 
“liliang”, “quanli”, and “guoli”90.  
How, then, can scholars and translators make sense of this variegated terminology 
without falling into the trap of being “lost in translation”? Analyzing the complex issue 
regarding the translation of the English term “soft power”, Chinese scholars express diverse 
opinions which can be roughly divided between those that support the thesis according to which 
all the aforementioned terms are synonyms that can be chosen based on the translator’s or 
researcher’s will and those that oppose this view. Belonging to the first cohort, Chinese scholar 
Zhang Xiaoming (2005), for instance, looks at the foreign origins of the term “soft power”, 
translated as “ruan quanli”, in order to find the reason behind such a composite scenario. To a 
Chinese reader, the term “ruan quanli” is undoubtedly a “word of foreign origin” (wailai cihui
ŁɼЍʹ), a loanword, and, as many other foreign words, it has many different transpositions 
in Chinese: apart from “ruan liliang”, which appeared in the first Chinese publications on the 
topic of soft power, and the translation “ruan quanli”, which was successively used by many 
authors, the author confirms that other translations include “ruan shili”, “ruan guoli”, and the 
Taiwanese “rouxing guoli” (Ibid.). Although preferring the term “ruan quanli”, given the fact 
that in previous literature “quanli” is generally used to translate the word “power”, and that the 
majority of Chinese scholars also adopt this translation, Zhang Xiaoming does not imply that 
the other translations are incorrect; on the contrary, recognizing the impossibility to always find 
a perfectly matching Chinese word for its foreign counterpart, the necessity to determine which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 See also Section 4.4. 
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Chinese translations are most appropriate for the words “power” and “soft power” is here 
denied, as each interpretation can only achieve relative accuracy (Ibid.).  
Zhang Xiaoming’s views are shared by other Chinese scholars. For instance, in Wang 
ChaoyȉжѦ (2009), the term “soft power” is also classified as a loanword which is translated 
in many ways in Chinese: besides echoing Zhang Xiaoming in saying that the first Chinese 
publications on the topic opted for the term “ruan liliang” and that many successive works used 
the translations “ruan shili” or “ruan quanli”, with some writers also choosing the terms “ruan 
guoli” or “rouxing guoli”, the authors believe that in order to address this issue it is necessary to 
objectively and rationally analyze the process this concept went through from the time of its 
formulation to its appearance in China, as well as its spread and development there. However, if 
one looks at the existing literature concerning the concept of “power”, the Chinese translation 
mostly adopted is “quanli”, and this makes “ruan quanli” the obvious choice to translate “soft 
power”, also in accordance with the principle of adopting the translation which has been 
“established by popular usage” (yueding sucheng ΂ŭyǸ ) (Ibid.). Although this 
interpretation appears to be more precise and in line with the original meaning intended by 
Joseph S. Nye, who looked at soft power from the perspective of a country’s capacity to 
influence other countries in the field of international relations, Wang Chaoyi believes, contrary 
to Zhang Xiaoming, that “ruan shili” is a more suitable term than “ruan quanli” to translate 
“soft power” in the Chinese context; the authors argue that Chinese people tend to prefer the 
former wording as the latter does not correspond to the Chinese devotion to qualities such as 
those embodied by the “Doctrine of the Mean” (Zhongyong) and the values of “harmony” 
(hexie), “balance” (pinghengƩϦ), and “introversion” (neilianɂ), while the word “shili” is 
more neutral and unbiased (Ibid.).  
This is not the only example of scholars being inclined to the use of “ruan shili”: 
Professor Gong WenxiangӖɇƷ also opts for this interpretation but explains that the word 
“power” also includes the meanings of both “quanli” and “liliang”; this is why, at times, “soft 
power” can be translated as “ruan quanli” and “ruan liliang” and every type of translation can 
be chosen based on the context (Renmin Wang 2007).  
Before going on to further examine the preference for the term “ruan shili”, the use of 
which is nowadays widespread, it is indeed useful to elaborate on the meanings of the words 
“shili”, “quanli”, and “liliang”, which generally translate the word “power” but convey different 
nuances of meanings. It is interesting to note, first and foremost, that besides these three words 
there exist other options. Zhao Gang and Xiao Huan (2010, foreword, p. 1n1), for instance, also 
mention the correspondence of “power” to “quanshi” (power and influence) and “daguońġ”91. 
Secondly, in Section 4.4, the explanations provided by Western scholars were presented to 
discuss the dissimilar interpretations of the concepts in question: Barr (2011), for instance, 
believes that “ruan shili” can be translated as “soft strength” and represent the term that is 
closest to the Western definition of soft power, while “quanli” refers to the authority to do 
something and “liliang” to physical strength. Aukia (2014), on the contrary, believes that the 
term that is more in line with Joseph S. Nye’s original concept is “ruan quanli”, which 
translates into “soft authority”; “ruan shili” takes a more domestic perspective, corresponds to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 “Daguo” means “power” in the sense of “great power”. See: Hanying Da Cidian (di er ban) ʺϏń业ͩ;̃
- Chinese-English Dictionary (Second Edition). Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong Daxue chubanshe, 2002, s.v. dàguóń
ġ.  
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“soft power”, and fits well into the context of cultural construction, while “ruan liliang” and 
“ruan guoli” can be translated as “soft strength” and “national soft power” respectively. 
Moreover, Zappone (2014, pp. 419-421) takes a very interesting approach and analyzes the 
etymology and historical evolution of the translation equivalents “quanli”, “shili”, “liliang”92. 
The author takes her lead from the character “li À”, which is present in all the three words and 
originally means “physical strength” or “physical effort”, according to the Chinese dictionary 
Shuowen Jiezi Жɇϵŝ, and explains that the other elements to examine are the characters 
“quan ɸ”, “shi ů”, and “liang 之”: “quan” was originally used with the meaning of 
“weighing”, referring to the officials’ authority to evaluate a situation and deliberate, and today 
the concept of authority is precisely based on this idea of power, that is the ability to judge a 
situation in a balanced way; “shili” relates to an objective status of abundance and “wealth and 
power”; and “liliang”, etymologically more obscure, derives from the character “zhong 义”, 
which means “heavy”, and refers to the act of measuring. The author concludes that “liliang” 
can be considered to be a hypernym of “quanli” and “shili”, with the former taking on a more 
subjective perspective, indicating the will and ability to deliberate, and the latter referring to the 
objective realization of power (Ibid., p. 421). This view is confirmed by Gu Junwei (2011, p. 65) 
who, defining “liliang” a “shangyici /Ѝ” (hypernym, superordinate) of “shili” and “quanli”, 
without a subjective stance, states that “shili” refers to the actual nature and an objective 
description of power, while “quanli” projects the “agent’s will and controlling force” (zhuti de 
yizhi he kongzhi li *i̪ǱǛĎȦ¼À).   
The considerations made thus far show the reason why it can be assumed that the 
distinction between “national soft strength” (guojia ruan shili) and “international soft power” 
(guoji ruan quanli) proposed by Guo Jiemin (2012) and discussed above is very much intrinsic 
to the characters used, but loses its saliency when translated into English as “national soft power” 
and “international soft power”. A more appropriate translation for the title of Guo Jiemin’s 
article could then be “From national ‘soft strength’ to international ‘soft power’”. It is evident 
that Guo Jiemin does not support the general belief according to which the existence of different 
translations for the English term “soft power” in Chinese is simply caused by the “richness” 
(fengfuxing 'źǦ) of this language, depending only on the translator’s or user’s preference, 
and thus representing non-substantial differences (Guo Jiemin 2012, pp. 16-17). The distinction 
the author makes between the two kinds of soft power, besides being determined by the 
adjectives “guojia” (national) and “guoji ġ书” (international), is based on the very own 
connotations of “shili” and “quanli” in the first place. As a matter of fact, apart from “ruan 
liliang”, which the author believes has a neutral connotation, covering a larger extension and 
being able to substitute the other translations, “shili” and “quanli” both have specific meanings 
on which it is worth elaborating: according to the explanations provided by the Chinese-English 
dictionary published by the Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press in 2010, “quanshi”, 
also mentioned above, can be translated as “power and influence”, “quanli” as “power; 
authority”, and “shili” as “actual strength; strength”; this shows that “quanli” and “quanshi” can 
be thought of as the same idea, embracing power, the power possessor, the power vector, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 The author notices that there is consensus regarding the Chinese equivalent of the adjective “soft”, usually 
translated as “ruan” (Zappone 2014, p. 418). This is confirmed also by Chinese authors such as Qu Xiaoying (2010, p. 
103) and Gu Junwei (2014, p. 66). In particular, Gu Junwei praises the effect achieved with the translation “ruan”, 
which follows the nature of “foreignization” (yihua ǀÌ) (Ibid.).  
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target of power, and other constituents that form a “dynamic chain of relations having 
something to do with power” (youguan quanli de yi ge dongtai guanxi lian ɭɸÀ̪%Å
ǡ͹҂), while “shili”, on the other hand, refers only to the qualities and characteristics of an 
object itself and represents a rather “static concept” (jingtai de gainian Ҭǡ̪ʝǟ) (Guo 
Jiemin 2012, p. 17). Thus, being built on the basis of “shili” and “quanli”, “ruan shili” and 
“ruan quanli” cannot certainly be equivalent (Ibid.). From the point of view of the meaning of 
characters, between “shili” and “quanli” there exist discrepancies related to “semantics and 
instinctive understanding of the language” (yuyi he yugan Г/ĎГǲ), and the dissimilarities 
between these two expressions, characterized by both overlapping and non-overlapping aspects 
and applying to distinct circumstances, are gradually emerging in the concrete Chinese practice 
(Guo Jiemin 2009, p. 13).  
A number of Chinese scholars have attempted to shed light on the aforementioned 
discrepancies, achieving interesting results. For instance, according to Qu Xiaoying (2010, p. 
102), in China, the study of soft power has been characterized by the development, among 
scholars, of a controversy regarding the correct transposition of this concept in the Chinese 
language, which may impede its scientificity if not resolved. In line with this discussion, the 
author believes that the key to the problem primarily rests with the translation of the word 
“power” because in English dictionaries the definition given comprises the meanings of 
“quanli”, “liliang”, and “shili” in the Chinese language: based on its connotation as “quanwei 
ɸŘ” (authority), it can be translated as “quanli” while according to its interpretation as 
“yingxiang Ǎđ” (influence) it can be translated as “liliang” and “shili”, but the fundamental 
meaning of “power” remains “kongzhi li Ȧ¼À” (controlling force), that is “kongzhi ren huo 
shi de yi zhong nengli Ȧ¼IǺ:̪͖ηÀ” (the ability to control people or things) (Ibid., p. 
103). On the other hand, the author continues, in contemporary Chinese dictionaries the 
differences in meaning among these three distinct terms, “liliang”, “shili”, and “quanli”, are 
clear and easy to see, even though in certain circumstances they all have the meaning that 
“power” acquires in the English language: “liliang” includes the meanings of “liqi Àʵ” 
(strength), “nengliηÀ” (ability, power), and “xiaoli ȽÀ” (efficacy); “shili” refers more to 
“actual strength or power”; and “quanli” emphasizes power and authority in a political 
perspective, or the “scope of one’s official power” (Ibid., pp. 103-104). From the explanations 
provided by English dictionaries one can see that “liliang” and “shili” are interchangeable, as 
they both belong to the category of “yingxiangli” (influence), and appear to be closer in 
meaning than “quanli”, which, conversely, emphasizes “authority”; in Chinese dictionaries, in 
addition, “liliang” and “shili” both indicate the resources something has or its intrinsic attributes, 
being different only insofar as the former emphasizes natural properties, while the latter 
emphasizes meanings of a social nature (Ibid.). The political objective and controlling nature of 
“quanli” are evidently higher, thus making it inappropriate to substitute this term with the other 
two (Ibid.). Although suggesting that it is best to avoid choosing among “liliang”, “shili”, and 
“quanli” based solely on one’s wishes, and that the most appropriate term can be selected 
according to the object being researched, the author, on the basis of the elements constituting 
the theory of soft power as presented by Joseph S. Nye, believes that “ruan quanli” reflects the 
original meaning of the concept in the most complete way, thus representing the best choice 
when translating the works by the Harvard Professor (Ibid., pp. 106-107).  
The saliency of this debate in the Chinese context is indeed evidenced by the co-existence 
of various translations even in regards to Joseph S. Nye’s books and papers. The controversy 
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over the translation of the term “soft power” is a particular problem Chinese scholars have 
encountered, and it has not been resolved even when a standard translation has been proposed: 
even though for the Chinese edition of Nye’s Soft Power: the Means to Success in World 
Politics, published in 2005 with the title Ruan Liliang: Shijie Zhengtan Chenggong zhi Dao且
À之: ̢ȻĭǸÂ0丹, it was agreed to use the term “ruan liliang”, supported by the 
American scholar himself, a collection of Nye’s papers issued in the same year with the 
title“Ying quanli yu ruan quanli ͈ɸÀ且ɸÀ” (Hard and soft power), translated by the 
well-known Chinese scholar Men Honghua, did not use “ruan liliang” but opted for “ruan 
quanli”93 (Qu Xiaoying 2010, pp. 102-103). In regard to the former, Liu Qing and Wang Litao 
(2007, p. 38) point out that, in order to find an appropriate translation for the term “soft power” 
and put an end to the confusion surrounding this topic, the translators of Nye’s work 
communicated several times with the author, who considered the term “ruan liliang” a rather 
precise way to express his thought. Nevertheless, more recently, in 2009, the Chinese version of 
an article written by Joseph Nye and Wang Jisi not only made use of yet another term, “ruan 
shili”, but also deliberately evaded the question as to which translation is most suitable (Qu 
Xiaoying 2010, p. 103). Nye and Wang’s statements regarding this issue drawn from the 
English version of this article are reported in Section 4.4, but it is interesting to briefly consider 
here that the Chinese version of the same piece clearly states that Chinese scholars continue to 
“stick to their own opinions” (ge chi jijianúȚƞϯ) when it comes to deciding how to 
translate “soft power”,!thus conveying subtle nuances of meaning according to the translation 
they choose (Nye and Wang 2009b). This is confirmed also by Liu Qing and Wang Litao (2007, 
p. 38) who describe the terminological choices made by several influential authors in the 
literature related to global politics and international relations when dealing with the topic of soft 
power; Yan Xuetong, for instance, has opted for the use of the term “ruan shili”, while other 
academics, such as Zhang Xiaoming and Liu Debin, prefer “ruan quanli”, and others again 
“ruan liliang” (for example, Pang Zhongying). According to the two authors, this phenomenon 
embodies the richness of the debate revolving around the soft power theory in China, but, at the 
same time, it is somehow inconvenient for its thorough understanding and popularization (Ibid.). 
In recent years, as noticed by Gu Junwei (2011, p. 66), another translation equivalent for 
“soft power” has appeared: “ruanli 且À”. The controversy, however, remains unresolved, as 
when this translation is employed scholars do not even seem to understand clearly what 
scientific field is being explored (Ibid.). For all these reasons, a proper discussion on the 
Chinese interpretation of the soft power theory needs to include a thorough look at the 
terminology used in intellectual and official jargon when talking about soft power in the 
Chinese context. Throughout the present discussion, the expression “wenhua ruan shili” has 
been pinpointed as the formulation that best represents all the most important characteristics of 
the Chinese discourse on soft power. This section has narrowed down the analysis to the level of 
terminology, focusing on the meaning of the words “shili”, “quanli”, and “liliang”, and the 
following pages will go even deeper into this research layer. In fact, as stated by Aukia (2014, p. 
79 and p. 80), “[a]n understanding of the multifaceted nature of the Chinese soft power rhetoric 
requires a brief look into the landscape of local terminology” because, as has been demonstrated, 
“it is indeed difficult to find any consensus in the rhetoric; it is scattered and multiple variations 
exist”.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 These translations were presented and discussed in Section 5.3. 
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One aspect that has been strongly highlighted throughout the present work is that starting 
from the 1990s, when the theory of soft power was first introduced into the Chinese context, the 
concept coined by Joseph S. Nye’s has rapidly gained popularity within Chinese intellectual and 
policy circles, developing an interpretation, elaborated by the Chinese academia and adopted by 
the Chinese leadership, that has gradually expanded beyond the original conceptualization to 
acquire peculiarities specific to the Chinese context. To answer the question as to whether or not 
the Chinese discourse on soft power in China can be summarized with the expression “soft 
power with Chinese characteristics”, it is thus useful to investigate how the conceptual 
differences that set Chinese soft power apart from Western soft power are embodied in the 
peculiar Chinese terminology utilized, ultimately representing different ideological orientations. 
What was affirmed in 2007 by Chinese scholar Liu Jie ³ɾ is emblematic: even though the 
translation “ruan quanli” seems to reflect relatively well the original meaning that Nye had in 
mind when analyzing the trends of American hegemony through the concept of soft power, 
continuing to use this term and rely on Nye’s definition, even after Chinese academia has 
attached importance to this theory and popularized it in China, can give rise to serious 
ambiguities and misunderstandings due to the “outward-looking, coercive, and relative nature” 
(waixiangxingyazhixing he xiangduixing Ł’Ǧ	!á¼ǦĎ̴żǦ)! that is peculiar to the 
American interpretation of soft power (cited in Liu Qing and Wang Litao 2007, p. 38). Similarly, 
Gu Junwei (2011, p. 66), who examines the issue from the point of view of Chinese 
deconstructivism (jiegouzhuyi ϵʀ*/), insofar as it tends to consider the translator as a 
creator, and makes reference to the binary relationship between “foreignization” (yihua) and 
“domestication” (guihua ǇÌ) in approaching the translation process, points out that behind the 
choice the translator makes among the terms “shili”, “quanli”, and “liliang” lie divergent 
translation principles: while the supporters of “quanli” choose the principle of foreignization, 
respecting the “intentional nature” (youyixing ɭǱǦ) and “controlling force” (kongzhi li)!
intrinsic to the concept of power and remaining faithful to the source language, those who 
choose “liliang” and “shili” adopt the tactics of domestication and want to eliminate the 
subjective character of soft power, namely its intentionality and controlling force. Preferring a 
more neutral approach seems to have been the reason why the translator of the previously 
mentioned book by Joseph S. Nye, Ruan Liliang: Shijie Luntan Chenggong zhi Dao, opted for 
“watering down” (danhua ˜Ì) the nature and meaning of the term “quanli”, using “liliang” in 
its place, regardless of the fact that this would somehow impede the accurate communication of 
Nye’s point of view (Wang Chaoyi 2009). On balance, behind the linguistic choices made by 
Chinese translators and scholars, it is possible to detect three motivations: making clear that in 
promoting its soft power China does not have, unlike the United States, any hegemonic 
ambitions; making clear that the aim of Chinese scholars researching soft power, unlike scholars 
in the United States, is not that of aiding China to proclaim itself as the world’s hegemon; and 
carrying out “academic innovation” (xueshu chuangxin ţɶ¶ɍ) in the name of “local 
adaptation” (Gu Junwei 2011, p. 66). In this sense, Zappone (2014, p. 416) argues that the 
terminological distinctions proposed by Chinese scholars debating soft power serve the purpose 
of creating ideological distinctions, in particular between the American and the Chinese context, 
in order to prevent the risk of stirring up antagonism between the two countries in the field of 
soft power. This is specifically true for those who choose to employ the terms “ruan shili” and 
“ruan liliang”, which stress that, for China, behind the enhancement of soft power there are no 
hegemonic ambitions (Ibid., p. 421).  
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All in all, the panorama that provides the tools to discuss soft power in China appears to 
be complex and variegated from both a terminological and conceptual, or ideological, point of 
view. Chinese scholars do not only disagree on which term, among the ones proposed, is the 
most suitable to convey the meaning of the expression “soft power” in the Chinese context, but 
also argue as to the relevance of determining whether or not the Chinese equivalents for “power” 
are synonyms or represent different concepts; among the ones who believe in making a 
distinction, the overall opinion is that “quanli” is closer to the concept of power Joseph S. Nye 
referred to when coining his soft power theory, thus making “ruan quanli” the most appropriate 
term to discuss soft power in relation to the American context. Conversely, in the Chinese 
context, the re-elaborated and expanded theoretical framework makes it more suitable to use the 
more neutral term “ruan shili” to discuss China’s soft power, thus toning down the subjective 
nature of the concept of power and providing an objective description of the country’s strength. 
An approach of this kind would set the Chinese discourse on soft power apart from its original 
conceptualization so much so as to constitute an independent concept that, although developing 
on the basis of Joseph S. Nye’s soft power, has acquired prominent Chinese characteristics.  
A possible solution to the controversy described is precisely that proposed by Guo Jiemin 
(2009, 2012), who, as has been previously pointed out, believes that China’s “ruan shili” differs 
from Joseph S. Nye’s soft power and is not equivalent to the concept of “ruan quanli” either. 
According to the author, as a Professor of Political Science, Nye formulated his soft power 
theory from the perspective of international politics, as part of the larger debate around “power” 
and in a period, the 1990s, when the United States feared a weakening of their hegemonic 
position in the world, a possibility rejected by Nye who believed that his country was simply 
undergoing a transformation in terms of power status, which could be explained through the 
lenses of soft power (Guo Jiemin 2009, p. 13). In this sense, in the period following the end of 
the Cold War, the theory of power, which had long been the core of Western international 
relations, acquired new content and it is no coincidence that Nye’s theory appeared right at that 
time, as part of the domain of international relations and global politics (Ibid.). Based on this 
interpretation, it would seem appropriate to translate “soft power”, as an important concept 
within international relations theories, into “ruan quanshi” or “ruan quanli” in Chinese, and this 
is why, when Nye’s conceptualization was first introduced into the Chinese context in the early 
1990s, many Chinese academics chose to use the latter term (Ibid.). This is due to the close-
fitting transposition “ruan quanli” provides for the original meaning intended by Nye in 
analyzing the decline of American hegemony and the phenomenon of power reconstruction, as 
is also shown by the paper, previously discussed, written in 1993 by Wang Huning with the title 
“Zuowei guojia shili de wenhua: ruan quanli” (Culture as national power: soft power) (Ibid.).  
Nonetheless, languages are always changing and, travelling in time and space, concepts 
acquire new meanings and connotations. This is what happened to Nye’s soft power concept 
once it entered and permeated the Chinese context. Guo Jiemin (2009, 2012) describes this 
process in terms of the capability of languages to develop and expand, with words being 
affected by all sorts of linguistic processes, being assigned new connotations and expanding, 
reducing, and shifting their meaning based on the different context, application, purpose, and 
focus. This is why, following the development of a deeper understanding of the topic of soft 
power, Chinese scholars began to pay more attention to China’s own soft power construction, as 
part of the country’s CNP, and think that “ruan guoli” and “ruan shili” would constitute more 
appropriate translations for the term “soft power” in this context (Guo Jiemin 2009, p. 14). 
Indeed, it is evident that the original domain of this expression has undergone a process of re-
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elaboration and expansion when applied to the Chinese reality. Guo Jiemin (2009, p. 14) 
describes this process as an expansion of the range of application of the concept of soft power 
which has occurred thanks to the acquisition of “national factors” (guoqing yinsu ġǮĜͺ), 
and which has led to the “Sinicization” (Zhongguohua &ġÌ) of its usage, making it necessary 
to distinguish between “ruan shili” and “ruan quanli”. In the Chinese context, the concept of 
soft power has met a certain degree of innovation, which Guo Jiemin (2012, p. 17) describes by 
means of the idiom “tui chen chu xin” (to push out the old and bring in the new). Thus, the heart 
of the matter here is to distinguish between the “original meaning” (benyi ɵ/) of the concept 
of soft power and its “extended meaning” (yinshenyi ǂ̟/), developed in the context of 
China’s “local adaptation” (bentuhua), because even though “ruan shili” and “ruan quanli” are 
interconnected, with the former being the foundation of the latter and both sharing the same 
origin, it is necessary to consider them as two nouns designating different meanings and 
objectives: in comparison to “ruan shili”, “ruan quanli” mainly designates a type of “relational 
power” (guanxixing quanli ͹ǦɸÀ) between countries, which is characterized by an 
outward-looking, coercive, and relative nature; it refers to both the “actor and receiver of 
influence” (yingxiangli de shidongzhe he shoudongzhe ǍđÀ̪ɐÅΨĎíÅΨ ) and 
concerns foreign affairs (shewai ˘Ł); and its effect is reflected onto its target (Ibid.). On the 
other hand, “ruan shili”, as a national strength, has an “introspective and inward-looking nature” 
(neixingxing	neixiangxing ̶Ǧ	’Ǧ); its range of application is much vaster; and its 
semantic extension can reach levels as specific as those of a region, a company, a department, 
and even an individual (Ibid.).   
It is precisely the expansion and extension that have characterized the use of soft power 
in China, as noted by Wang Chaoyi (2009), that have made it possible to develop the derivative 
terms built on the basis of “ruan shili” and previously discussed, which transcending the realm 
of international relations could not be represented by “ruan quanli”. Combining with the 
Chinese language and culture, soft power has already generated new meanings and categories 
for the understanding and study of which the use of “ruan quanli” is inappropriate (Ibid.).  
For all of these reasons, it can be argued that the extended meaning of the concept of soft 
power is represented in China by the concept of “ruan shili”, which, despite being commonly 
translated as “soft power”, encapsulates a whole new range of meanings and connotations in 
comparison to Joseph S. Nye’s theory. Transcending the field of international relations, the 
domain of “ruan shili” touches upon a wider range of aspects than is the case for “ruan quanli”, 
which is thus insufficient to represent all the new developments arisen from the phenomenon of 
re-elaboration and expansion experienced in China by Nye’s conceptualization. China’s soft 
power is not only part of a foreign strategy, but also of a domestic strategy, being applied to the 
realm of national cultural policies. In a terminological perspective, this is made clear by the use 
of the term “shili”, which refers to an objective, neutral strength that characterizes the possessor 
of this type of power. In this sense, it comes as no surprise that culture is chosen, in the official 
discourse on China’s soft power, as the main resource of soft power, representing the inborn 
strength of China’s civilization, being deeply-rooted in China’s society, and having continued 
almost uninterruptedly throughout history.  
When trying to distinguish between the two similar and interrelated concepts of “ruan 
quanli” and “ruan shili”, the role of culture as a strength that comes from the inside appears to 
be crucial, and that’s why in China it is possible to talk about “wenhua ruan shili” (cultural soft 
power). According to Guo Jiemin (2009, p. 14), distinguishing between the meaning of “ruan 
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shili” and “ruan quanli” implies knowing the “strategic goals of a country” (yi ge guojia de 
zhanlüe mubiao %ġŶ̪ǻ̤̲ʋ) and whether or not it is after hegemony (baquanҪɸ) 
or self-improvement (ziwo tisheng νǹȪÒ). In order to separate the subtle differences 
existing between the two concepts in different contexts, cultures, and purpose orientation, it is 
necessary to consider them as two words that do not completely coincide (Ibid.). In fact, upon 
inheriting Joseph S. Nye’s soft power theory, China has gradually enriched its discourse on soft 
power with Chinese characteristics, thus constructing an innovative, complex, and multilayered 
concept. As noted by Guo Jiemin (2009, 2012), when Nye proposed his theory he equipped it 
with “vivid ‘American characteristics’” (qianglie de “Meiguo tese” ǆ˺̪Τġ̇υ), in 
light of a search for external “soft” (ruanxing) hegemony and assigning soft power rather 
pronounced utilitarian and pragmatic characteristics. Conversely, borrowing Nye’s theory, 
China has fit it into the strategy of peaceful development, in an attempt to promote the country’s 
“national cohesion” (guojia ningjuli ġŶ©ήÀ) and “international affinity” (guoji qinheli ġ
书HĎÀ), under the guidance of the concept of harmony (Ibid.). What “ruan shili” places 
emphasis on is the promotion of one’s own strength and the construction of capabilities, with 
the aim of reducing misunderstanding and eliminating conflicts (Guo Jiemin 2012, p. 18). This 
is where the role of culture comes into play with great force, embracing both internal and 
external aspects. The construction of China’s soft power takes place from the angle of a cultural 
strategy: domestically, it promotes “objectives of a soft nature” (ruanxing zhibiao 且Ǧțʋ) in 
terms of CNP, for example by promoting the prosperous development of culture, increasing 
cultural cohesion, and improving the national image; externally, it focuses on the power of 
culture to inspire, in order to promote communication and understanding between different 
countries and peoples, through cultural dialogue and exchange, thereby amplifying China’s 
international discourse power (guoji huayu quan) (Guo Jiemin 2012, p. 18). Thus, in spite of the 
fact that “ruan shili” and “ruan quanli” are closely related, as enhancing the former can 
naturally lead to exercising more attractiveness and influence towards other countries, failing to 
distinguish between them would result in confusing China’s pursued goals and strategic policies 
with those of the United States, regardless of their pronounced differences (Ibid.). Moreover, 
being able to attract and influence other countries internationally, realizing the country’s 
national interests, and deliberately seeking international power are two very different things, 
and the enhancement of “ruan shili” does not imply the synchronous enhancement of “ruan 
quanli” (Ibid.). 
To sum up, the solution proposed by Guo Jiemin (2012, p. 18), which is supported also 
by the present author, is that of viewing “ruan shili” and “ruan quanli” as two concepts that are 
both connected and different, belonging to distinct categories: if one looks at soft power from 
the perspective of international politics, it seems quite appropriate to label it “ruan quanli”, as 
the theory of power (quanli) is a core concept in the field of Western international relations; yet, 
if the perspective is that of cultural strategy, then it seems more appropriate to use the 
formulation “ruan shili”, as strength (shili) is an attribute of the country, and culture is an 
important source of national cohesion and creativity which is becoming an increasingly 
significant factor in CNP. As a matter of fact, what has arisen from the reconceptualization 
presented in this section from a terminological point of view is precisely the basis upon which 
this potentially dual interpretation of the concept of soft power is built. In the Chinese context, 
the wording “ruan shili” has been chosen to translate “soft power” because of its intrinsic 
characteristics, which make it a more suitable label for the strategic objectives China aims to 
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attain through the construction and enhancement of the country’s soft power. This brief 
overview has confirmed that the scope of soft power in China is broadly comprehensive, 
covering both the domestic and international fields. In this sense, “ruan shili” appears to 
somehow incorporate “ruan quanli”, as a country that has a strong soft power domestically 
(ruan shili) may also be able to exercise attractiveness and influence more effectively on the 
global stage (ruan quanli). This is in line with the assumption, which the present work has 
attempted to demonstrate, that, in the Chinese context, there exists a binary interpretation of soft 
power, which is oriented both domestically and internationally. The domestic aspect is 
emphasized through the use of the formulation “ruan shili”, and more specifically “wenhua 
ruan shili”, while “ruan quanli” embodies the external aspect, with a more pronounced 
inclination towards international relations and global politics. As the former is officially 
employed in the Chinese leadership discourse, disseminated through the media, and thoroughly 
researched by Chinese scholars, it can be assumed that the domestic orientation of soft power in 
China is the most prominent and relevant feature of Chinese soft power, with culture as the core 
and leading to “ruan quanli” internationally; hence, “soft power with Chinese characteristics”.  
 
 
Closing remarks 
 
The ultimate aim of this chapter was to find an answer to the question as to whether or 
not it is possible to talk about “soft power with Chinese characteristics”. This task has been 
carried out by looking at the latest developments in the Chinese discourse on cultural soft power, 
focusing on the period between 2012 and 2015, and taking into consideration terminological 
aspects related to the use of the formulations “ruan shili” and “wenhua ruan shili”.  
The first step of the research has facilitated the detection of a higher degree of innovation 
in the development of the Chinese discourse on cultural soft power in comparison to the years 
prior to 2012. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, even more emphasis has been 
placed on the reach of cultural soft power, with the call to build a “socialist cultural great power” 
and the indication that culture is being envisioned as a symbol of China’s renewed “wealth and 
power”. By comparing Hu Jintao’s 2007 and 2012 keynote speeches, and continuing to pay 
attention to the national plans and programs aimed at improving the Chinese cultural system, it 
has been highlighted how in turning cultural soft power from theory into practice, the State and 
the Party have shown increased awareness of and confidence in Chinese culture. This is 
continuing in the Xi Jinping era, as is shown by the Chinese leader’s speeches analyzed, which 
demonstrate that enhancing China’s cultural soft power is still today a major strategic task of the 
Party-State. Moreover, Xi Jinping’s discourse emphasizes the role of socialist core values as the 
focal point of soft power construction and calls for greater assertiveness of China’s international 
discourse power. Constituting the end of a journey that has described the evolution and re-
elaboration of the concept of soft power in China, the conclusions this chapter has reached show 
that it is indeed possible to talk about “soft power with Chinese characteristics”. The peculiar 
features detected include the key role of culture and the binary interpretation embracing both 
domestic and international objectives, but with marked attention to the construction of the 
country’s internal cultural strength.  
 Following the same assumption, the second part of this chapter has detected a link 
between the aforementioned characteristics and the terminology used to refer to soft power in 
the Chinese context, narrowing down the analysis to the level of the meanings of the most 
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common words chosen to translate the word power, namely “shili”, “quanli”, and “liliang”. 
With the terminological panorama remaining complex and variegated, sometimes even 
contradictory, a certain degree of consensus can be found regarding the choice of the 
formulation “ruan shili” as the most suitable Chinese translation equivalent for the English 
expression “soft power”. This kind of approach is indicative of the objectives that China intends 
to attain through soft power; they differ from those articulated in the American context and 
include cultural construction aimed at reaching a variety of domestic and international purposes 
that are not strictly related to the pursue of hegemony. This sets the Chinese discourse on soft 
power apart from Joseph S. Nye’s conceptualization. The latter is more accurately represented 
by the use of the wording “ruan quanli”, which nonetheless implies a concept that is 
specifically related to international relations, political authority, and subjective use of power, in 
a way that does not reflect the Chinese practice of self-improvement through cultural soft power. 
Finally, from an opposite perspective, the present analysis has made clear that when translating 
“ruan shili” or “wenhua ruan shili” into “soft power”, as is a rather common practice in 
Western literature, the translator must be aware of the conceptual and ideological orientations 
embedded in this terminology, namely the Chinese characteristics of soft power.  
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8. Case study: putonghua as a resource of cultural soft power at home and abroad 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a specific example of China’s cultural soft power at work; 
that is the language policy expressed through the management of the domestic and international 
promotion of putonghua, the official language of the PRC. Throughout the study, it has been 
shown how enhancing cultural soft power is an increasingly important task the Chinese 
leadership intends to carry out with the aim of achieving strategic goals both at home and 
abroad. Having detected what these strategic goals are and having highlighted the peculiar 
elements that emerge in the discourse, or discourses, on China’s soft power and cultural strength, 
after providing a background of China’s language situation, the following pages will show how 
the field of Chinese language standardization and promotion, both at home and abroad, offers a 
clear display of the predominant traits of Chinese cultural soft power.  
It is indeed relevant to recall that Hu Jintao drew attention to China’s language situation 
in relation to the effort to “complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all 
respects” (quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui ҮƾǸƂƻ͍`) in his keynote speech to 
the 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012, when language standardization and promotion at 
the national level were taken into consideration as part of the fundamental requirements for the 
development of a strong socialist culture – the fulfillment of which would lead to the betterment 
of the level of health and richness of the people’s intellectual and cultural lives (Xinhua She 
2012; Xinhua News Agency 2012d). The discussion here takes its lead from a critical analysis 
of the “Outline of the National Medium-to-long-term Plan for the Reform and Development of 
the Cause of Chinese Language and Characters” Guojia Zhong Changqi Yuyan Wenzi Shiye 
Gaige he Fazhan Guihua Gangyao) for the period 2012-2020 (hereafter, the “Outline”), 
specifically focusing on its preamble and presenting an overview of its guiding ideology, 
objectives, and tasks. As this document is contained in a report edited by the Department of 
Language and Script Information Management of the (PRC) Ministry of Education (Jiaoyubu 
Yuyan Wenzi Xinxi Guanlisi ɁβѲГ϶ɇŝ|Ǫ̖ͯù) and entitled Zhongguo Yuyan 
Shenghuo Zhuangkuang Baogao 2013 (Language Situation in China: 2013), obtained in the 
course of a research trip to the PRC undertaken by the present author in April 2014, the 
following pages will also present the topics identified by the PRC Ministry of Education 
(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu &ÔIʴĎġɁβѲ ) as focal points 
characterizing China’s language situation, or what has been called “language life” (yuyan 
shenghuo Г϶̛ː), as the title of said report indicates. Even though the “Outline” has been 
recognized as “having promoted the cause of the language and script to the height of a national 
strategy” (jiang yuyan wenzi shiye tisheng dao guojia zhanlüe de gaodu ƀГ϶ɇŝ: ȪÒ
»ġŶǻ̤̪亚Ƹ) (Jiaoyubu Yuyan Wenzi Xinxi Guanlisi 2013, p. 1), the potential and 
efficiency of such a majestic undertaking can only be evaluated on the basis of specific aspects 
which characterize the present-day Chinese society, in terms of development of language and 
culture and tapping into the fields of linguistics, sociolinguistics, and sociology of language, 
such as the debates on the importance of safeguarding Chinese dialects in relation to the spread 
of putonghua, or seemingly less important aspects such as the discussion about the choice of 
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Pinyin or English on traffic signs and train tickets, as well as the cultural relationship between 
China and the world in terms of the global spread of the Chinese language94.  
 
 
8.1 China’s “language life”: constructing a backdrop  
 
As explained in its introduction, the volume Zhongguo Yuyan Shenghuo Zhuangkuang 
Baogao 2013 is issued as part of the book series “Green Paper on Language Life in China” 
(Zhongguo Yuyan Shenghuo Lüpishu &ġГ϶̛ːΛ̭6) released by the State Language 
Commission (Guojia Yuyan Wenzi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui ġŶГ϶ɇŝƙmŖĉ`)95 with the 
purpose of putting into effect the “Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Language of the 
People’s Republic of China” (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongyong Yuyan Wenzi Fa 
&ÔIʴĎġġŶѣ̜Г϶ɇŝˇ) (hereafter, the “2001 Language Law”), advocating the 
principle of “language service” (yuyan fuwu Г϶ɮÄ), guiding the harmonious development 
of the society’s language life, and making a contribution to the construction of a harmonious 
society (Jiaoyubu Yuyan Wenzi Xinxi Guanlisi 2013, introduction, p. 1). The “Green Paper” 
collection is divided into two series, A and B: series A is constituted by norms of a “soft nature” 
(ruanxing) which are denominated “cao’an ϒʗ” (draft) so as to indicate that they differ from 
the norms officially promulgated by the State and reflect the probationary process language and 
script regulations have to go through before reaching the status of “rigid” (yingxing ͈Ǧ) rules, 
due to the degree of difficulty and complexity in regulating a subject whose primary aim is to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 To better understand the following discussion, some clarifications are in order. First and foremost, it is necessary to 
clarify what is generally meant with the term “hanyu ʺГ”, “Chinese”. DeFrancis (1984, pp. 38-39) clarifies that the 
term “Chinese” is used to refer to both a people, that is the segment of the Chinese population that is called “Han 
Chinese” (hanzu ʺɑ), after the name of the Han dynasty, and their language in both its written and spoken forms. 
The Chinese spoken by the Han Chinese, however, is far from being a uniform reality, as it comprises a number of 
mutually unintelligible forms of speech; the biggest portion of the Chinese-speaking population of China speaks what 
is called putonghua (“common speech”) in Chinese and Mandarin in English (Ibid.). Moreover, a temporal factor has 
to be taken into account as both spoken and written Chinese have undergone significant changes over time (Ibid.). 
DeFrancis further explains that the official Chinese denomination for the major forms of speech is fangyan Ɏ϶ 
(dialect) and that the usual classification divides Chinese dialects into eight groups, with minor differences within 
each group and major differences among groups, so much so as to generate mutual unintelligibility (Ibid., pp. 54-58). 
Numerically speaking, the most important group is that of the Northern dialects, a term that is more or less equivalent 
to putonghua, or Mandarin (Ibid., p. 58). In the related literature, there exist different classifications of Chinese 
dialects, as will be further discussed.!!
95 According to Rohsenow (2004, p. 30), the denomination “State Language Commission” is the one preferred in 
China to translate the Chinese name “Guojia Yuyan Wenzi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui” even though a more accurate 
translation would be “National Committee for Language and Script Work”. The State Language Commission has a 
long history that dates back to the foundation of the PRC in 1949 when this independent central government 
organization, was established under the name “Chinese Script Reform Association” (Zhongguo Wenzi Gaige Xiehui 
&ġɇŝȸүÕ`), reporting directly to the State Council (Guowuyuan ġÄҙ) (Ibid., p. 23 and p. 30). It was later 
succeeded by the Chinese Committee on Script Reform (Zhongguo Wenzi Gaige Weiyuanhui &ġɇŝȸүŖĉ`), 
which is often referred to as the Committee on Language Reform in order to indicate that its scope goes beyond the 
reform of Chinese characters (Ibid., p. 38n1). In 1985, the Committee was reorganized, taking the denomination 
“Guojia Yuyan Wenzi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui” and remaining under the direct control of the State Council (Ibid., p. 30). 
From these brief observations, it emerges that language reform in China has prolonged over time and that its scope 
has included written Chinese characters but also other aspects of language use. The website China.org.cn (2013) 
reports that the State Language Commission was merged into the Ministry of Education in 1998, maintaining its 
name. 
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fulfill the many demands arising in the society’s language life; series B describes the state of 
affairs of China’s language life and contains analyses, surveys, and data regarding the Chinese 
language, as understanding China’s internal and external language situation and researching the 
issues that affect the country’s language life are conceived as tasks that have an extremely 
important significance for the formulation of a scientific language plan, the protection and 
development of language resources, and the guarantee of harmony and vitality for China’s 
linguistic panorama (Ibid.). The report Zhongguo Yuyan Shenghuo Zhuangkuang Baogao 2013 
is part of series B and, more specifically, is labeled with the serial number B013 which indicates 
that it constitutes the thirteenth document of the series, that is, in the edition analyzed by the 
present author, the eighth “baogaoȏĈ” (report) to be published after the series started with 
the 2005 Baogao. According to Li Yuming ɹŧə (2007), an important contributor to the work 
of the Ministry of Education and the State Language Commission, including editing the reports, 
the 2005 Baogao was the first report on the language situation in China to be issued in the 
government’s name, constituting one of the rare examples of such reports in the world. The 
release of the “Green Paper” series by the State Language Commission constitutes a “concrete 
act of language planning in modern China” (dangdai Zhongguo yuyan guihua de yi xiang juti 
jucuo ǈS&ġГ϶ϱ±̪ҵi+Ȩ), embodying new concepts of state language 
management and new developments in linguistic research in China; their aim is to serve as 
reference in the State’s decision-making process, offer services for language researchers, 
researchers and developers of language products, and other related people, and “guide the 
society’s language life towards harmony” (yinling shehui yuyan shenghuo zou xiang hexie ǂҺ
͍`Г϶̛ː七’ĎН) (Ibid.). The list of contents of the 2013 Baogao, both in Chinese and 
in English, is reported as an Appendix to this work.  
In order to comprehend the significance that language policy acquires in China, it is 
pertinent to provide a brief description of the background against which the “2001 Language 
Law” was formulated. This regulation, in fact, can be considered a milestone in the history of 
language reform in China. Although its proposal and drafting started in the mid-1990s, the law 
was passed in October 2000 at the 18th Meeting of the Ninth Session of the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress (Di Jiu Jie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu 
Weiyuanhui Di Shiba Ci Huiyi ͩ2ƍġIʴSϧń`ƦÄŖĉ`ͩÐʡ`Ђ) and was 
signed by then-President Jiang Zemin (Rohsenow 2004, pp. 35-36). Effective as of January 1st, 
2001, the law aims to regulate the use of the spoken and written Chinese language, as stated by 
Article 1:  
 
)ȧÅġŶѣ̜Г϶ɇŝ̪ϱϑÌ	ʋ§ÌèƻëƎoġŶѣ̜Г϶ɇŝĨ͍`̛ː&
ɨŒĩëȝm̜w严úʴɑ	úĩÏΏ˒ɇÌCˑʑȠŴˇ¼ŭɵˇ
 
(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu 2000) 
 
This Law is enacted in accordance with the Constitution for the purpose of promoting the 
normalization and standardization of the standard spoken and written Chinese language and its sound 
development, making it play a better role in public activities, and promoting economic and cultural 
exchange among all the Chinese ethnic groups and regions. 
(PRC Ministry of Education 2000) 
  
By regulating and standardizing language use, the “2001 Language Law” normalized the 
status of putonghua as the official language of the PRC and its relationship with Chinese 
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dialects96 and minority languages97. In regard to the first aspect, in fact, Article 2 states that, by 
standard spoken and written Chinese language, the law means putonghua and the standardized 
Chinese characters, while Article 3 states that the State is committed to the popularization of 
both. Moreover, the title of the law, which underwent changes in the course of the drafting 
process, makes it clear that the intent is to regulate China’s “national commonly used” (guojia 
tongyong ġŶѣ̜) language and script, that is putonghua and simplified characters, and not 
all of China’s languages and scripts, which are protected and regulated in accordance with the 
PRC Constitution (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa &ÔIʴĎġŴˇ) (Rohsenow 
2004, p. 36). In fact, Article 4 of the Constitution states that all nationalities in the PRC are 
equal and that the State protects the rights and interests of minority nationalities (shaoshu minzu 
ƃɅʴɑ)98 (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu &ÔIʴĎġ&
ňIʴȻƵ n.d.), while Article 8 of the “2001 Language Law” grants all ethnic groups the 
freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, the minority languages and 
scripts (shaoshu minzu yuyan wenzi ƃɅʴɑГ϶ɇŝ) (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Jiaoyubu 2000). More will be expounded upon about this and other aspects related to the case of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 DeFrancis (1984, pp. 41-42) notes that to have been chosen as the basis for putonghua and promoted as the 
national standard in China is the speech of educated speakers in Beijing. In a wider meaning, however, putonghua 
also embraces other local varieties, in contrast to the other “regionalects” and delineating a linguistic community that 
constitutes “the largest group of people in the world who speak the same language” (Ibid., p. 58). As for the 
classification of Chinese dialects, scholars propose a variety of divisions. Norman (1988, pp. 181-183), for instance, 
elaborates on the traditional classification, which comprises Beifanghua ÍɎБ (Mandarin), Wu Ć, Xiang ˧, Gan 
в, Kejia űŶ (Hakka), Yue ͵ (Cantonese), and Min Ҍ, and based on diagnostic features divides these seven 
varieties into three larger groups: the Northern group (Mandarin), the Southern group (Kejia, Yue, and Min), and the 
Central group (Wu, Gan, and Xiang). Ramsey (1987, p. 21) suggests that the Chinese language, similarly to China’s 
geography, is divided into North and South: the Northern varieties of the language are usually known in English as 
“Mandarin dialects” and constitute a uniform group of dialects that are, for the most part, mutually intelligible; while 
the Southern varieties are usually referred to as “non-Mandarin dialects” and constitute a varied group of dialects 
with sharp differences even within a relatively small area. Mandarin dialects, therefore, coincide with the North, 
while all the other six groups, Wu, Xiang, Gan, Kejia, Yue, and Min, coincide with the South (Ibid., p. 87).    
97 Generally speaking, linguists classify Chinese as belonging to the Sino-Tibetan language family, which is 
composed of Chinese (Sinitic) and Tibeto-Karen, with the latter group divided into Karen and Tibeto-Burman 
(Norman 1988, pp. 12-16). Analyzing the term “Chinese” as used for both the people, the “Han Chinese”, and their 
language, DeFrancis (1984, p. 39) specifies that the non-Han population consists of 55 ethnic minorities, while when 
the term “Chinese”, or more specifically “spoken Chinese”, is applied to the language, it refers to the Han Chinese, 
leaving out the ethnic minorities that speak non-Chinese languages. According to Ramsey (1987, p. 157), the PRC 
government recognizes 56 ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, and only one of these is traditionally known as 
“Chinese”, the Han group. The particular situation of China’s minorities is described by the author as follows: “In a 
world neatly divided into nations and states, these people are Chinese – and yet they are not Chinese. They live in 
China and are citizens of the People’s Republic, but they are not the heirs of Chinese civilization, literature, history, 
or tradition” (Ibid.). Ramsey elaborates on the fact that the Han group is recognized as the speaker of the national 
language and carrier of Chinese culture and history, but, nonetheless, the other 55 nationalities are also considered 
“Zhongguo ren &ġI” (Chinese, or “People of the Middle Country”); the word “Chinese” is thus not used as an 
ethnic term, but based on citizenship, with the ethnic majority being referred to as the Han and derivatives such as the 
“Han culture” and the “Han language” (hanyu) being used (Ibid., p. 158). For a visual representation of China’s 
linguistic context, see Figure 3 reproduced at the end of this section. !
98!The 2010 population census released by the National Bureau of Statistics of China reports a total population of 
1,370,536,875 for the entire Chinese territory (including Taiwan) of which 1,339,724,852 people constitute the 
population of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, and servicemen on the mainland of China; this 
amount is divided between 91.51% people of Han nationality and 8.49% belonging to various national minorities 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011).!
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China’s minority languages and that of Chinese dialects in the following pages, while the 
complete text of the “2001 Language Law”, both in Chinese and English, is provided as an 
Appendix to this work.  
In brief, the content of the “2001 Language Law”, as stated by Rohsenow (2004 p. 37), 
can be summarized into four points: 1) the standardization of the simplified characters and the 
Pinyin phonetic system is preserved; 2) the use of putonghua by government officials and in 
public interactions is strongly encouraged; 3) the use of dialects is permitted in necessary or 
appropriate situations; and 4) ethnic minorities are authorized to maintain their own spoken 
languages and scripts. It can thus be argued that, in the proposal and formulation of the “2001 
Language Law”, Chinese authorities took into consideration the limits of what can be called 
“social engineering” in terms of everyday language use, while emphasizing both the legal status 
of putonghua as China’s commonly used national language and simplified Chinese characters as 
the script and the authoritative role of China’s language reform bodies (Ibid.). The General 
Provisions of the “2001 Language Law”, moreover, state that the law is enacted in accordance 
with the PRC Constitution, as reported above; this is because it was indeed the addition of an 
article to the revised Constitution of 1982 that declared the intent to popularize putonghua 
countrywide, as reported by Chen Ping (1999, p. 26). Article 19 of the Constitution states: 
“Guojia tuiguang quanguo tongyong de putonghua  ġŶȧƮġѣ̜̪ɤѣБ” (The state 
promotes the nationwide use of Putonghua) (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongyang Renmin 
Zhengfu n.d.; People’s Daily Online n.d.).  
As for a precise definition of what has come to constitute China’s “common language and 
script” (tongyong yuyan wenzi ѣ̜Г϶ɇŝ), the process of language reform takes this 
discussion even further back in history than 1982. In 1955, two important conferences were 
organized by the PRC Ministry of Education and the Script Reform Committee: the National 
Conference on Script Reform (Quanguo Wenzi Gaige Huiyi ġɇŝȸү`Ђ) and the 
Symposium on the Standardization of Modern Chinese (Xiandai Hanyu Guifanhua Xueshu 
Huiyi ̒SʺГϱϑÌţɶ`Ђ), which focused on the definition of putonghua, the drafting 
of a phonetic scheme, and the simplification of Chinese traditional characters (Chen Ping 1999, 
pp. 23-24; Rohsenow 2004, p. 23). Consequently, putonghua was officially chosen as the 
designation of the national norm (DeFrancis 1984, p. 231) and attributed the title of standard 
form of modern Chinese, while its formal definition was given in 1956 (Chen Ping 1999, p. 24). 
Putonghua is based on the vocabulary and grammar of the Northern (Mandarin) dialects99, with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99!Reconstructing the process of language reform from the beginning of the 20th century, Ramsey (1987, pp. 3-7) 
stresses that the problem of standardization in China was affected by the extreme diversity of what was called the 
“Chinese language”: although the fact that Chinese speakers could not understand each other due to the different 
dialects spoken did not make the Chinese case unique, the number and complexity of Chinese dialects, the 
interconnections among which are more similar to those within a family of languages, certainly made the Chinese 
case different (Ibid.). In fact, from a linguistic point of view, Chinese dialects could actually be considered different 
languages, if it was not for a number of cultural factors, such as the common heritage and faith in the unifying power 
of Chinese writing, that make the Chinese people believe they speak dialects of a single language (Ibid., p. 7 and pp. 
16-18). The classification of Chinese dialects as variations of the same language or as different languages belonging 
to the same family is indeed a controversial subject: Norman (1988, p. 1), for instance, states that “the modern 
Chinese dialects are really more like a family of languages”, while DeFrancis (1984, p. 54) explains that linguists 
often prefer to use the term “dialect” only for mutually intelligible forms of speech, while they call “languages” those 
that lack this characteristic. The dilemma, however, lies in the fact that “[t]o call Chinese a single language composed 
of dialects with varying degrees of difference is to mislead by minimizing disparities that […] are as great as those 
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the Beijing dialect as its standard pronunciation and the grammar norms of baihua ̨Б (the 
vernacular literary language)100 as its standard written grammar (Rohsenow 2004, p. 24).  
In regard to the other aspects of language that the reformers involved in the two 
conferences mentioned above aimed to regulate, it is important to mention the elaboration of the 
phonetic scheme hanyu pinyin ʺГȗҳ (Pinyin) during the 1950s and its promulgation in 
1958: it is the official phonographic scheme of the Chinese language, employed to represent the 
standard pronunciation of Chinese characters; adopting the roman alphabet and a phonemic 
representation, it is used in a variety of areas, such as schools and textbooks and other 
publications; and it constitutes the standard form for the transcription of Chinese words 
accepted in 1982 by the International Standardization Organization (ISO) (Chen Ping 1999, pp. 
186-187). The peculiarities of the hanyu pinyin, which was promulgated with the official name 
“Hanyu Pinyin Fang’an ʺГȗҳɎʗ” (Phonetic Scheme of Chinese), are the fact that it is 
based exclusively on the pronunciation of the Beijing dialect and that its function is entirely 
auxiliary (Ibid., pp. 186-189). This is also shown by the role it has played in the promotion of 
putonghua, thanks to the practical and accurate way in which it indicates the pronunciation of 
modern standard Chinese, especially to speakers of Southern dialects (Ibid., p. 26)101.  
A more in-depth analysis of every step of the reform and development of the Chinese 
language and script over the course of history goes beyond the scope of this chapter as the 
extension and complexity of the process which has led to China’s present-day language 
situation could not be described in just a few pages. It will suffice to mention here that the there 
is yet another aspect that, as the phonetization of Chinese mentioned above, requires a step back 
into the history of the PRC. It is the simplification of the traditional writing system, which, 
according to Chen Ping (1999, p. 148), included two aspects: the reduction of the number of 
strokes per character and the reduction of the number of characters in use. The author argues 
that, starting from the second half of the 19th century, the simplification of the writing system 
became an essential part of the overall process of modernization of the Chinese language, made 
increasingly urgent by the fact that the use of traditional characters lost its prestige with the 
abolition of the system of imperial examination (keju ͗+) in 1905, and the overthrow of the 
Qing dynasty in 1911, and started to be considered as an obstacle for the spread of a good level 
of literacy (Ibid., pp.150-151). At the turn of the 20th century, emphasis was placed on the 
phonetization of the script in the hope that it could one day be replaced by a phonographic 
writing system, but after a few decades the attention was redirected towards the simplification 
of traditional characters, with a first glossary of simplified Chinese characters appearing in 1935, 
followed by the short-lived “First List of Simplified Characters”, which was repealed soon after 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
between English and Dutch. To call Chinese a family of languages is to suggest extralinguistic differences that in fact 
do not exist and to overlook the unique linguistic situation that exists in China” (Ibid., p. 56).   
100 According to Norman (1988, p. 136), baihua can be defined as the “vernacular literary language” as opposed to 
the “classical literary language” (wenyan ɇ϶); following the May Fourth Movement, the former replaced the latter 
as the ordinary form of written Chinese. Chen Ping (1999, pp. 67-82) describes in great detail the replacement of 
wenyan by baihua as the standard form of written Chinese, much closer to the contemporary vernacular than the 
classical literary language, which was almost completely different from the speech of its users.  
101 The design and promulgation by the Chinese government of the hanyu pinyin system, however, did not happen out 
of the blue, but can be thought of as an achievement reached after attempts carried out before the founding of the 
PRC in 1949, which include: guanghua zimu (1900), zhuyin zimu or zhuyin fuhao ˊҳͨø (1918) (for what 
concerns the diacritical marks indicating the four tones over the vowels), guoyu luomazi ġГΠ五ŝ (1928), and the 
latinxua sin wenz (1931) (Chen Ping 1999, pp. 178-186; Rohsenow 2004, p. 23).!
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(Ibid., pp. 151-153). 1956 saw the approval of the first “Scheme for Chinese Characters 
Simplification”, according to which a complete list of simplified characters was published in 
1964, with the title “General List of Simplified Characters” (Jianhuazi ZongbiaoͮÌŝǧϧ), 
and republished in 1986 with minor changes, constituting the official standard today (Chen Ping 
1999, p. 154; Rohsenow 2004, pp. 23-24)102. A second scheme was promulgated in 1977 but 
strongly criticized and subsequently officially withdrawn in 1986, during the Second National 
Conference on Language and Script (Chen Ping 1999, pp. 155-156; Rohsenow 2004, pp. 27-29). 
On this occasion, it was decided to take a more cautious approach towards character 
simplification and a new agenda of language reform and development to be fulfilled by the end 
of the 20th century was proposed, including the following goals: 1) putonghua to become the 
language of instruction in all schools nationwide; 2) putonghua to become the working 
language of government at all levels; 3) putonghua to be the language used in radio and 
television broadcasting, and in cinemas and theatres; and 4) putonghua to become the common 
language used among speakers of various local dialects (Chen Ping 1999, pp. 26-27; Rohsenow 
2004, pp. 29-31). According to Chen Ping (1999, p. 27), these objectives were not very different 
from those set in the 1950s, a fact which shows that, despite having achieved great results, 
China still had a long way to go to reach the completion of the modernization of the Chinese 
language. 
 The vicissitudes described thus far have served the purpose of delineating the 
background against which the reform of Chinese language and script gradually progressed over 
time, to then result in the formulation of the “2001 Language Law”. Only a few episodes were 
selected as representative moments on the path of China’s language policy, focusing on the 20th 
century and especially on the period after 1949. Simply put, in order to thoroughly comprehend 
the meaning that language planning had, and still has, for China, many other historical events 
and linguistic aspects should be taken into consideration. As stated by Norman (1988, p. IX), 
the Chinese language, which in all of its many dialectal forms has the highest number of 
speakers in the modern world, is one of the very few examples of contemporary languages 
whose history can be uninterruptedly traced back as far as the second millennium BC. The term 
“hanyu”, commonly used to refer to the Chinese language, literally means “the language of the 
Hans”, that is the ethnic Chinese, but, to be specific, it may also refer to any variety of spoken 
or written Chinese across time and space (Ibid., p. 137). However, despite its rather loose 
definition, the Chinese language, has been for China one of the symbols that has represented 
cultural, and also political, unity most powerfully, thanks in particular to a script, the Chinese 
characters, that is detached from the way it is pronounced in such a way that allows for the 
Chinese to consider their language as being uniform in space and constant in time (Ibid., pp. 1-
2). This is the manifestation of a historical, cultural, and ethnic identity that neither the 
coexistence of different diatopic variations nor the diachronic evolutions leading to the shaping 
of putonghua and the modern writing system were able to shake. Despite being able to 
distinguish standard Chinese from non-standard dialects, putonghua, however, with the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 According to Ramsey (1987, p. 146), the terms “simplified characters” (jiantizi ͮiŝ) and “complex characters” 
(fantizi Ϳiŝ) are neologisms coined close to the end of the 19th century. As will be further discussed, traditional 
Chinese characters continue to be used in Hong Kong (Xianggang Ӄ˥), Macau (Aomen ˲҇), Taiwan (õ˨), and 
overseas Chinese communities (Churchman 2011). !
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meaning of “common language”, does not convey the same strong reference to an ethnic and 
cultural bound (Norman 1988, p. 137).  
It is also important to recall that the Chinese script, defined as logographic and with the 
Chinese character as its basis, has a history of thousands of years, reported to have started with 
the Xia ŀ (c. XXII-XVII BC) and the ShangĖ (c. XVII-XI BC) dynasties and continued 
through many evolutionary phases (Norman 1988, p. 4; Lam 2005, p. 34). Analyzing merits and 
faults of the Chinese writing system, Chen Ping (1999, pp. 139-146) states that one of the 
advantages of the Chinese script, besides the ability to differentiate homophonous morphemes, 
is the capacity to “span times and dialects” through the use of characters, which, assuming 
different phonetic values at different times and places, can be used to represent varieties of 
language spoken in different periods and geographic areas. This is why it is easier for Chinese 
people to read ancient texts and communicate in writing even when they speak mutually 
unintelligible dialects (Ibid.). Among the “faults” of Chinese characters, the author identifies the 
difficulty of learning how to read and write them, the difficulty to use them in terms of indexing 
and retrieving, and the fact that their “logographicity” can be considered to be a contributing 
factor to the dialectal assortment of the Chinese language, insomuch as the component of the 
writing system can assume different phonetic values in different dialects and fails to encourage 
the development of a common spoken standard (Ibid.). 
The profound faith in the unifying ability of Chinese characters, however, has not 
precluded the reform of the Chinese writing system as part of the wider project of language 
modernization and standardization. In fact, actions for the unification of the Chinese language 
were taken starting from very ancient times and targeting the script in the first place. 
Highlighting the historical relation between language and state control, Zhou and Ross (2004, p. 
2), for instance, identify the beginning of language planning in China with the standardization 
of the script, in the form of the “small seal style” (xiaozhuangƂͰ), carried out by Emperor 
Qin Shi Huang ͘ŕ̫ in 221 BC, in an attempt to consolidate his power over the newly-
unified China. From that point onwards, a literate person could read and write a standardized 
form of written Chinese, regardless of the dialect spoken (Ibid.). With the Han dynasty, Chinese 
became an important “identity marker” for the Han Chinese and a direct link between language 
and nation was established; this link also lasted in the following centuries and was reinforced by 
China’s encounter with Western powers in the 19th century when, amid the various attempts to 
modernize, two linguistic ideas caught the attention of many Chinese intellectuals: the notion of 
“one state with one nation and one language” and the need to Romanize the Chinese writing 
system (Ibid., p. 3). In fact, the Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860) represented a real 
“turning point in the modern history of China” and the defeat suffered by the Chinese Empire 
made it clear that it was no longer as glorious as in the past; starting from the mid-19th century, 
the efforts made by both the government and the general public to modernize the country also 
included reforming the language, as the uniformity of the spoken language, in a linguistic 
panorama which was made up of mutually unintelligible dialects, started to be perceived as a 
precondition for the country’s unity, together with the reform of the writing system (Chen Ping 
1999, pp. 13-14). Rohsenow (2004, p. 22) highlights another aspect that is strictly related to the 
Chinese language reform and the intent to modernize the country, expressed first in the last 
years of the Qing dynasty and in the entire course of the 20th century, that is the necessity to rid 
the Chinese population of a high level of illiteracy. In this view, developing a modern standard 
spoken language and a common written style more closely resembling the spoken language 
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became the necessary preconditions for the modernization of the country, with the 
simplification of the archaic logographic system and the development of a phonetic notation 
system being key to that endeavor  (Ibid.).  
To conclude this brief overview of the historical roots of today’s language life in China, a 
few considerations can be made in regard to the actual meaning of the concept of language 
reform in the Chinese context. Chinese linguist Zhou Youguang ċɭ (2003, p. 2) defines the 
modernization of Chinese language as “[…] a case of modern social change inducing a change 
in language and script” (jindai de shehui yanbian yinqi le yuwen yanbian  ђS̪͍`ˮîǂ
е7Гɇˮî) and sums up the objectives of language reform into four points: 1) commonality 
of the Chinese spoken language (yuyan de gongtonghuaГ϶̪—Ì); 2) writing in a style 
close to the Chinese spoken language (wenti de kouyuhuaɇi̪ïГÌ); 3) simplification of 
Chinese characters (wenzi de jianbianhua ɇŝ̪ͮvÌ); and 4) the Romanization of the 
Chinese phonetic system (zhuyin de zimuhua ˊҳ̪ŝʰÌ). This would explain why to 
normally translate the Chinese term “wenzi gaige ɇŝȸү” is the English expression 
“language reform” which encompasses a broader meaning than the actual, literal translation 
“writing reform” or “script reform”, as  DeFrancis (1984, p. 223) points out. This is because in 
practice “wenzi gaige” covers an ampler range of meanings, depending on the user: at times it is 
used to indicate the sole reform of the “symbols” used in writing, other times it refers to the 
reform of the style of writing, and other times again it means the reform of spoken language; 
and because the word “reform” indicates a voluntary change, it can also be used to indicate the 
phenomenon of language planning or language policy, without excluding more or less natural 
developments in speech and writing (Ibid.). But the reform of the writing system is the most 
complex and perhaps most relevant of all these aspects (Ibid.). And, as will be described in the 
following pages, perhaps one of the most controversial in some of its implications.  
This journey into the history of China’s language planning also explains why, in one of 
the most authoritative volumes in the field of history and sociolinguistics of the Chinese 
language, Chen Ping (1999), the birth of modern Chinese is examined focusing on the periods 
starting from the late 19th century and then in 1949 respectively, but also including descriptions 
of earlier evolutions, going back to the age of Confucius and pre-modern times, providing a 
thorough analysis of the evolution of old written Chinese into modern written Chinese, and 
describing the extended history of the Chinese script and the many vicissitudes experienced by 
the Chinese writing system. This in-depth study is carried out focusing on the three main 
aspects of the Chinese language, which have become the three main targets of the language 
reform in China, namely “Modern Spoken Chinese”, including the development of putonghua, 
“Modern Written Chinese”, including the replacement of wenyan with baihua, and “Modern 
Chinese Writing System”, including the process of simplification of traditional Chinese 
characters and the design of a phonetization system (Ibid.). Chen Ping concludes his seminal 
work by stating that starting from the late 19th century and coinciding with many historical 
events, such as the defeat of China by Western powers, the overthrow of the Empire in 1911, 
the New Culture Movement in the late 1910s, and the founding of the PRC in 1949, all the 
efforts made by the PRC authorities to reform the Chinese language were triggered by the 
necessity to shape a language that would be more suitable for a modernizing China: the variety 
and diversity of spoken dialects, the gap between the style of writing and contemporary 
vernacular, and the logographic writing system were perceived as serious obstacles on the path 
towards modernization, correlating the linguistic necessity to reform the three fundamental 
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aspects of language, that is the spoken language forms, the written language styles, and the 
script, with historical, economic, and social factors (Ibid., pp. 202-203). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Chinese in its linguistic context (DeFrancis 1984, p. 67). 
 
 
 
8.2 Language policy and cultural soft power 
 
Historical, economic, and social factors affect China’s language policy still today. It must 
be kept in mind, in fact, that China is a multilingual and multidialectal country; the majority 
language group is the Han Chinese and, after 1949, promoting literacy among the members of 
this group became the main target, to be reached through the simplification and standardization 
of the script and the popularization of a standard dialect, putonghua, overcoming spoken 
dialectal variations with the help of the hanyu pinyin system (Lam 2005, p. 8 and p. 33). While 
these measures started to be implemented by the State in the mid-1950s, they are periodically 
reaffirmed, with more language policies being launched in recent years (Ibid., p. 33). In this 
sense, the 2013 Baogao fits perfectly into this discussion. It is also interesting to note that, 
according to a search carried out online at the time of writing, there are, in 2016, two more 
recent baogao published in 2014 and 2015 respectively. As well, it is noteworthy that some of 
the earliest volumes are now available in English thanks to the work of the publishing house De 
Gruyter, whose attention for the release of annual reports regarding the language life in China 
by the State Language Commission has made it possible to diffuse important information about 
China’s language policies, everyday language use, language standardization and language 
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engineering, and trends and events in the field of language planning at the national, provincial, 
and local levels103. According to an article in the Renmin Zhengxie Bao IʴȻÕȏ (the 
newspaper of the CPPCC), a Korean edition is also available, starting from 2015  (Renmin 
Zhengxie Bao 2015). 
In the case of the 2013 Baogao, one of the most salient components of its content 
regarding language standardization is the detailed analysis of the “Outline” for the period 2012-
2020, an excerpt of which is reported as an Appendix to this work. According to the 2013 
Baogao China’s language life in 2012 is “colorful” (duocai ł》), “reflecting a China that is 
developing and progressing” (fanying zhe fazhan jinbu zhong de Zhongguo êɜ̺ëƎ严ʨ&
̪&ġ), and the “Outline” describes a “blueprint for the scientific development of the cause of 
the language and script” (yuyan wenzi shiye kexue fazhan lantu Г϶ɇŝ: ͗ţëƎϛĢ) 
(Jiaoyubu Yuyan Wenzi Xinxi Guanlisi 2013, p. 1). Issued by the PRC Ministry of Education 
and the State Language Commission in December 2012, the “Outline” represents the first mid-
to-long-term plan for the reform and development of the Chinese language and characters in the 
21st century and is the “programmatic document” (ganglingxing wenjian) that will guide the 
nationwide work in this field for the years to come (Ibid.). In the report’s words:  
 
¼ŭƫůɐГ϶ɇŝϱ±·ϭɞЩǎϘů̪Ðńͷ̪͐义ϭ+Ȩɞů̒Ɂβ̒SÌ
̪ǙľɻYɞȧÅ͍`*/ɇÌńëƎńͿϔ	ȧ严͍`*/ɇÌǆġƾЈ̪义ϭǾʭɞ
ҮƾǸƂƻ͍`̪义ϭŷ
 
(Jiaoyubu Yuyan Wenzi Xinxi Guanlisi 2013, p. 1) 
 
Formulating and implementing the “Outline for the Language and Script Plan” is an important action 
to put into practice and carry out the spirit of the Party’s 18th National Congress; it is an essential 
prerequisite for the modernization of education; it is an important method to promote the great 
development and prosperity of socialist culture and advance the construction of a socialist cultural 
great power; and it is an important content of the all-around establishment of a moderately prosperous 
society.   
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
 
It can be seen that many of the words that were highlighted in the previous chapter as 
keywords characterizing the discourse on China’s cultural soft power practice, in light of the 
country’s increasing awareness of and confidence in the potentiality of Chinese culture, are 
reiterated here in relation to China’s language situation as a whole and, in particular, to the 
“Outline”, a plan which belongs to the field of language standardization and language 
engineering. In fact, as stated in the 2013 Baogao, the “Outline” sums up the achievements and 
experience accumulated in more than 60 years of language and script work in “New China” (Xin 
Zhongguo ɍ&ġ), it integrates them with the features of the time, and it clearly puts forward 
new objectives (Jiaoyubu Yuyan Wenzi Xinxi Guanlisi 2013, p. 1). But the relationship 
between language and cultural soft power emerges with even more clarity in the preamble to the 
“Outline”, which deserves quoting at length:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 More information regarding the available English editions, which are part of the series “Language Policies and 
Practices in China” can be found on the publishing house’s website at: 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/product/186365 and http://www.degruyter.com/view/serial/184187.  
 196 
 
Г϶ɇŝɞIͳɫ义ϭ̪C书ƙĎ|ǪхiɞɇÌ̪ĳ͆ϭͺĎӍəʋǛɞw严àöë
ƎĎ͍`严ʨ̪义ϭÀ之
Г϶ɇŝ: ɭĳ͆Ǧ	ƉǦ	͍`ǦĎʴǦ̇˸ɞġŶ
ɇÌƾЈĎ͍`ëƎ̪义ϭΌǸѲ®:àöɇÌbȇĎΏ˒͍`ëƎ:ġŶΔĎʴ
ɑĝΐ:ġʴͺЧȪ亚ĎI̪ҮëƎĨġŶëƎǻ̤&ɭ义ϭĩ·Ďm̜
Үƾ
ǸƂƻ͍`ʀƾ&Ôʴɑɭͷ͐ŶĞȪ亚ġŶɇÌ且ůÀÃǞȧ严Ɂβ̒SÌѴż
Г϶ɇŝ: Ȫ«7ɍ̪ϭʸ
Ǚҷʌ͢Ďķǆ亚Ƹ̪ɇÌνϳĎɇÌν|ÆÀȧ严Г϶ɇ
ŝ: ҮëƎ)ҮƾǸƂƻ͍`	ů̒&ÔʴɑańĿФ̌À之
 
(cited in Jiaoyubu Yuyan Wenzi Xinxi Guanlisi 2013, p. 13) 
 
Language and script are humanity’s most important means of communication and vehicle of 
information; they are the fundamental element of culture and a distinctive symbol; and they constitute 
an important force for the promotion of historical development and social progress. The cause of the 
language and script has characteristics of a basic, global, social, and national nature; it is a major 
component in the construction of national culture and societal development, concerning the 
inheritance of history and culture and the development of the economy and society, having 
importance for the country’s unification and national unity, and affecting the improvement of the 
nationals’ inner quality and the people’s all-around development; and it has an important position and 
role within the national development strategy. The comprehensive establishment of a moderately 
prosperous society, the construction of a common spiritual home for the Chinese people, the 
enhancement of the country’s cultural soft power, the acceleration of the modernization of education, 
all put forward new requirements for language and script undertakings. It is necessary to establish and 
enhance a high level of cultural awareness and cultural confidence, make great efforts to promote the 
all-around development of language and script projects, and devote strength to the overall 
construction of a moderately prosperous society and the achievement of the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese people. 
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
The preamble highlights the important role that language, spoken and written, plays for 
humanity as a whole; it is the basic means of communication, a symbol of national culture and 
national unity, and a vehicle to pass down history and knowledge to the future generations. This 
is even truer for China, insofar as the implementation of a plan regulating the reform and 
development of the Chinese spoken and written language is considered as a resource that will 
facilitate national unity, the construction of a moderately prosperous society, and, in the end, the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese people. It is indeed the necessity to enhance the cohesion of 
the Chinese people, against the background described in the previous section, their confidence 
in Chinese culture, and, ultimately, the country’s cultural soft power that makes it imperative to 
undertake language and script work.  
Based on the considerations made thus far, it comes as no surprise that the enhancement 
of China’s cultural soft power is thought of as posing new challenges to the language and script 
work undertaken to regulate and normalize the country’s language situation. A unified and 
harmonious language life is envisioned as one of the components taking part in the process of 
culture-building which, as has been described throughout this research, is at the basis of China’s 
cultural soft power. This is also made clear in a scholarly article written by Wang Yue and Lü 
Meijia in 2011, also mentioned in Chapter 7 in regard to the use of the term “yuyan ruan shili” 
(language soft power), featured in the title, in which the authors describe language as a vehicle 
and important constituent of culture, representing one of the major indicators to measure a 
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country’s soft power. The authors believe that as a new strategic focal point for the achievement 
of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, cultural soft power represents the spiritual force, 
intellectual support, and ideological guarantee behind the society’s scientific development, 
being nonetheless an even more an important source of national cohesion and creativity and a 
key factor in the competition for overall national strength (Wang Yue and Lü Meijia 2011, p. 
93). In this sense, language and culture are the core of soft power, having a fundamental and 
leading function in the process of national soft power construction and participation in the 
international competition (Ibid.). As well, as a vehicle of culture, language plays an extremely 
important role in accelerating the development of China’s cultural industry and undertakings 
and promoting the country’s cultural soft power (Ibid.).  
Continuing the analysis of the “Outline”, in terms of guiding ideology, objectives, and 
tasks, the text states the following:  
 
亚+&ġ̇υ͍`*/ańɒƤUѬƂƩ̖Ї	%Sϧ义ϭǤǰ	͗ţëƎϰ)țŽ
ҮЩǎġŶѣ̜Г϶ɇŝˇ[…] ńÀȧƮĎϱϑo̜ġŶѣ̜Г϶ɇŝ͗ţzȎú
ʴɑГ϶ɇŝ[…] ķǆġŶГ϶ůÀȪ亚ġʴГ϶ηÀʀƾĎНГ϶̛ːɮÄɁβ̒
SÌɮÄ͍`*/ɇÌǆġƾЈȧ严Г϶ɇŝ: ҮëƎ
 
(cited in Jiaoyubu Yuyan Wenzi Xinxi Guanlisi 2013, p. 13) 
 
Holding high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, under the guidance of Deng 
Xiaoping’s Theory, the important thought of the Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on 
Development, fully implement the “Law on the Standard and Written Chinese Language of the PRC”, 
[…] vigorously popularize and regulate the use of the common language and script, scientifically 
protect every ethnic group’s language and script, […] increase the strength of the national language, 
enhance the language abilities of the nationals, build a harmonious language life, serve the 
modernization of education, serve the construction of a socialist cultural great  power, and promote 
the all-around development of language and script undertakings.   
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
More specifically, the guiding principles include the following statement:  
 
ȧƮĎɤèġŶѣ̜Г϶ɇŝɞЩǎϘůġŶˇǔˇϱ̪ĳɵϭʸɞΗȎġŶ*ɸΔ	w
严Ώ˒͍`ëƎ	ķǆ&Ôʴɑ©ήÀĎɇÌ且ůÀ̪义ϭŷ
 
(Ibid., pp. 13-14) 
 
 
Spreading and popularizing the national commonly used language and script is the fundamental 
requirement of the implementation of the State law and regulations and an important content in the 
protection of national sovereignty and unity, in the promotion of socio-economic development, and in 
the strengthening of the cohesiveness of the Chinese nation and cultural soft power.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
As well as:  
 
ϭÃǆГ϶ɇŝϱϑʋ§ƾЈǆÌġŶѣ̜Г϶ɇŝϱϑǱЋȪÒġʴГ϶ɇŝƳ̜ηÀ
Ȫ亚͍`Г϶ɇŝϱϑÌʶƩķǆġŶɇÌ且ůÀ
 
(Ibid., p. 14) 
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It is necessary to reinforce the establishment of norm and standards for the spoken and written 
language, intensify the awareness of standards for the national commonly used language and 
characters, upgrade the capability of citizens to use language and script, enhance the level of 
standardization of language and characters across the whole society, and increase the country’s 
cultural soft power.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
The overall aim of China’s current language policy is stated as follows:  
 
» 2020 ƪɤѣБĨġϑğĳɵɤèʺŝ͍`Ƴ̜̪ϱϑÌ͜Ƹ严ʨȪ亚ʺГȗ
ҳɨŒĩëȝm̜
[…] Г϶ɇŝbȇĎ、Ȅ&Ô_͔ɇÌ̪m̜严ʨëȝ
ġŶГ϶ůÀ
ɟϙķǆġʴГ϶ηÀəɟȪ亚͍`Г϶̛ːĎНëƎ
 
(Ibid.) 
 
By 2020, putonghua will have reached basic universality across the country, the degree of 
standardization in the society’s use of Chinese characters will have further improved, hanyu pinyin 
will display its functionality in an even better way. […] The role of language and script heritage and 
that of the outstanding Chinese culture will be further brought into play. The strength of the national 
language will markedly increase and the society’s language life will develop harmoniously.   
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
Such a majestic undertaking requires the fulfillment of a number of major tasks, including: 
1) energetically spreading and popularizing the national commonly used language and script 
(dali tuiguang he puji guojia tongyong yuyan wenzińÀȧƮĎɤèġŶѣ̜Г϶ɇŝ); 2) 
pushing forward with the normalization, standardization, and informatization of language and 
script (tuijin yuyan wenzi guifanhua biaozhunhua xinxihua jianshe ȧ严Г϶ɇŝϱϑÌʋ§
Ì|ǪÌƾЈ); 3) reinforcing supervision, inspection, and services related to the society’s use 
of language and script (jiaqiang yuyan wenzi shehui yingyong jiandu jiancha he fuwu ÃǆГ϶
ɇŝ͍`Ƴ̜̯̼ʚʉĎɮÄ); 4) increasing the nationals’ ability to use language and script 
(tigao guomin yuyan wenzi yingyong nengli Ȫ亚ġʴГ϶ɇŝƳ̜ηÀ); 5) scientifically 
protect every ethnic group’s language and script (kexue baohu ge minzu yuyan wenzi ͗ţzȎ
úʴɑГ϶ɇŝ); 6) promoting the dissemination of China’s outstanding culture (hongyang 
chuanbo Zhonghua youxiu wenhua 、ȄbȲ&Ô_͔ɇÌ ); and 7) reinforcing the 
construction of the legal system and institutions responsible for language and script (jiaqiang 
yuyan wenzi fazhi jianshe ÃǆГ϶ɇŝˇ¼ƾЈ) (cited in Jiaoyubu Yuyan Wenzi Xinxi 
Guanlisi 2013, pp. 14-17).  
Taking into consideration the overall picture depicted in the preamble, guiding ideology 
and principle, objectives, and tasks of the regulation analyzed here, which can be considered to 
constitute an example of language policy, drawn from the ampler panorama of cultural policies, 
the field in which this discourse appears to be embedded is that of the enhancement of the 
country’s strength, national unity, and sovereignty. The overall goal of the “Outline” is indeed 
an increase in the strength of the national language and the harmonious development of 
society’s language life. As shown by the extracts translated above, it can be clearly noticed that 
the links between the discourse on the theory and practice of cultural soft power and that on 
language standardization and promotion are both numerous and well-defined. This is precisely 
why the field of language policy has been chosen as a case study for the present research, taking 
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the lead from the assumption that the Chinese language can constitute a key instrument through 
which Chinese culture is expressed to the outside world, but only based on the premise that 
China can present to the world a harmonious and cohesive cultural and linguistic environment; a 
goal which is achieved through language standardization and promotion at home in the first 
place. Language can become a tool to increase national cohesion and infuse into the people a 
sense of identity and belonging. Moreover, it can draw foreign people towards the appreciation 
of China. In practical terms this means that China’s language policy ultimately aims to enhance 
linguistic uniformity as a key component of the country’s self-improvement and cultural 
construction, participating in the enhancement of China’s cultural soft power.  
 
 
8.3 Managing the domestic promotion of putonghua 
 
Before overviewing the topics contained in the 2013 Baogao, identified by the PRC 
Ministry of Education as crucial nodes in China’s language life, and providing insights into a 
selection of aspects considered relevant to the present discussion, another official contribution is 
worth mentioning here. It is the speech delivered on March 31st , 2006 by Zhao Qinping дʾƩ, 
at the time Chairperson of the State Language Commission, at a symposium on language 
standardization held in Beijing to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the release of two important 
documents: the “Resolutions Concerning the Publication of the Scheme for the Simplification of 
Chinese characters” (Guanyu Gongbu Hanzi Jianhua Fang’an de Jueding <ƢʺŝͮÌ
Ɏʗ̪¥Ђ ) and the “Instructions Concerning the Promotion of Putonghua” (Guanyu 
Tuiguang Putonghua de Zhibiao <ȧƮɤѣБ̪ț͋). These two documents were issued 
by the State Council following two conferences held in the same year, which included the 
National Conference on Script Reform, also mentioned above. In his speech entitled “Guanzhu 
shehui yuyan shenghuo, zuo hao yuyan wenzi guifanhua gongzuo ˊ͍`Г϶̛ːŒГ
϶ɇŝϱϑÌƙm” (Pay close attention to society’s language life, efficiently carry out 
language and script standardization work), Zhao Qinping touches upon many aspects related to 
the research on language and the work on language standardization to be carried out in the 21st 
century, in particular:  
 
Г϶̛ːɞ͍`̛ː̪义ϭΌǸѲ®ĎН͍`ҦϭĎН̪Г϶̛ː
ϭĽ̖Œ&ġúʴɑГ
϶0Ҋ̪͹Ľ̖Œ—ГɎ϶0Ҋ̪͹Ľ̖ŒʰГ—ŁГ̪͹Ľ̖ŒɤѣБ̪
ġȧƮĎġ书bȲ0Ҋ̪͹
Ƴ®ЀЋ»ƻĎН̪Г϶̛ːɞĎН͍`̪ϧ̒
3ɞwo͍`ĎН̪义ϭɎҮ
 
(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu 2006) 
 
Language life is an important component of social life; a harmonious society requires a harmonious 
language life. It is necessary to efficiently manage the relationships among the languages of China’s 
various ethnic groups, efficiently manage the relationship between the common language and dialects, 
efficiently manage the relationship between the mother tongue and foreign languages, efficiently 
manage the relationship between the domestic popularization of putonghua and its international 
diffusion. It must be totally clear that a healthy and harmonious language life is the manifestation of a 
harmonious society, and is also an important aspect in stimulating social harmony.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
!
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Based on Zhao Qinping’s statement, it can be argued that the aim of China’s language 
policy is to build a harmonious language life as part of the wider national program concerning 
the establishment of a harmonious society, discussed in Chapter 3. This aim is in line with the 
general purpose of the “Green Paper” collection, discussed in the previous section, and reflected 
in the contents of the 2013 Baogao, which, according to the table of contents in both English 
and Chinese, includes seven main parts divided as follows: 1) “Special Reports” (te gao pian ̇
͝ͱ), comprising the “Outline”; 2) “Language Work” (gongzuo pian ƙmͱ), exploring 
official documents and laws and regulations; 3) “Special Focuses” (zhuanti pian ҽͱ), 
including, among others, topics such as the proficiency in putonghua of migrant workers and its 
impact on their social life and identity, the protection of minority languages, an overview of the 
most common language errors in 2012, the publication of the sixth edition of The Contemporary 
Chinese Dictionary, and the global spread of Chinese; 4) “Area Data” (shuju pian ɅȠͱ), 
covering surveys in a variety of areas; 5) “Hot Topics” (redian pian ˼˸ͱ), including, among 
other topics, debates on alphabetic words, debates on the protection of dialects, an overview of 
popular phrases and expressions in 2012, and the use of Pinyin or English on traffic signs and 
train tickets; 6) “Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan” (Xiang Ao Tai pianӃ˲õͱ), overviewing 
the language use in these areas; and 7) “International Experience” (cankao pian æΧͱ), 
exploring language policy in foreign countries.   
Besides serving as a display for the State’s language law and regulations in the field of 
language planning, it can be seen that the 2013 Baogao also touches upon all the points raised 
by Zhao Qinping in the aforementioned speech. The relationship amongst putonghua, Chinese 
dialects, and minority languages, the contact between Chinese and foreign languages, and the 
international promotion of putonghua are treated through the examination of language use by 
ordinary people and in a vast range of social areas, including appendices and glossaries that 
corroborate the analysis. Before elaborating on a selection of topics drawn from the report, 
which will primarily focus on the management of the promotion of putonghua at home and 
abroad, against the background of the debates on the protection of dialects and the role of the 
Confucius Institutes in the global projection of China’s cultural soft power respectively, a few 
clarifications are in order.  
Firstly, it must be once again pointed out that the language situation in China is unique 
and complex. According to an article in the Renmin Ribao, in 2010, the amount of Chinese 
people not able to communicate in putonghua was equal to 30%, with the remaining 70% 
including only 10% of people whose ability to use the standard common language could be said 
to be fluent (Renmin Ribao 2014). These percentages are drawn from a comparatively large-
scale survey carried out by the PRC Ministry of Education and the State Language Commission 
in the three representative provinces of Hebei （Í, Jiangsu ʻϋ, and Guangxi ƮϬ, which 
found that the highest concentration of putonghua-illiterate communities is in rural and remote 
areas and in the regions occupied by national minorities, especially among the elderly (Ibid.). In 
spite of the remarkable increase in putonghua proficiency in the last decade104, the article 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104!A communiqué entitled “Zhongguo yuyan wenzi shiyong qingkuang diaocha zhuyao jieguo fabu &ġГ϶ɇŝo
̜Ǯ¦Кʉ*ϭΐʃëƢ (Main results of the survey on China’s language and script usage released) issued by the 
PRC Ministry of Education contains the results of a survey on China’s language situation carried out by the State 
Language Commission, the results of which were revealed in 2004: the amount of Chinese people able to 
communicate in putonghua was reported to be equal to 53.06%, while 86.38% of the population was reported to be 
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defines the task of increasing the nationals’ ability to use the common language as “still 
extremely arduous” (yiran shifen jianju s˾Ð®τƛ) (Ibid.). Analyzing trends of putonghua 
promotion, Chen Ping (1999, pp. 27-30) identifies a variety of factors that, besides official 
measures, may have contributed to the outcomes of such an endeavor, such as the presence of a 
dialect able to compete with putonghua as lingua franca among speakers of mutually 
unintelligible dialects, as is the case for Cantonese105, in particular the variety spoken in 
Guangzhou and Hong Kong106, in Guangdong province and surrounding areas, the degree of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
able to communicate in a Chinese dialect and 5.46% in a minority language (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu 
n.d.).   
105!The term “Cantonese” (Guangdonghua Ʈ!Б) generally refers to the Yue dialect group, even though it should 
be reserved to the dialect of the city of Guangzhou (ƮƘ, Canton), as Norman (1988, pp. 214-215) notes. Yue 
dialects are spoken in the provinces of GuangdongƮ! and Guangxi, they predominate the deltas of the rivers 
Zhujiang ̔ʻ and Xijiang Ϭʻ, and are also used by overseas Chinese. The variety of language spoken in 
Guangzhou enjoys the status of standard language among speakers of Yue and other Southern dialects, constituting 
the standard dialect also in Hong Kong and Macau (Ibid.). Cantonese has a rich written folk literature for which 
special characters have been developed (Ibid.). Ramsey (1987, p. 99) specifies that these styles of colloquial writing 
make Cantonese the only modern Chinese dialect, besides Mandarin, with non-traditional graphs that are widely 
recognized and used for colloquial words and expressions. Largely suppressed in the PRC, these special characters 
continue to be used in Hong Kong and overseas Chinese communities (Ibid.). The peculiar characteristics of 
Cantonese make it more than a dialect: it is a “genuine regional standard” which despite being challenged by 
putonghua enjoys such a high status that it is even used by some national minorities and whose speakers retain their 
own separate traditions (Ibid.). The Yue-speaking people feel relatively distinct from the Northern Chinese and 
although they are less numerous than the Wu-speakers their sense of identity is so deep-rooted that they can be said 
to constitute a sub-group of the Han Chinese: they identify themselves as “Cantonese”, consider Canton the center of 
the local culture, and regard Cantonese dialect as the standard (Ibid,. p. 98). Estimates report that there are 
approximately 63 million first-language speakers of Cantonese in the world (Lewis, Simons, and Fennig 2016), an 
amount which includes 5% of the Chinese population (Ramsey 1987, p. 87).   
106 The linguistic panorama of Hong Kong, before and after the 1997 handover to the PRC and the acquisition of the 
status of Special Administration Region (SAR), is historically unique. The interplay of historical and political 
dimensions and the direction pursued by national and local governments in the field of language policy are strictly 
connected: the relationship between Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, first, and that of the island with the 
mainland, then, are factors that have influenced the language policy implemented in the territory in the course of 
history, consequently reflecting on the use of language by Hong Kong’s society, which is characterized by a shift 
from bilingualism (English and Cantonese) to tri-lingualism (English, Cantonese and putonghua) and policies such as 
that of “bi-literacy and tri-lingualism”. According to Chen Ping (1999, p. 32), the Chinese language did not receive 
much attention during the colonial period. Zhang and Yang (2004, p. 145) specify that it was the enactment of the 
“Official Language Ordinance” in 1974 that declared that both English and Chinese were to be the official languages 
of Hong Kong. Chen Ping (1999, p. 32) specifies that the term “Chinese” in the context of Hong Kong means 
Cantonese in its spoken form and modern written Chinese in its written form. As well, the norm for the writing 
system remains the complex script (Ibid., p. 163). In the 1990s, as a result of the economic development enjoyed by 
Hong Kong and the city’s transformation into a major center for international trade and business, English became the 
symbol of the internationalization of the city, gaining even more prestige than before (Poon 2004, p. 55). At the same 
time, the status of the Chinese language enjoyed an improvement since Cantonese became a unifying force for the 
Hong Kong community, which was aware of the renewed prestige of the city and had started to emerge 
internationally as a community in its own right (Ibid.). The years that followed the PRC reform and opening-up 
policy saw an increase in contact between Hong Kong and the PRC and the gradual penetration into the island of the 
“common speech”: putonghua also became part of the linguistic scene of Hong Kong (Ibid.). This process reached its 
climax with the transfer of sovereignty in 1997: Zhang and Yang (2004, p.144) note that, although the formula of 
“one country, two systems” allows the SAR to make independent decisions on language policy, the Hong Kong 
government had to find a new balance between the three languages that populated the city’s linguistic panorama and 
that of “bi-literacy and tri-lingualism” seemed to be an appropriate solution. “Bi-literacy” refers to Chinese and 
English in their written forms, while “tri-lingualism” refers to the spoken forms of English, Cantonese, and 
putonghua (Ibid., p. 145).!
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homogeneity of local dialects, the mobility of population and the dynamism of the local 
economy, and the degree of education of the speakers, and argues that because an ever-
increasing number of people have access to radio and television programs the knowledge of 
putonghua is also steadily expanding. As well, with greater social and geographical mobility, 
putonghua is being increasingly used as a lingua franca among speakers of mutually 
unintelligible dialects, leading to a situation of bidialectalism in which the common speech is 
used together with the local dialects (Ibid.). According to Norman (1988, p. 252), the path 
China has taken is that of transforming from a multidialectal to a bidialectal country, with an 
increasing number of people learning and using putonghua but also continuing to employ their 
local dialects with their families and in social situations. In a situation of this kind, with 
putonghua being used alongside the local dialect by a growing number of people in non-
Northern Mandarin dialect areas, a diglossic differentiation has developed, one in which the 
choice of language variety is determined by the functions, attitudes, and values attributed to the 
situation of language use: as the “high variety”, putonghua is used for literary, scholarly, and 
formal functions, is taught in schools, is the vehicle of a body of literature, and is the standard 
for television, radio broadcasting, and films and theatre (exception made for local operas); as 
the “low variety”, the primary local dialect is used in ordinary, everyday situations and at home 
(Chen Ping 1999, pp. 50-57). Therefore, modern Chinese society can be thought of as being 
characterized by both bilingualism and diglossia: people become bilingual in modern standard 
Chinese and the local dialect and geographical dialects assume the shape of social dialects, 
defined in terms of social functions and values (Ibid.)107.  
Secondly, since 1949, the PRC government has applied a tolerant policy towards dialects, 
even though it was believed that the promotion of putonghua would progressively shrink their 
use (Chen Ping 1999, p. 57)108. Consequently, the measures applied to promote putonghua have 
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107 More precisely, the Chinese case could be defined as a situation of “standard-with-dialects” because, differently 
from the “high variety” in diglossia, a “standard” is also used more or less naturally as a medium of ordinary 
communication in a certain region or community, being often similar to the variety of that group and used as a 
superposed variety by others (Chen Ping 1999, pp. 55-56; Norman 1988, p. 250). Putonghua is not exactly identical 
to any local dialect, but practically it can be considered the same as the Beijing dialect (Norman 1988, p. 250). Chen 
Ping (1999, pp. 204-205n3) also clarifies that, in the Chinese case, the terms “language” and “dialect” are sometimes 
used interchangeably to refer to regional varieties: all the seven primary dialectal groups can be considered languages 
insofar as they are mutually unintelligible, embrace genetically related varieties, and are used by speakers of other 
dialects as lingua franca (such as Cantonese, the dialect of Guangzhou). Nonetheless, only Mandarin has an 
established writing tradition (Ibid.). To enrich this discussion, it is also interesting to recall the case of Hong Kong 
during the colonial period when, according to Poon (2004, pp. 54-55), the most suitable terms to describe the 
linguistic panorama, until the late 1980s, were “diglossia” and “superposed bilingualism”; English enjoyed a more 
prestigious status than Chinese as a consequence of colonialism and, even after the promulgation of the “Official 
Language Ordinance”, it continued to be used as a “high” variety of language in education, administration, and the 
legislature and judiciary sectors, while Chinese represented the “low” variety and was used by most people at home 
and for socialization. When putonghua also became part of the linguistic scene of Hong Kong, after 1978, this 
diglossic situation was gradually replaced by a situation of “triglossia”, with English as the high variety and 
Cantonese and putonghua as the low varieties (Ibid.).  
108 Analyzing the evolution of the relationship between putonghua and Chinese dialects, Guo Longsheng (2004) 
identifies three phases: the initial understanding, the reconsideration, and the redefinition. In the first phase, as 
dialects were considered an obstacle to China’s national unity, national security, and socialist construction, the goal 
to reach was their elimination, either artificial or natural; the second phase coincided with the beginning of the period 
of reform and opening-up, when diversity started to be reevaluated in comparison to the value placed on uniformity 
in the past, both in the field of economy and in that of linguistics (Ibid.). The realization that, even if the use of a 
national common language would be able to facilitate China’s modernization, the coexistence of various dialects 
would not necessarily harm it, as was evidenced by the economic success of Southern China, where many 
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focused on a positive encouragement rather then prohibitive actions towards the use of dialects 
(Ibid., p. 58). This is reflected also in the text of the “2001 Language Law”, with Article 19 
clarifying on which public occasions the use of dialects is permitted:  
  
ɵͦɭϱŭ&ɭ²Ǯ《̪ôUo̜Ɏ϶ 
 () ġŶɷ̪ƙmIĉȂϤÄɗ͉Ҧo̜̪  
 (;) ΏġÄҙƮȲ̠ϲѲ҇Ǻ̶΃ƮȲ̠ϲѲ҇ȅ§̪Ȳҳ̜Г 
 () Ƿɧ	Ǎϲͪχɶ《ǁ&Ҧϭo̜̪  
 (Ě) «̃	Ɂţ	̈́͞&͉Ҧo̜̪
 
(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu 2000) 
 
Where the relevant provisions of this Chapter are concerned, local dialects may be used under the 
following circumstances:  
1. When State functionaries really need to use them in the performance of official duties;  
2. Where they are used in broadcasting with the approval of the Broadcasting and Television 
Administration under the State Council or of the Broadcasting and Television Department at the 
provincial level;  
3. Where they are needed in traditional operas, films and TV programs, and other forms of art;   
4. Where their use is really required in publishing, teaching and research.  
(PRC Ministry of Education 2000) 
 
On balance, it can be implied that putonghua and dialects continue to coexist in China’s 
language life; even if the diffusion of the former is encouraged energetically, local varieties of 
Chinese continue to be used. The PRC Ministry of Education defines this relationship as 
follows:  
 
ɤѣБɎ϶ƫŞ®̜ĨÄĪûo̜ɤѣБ ɞǹġ̲¾Г϶o̜̪*ϭʒƉ

ɤѣБm)ѣ̜Г϶o̜ʱqC书ĪûɭŹ¯͹ÜĪû万ʦǁ ɤѣБ̪o̜ʱ
q万亚
ĨŶƺ&ɫƦo̜ɤѣБ̪ʱq) 17.85ΩĨÖ·ɫƦo̜ɤѣБ̪ʱq)
41.97
ʺГɎ϶ɞŶƺǸĉCˑ̪*ϭ̜Г ΩĨĪûIW̪*ϭC书̜Г´丰ˡи
’ɤѣБ
 
 (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu n.d.)  
 
“Putonghua and dialects coexist and are used discriminately”, “in official contexts putonghua is used”: 
this is the primary pattern of China’s current language use. In its role as the common language, the 
proportion in the use of putonghua is closely related with the communicative situation, that is, the 
more formal the situation, the higher the percentage in the use of putonghua. At home, the proportion 
[of people] that uses putonghua the most is equal to 17.85%, but the percentage using putonghua the 
most at work is equal to 41.97%. Chinese dialects are the primary communicative choice among 
family members, but in public situations the people’s principal communicative choice is gradually 
taking the direction of putonghua.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
From these statements it appears that to determine the choice between the speaker’s 
primary dialect and putonghua are the values attached to the communicative situation. As Chen 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
unintelligible dialects are spoken, made it possible to redefine the relationship between putonghua and dialects, in a 
way that is also reflected by the text of the “2001 Language Law” (Ibid.).  
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Ping (1999, pp. 56-57) states, a good level of education, intelligence, social refinement, 
authority, and formality are values usually associated with putonghua; solidarity, familiarity, 
sociability, and intimacy are values usually associated with the primary local dialect, together 
with a strong sense of regional belonging and identity. 
The debates on language use, however, are not only statistical or theoretical; they trigger 
deep and shared passions among the members of those communities that still use regional and 
local dialects. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the 2013 Baogao contains a section entitled 
“Hot debates on the protection of dialects” (Fangyan baohu reyi Ɏ϶zȎ˼Ђ) in which three 
topics that, in 2012, became “subjects of conversation” (huati Бҽ) in the media and among 
society are analyzed: “Dialect announcement of the name of the stops on public means of 
transportation” (gonggong jiaotong fangyan baozhan ming CѣɎ϶ȏͣý), “Dialects in 
the classroom” (fangyan jin ketang Ɏ϶严ЙĴ), and “Firms forbid speaking dialect” (gongsi 
jinzhi shuo fangyan ù͑ʥЖɎ϶) (Xie Junying ПxϏ 2013, pp. 263-271). Vicissitudes 
that occurred in 2012 in relation to these three topics are described in detail and an evaluation is 
provided: for instance, in the first case, the facts are reported to have started in Shanghai at the 
end of 2011, when the bus line 785 began to use the Shanghai dialect in its announcements, and 
continued throughout 2012, affecting a number of other cities so much as to give rise to a sort of 
“agitation” (fengchao 于˱) over dialect announcements (Ibid., p. 263). In terms of the analysis 
proposed, the core of the debate is detected in the choice between the simultaneous use of 
putonghua and dialects and putonghua, dialects, and English, but not the sole use of dialects, 
with the opinions of both supporters and detractors being consistent in terms of the value 
attached to the matter: the former often look at dialect announcements on public means of 
transportation from the emotional point of view of the distinguishing characteristics of the 
dialect and the culture it represents, while the latter base their opinions on actual needs and 
development requirements (Ibid., p. 265). Although recognizing that, from the point of view of 
efficiency, dialect announcements can benefit local elderly that cannot understand putonghua, it 
is also true that announcements in putonghua can narrow the distance among all speakers of 
putonghua, young and old alike (Ibid.). But, above all, the debate over public announcements in 
dialect has a deep symbolic meaning: dialects bear the weight of cultural values and dialect 
announcements can clearly reveal the features of and feelings for the city or place (Ibid.). From 
the point of view of actuality and development, the level of modernization of the Chinese 
society is increasingly higher, and so is the degree of mobility and the speed of urbanization, 
thereby making the use of a common language a requirement for public means of transportation; 
being the language commonly used in public contexts, putonghua has already become part of 
the people’s general knowledge and this is one of the reasons why dialect announcements drawn 
attention and sparked a debate (Ibid.). On balance, in the 2013 Baogao, all sides of the problem 
are taken into consideration and, as the purpose of public announcements is conceived as the 
smooth communication of information to the passengers, thus satisfying the largest number of 
people, in the end the resolution of the issue falls within the scope of public services, with the 
message being that “the will of the people [comes] first” (yi minyi wei xian UʴǱ)) (Ibid.). 
In a final evaluation of the debate over these hot topics, the 2013 Baogao defines the 
protection of dialects as “actions taken through various ways and means with the aim of 
preventing dialects from changing, deteriorating or declining, and even disappearing” (tongguo 
ge zhong fangshishouduan zuzhi fangyan bianhuatuihua huo shuailuo naizhi xiaoshi de 
xingwei ѣяú͖Ɏǁ	ǾʭҔʥɎ϶îÌ	中ÌǺϨϘ,ξ；Ŋ̪Ϥ)); it highlights 
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that, having started to be voiced from a scientific point of view towards the end of the 20th 
century, worries of this kind are being increasingly expressed also in the 21st century, taking the 
form of substantial acts (Xie Junying ПxϏ 2013, p. 270). With today’s fast flow of 
information, language issues have the potentiality to become a “wire [inducing] social and 
group conflicts” (shehui qunti chongtu de daoxian ͍`Υi¤̪͡Ž΋), which is why 
comprehensively mastering China’s language situation and correctly formulating, fully 
explaining, and effectively implementing language policies, in accordance with the nation’s and 
society’s development needs, are matters that demand immediate attention, together with 
clarifying the position of languages and dialects and reinforcing regional language programs 
(Ibid.).  
Similar considerations can also be made in regard to less recent events, the effects of 
which continue to be felt, which took place in Guangdong province and Hong Kong in 2010. It 
is what the Global Times defined a “culture war”, which burst out in Southern China in July 
2010 over the proposal to use putonghua instead of Cantonese on the Guangzhou TV news and 
satellite channels, put forward by the local CPPCC (An Baijie 2010). The worries of many 
residents in Guangzhou that their local dialect, faced with the challenge posed by putonghua, 
could one day disappear, together with the rich Cantonese cultural heritage, were fueled by the 
potential ban on Cantonese from television broadcasting and a previous case of a local school 
forbidding students to communicate in Cantonese (Ibid.). The CPPCC’s plan, which was made 
known on July 5th, suggesting that putonghua should become the only language for all programs 
on Guangzhou TV, or at least for prime time news shows and satellite channels, in preparation 
for the organization of the Asian Games in the city, triggered the establishment of Cantonese 
support groups on social media and the actual gathering of protesters against the proposal, not 
only in Guangzhou but also in other cities, including Hong Kong (Ibid.)109. Although it is 
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109 The fact that language-related disputes in Hong Kong can give rive to tensions within society is not surprising, 
given the linguistic panorama described above: the relationship between English, Cantonese, and putonghua, the 
three main languages that make up the SAR’s linguistic landscape, is indeed historically delicate and complex. On 
July 1st, 2012 the former British colony celebrated the 15th anniversary of its return to the motherland and the 
celebrations coincided with the inauguration ceremony of the new Chief Executive, Leung Chun-Ying, whose 
swearing-in was attended by then-President of the PRC Hu Jintao and conducted in putonghua, including Leung’s 
inaugural address (Chen Te-Ping 2012). The choice made by the new Hong Kong leader to use putonghua instead of 
Cantonese, the dialect spoken by most of the local population, was seen by many as a sign of the growing influence 
of mainland China on the SAR, a “kowtow” to Beijing that gave rise to numerous debates (Ibid.). The media 
extensively reported on Leung Chun-Ying’s alleged ties with the highest ranks of the CPC, giving him the nickname 
“the wolf” as a sign of mistrust (The Wall Street Journal 2012). In a mix of politics and linguistic matters, at stake is 
the identity of the people of Hong Kong, who find in Cantonese the most significant symbol to represent their 
community. Besides the potential “peril” faced by Cantonese, made worse by the fact that 70% of the city’s 569 local 
primary schools and 40% of its 514 secondary schools use putonghua for Chinese-language lessons, marginalizing 
the language spoken by 90% of the population at home and the workplace (Chow 2014), there is also the news that, 
for the first time, the 2011 Population Census registered that the primary second language of Hongkongers, English, 
had been overthrown by putonghua (Chen Te-Ping 2012). Zhang and Yang (2004, p. 156) point out that the 1997 
handover was for the people of Hong Kong a “political reunion” that has not been able, however, to resolve the issue 
of cultural identity; in the context of Hong Kong the use of putonghua symbolizes “a belonging to the Chinese people 
or citizenship to China”, but the identification of the local culture with that of the motherland and the patriotism that 
could result from it are factors still too weak to serve as a drive for sympathizing with putonghua. It comes as no 
surprise that in a society in which people identify with the city and not with the State (Wong Edward and Wong Alan 
2014), with only 18.1% of residents opting for “Chinese” (Zhongguo ren) and 40.2% choosing “Hongkonger” 
(Xianggang ren Ӄ˥I) as the first adjective to describe themselves (The University of Hong Kong 2015), incidents 
can erupt quite easily between residents and tourists or immigrants from mainland China, showing growing 
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unclear whether or not the government actually ordered Guangzhou TV to broadcast programs 
in putonghua, the station promised to do everything possible to continue to broadcast programs 
in Cantonese, according to the China Daily (Zheng Caixiong 2010a). More recent news reports 
(Lau 2014a, 2014b) indicate that the matter is not yet resolved as, in July 2014, Guangzhou 
residents expressed the desire to name July 25th, the date that represents the apex of the 2010 
rallies, “Cantonese Day”, following reports that the provincial television station was once again 
planning to switch from Cantonese to putonghua, and this time without any clear notice. An 
online campaign was then launched to celebrate, through the establishment of a Cantonese Day, 
Cantonese culture and history, voicing support for Cantonese on social media, instead of in the 
streets, in an attempt not to trigger suspicion of any radical moves being planned (Lau 2014b). 
The opposition from the public, however, has been reported to have succeeded in stopping the 
plan for the TV network’s language switch (Ibid.). 
Nevertheless, it appears that the memory of the events that took place in Guangzhou on 
July 25th, 2010 is still very vivid in the mind of Cantonese enthusiasts. It was indeed this protest 
that drew the most attention from both international and local media. According to The 
Economist (2010), the gathering of over a thousand Guangzhou citizens was organized thanks to 
young people, who were able to overcome the government’s censorship and spread the news 
through the social networks that are kept outside of China thanks to the powerful “Great 
Firewall”. Thus, more than the discontent over the decline of Cantonese, the protest seems to 
have embodied an example of what shape the youth’s resentment at the actions of the 
government could assume in situations other than protests against language practices and 
perhaps laden with political values, as shown by the large presence of the police on the said 
occasion (Ibid.). The New York Times called the outrage voiced in opposing this language policy 
a “politically delicate matter”, as indicated by the fact that only one national newspaper, the 
English language edition of the Global Times, reported extensively on the protests (Wong 
Edward 2010). Besides Southern China, worries that dialects and languages will be lost due to 
the spread of putonghua are becoming common both in other parts of China and abroad, 
involving ethnic minorities but also overseas Chinese living in Chinatowns in the United States, 
where many residents who traditionally spoke Cantonese are now being increasingly exposed to 
putonghua due to the arrival of immigrants from other parts of China (Ibid.). As well, the Time 
reported that a second protest was organized in Guangzhou on August 1st, 2010; this instance 
was met with stronger resistance from the city policy, with several people placed under 
detention (Ramzy 2010). Echoes of this protest were also felt in Hong Kong where people 
gathered to show support to their Cantonese counterpart in mainland China (Ibid.). The 
Guangzhou city government was reported to have said that the rumors about eliminating 
Cantonese to promote putonghua were false and that the people found responsible for spreading 
such rumors would be punished; accordingly, a suspect was placed under a five-day detention 
period (Zheng Caixiong 2010b).  
As explained above, Chinese authorities place a great deal of importance on establishing 
and maintaining a harmonious language life for the Chinese society as a whole, as language 
conflicts have the potential to become mass conflicts. The events reported here, which could be 
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intolerance simmering in the SAR (Magistad 2012). Perhaps one could even talk of an “anti-Chinese” sentiment, but 
it is certainly a fear for the future of the city, as the movie “Ten Years” portrays: Hong Kong in the near future is 
struggling under the tightening grip of the CPC and even Cantonese has been replaced by putonghua as the official 
language (Wong Alan 2016).  
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described in even greater detail and accompanied by other numerous insights diffused over the 
Internet by the Chinese and international media (among others, Speakman 2010; Zhang Junyu 
。¢̘  2010; Zhongguo Qingnian Bao &ġҫƪȏ  2011), constitute a rather violent 
manifestation of the desire, widespread among Chinese people, to keep local dialects alive. As 
such, it can be argued that the Chinese government makes great efforts to limit the occurrence 
of episodes of this kind, fearing that protests and riots may undermine national unity, social 
harmony, economic development, and, ultimately, political consensus.  Defending national 
union, ethnic unity, political cohesion, and social harmony are recurrent themes in the Chinese 
discourse on the purpose of language policy and the value attached to language and script work; 
as well, they constitute relevant aspects in the construction of cultural soft power. These 
considerations emerge clearly in the statements released in 2013 by Li WeihongɹÙ΁, a well-
known political figure within the PRC Ministry of Education and the State Language 
Commission, reported below:   
 
[…] ϭ®ëȝГ϶ɇŝ: ĨÃǆ͍`*/ʐǘZi͹	ҮȪ亚ʴ丹ǗͺЧ	'źI
ʴͷ͐ɇÌ̛ː	ÆÀÁŒIʴˬǱ̪Ɂβ	ķǆɇÌɆiůÀĎͤ9ÀͪɎҮ̪̉̇Ωô
ǺΞ̪m̜ […]. 
(Zhongguo Zhengfu Wang &ġȻƵΟ 2013) 
 
[…] It is necessary to adequately bring out the unique and indispensable effect of language and script 
undertakings in relation to reinforcing the system of socialist core values, comprehensively increasing 
the citizens’ inner ethic values, enriching the people’s spiritual and cultural lives, striving to manage 
well a satisfactory education for the people, enhancing the strength of culture as a whole and [its] 
competitiveness, and other aspects […].  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
By persevering with the promotion and standardization of the national commonly used 
language and script, and maintaining a harmonious language life, the strength of China’s 
language will be enhanced and the country’s international influence upgraded, while protecting 
national union (guojia tongyi ġŶΔ), ethnic unity (minzu tuanjie ʴɑĝΐ), and social 
harmony (shehui hexie ͍`ĎН) (Zhongguo Zhengfu Wang 2013). Two important points are 
raised by Li Weihong in terms of the relationship between language and China’s cultural soft 
power. First and foremost, it must be understood that in today’s competition for overall national 
strength, and amid the process of integration of the economy and informatization of society, 
“resources” (ziyuan Э˪ ) have already become decisive factors in the socio-economic 
development and modernization; as well, the strategic value of cultural resources has already 
been upgraded to the level of a national strategy and it is from this strategic height that language 
must be interpreted as a cultural resource which has a strategic position and value (Zhongguo 
Zhengfu Wang 2013). Adequately understanding that language in itself and the related products 
are not just a tool of communication and a vehicle of information in modern society but even 
more a strategic cultural resource and an underlying source in every domain of modernization, 
and energetically making use of and exploiting language resources, can serve well the cause of 
national development, the construction of a socialist cultural great power, and the promotion of 
China’s cultural soft power (Ibid.). This is the establishment of the “‘resource’ concept” 
(“ziyuan” gainian Э˪ʝǟ), which must be accompanied by that of “cultural strength” 
(wenhua li) (Ibid.). This second aspect is conceived by Li Weihong as the merger of cultural 
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productivity, cultural influence, and cultural soft power, recognizing that language is both a 
basic factor of cultural strength and one of its components, with its own unique capability and 
force; it is thus necessary to increase the awareness that the country has a great culture and 
language, strengthen the nation’s language sovereignty and security, promote the development 
and prosperity of language and script work through reform and innovation, and enhance the 
country’s cultural soft power (Ibid.).  
In other words, for China, language, as an essential element of culture, can be considered 
to be a resource complementary to all the other components of its “zonghe guoli” (CNP). A 
harmonious language situation, characterized by a uniform and cohesive language use, 
corroborates socialist core values and generates cultural strength, as well as playing an 
important role in socio-economic development. As was discussed in the previous chapters, the 
Chinese leadership has been reevaluating the function of culture as a pillar industry of the 
economy, and the same can be said for the production of cultural products related to the 
language sector. An article drawn from the Jingji Ribao Ώ˒ɕȏ (Economic Daily News) and 
published on the website Renmin Wang makes this clear: language and culture represent a 
country’s soft power but the capabilities of China’s language industry (yuyan chanye Г϶D ) 
do not match its national power yet, leaving much room for improvement (He HongzhiЫŪǛ 
and Chen Peng җӒ 2013).  
In light of the many issues brought to the surface in this brief examination, how, then, can 
China’s language policy be evaluated? And how well established is its relation with China’s 
growing cultural soft power? Well over a decade has gone by since the promulgation of the 
“2001 Language Law” and some evaluations have been proposed. For instance, on the occasion 
of the law’s 10th anniversary, an article drawn from Fazhi Zhoumo ˇ）ċɴ (Legal Weekly) 
and published on the website Renmin Wang states that it is impossible to directly solve all the 
language-related problems:   
!
ě予Ðƪɼ两Ѳˇǔɞăϵ¥7A҉ҽç̣7J.҉ҽ 
ĨǹġœjzȎɎ϶ĎȧƮɤѣБœjËŷŁɼГ—ɗȟÙʺГ̪ΆˌǦœjżǒƮĈ
ГĎΟΒˑϤГ两ѴɞǹWǽǘ̪
 
(Fazhi Zhoumo 2010) 
 
Looking back ten years, this law has solved any problems? And what issues are left?  
In China, how [is it possible] to protect dialects and promote putonghua? How [is it possible] to show 
tolerance towards loanwords and at the same time safeguard the purity of the Chinese language? How 
[should we] treat the popular jargon of advertising and the Internet? This is what concerns us.    
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
!
On the same occasion, which coincided with the opening of the 13th edition of the 
Publicity Week for the Nationwide Diffusion of Putonghua (Quanguo Tuiguang Putonghua 
Xuanchuan Zhou ġȧƮɤѣБŲbċ), Li Weihong released a communiqué entitled 
“Spread the national commonly used language and script, promote the development of a 
harmonious society” (Puji guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi, cujin shehui hexie fazhanɤèġŶѣ
̜Г϶ɇŝw严͍`ĎНëƎ), in which he explained that, since 1998 and with the 
approval of the State Council, the third week of September had been dedicated to the 
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celebration of the promotion of putonghua (Li Weihong 2010). The theme for that year’s 
celebrations, which also coincided with the  promulgation of the “Outline for the National 
Medium-to-long-term Plan for the Reform and Development of Education 2010-2020 (Guojia 
Zhong Changqi Jiaoyu Gaige he Fazhan Guihua Gangyao 2010-2020 Nian ġŶ&҆ɱɁβȸ
үĎëƎϱ±·ϭ 2010 2020ƪ), thus assuming greater relevance, was “standardizing the 
use of the national commonly used spoken and written language, carrying forward the excellent 
tradition of Chinese culture” (guifan shiyong guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi, hongyang Zhonghua 
youxiu wenhua chuantong ϱϑo̜ġŶѣ̜Г϶ɇŝ、Ȅ&Ô_͔ɇÌbΔ) (Ibid.). 
Listing all the important steps of language reform in the history of China after 1949, Li 
Weihong stressed that China is “a great country with a multiethnic, multi-language, and multi-
dialect population” (yi ge duo minzuduo yuyanduo fangyan de renkou daguo %łʴɑ	
łГ϶	łɎ϶̪Iïńġ), where the principle “shu tong wenyu tong yin 6—ɇ	Г—
ҳ”110, which can be translated as “writing the same script, speaking the same sound”, has 
always been an important content of culture-building; in order to follow the directives of the 
17th National Congress of the CPC and build a harmonious society, the State Language 
Commission was committed to establish a harmonious language life embracing the subjectivity 
and variety of the language, insofar as Chinese and minority languages represent valuable 
language resources for the country, in the same way as dialects do when they interact with and 
are complementary to putonghua (Ibid.).    
Similar insights were also proposed in September 2014, on the occasion of the 17th 
Publicity Week for the Nationwide Diffusion of Putonghua. Commenting on the estimates that 
there are still four hundred million people in China that cannot communicate in putonghua, also 
discussed above, Li Weihong evaluated the progress made by China’s language situation in the 
previous 17 years as positive, with results showing, for instance, that over 95% of the educated 
population can use standard characters (Xinhua Wang 2014c). According to the experts’ opinion, 
“spreading putonghua does not mean artificially annihilate dialects, but eliminating the 
estrangement of different dialects, in order to facilitate social communication” (tuiguan 
putonghua bushi yao renwei de xiaomie fangyan, ershi weile xiaochu bu tong fangyan de gehe, 
yi liyu shehui jiaoji ȧƮɤѣБɞϭI)ĩ；˴Ɏ϶Ωɞ)7；Қ—Ɏ϶̪ҝ九
U¹<͍`C书) (Ibid.).      
As well, in 2015, the year that marked the 15th anniversary of the “2001 Language Law”, 
and on the occasion of the organization of the 18th edition of the Publicity Week for the 
Nationwide Diffusion of Putonghua, an article appeared on the Zhongguo Jiaoyu Bao &ġɁβ
ȏ (China Education Daily) reporting that for that year’s celebrations the theme was “yifa 
tuiguang putonghua, tisheng guojia ruan shili sˇȧƮɤѣБȪÒġŶ且ůÀ” (spread 
putonghua according to the law, upgrade national soft power) (Zhongguo Jiaoyu Bao 2015). 
The successful organization of the event would entail the participation of all sectors of society 
and all the related Party and State departments, the work of the propaganda machine, with the 
diffusion of posters covering squares, streets, and parks in every part of the country with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 According to Ma Qingzhu五ưʎ (2006), this expression, which can be applied to the first unification of the 
Chinese script by Emperor Qin Shi Huang, sums up the outcomes of China’s language reform as a whole and, in 
particular, two relevant events in the history of the PRC’s language planning and language policy, which occurred in 
1956, that is the decision by the State Council to begin the process of character simplification and the promulgation 
of resolutions on the promotion of putonghua.  
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slogans such as “The state promotes the nationwide use of putonghua” (as in the PRC 
Constitution) and “mastering the language of one country means seizing the key leading to the 
culture of one country” (zhangwo yi guo yuyan, jiu zhangwo le tongwang yi guo wenhua de 
yaoshi ȢȬġГ϶ƆȢȬ7ѣǏġɇÌ̪ѿÎ), and the contribution of the news 
media (Ibid.).   
In the slogans translated above, emphasis is voluntarily placed on the word “one” by the 
present author, in order to stress once again that a close bond between language and unity, in 
this case cultural unity, can be identified within the structure of language planning in China. 
With language being at the core of culture and culture being, in turn, at the core of the Chinese 
discourse on soft power, the relationship between the management of China’s harmonious 
language life and the promotion of putonghua nationwide and the enhancement of China’s 
cultural soft power cannot be anything but strong.  
Nonetheless, in the discussion on China’s language life, in addition to the management of 
the relationship between putonghua and minority languages and scripts, which is regulated by 
the Constitution and Article 8 in the “2001 Language Law”, as previously described, and that 
between putonghua and Chinese dialects, expounded upon in great detail here, there also 
emerge issues that are related to the contacts between the Chinese language and foreign 
languages, as well as the popularization of putonghua abroad.  
 
 
8.4 Maintaining the purity and unity of the Chinese language 
 
As is known, the language of the PRC, that is putonghua, is increasingly becoming a 
strong competitor for English in the global race for prestige. The pervasiveness of the Chinese 
language, of course, is due to the astonishing number of native speakers it can boast, both 
intended as a “macrolanguage”, including first-language speakers of different dialects, and as 
the main variety, that is first-language speakers of putonghua, or Mandarin (López 2015; Lewis, 
Simons, and Fennig 2016). Chinese is also one of the languages most learned in the world, with 
numbers of students gravitating between 30 or 50 million, depending on the source (China 
Daily 2009; Moore 2011; López 2015). But English and other foreign languages are also widely 
studied in China. Xinhua News Agency (2006) reports that English, in particular, is studied by a 
quarter of China’s population, or more than three hundred million people. Contacts between 
different languages generate new phenomena that the PRC government structures in charge of 
language supervision have the duty to regulate through ad hoc language policies, as also shown 
by some of the topics contained in the 2013 Baogao previously described. Thus, it is interesting 
to briefly discuss the concept of language “purity” (chunjiexing ΆˌǦ) as intended within the 
scope of China’s language policy and, in particular, in regard to a case that emerged in 2010. In 
December 2010, Chinese and international media alike (BBC 2010; Li Mu 2010; Wang 
Jingqiong 2010) extensively reported on the decision of the PRC General Administration of 
Press and Publication (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xinwen Chuban Zongshu &ÔIʴĎ
ġɍҋ«̃ǧΣ, GAPP) to ban publishers and website-owners from the use of foreign words 
that are thought of as a potential harm to the purity of the Chinese language and the 
development of a harmonious and healthy cultural environment. The press, to which the 
warning was extended after having first targeted radio and television broadcasting, should then 
use standardized Chinese and avoid using acronyms and the mix of English and Chinese known 
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as “Chinglish” (BBC 2010). Under the new GAPP regulation, mixing foreign languages with 
Chinese in publications would only be allowed if necessary and accompanied by a translation of 
the foreign word or providing an explanation in Chinese (Wang Jingqiong 2010). This would 
also apply to abbreviations such as GDP (gross domestic product), CEO (chief executive 
officer), and CPI (consumer price index), as well as English place names, people, and 
companies (Ibid.). The regulation sparked a lively debate about how to preserve the purity of 
Chinese against the increasing use of English, with commentators expressing mixed-feelings 
about a potential crisis of Chinese (Wang Jingqiong 2010; Xinhua She 2010b). The results of a 
survey conducted on a sample of 3,269 Chinese people were also released showing that 80% of 
the respondents believed that there was a “hanyu weiji ʺГÛɷ” (Chinese language crisis) 
under way, with 52% pointing the finger to the “fever for foreign languages” (waiyu re ŁГ˼), 
and especially English, as the main reason for “the crisis in the ability to use Chinese” (hanyu 
yingyong nengli weiji ʺГƳ̜ηÀÛɷ) (Xinhua She 2010b). As well, a research project 
conducted in 2009 had shown that, among the 319 students that had been tested on their 
knowledge of Chinese at four universities in Beijing, only 2% had obtained a score of more than 
70 out of 100, while 30% had failed the test (Wang Jingqiong 2010).  
The campaign for the purity of the Chinese language has also had more recent 
developments. In 2014, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and 
Television (Guojia Xinwen Chuban Guangbo Dianying Dianshi Zongju ġŶɍҋ«̃ƮȲ̠
Ǎ̠ϲǧ, SAPPRFT)111 called for advertisements and broadcasts to stop using puns and 
wordplays, putting an end to the possibility of making use of homophones to have fun with the 
Chinese language (Chen Te-Ping 2014). More specifically, the notice issued by the regulatory 
administrative agency targeted the case of the idiom “jin shan jin mei ƈėƈΤ” which, in an 
ad, was transformed into “jin shan jin mei ɠėɠΤ”, a play-on-words based on the characters 
“jin ƈ” (to the greatest extent) and “jin ɠ” (the short name for Shanxi ƐϬ province), thus 
changing the meaning of “the acme of perfection” of the former into “Shanxi is good and 
beautiful” of the latter (Chen Te-Ping 2014; Guojia Xinwen Chuban Guangdian Zongju 2014). 
Below is an excerpt drawn from the regulation:  
 
[…] 两AˇͨûġŶѣ̜Г϶ɇŝˇƮȲ̠ϲ̖ͯɻqͪˇǔˇϱ̪ĳɵϭʸ
bȇĎ、Ȅ&Ô_͔bΔɇÌ̪ͷ̴͐їδż͍`^ƅɞɳǸƪI`D̛ДŽǙҷ
Ĭ¥8U΀ʦ
̒Ɔɭƙmѣ́œ 
	®ЀЋϱϑo̜ġŶѣ̜Г϶ɇŝ̪义ńǱ/
ƮȲ̠ϲȧƮɤè	ϱϑo̜ġŶѣ̜
Г϶ɇŝɞbȇ&Ô_͔bΔɇÌ	ķǆġŶɇÌ且ůÀ̪ǻ̤Ҧϭɞʌ͢ɇÌνϳ	ɇ
Ìν|	ɇÌνǆ͉zɇÌŨ̪i+Ȩ3ɞƮńą^ϰ^ȷąȷ̷ŒƮȲ̠ϲω̲̪
ĳɵϭʸ
ƮȲ̠ϲm)ń^bŚȒУ̺ǂҺĎ͋ϑ̪άЦǙҷƥŋϱϑo̜ѣ̜Г϶ɇ
ŝ͍`̪ϧ̍
 
(Guojia Xinwen Chuban Guangdian Zongju 2014) 
 
[…] These methods [non-standard language and writing] do not conform to the basic demands of the 
“Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Language”, the “Radio and Television Management 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 The body, which goes by the name Guojia Xinwen Chuban Guangdian Zongju ġŶɍҋ«̃Ʈ̠ǧƉ, is 
formerly known as State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (Guojia Guangbo Dianying Dianshi Zongju 
ġŶƮȲ̠Ǎ̠ϲǧƉ, SARFT) and includes the GAPP.  
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Regulations” and other laws and regulations,!are contrary to the spirit of passing on and promoting the 
excellent traditional culture of the Chinese nation, they can mislead the social public and especially 
the youth, and they must be firmly corrected. Hereby, the relevant work is notified as follows: 
1) Fully understand the major significance of the standardized use of the national common language 
and script. The spreading, popularization, and standardized use of the national common spoken and 
written language is a strategic need for inheriting the excellent traditional Chinese culture and 
strengthening the country’s cultural soft power; it is a concrete measure to establish cultural self-
awareness, cultural self-confidence, and cultural self-improvement, and to guarantee cultural security; 
and it is also a basic requirement for the large-scale listeners and viewers [to be able] to properly 
listen to and watch radio and television programs. Radio and television are mass media, they bear 
responsibilities to show the way and be model examples, they must take the lead in the standardized 
use of the common spoken and written language, and be models for the entire society. 
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
The language habits targeted by regulations of the kind described above are thus seen as a 
potential detriment to the awareness of and confidence in Chinese culture of the Chinese people, 
and ultimately to the projection of the country’s cultural soft power abroad. They indeed 
constitute a controversial aspect of the current trend of language use in China. In 2014, whereas 
the Renmin Ribao published online an article entitled “Misuse of loanwords: disturb 
communication and harm the purity of the Chinese language” (Wailaiyu lanyong: yingxiang 
goutong shanghai hanyu chunjiexing ŁɼГ˭̜Ǎđ％ѣcŵʺГΆˌǦ) in which the 
common occurrence in Chinese publications of English acronyms such as Wi-Fi, CEO, MBA, 
CBD, VIP, and PM2.5, and names such as iPhone and iPad, was strongly criticized as an 
element that disrupts the order and harmony of the Chinese script, affecting the capability of 
Chinese to express meanings, making the context scattered and incoherent, and, what is worse, 
annihilating the profound and rich connotations of Chinese culture (Dong Hongliang ϚˎG, 
Cao Lingjuan ɩ̓ř , and Gong Yuhua ƜβÔ  2014), the South China Morning Post 
documented the sarcasm and mockery with which the official concerns were met among 
Internet users, reporting that some observers ascribed the campaign for language purity to the 
government’s efforts to limit  the influence of foreign culture on Chinese media and popular 
culture (Luo 2014). The article in the Hong Kong newspaper also recalls that, in 2012, a 
committee was created by the Chinese government and given the task of standardizing the use 
of foreign words, an endeavor that resulted in the publication of 10 standardized Chinese 
translations for popular English terms such as WTO, Aids, and GDP (Ibid.). Similarly, in 2010, 
the CCTV asked its broadcasters to replace the English acronym NBA with the Chinese 
equivalent of “US professional basketball association”, a fact that the audience perceived as 
being a mere and strange formalism (Ibid.). 
Nonetheless, all sectors of the media are called to actively participate in the 
standardization and promotion of putonghua, acting as models for China’s modern society and, 
consequently, assuming a leading role in the national culture-building process. As discussed in 
the previous chapters and highlighted above, the enhancement of China’s cultural soft power is 
envisioned by the Chinese leadership as a collective effort that involves all members of society 
and every Chinese person. Even people of Chinese origins living abroad are involved in this 
process. In this view, an article which appeared in the Renmin Ribao Haiwaiban as early as 
2007, with the title “Putonghua he fangyan: yi ge dou bu neng shao ɤѣБĎɎ϶:%Ѵ
ηƃ” (Putonghua and dialects: not one less), is worth mentioning as it explores an interesting 
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phenomenon: “dialectal barriers” (fangyan Ɏ϶ҝ九) in Chinese communities overseas. The 
need to promote putonghua both in China and overseas is affirmed, as well as the importance of 
the interaction between the unity of Chinese language and culture and the intrinsic value of 
dialects, which are envisioned as carriers of local cultures and traditions and vehicles 
representing the richness of China’s heritage:  
 
Ĩ：ŁÔI͍`&ɤѣБQ&ġɎ϶úɭŅĩƫŞëƎȚΖ˯҆ƒɬ
 
m)&ġ̪ŬɎГ϶Ď*ϭГ϶ɤѣБ̪ɤèɞńÈǽи
ǹWǰСœʃĨң`ɗI
Wúν̜Ɏ϶ë϶ú̠ϲõѴ̜Ɏ϶Ȳ«×μÍКQIΥœj`Ǳ? Ĩ̕еʺГ
ɤѣБ˼̪NŅÔI͍Ï̪—Ɏ϶Υiљ¯ҦϭȧƮѣ̪Г϶
 
ʯƼЅ϶Ɏ϶ҝ九̪̒С3ƽe»7：ŁÔı
̞<ȑıɗҊ—ɼ˪ĩ—̴>ҊŞ
ĩİƝº
 
[…] ů ȧƮɤѣБ̪̲̪ƫɞ)7；˴Ɏ϶
Ɏ϶ɞǓłÔI̪ʰГƥɭ'ź̪ĩ
İɇÌŦWѴɞΏяª̩ƪ̚ξªÑƪëƎ《Ǹ̪̛čÀǓǆ […]
 
[…] &ġIѴɞŶI ɭ̺—ɻʑȕɭ—ʏ̪ʰГĎɇŝ
×ɎɎ϶Ï̪ʴΓń
łɅɼνÍɎ
：ŁÔIɓЇЄJ.Ɏ϶ɼ‘»ѴƳВĝΐĨе
 
[…] &ÔɇÌØńͷ˞ʺГɵрËŷ̺łÌ
ǽUɤѣБɎ϶ ĨÔı̖ƳΕΖĎ
Н̴Ľƫ—Ĩ：Ł、Ȅ&ÔɇÌ
[…] Ѵɞ&ġIęǈ˾Ƴ ӏ—亡Є
 
(Lian Tian јŅ 2007) 
 
In the overseas Chinese communities, putonghua and each of the other Chinese dialects all have their 
own field of activity, they coexist and develop, and it will continue to be so for a long time. As 
China’s official and primary language, the popularization of putonghua is the general trend. If we 
imagine for a minute that in the case of a meeting every person can use a dialect to speak, or that 
every TV station uses a dialect to broadcast, with a regional accent, how would the other people be 
able to understand? In today’s world, where the fever for Chinese, for putonghua, is rising, the 
common language must urgently be spread in the communities of ethnic Chinese people who speak 
different dialects.   
It goes without saying that the phenomenon of dialectal barriers has also expanded into overseas 
Chinatowns. Due to the fact that they arrived at different places in different times and their origins are 
different, among them [overseas Chinese] there exist regional differences.  
[…] Actually, the purpose of promoting putonghua is not the annihilation of dialects. Dialects are the 
mother tongue of many ethnic Chinese, they carry a rich local culture, and were all formed through 
hundreds, thousands of years of development; their vitality is strong […]. 
[…] Chinese people are one family; they have the same origins and posses the same mother tongue 
and script. The inhabitants of the areas where southern dialects are spoken came from the north for the 
most part. No matter what dialects they speak, the overseas Chinese that arrived first and those that 
arrived later all have to be united.  
[…] Chinese culture is broad and deep, and the Chinese language contains diversifications in itself. 
Thus, putonghua and dialects should continue to get along in harmony in the Chinatowns, and 
together promote Chinese culture abroad. […] It is all Chinese people, and of course [we] cannot “talk 
without communicating”.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
 
“Dou shi Zhongguo ren ma, dangran bu ying ‘ji tong ya jiang’ Ѵɞ&ġIęǈ˾
Ƴ ӏ—亡Є”: “ji tong ya jiang” is an expression that, when translated into English, 
literally means “chicken speaking with duck”, perfectly conveying the meaning of 
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miscommunication and misunderstanding. In this context, it is a significant statement that 
encapsulate the meaning and scope of a one of the most prominent components of the PRC’s 
language planning: mutually unintelligible language varieties are considered dialects insofar as 
they belong to the same people, or better, one people: the Chinese nation. In this light, the 
promotion of putonghua will act as a booster of national identity and unity, and all Chinese are 
called to collaborate. And it will be the people’s collaboration that will not make it necessary to 
eliminate dialects by law enforcement and coercive measures.  
Based on the considerations made so far, it comes as no surprise that even in the field of 
Chinese language promotion abroad, or among foreigners in China, reflections of the value 
placed on harmony and unity can be found. It is indeed interesting to recall that following the 
principles “shu tong wen” (writing the same script) and “yu tong yin” (speaking the same sound) 
means, for the Chinese people, being devoted to putonghua, standardized characters, and hanyu 
pinyin, and, by constructing a harmonious language and social life, be ready for welcoming the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese people; this will in turn increase the confidence of foreigners 
in studying the Chinese language and characters, thus enhancing the international 
competitiveness of Chinese, and making it move faster towards the world (Ma Qingzhu 2006). 
The large-scale promotion of Chinese shall become an essential factor in the enhancement of 
China’s soft power and CNP, contributing to spreading the Chinese civilization internationally, 
advancing the unity between Chinese citizens and every other people in the world, and creating 
a multipolar and peaceful world (Ibid.).  
 
 
8.5 International reflections 
 
Judging from the ever-increasing amount of foreign students that the Chinese language is 
attracting, discussed in the previous section, and the great results achieved by language and 
culture exchange programs between China and the rest of the world, it can be argued that, in 
2016, Chinese has successfully “gone towards the world”.  Chapter 1 highlighted how the value 
of culture as a source of power has reached the same level of importance as traditional hard 
power resources. The same can be said about the role of language in international relations, as is 
shown by the fact that in the course of a joint conference with Chinese President Xi Jinping in 
September 2015, American President Barack Obama announced the launch of the “1 Million 
Strong” initiative, a program that, recognizing the increasing importance of the relationship 
between the United States and China, aims to bring the total number of learners of putonghua in 
America to one million by the end of the year 2020, in order to prepare a new cohort of 
American leaders able to understand China effectively (Allen-Ebrahimian 2015).  
In terms of guidelines for the management of this international branch of language policy, 
which primarily responds to the growing interest for “everything Chinese” which has been 
simmering in the foreign public following the takeoff of China’s rise, they are to be found in 
Article 20 of the “2001 Language Law”, which states: “Duiwai hanyu jiaoxue yingdang 
jiaoshou putonghua he guifan hanzi żŁʺГɁţƳǈɁȡɤѣБĎϱϑʺŝ” (Putonghua 
and the standardized Chinese characters shall be taught in classes for foreigners who are 
learning Chinese) (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu 2000; PRC Ministry of Education 
2000). In the same framework fall the Constitution and By-Laws of the institution that is 
currently the most renowned in the domain of Chinese language promotion internationally: the 
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Confucius Institute (hereafter, CI). According to the website of Hanban112, the Office of the 
Chinese Language Council International (Zhongguo Guojia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao 
Xiaozu Bangongshi &ġġŶʺГġ书ȧƮҺŽƂΌÁų) by which the CI program is 
overseen, Article 10, in fact, states the following: “Kongzi xueyuan de hanyu jiaoxue caiyong 
putonghua he guifan hanzi Ŝśţҙ̪ʺГɁţѶ̜ɤѣБĎϱϑʺŝ” (The Confucius 
Institutes conduct Chinese language instructions in Mandarin, using Standard Chinese 
Characters) (Kongzi Xueyuan Zongbu ŜśţҙǧѲ /Guojia Hanban ġŶʺÁ n.d.1; 
Confucius Institute Headquarters/Hanban n.d.1).  
In recent years, the establishment of an increasingly large number of CIs around the 
world and the role they play as part of the effort for the enhancement of China’s cultural soft 
power have become oft-debated topics of scholars and researchers in and out of China (among 
others, Ding and Saunders 2006; Chey 2008; Gil 2009; Paradise 2009; Starr 2009; Liu Wei ³
a 2010; Barr 2011; Hong Xiaonan et. al 2013; Sahlins 2015). In the present research, attention 
has been paid to the culture-building endeavor that soft power development entails, according to 
the view of the Chinese leadership, thus focusing on the construction of cultural soft power 
resources within China. The projection of cultural soft power abroad has thus appeared to be 
intended as a natural reflection of a process of self-improvement that is unfolding nationwide, 
under the guidance of the government and through the implementation of cultural policies, 
including the language policies discussed above. In this sense, Starr (2009, p. 68) observes that 
the PRC’s language policy, which has essentially shown that standardization is a “vital part in 
maintaining the integrity of the Chinese State”, is decided by the government in China, but also 
extended internationally. Due to the approach chosen by the present work, which has primarily 
stressed the importance of internal dynamics in the enhancement of China’s cultural soft power, 
and the extent that a multi-layered discussion, which embraces a variety of research angles, 
points of views, debates, and even controversies, as is the one around the CIs, would entail, only 
a limited sample of data, literature, and salient aspects will be presented in the following pages, 
in order to provide a selection of insights that are useful to firmly place the topic of Chinese 
language and culture promotion within the discourse on Chinese cultural soft power and, 
conceivably, inspire future analyses.    
  Besides the Constitution and By-Laws of the CIs, the Confucius Institute 
Headquarters/Hanban website, in both its Chinese and English editions, provides a variety of 
information, data, announcements, and news describing, in a more or less updated way, the 
activities promoted. In terms of numbers, by December 1st, 2015, the worldwide presence of 
five hundred CIs was registered, covering over a hundred countries and distributed as follows: 
110 in Asia; 46 in Africa; 169 in Europe; 157 in America; and 18 in Oceania (Kongzi Xueyuan 
Zongbu/Guojia Hanban n.d.2). As well, this capillary distribution is corroborated by one 
thousand Confucius Classrooms (Kongzi Ketang ŜśЙĴ) (Ibid.). The Confucius Classrooms 
(CCs) represent what Starr (2009, p. 71) calls a “junior version” of the institutes, as they focus 
on secondary rather than university education. The system put in place by Hanban as early as 
2004, when the first CI was established in Seoul, functions according to three modes of 
operation: full management of the operations by the headquarters (similar to the British 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 Unless otherwise indicated, information regarding the CI project was drawn from various pages of the Chinese 
and English websites (http://www.hanban.org/ and http://english.hanban.org/) and referenced with progressive 
numbers.  
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Institutes); joint ventures with local partners (similar to the Instituto Cervantes); and locally run 
offices licensed by the headquarters (similar to the Alliance Française) (Ibid., pp. 65-70). The 
second category includes most European CIs as they function as a partnership among a foreign 
university, the headquarters, and one or more Chinese universities (Ibid., p. 71). As for their 
nature and mission, the CIs are defined in the Constitution and By-Laws as “non-profit 
educational institutions” which aim to “devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people 
from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language”, thus 
enhancing these people’s understanding of the Chinese language and culture, strengthening 
educational and cultural exchanges and cooperation between China and other countries, 
deepening friendly relationships, and promoting the development of multiculturalism and the 
construction of a harmonious world (Confucius Institute Headquarters/Hanban n.d.1). Similarly, 
Hanban is described as a “public institution affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education” 
whose functions are: making policies and development plans for promoting Chinese language 
internationally; supporting Chinese language programs at foreign educational institutions of 
various types and levels; drafting international Chinese teaching standards; and developing and 
promoting Chinese language teaching materials (Confucius Institute Headquarters/Hanban 
n.d.2). As for the CI Headquarters, the body in charge of controlling their operations is the 
Council of Confucius Institute Headquarters comprising of a Chair, Vice-Chairs, Executive 
Council Members, and Council Members (Confucius Institute Headquarters/Hanban n.d.3).  
The structure of Hanban and the CI Headquarters is perhaps one of the most controversial 
aspects debated by scholars. Among the studies that analyze the operations of the CIs 
worldwide, Marshall Sahlins’s 2015 work emerges as possibly one of the harshest. The author 
defines Hanban, and the CIs, as a “Chinese government agency” whose actual purpose is very 
distant from the picture portrayed by the description as a “non-profit organization” that is 
“affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education” (Sahlins 2015, pp. 1-13). The target of the 
author’s criticism is, in particular, the aforementioned Council, a “bureaucratic body” 
comprising a number of high-ranking Party-State officials connected with the State Council and 
various ministries (Ibid.). Sahlins detects a strong link between the activities carried out within 
the CI project and the PRC’s political agenda, an element that would definitely set the project 
apart from the organizations often considered its Western counterpart, such as the British 
Institute or the Goethe Institut, insofar as the individual CI offices are located within the host 
universities and function as elements of a foreign government (Ibid., p. 13). And, although his 
approach is remarkable, insofar as his book provides a detailed collection of a great number of 
academic contradictions that, over the years, have taken the spotlight of the debates in faculties 
and among professors and scholars, igniting a lively controversy over the genuineness of CI’s 
operations113, he is not the only one making this judgment: according to Barr (2011, Chapter 4), 
while supporters of the CI program compare it to the activities of the European British Institute, 
Goethe Institut, Alliance Française, and Instituto Cervantes and believe that it is a useful 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 Minter (2014), for instance, reports on some cases that saw foreign universities, including the University of 
Chicago and Pennsylvania State University, cut ties with Hanban and argues that CIs are causing more disadvantage 
than advantage to China’s international image. The widespread worry is that behind CI’s operations there hides an 
“insidious vehicle of soft-power indoctrination” through which what is being taught is not just language and culture 
but ideology and values (Ibid.). In order to explain the certain amount of suspicion generated by CIs abroad, 
commentators often refer to Politburo member Li Changchunɹ҆ɝ and his open reference to the importance of 
CI’s initiatives as part of China’s foreign propaganda efforts (Redden 2012; Minter 2014).  
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structure to teach Chinese language and culture, especially in places that otherwise could not 
afford such activities, detractors fear the infiltration of a foreign government into local affairs, 
and even the gathering of intelligence on the PRC’s part. As Barr’s puts it, “the notion of a 
Chinese government-backed institution on Western university campuses has not gone down 
well with many”, making the CIs the “possibly most controversial example of Chinese soft 
power”, but nonetheless the best (Ibid.). Chey (2008, p. 40) argues that what differentiates the 
operations run by the PRC and those, for example, carried out by the Alliance Française is the 
“degree of control exercised by the government over administration and operations”. The author 
analyzes the CI project against the background of cultural diplomacy and calls for universities 
to “vigilantly guard their autonomy and academic freedom” (Ibid., pp. 33-38). As an expression 
of how China uses cultural diplomacy and soft power, exploiting propaganda tools at home and 
abroad to shape public opinion, the CI project can be placed within the boundaries of China’s 
international strategy, which is primarily aimed at maintaining a stable global environment for 
the well-being of its development (Ibid.). 
Overall, there is agreement in the literature analyzed regarding the definition of a 
corollary for the present discussion: by promoting language and culture abroad and cooperating 
with foreign institutions, the CIs are a potential source of soft power which can help create a 
positive image for China and refute the “China threat theory”, within the frame of the theories 
of China’s peaceful rise and peaceful development (among others, Chey 2008; Paradise 2009; 
Starr 2009). However, at least one observer (Gil 2009) notices that the benefits that China is 
obtaining from the Confucius Institute project are related to the ability to channel the foreign 
learners’ language preferences and attitudes towards China more than they are to actual foreign 
policy outcomes. The scholar argues that the students involved in CI activities around the world 
are more likely to perceive a change in their attitudes towards China and perhaps become more 
sympathetic through the study of the language that has been chosen by the PRC as the base of 
foreign language teaching, namely putonghua, simplified characters, and the hanyu pinyin 
system (Ibid., p.67). The author’s worry that the pool of China-connoisseurs that Hanban aims 
to create, for example through the provisions of materials that support the PRC’s views to the 
CIs, may be cut out of perspectives expressed in other parts of the Chinese-speaking world, 
such as Taiwan, is corroborated by the analyses offered by a number of other scholars; Chey 
(2008, p. 40), for instance, asks the question as to whether or not the support of the Chinese 
government in backing the program and sponsoring Chinese teachers may leave out people who 
support the independence of Taiwan, full democracy for Hong Kong, religious freedom, and 
other controversial matters.  
The considerations made above lead the present discussion to examine in greater detail 
two other aspects that emerge in the analysis of the PRC’s management of language promotion 
abroad: the mandatory language rule for instruction in CI classes and the question as to weather 
or not, and to what extent, the institution can be considered an actual indication of cultural soft 
power in action. In regard to the first issue, as previously, mentioned, it is important to recall 
that it is indeed the Constitution and By-Laws of the CIs to state that the institutions shall 
“conduct Chinese language instructions in Mandarin, using Standard Chinese Characters” 
(Confucius Institute Headquarters/Hanban n.d.1). Sahlins (2015, pp. 25-39) detects in this 
practice a direct political influence exercised by the PRC, providing the description of a number 
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of cases114 which have seen conflicts between Hanban and foreign universities arise and which 
can be considered to have been caused by a threatening level of intervention on the Chinese part. 
Churchman (2011) challenges the common idea that CIs are part of the effort to increase 
China’s cultural soft power, even though the logic behind their operations is that promoting 
interest in the Chinese language and culture abroad will lead more people to understand and 
appreciate China itself. In his words: “It is naïve to believe that Confucius Institutes are 
politically disinterested teachers imparting Chinese culture and language. They exist for the 
express purpose of letting foreigners understand China on terms acceptable to official China” 
(Ibid.). This provocative statement is explained in light of the view that the proliferation of CIs 
around the world hides a “political move” by the Chinese government aimed at guiding the 
interests of the global public towards a sort of selected knowledge that is in sync with what the 
Party-State wants to popularize (Ibid.). Moreover, scholars (Paradise 2009; Churchman 2011; 
Sahlins 2015) agree in detecting the most explicit evidence of control on the part of the PRC 
government in the Constitution and By-Laws of the CIs, in particular in the restrictions 
contained in Article 10, discussed above, and Article 6. The latter states the following: “The 
Confucius Institutes shall abide by the laws and regulations of the countries in which they are 
located, respect local cultural and educational traditions and social customs, and they shall not 
contravene concerning the laws and regulations of China” (Confucius Institute 
Headquarters/Hanban n.d.1). But if this statement offers the possibility to ban a variety of topics 
which are knowingly out of line with the approval of the Chinese leadership, it is in particular 
the mandatory requirement to teach putonghua and simplified characters, and promoting what 
Churchman (2011) calls “semi-literacy in Chinese”, that should raise suspicion. This kind of 
partial knowledge that is particularly encouraged for foreigners and foreign-born ethnic Chinese 
does not facilitate the acquisition of skills in reading and writing traditional characters, which 
are still used in Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, communities of overseas Chinese, and in the field 
of Classical studies, and guides learners towards a “‘correct’ ideological path” which denies 
access to texts and materials produced outside of China’s central control (Ibid.). In 
Churchman’s words: “The control through Confucius Institutes of what can and cannot be 
taught as Chinese is as equally rooted in the politics of the People’s Republic of China as the 
control of what can and cannot be discussed about China” (Ibid.).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114!Having witnessed the incident first-hand, the present author would like to mention one of the cases described by 
Sahlins (2015): the “Braga Incident”. In late July 2014, the European Association of Chinese Studies (EACS) 
conference took place in Braga and Coimbra, Portugal. Among the many highlights of the event, one unfortunate 
episode occurred, drawing the attention of the participating scholars and, afterwards, the media. The smooth 
unfolding of the conference was in fact disrupted by the decision made by Hanban Director General and Chief 
Executive of the CI Headquarters Xu Lin І̗ to order certain pages be removed from the conference program and 
book of abstracts. When conference attendees received the materials, after an unexplained delay, four pages were 
missing: the frontispiece of the book of abstracts mentioning the sponsorship of the Confucius China Studies 
Program, one of Hanban’s academic projects, and three pages from the conference program containing information 
about the book exhibition and library donation organized by the Taiwan National Central Library and the Chiang 
Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. Describing the incident in great detail, Sahlins (2015, p. 
36) argues that the CIs had never manifested their political component so openly as Xu Lin’s “meltdown” in Braga. 
Comments were harsh also in the media, which strongly criticized Xu Lin’s decision to obstruct activities that are 
considered “contrary to Chinese regulations” (Minter 2014). As well, Professor Roger Greatrex of Lund University, 
the President of the Association, is reported to have publicly called this kind of interference in the academic activities 
“totally unacceptable” (Sahlins 2015, p. 35).   
!
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For all these reasons, it can be argued that, as is the case for domestic language policies, 
linguistics, sociolinguistics, and the sociology of language assume a deeper, often political, 
meaning. According to the views described above, by setting parameters for the promotion of 
Chinese, or better, for what kind of Chinese should be taught abroad, the PRC government 
projects the intention to channel the foreigners’ desire to learn more about China towards the 
appreciation of a specific, polished image of China that excludes controversial topics often 
discussed within, and about, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other controversial realities. It is equally 
interesting to note, as Churchman (2011) does, that the language restrictions imposed by the 
Constitution and By-Laws of the CIs appear to be a reflection of the language policy established 
domestically, insofar as the “2001 Language Law” exhorts the Chinese citizens to increasingly 
use putonghua and simplified Chinese characters, somewhat to the detriment of Chinese 
dialects and other languages used in the PRC. Although Hong Kong and Cantonese culture may 
be regarded as falling outside of the mainstream Chinese culture upheld and promoted by the 
PRC authorities, the protests in favor of the protection of Cantonese, discussed above, are an 
example of the difficulty the Chinese government may encounter in attempting to weaken the 
bond between the people and their local traditions (Ibid.). ! In an email conversion with the 
present author in spring 2014, Hong Kong-based Cantonese expert Professor Robert S. Bauer, 
expressed an interesting thought which testifies to the delicate nature of linguistic phenomena in 
the PRC: “As for the impact of the promotion of Putonghua on the Chinese dialects and non-
Han minority languages, I have come to see Putonghua as a destructive steamroller that is 
responsible for decimating China’s linguistic diversity” (Bauer 2014a). As well, he referred to 
the idea put forward in some of his previous writings on Cantonese that “the agenda of teaching 
Putonghua should include the promotion of ‘harmonious bilingualism’ among schoolchildren, 
that is, that they be encouraged to continue speaking their local varieties and not to think that 
learning Putonghua requires replacing them with Putonghua and so forgetting them”. 
Commenting on the proposal of this concept, which referred in particular to the language 
situation in Hong Kong, Professor Bauer further suggested: “At the same time, however, given 
that the Putonghua agenda in Hong Kong is highly politicized, I realize this concept is naive and 
unrealistic. Not surprisingly, some local Cantonese speakers see the writing on the wall and so 
have started up a [fan pu jiao zhong] êɤɁ& movement (i.e., ‘oppose using Putonghua to 
teach Chinese-language subjects’)” (Ibid.). Referring to an article in the South China Morning 
Post describing the case of a luxury hotel in Hong Kong that had changed its elevator 
instructions from complex to simplified Chinese characters, Professor Bauer also commented 
that this switch had generated so much anger in one person that it led her to complain about it in 
an article in a Chinese-language newspaper; showing how such an incident represents “one 
small but incremental erosion of Hong Kong’s unique cultural identity” (Bauer 2014b). 
According to Professor Bauer, who at the time of writing further confirmed these thoughts by 
affirming that “the Cantonese language and the switch to using Putonghua as medium of 
instruction have become even more politicized” (Bauer 2016), there even exists a Cantonese 
expression for these phenomena: [Xianggang daluhua] Ӄ˥ńқÌ ‘mainlandization of Hong 
Kong’” (Bauer 2014b).  
Another phenomenon difficult to eradicate is that of “language contamination”, analyzed 
above, which Barr (2014, Chapter 4) discusses within the framework of the importance played 
by language policy and standardization in maintaining the integrity of the PRC. According to 
the author, it is the complex interconnection among language learning, political identity, and 
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boundary drawing115 that constitutes the saliency of China’s language policy, making language 
and national identity “mutually constitutive” (Ibid.).   
In regard to the second point made above, doubts have been raised about the soft power 
nature of CI operations as they also involve a conspicuous monetary component. Churchman 
(2011), for instance, argues that educational institutions worldwide receive the “carrot” that 
comes with the establishment of a CI on their premises. The “carrot” to which the author refers 
includes the funding and support provided by Hanban and received by foreign universities, as 
documented by a number of sources (Chey 2008; Starr 2009; Barr 2011; Sahlins 2015): as a 
partnership between a foreign organization and one or more Chinese partners, in most cases 
universities, the basic agreement is usually for five years and based on equally shared funding, 
with Hanban providing start-up and annual funding as well as teaching materials and instructors. 
Moreover, CCs, as “local hubs” established within primary and secondary schools, are 
supported by CIs in the provision of activities and receive funds from them (Barr 2011, Chapter 
4). While Sahlins (2015, p. 3) defines the CI’s practices as “subcontracting teaching to a foreign 
government”, Paradise (2009, pp. 659-662) and Barr (2011, Chapter 4) argue that the CI project 
is “impression management”, as it aims to create a positive image for China, which is well in 
line with the notion of peaceful development. On the one hand, the former believes that, 
although fitting well in the grand strategy of increasing the country’s attractiveness as a leading 
power, the CI project is not entirely a soft power strategy, as it relies on payments (Paradise 
2009, pp. 659-662). Thus, the fear is that, by accepting money, foreign institutions may also 
accept a sort of “string-attached” policy, that is one aimed at expanding China’s influence 
abroad, jeopardizing academic freedom and essentially representing a “Trojan Horse” strategy 
for China (Ibid.). To avoid the political issue arising from the Chinese government’s funding of 
language learning operations, the “1 Million Strong” initiative mentioned above is reported to 
be financed privately (Allen-Ebrahimian 2015).    
These considerations, together with the concerns related to the location of many CIs, that 
is on campus and within pre-established educational institutions (Chey 2008; Churchman 2011; 
Sahlins 2015), raise suspicion about the real intentions hiding behind this PRC government’s 
strategy. On the other hand, Barr (2011, Chapter 4) argues that the suspicion some people feel 
in regard to CIs does not only derive from the fear of a foreign culture or the peculiarity of the 
Chinese language, but even more from the realization that the “development of CIs is China’s 
most widely coordinated long-term collective effort to articulate a Chinese identity and brand it 
on the world stage”. Taking into consideration both the gains that host universities obtain, in 
terms of the possibility they have to broaden their academic horizon and the opportunity for 
more students to learn Chinese, and those obtained by Chinese universities, which become more 
international, the author evaluates the CIs as the concrete manifestation of China’s 
determination to promote its culture, and thus “China’s most comprehensive exercise of soft 
power to date” (Ibid.).   
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115 By “boundary drawing” Barr (2011, Chapter 4) refers, in particular, to the characteristics of the linguistic situation 
existing between the PRC and Taiwan. While the former calls the national language putonghua, the latter refers to it 
with the term guoyu ġГ and maintains the use of non-simplified characters (Ibid.). 
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8.6 What is in a “trademark”? 
 
On balance, belonging to the same language policy structure, the management of 
language promotion internationally can be seen as displaying similar characteristics to that of 
language standardization and promotion domestically; and the former raises as many doubts and 
concerns as the latter. According to Barr (2011, Chapter 4), placing language teaching and 
culture promotion within the boundaries of public diplomacy could be seen as restrictive, as 
language represents much more: it is the “means by which people define themselves and others” 
which means that “when one learns a language one is also inevitably drawn into a new 
community”, acquiring skills useful to identify with and participate in that community. It is the 
relationship between language and identity, then, that constitutes the primary cause of the 
controversies over the CI project (Ibid.). In this view, one can argue that the same reasons that 
make language standardization and promotion so important, and sometimes controversial, for 
the Chinese government domestically, that is creating a sense of national identity and political 
consensus through the shaping of common and standardized language habits, is also the source 
of much controversy internationally because of the channels and ways through which language 
promotion is managed.  
Before moving on to more positive opinions regarding the projection of cultural soft 
power through the activities of the CIs, mainly expressed by Chinese authors, a few reflections 
must be made in regard to the name chosen to represent China’s international language export: 
Confucius. Scholars (Chey 2008; Starr 2009; Barr 2011) argue that the choice of Confucius as 
the symbol of China’s initiative to export Chinese language and culture is rather singular: Barr 
(2011, Chapter 4), for instance, notes that if Confucius were still alive he would be speaking the 
dialect of the northern state of Lu and not at all the language taught in CI classes. Moreover, CIs 
do not do much to spread Confucianism. Chey (2008, p. 39) corroborates this view highlighting 
the fact that CIs do not generally embark on the task of promoting Confucianism. Why, then, 
was the sage’s name chosen as a global brand for Chinese language promotion? All three 
authors considered seem to agree that one of the primary reasons is that a rehabilitation of 
Confucius and his doctrine is underway in China: Chey (2008, pp. 38-39) states that, as a 
symbol of China’s cultural diplomacy goals, which include uniting all ethnic Chinese around 
the world and create a friendly global environment, Confucius has been freed, in the last 
decades, of the ban previously imposed by the CPC, when he was thought of as representing the 
unchanging status quo. According to Barr (2011, Chapter 4), the official rehabilitation of 
Confucius started not long after the installment of Deng Xiaoping’s policy of reform and 
opening-up, when Confucian principles of loyalty, social responsibility, respect for authority, 
self-discipline, and others were restored. Nevertheless, this rehabilitation is continuing still 
today, as shown by stories such as the great success achieved by a TV program broadcast in 
2006 and featuring Beijing Normal University Professor Yu Dan <( offering the audience her 
modern interpretation of The Analects; Confucian tenets emphasizing equality for rich and poor 
through education, social order, hierarchy, and stability are thought of as a means to fill the 
spiritual vacuum Chinese society is experiencing in facing materialism and, politically, are very 
appealing to the Chinese leadership (Starr 2009, p. 69; Barr 2011, Chapter 4). As well, the 
authors note that the persona of Confucius is usually associated with teaching and culture, his 
name has global brand recognition, and his image, standardized in 2006 in a portrait that depicts 
him as an old man with a long beard, oozes feelings such as kindness, friendliness, and 
sagaciousness (Ibid.). In addition, Barr (2011, Chapter 4) raises an interesting point, that is the 
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“consumption” of Confucius: as many other aspects of China’s soft power discourse, the value 
placed on Confucius in modern days applies both to China’s internal and external dynamics. As 
explained before, internally, Confucian principles are useful to maintain social order and 
stability, while externally the “brand Confucius” helps the CPC enhance its legitimacy, 
projecting a positive image for China (Ibid.). In this sense, it can be argued that the legitimacy 
the CPC is pursuing through the enhancement of the national cultural soft power is both within 
and outside the country. It is rather surprising, then, that the logo of the CIs is not the official 
image of Confucius but instead a drawing representing a mutual embrace between a dove and 
the world. Barr (2011, Chapter 4) elaborates on this aspect stating that: “The symbolism is clear. 
Beijing’s choice of imagery is meant to express its desire to develop peacefully and to persuade 
the world to welcome China’s growing presence and influence in it”.   
As stated before, more positive opinions regarding the projection of cultural soft power 
through the activities of the CIs have also been expressed, mainly by Chinese authors. The 
paper entitled “Talking Up China: An Analysis of China’s Rising Cultural Power and Global 
Promotion of the Chinese Language” by Ding Sheng and Robert A. Saunders, for instance, 
examines both the features of coercive cultural power in international relations and the theory of 
soft power put forward by Joseph S. Nye, as power can also emanate from a country’s cultural 
attractiveness, image, and reputation, in a way that changes others’ preferences (Ding and 
Saunders 2006, p. 9). In this view, China is a country that has seen its colossal cultural power 
diminish, to then return in force in recent years (Ibid., p. 11). Language, religion, myths, 
literature, and so forth are the basis of national identity which is, in turn, the core of a country’s 
cultural tradition, but in the case of China what actually constitutes Chinese culture is hard to 
define; among the most evident criteria to determine a sense of cultural belonging, there emerge 
the ability to speak Mandarin or any of the Chinese dialects, as it allows access into the Chinese 
linguistic and cultural space, and familiarity with Confucian values and folklore (Ibid., p. 12). 
Chinese culture, moreover, has always had the ability to assimilate different peoples and 
exercise “localization” on foreign ideas (Ibid., p. 13). In regard to the relationship between 
language and culture, the authors state that the two are closely connected and that while the 
former is a central element in cultural globalization, the latter is increasingly important in 
international relations, with global cultural exchanges being a visible indicator of how 
globalization presently works (Ibid., pp. 4-5). In the current globalization era, English is still the 
global lingua franca, but it has competitors, among which there is Chinese, whose global 
demand has been growing since the 1980s; unsurprisingly, the Chinese government has been 
seeking to take advantage of this international popularity, in order to reach its goals of 
expanding the country’s economic, cultural, and diplomatic power (Ibid., p. 4 and p. 19). This 
task has been primarily carried out by the CIs, the “soft architecture” necessary to become a 
global player, which nonetheless have come after decades of success of other initiatives 
promoting the Chinese language abroad, such as the establishment of the Hanyu Shuiping 
Kaoshi ʺГʶƩΧЏ  (HSK, the Chinese proficiency test) (Ibid., pp. 19-22). In regard to 
China’s soft power, the authors state that language promotion activities, such as those carried 
out by CI centers, can help grow the country’s cultural power resources, but this is not 
necessarily equivalent to achieving desired policy outcomes (Ibid., pp. 22). Among the elements 
that can curtail China’s soft power, the authors include the lack of political credibility, the 
potential future disappearance of the country’s uniqueness, due to globalization and 
informatization, the infiltration of foreign cultures and languages, also previously discussed, and 
the competition of the country’s cultural power with Americanization or Westernization (Ibid., 
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pp. 22-25). As for putonghua, finally, although the campaign for its promotion has created unity 
among Chinese speakers around the world, it is still an aspect characterized by “power-plays” at 
the local, national, and international levels; and certainly not free of crises: dialectal disputes in 
the overall Chinese speaking community, for instance, may pose a challenge to the global 
promotion of the Chinese language in the future (Ibid., pp. 25-26).  
Judging from the number of foreign students in China, reported to have surpassed 377 
thousand in 2014 (with over 36 thousand receiving a scholarship from the Chinese government) 
(Statista 2016), and pondering difficulties and benefits of living in China for foreign students, 
including, on the one hand, language experience with potential for career advancement and 
cultural immersion and, on the other hand, difficulties to learn the language and adapt to the 
local lifestyle (Urban 2015), the situation of international Chinese education appears to be both 
positive and debatable at the same time, leaving much room for future developments. The 2013 
Baogao reports that although the global spread of Chinese had to face “resistance coming from 
every side” (laizi ge fangmian de zuli ɼνúɎҮ̪ҔÀ) it still obtained satisfying results, 
receiving widespread attention and approval (Sun Chunying şɝ二 and Guo Xi 乃́ 2013, p. 
175). Apart from the achievements of the CI project, the report records an expansion of Chinese 
language teaching within the international education system, an escalation of the number of test-
takers in various Chinese examinations, and the fact that the US Department of State has 
classified Chinese as a “key language” (guanjian yuyan ҅Г϶) (Ibid., pp. 175-181). Worth 
mentioning is also the fact that the 2013 Baogao contains the text of the “Confucius Institute 
Development Plan” (Kongzi Xueyuan Fazhan Guihua ŜśţҙëƎϱ±) for the period 2012-
2020, which aims to further strengthen the activities of the CIs and Sino-foreign educational 
exchanges and cooperation, ensuring that Chinese culture can go towards the world (Jiaoyubu 
Yuyan Wenzi Xinxi Guanlisi, pp. 367-372).  
Among Chinese sources, other positive evaluations of the CI project are offered by Liu 
Wei (2010), Wang Yue and Lü Meijia (2011), and Hong Xiaonan et al. (2013). Liu Wei (2010) 
analyzes the role of the CI project within the framework of cultural soft power; the author 
argues that this function finds expression mainly through two aspects: the inheritance and 
dissemination of traditional Chinese culture, on the rise domestically, and the promotion of a 
global understanding of Chinese culture, for which CIs create an international platform. As the 
representative individual of traditional Chinese culture, Confucius gives his name to the 
institutes dedicated to the popularization of Chinese language and culture, thus becoming the 
spokesperson for the their promotion and dissemination and showing that traditional Chinese 
culture has evidently received the approval of the Chinese government (Ibid., p. 40). Moreover, 
CIs play an important role in accelerating the development of China’s cultural industry through 
the internationalization of China’s higher education, while being an important channel through 
which China’s cultural diplomacy can help establish a good international image for the country 
(Ibid., pp. 42-44). Similarly, Wang Yue and Lü Meijia (2011, p. 95) define the CI project as the 
“shiniest trademark incarnating China’s soft power” (tixian Zhongguo “ruan shili” de zui liang 
pinpai&ġ且ůÀ̪ɫGď̄), recognizing that, to some extent, the rapid expansion in 
the number of CI centers abroad is a manifestation of China’s determination to strive to expand 
its international influence. Language has the ability to penetrate slowly into the hearts and 
minds of learners, and while being a vector to export culture, it is also a vehicle to export a 
country’s system of values (Ibid.). Hong Xiaonan et al. (2013, p. 367), defines the CI project as 
“China’s successful case in the enhancement of the country’s cultural soft power” (Zhongguo 
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tisheng guojia wenhua ruan shili de chenggong anli&ġȪÒġŶɇÌ且ůÀ̪ǸÂʗq) 
and argues that language exchanges bear the weight of cultural blending; if China wants to 
promote a good image for its culture and communicate the scientific concept of peaceful 
development, then it must let the world know Chinese and allow it to speak it. The CI project 
precisely responds to these needs as it was established with the aim of increasing the 
understanding of every people in the world towards the Chinese language and culture and 
providing students in every country with a convenient learning environment; CI centers have 
made it possible for the people of every country to come into contact with authentic Chinese 
culture “at zero distance” (lingjuli ҥ下͓ ) (Ibid.). Having drawn on the international 
experience in language promotion, the CI project has developed Chinese characteristics and, 
having become the brand of Chinese national culture (guoxueġţ) in the world, it benefits the 
enhancement of China’s cultural soft power, the promotion of Chinese culture, and cultural 
exchanges and fusion among China and every other country in the world (Ibid.).  
An article drawn from the Guangming Ribao (Guangming Daily) and published on the 
website Renmin Wang in 2012 stresses the interconnection of “language soft power” (yuyan 
ruan shili), the “propagating force” (chuanbo libȲÀ) of the language, and cultural soft power: 
language soft power is the core of cultural soft power, while the language’s propagating force is 
the emblem of language soft power (Liu Xiaotian ³ɡŅ 2012). Moreover, the dissemination 
of a country’s language in the world is the embodiment of that country’s international image, 
global status, and economic strength, while culture and values go along with language 
promotion (Ibid.). There is also mutual influence between the propagating force of a language 
and the enhancement of a country’s language soft power as the former pushes the latter, while 
the latter boosts the former; ultimately, establishing CIs worldwide and strengthening the 
propagating force of language constitute effective ways to enhance language soft power (Ibid.). 
And, consequently, cultural soft power.  
Similar thoughts were also expressed by Hanban Director General Xu Lin, when she 
stated the following:  
 
!：ŁѣяʺГţ4&ġɇÌ	7ϵǈS&ġ̪ҦʸÐ®љ¯
”Ŝśţҙ”ƟǸ)i̒&ġ”且
ůÀ”̪ɫGď̄
[…]!ġŶǆ´ɇÌ̱ġŶǆ´Г϶ǆ
!
(cited in Xinhua Wang 2007) 
!
Studying Chinese culture and understanding contemporary China through the Chinese language are 
urgent demands overseas. The “Confucius Institute” has already become the brightest trademark 
embodying China’s “soft power”. […] When a country is strong then the culture is flourishing, when 
the culture is strong then the language is strong.  
(Translated by the present author.) 
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Closing remarks 
 
łƃƪǹώ;Ϗɇ̧ҳĎɇˇ 
ѢƭƪȫQÞϙπҴŤƩä̪ϽÌ 
ƩƩLLƩƩL (LLƩƩLLƩ) 
Œίə̪&ĥI ŒΤ̪&ĥϷ 
      
̢ѴĨŤ&ĥϷ 
ŜŇś̪Ϸ 万p万ĥҟÌ 
̢ѴĨϻ&ĥϷ 
ǹϺ̪Ϸ Ͼ̢ѴϹ̸ΰϷ 
!
How many years did we painstakingly practice 
English pronunciation and learn their 
grammar? 
For a change, now it’s their turn to get their 
tongues all in a knot 
[no translation available] 
How smart the Chinese are! – and how 
beautiful our language! 
 
The whole world is learning Chinese 
Confucius’ words are becoming world culture 
The whole world is speaking Chinese 
Our language makes the people of the world 
listen up  
(S.H.E 2007)116 
 
These are passages drawn from the lyrics of a Taiwanese hit released in 2007 by the girl 
band S.H.E, entitled &ĥϷ Zhongguohua (Chinese Language) 117 . Praising Chinese as 
Confucius’ language that the whole world wants to learn, the song also constitutes a hymn to 
the fever for “everything Chinese” that is taking over the world. But as is the case with every 
matter concerning the domestic and international management of Chinese language promotion, 
the feelings the song arises are profound and not necessarily entirely positive. Foreigners are 
challenged to learn a language that is so hard as to “get their tongues all in a knot”, a dare that 
sounds as the “nationalistic comeback” of Chinese after years of “submission” to the English 
language. The matter would stop here if it was not for the fact the singers are part of a 
Taiwanese band which made the whole operation the target of harsh criticism: flattering the 
mainland by referring to the language of Confucius, and indirectly the CI project, and 
promoting a variety of Chinese that is now entirely different from Confucius’ dialect, and partly 
from Taiwan’s own national language, under the label “Confucius’ words” were some of the 
critiques received by the band (Starr 2009, p. 67).  
It is nonetheless interesting to note that a remake of “Zhongguohua” has also been 
proposed in a music video produced in 2011 by Martin Papp and Benji Schwartz, American 
performing artists based in Beijing, as reported on YouTube (Papp 2011). The video, which is 
provided with Chinese subtitles in simplified characters, was a way for the artist to fulfill his 
wish of having “fun making a Chinese song” and received 350 thousand views in Chinese video 
sites (Ibid.). Thus, regardless of the controversies over the song’s Taiwanese origins, one can 
assume that this praise for the Chinese language, shared on this occasion by Chinese and foreign 
people alike, is an evident symbol of an increasingly strong confidence in the potentiality of the 
appeal the Chinese language and culture can exercise on the entire globe, drawing an ever-
growing audience towards China. As well, this renewed assertiveness is an emblem, as well as 
an outcome, of the hundreds of years of struggle spent to modernize the country, reform the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 The lyrics are reported in traditional characters as in the original text of the Taiwanese song.  
117 According to Norman (1988, p. 137), “Zhongguohua &ġБ” (literally, “the language of China”) is an old, 
colloquial term which refers to spoken forms of Chinese; it is used both for dialects and the standard language.  
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language, and reshape a strong cultural identity. Over the course of history, value has been 
increasingly placed on the unity of the Chinese people, not only politically but also 
linguistically and culturally. It is the “ownership of the national language” (Starr 2009, p. 67), 
or a popular manifestation of how the choice of language can be “of paramount importance to 
one’s identity construction” (Barr 2011, Chapter 4).  
To conclude, this chapter has shown that, from the Chinese point of view, the 
management of language standardization and promotion at home and abroad can be considered 
as falling into the field of cultural soft power. This becomes a resource for China insofar as all 
branches of the PRC’s language policy require an effort of self-improvement, in terms of 
cohesion, union, identity, and even language purity, in order to be able to export a product, the 
Chinese language, that is well-defined and unique; and capable of attracting the entire world 
towards the appreciation of China. Given the long history of language reform and 
modernization and the value placed on the interconnection of concepts such as “one language”, 
“one country”, and “one nation”, it comes as no surprise that putonghua as been chosen as the 
language energetically promoted domestically and disseminated internationally in order to 
strengthen the cultural inner identity and external image of the Chinese people, regardless of the 
many issues that are still left unresolved. The gains that this endeavor, in terms of soft power 
outcomes on the global stage, may generate still remain difficult to evaluate; China’s efforts to 
enhance its cultural soft power are, however, very clear.   
!
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Conclusions 
 
Almost four years ago, when this research project started to take shape in the mind of the 
present writer, the primary aim was to explore the oft-debated idea of China-related scholars 
and pundits that a rising PRC can make use of the Chinese language and its worldwide 
promotion as a tool to enhance the effectiveness of its charm and as a resource of soft power. 
Given the knowledge acquired over a number of years of study of the Chinese language and 
culture, there was no question about the attractive force the Chinese language can exercise on 
foreign learners and, as well, an analysis of the PRC’s linguistic panorama, which would 
provide the background for such a study, did not seem to present an insurmountable challenge 
for the present researcher. The statement that constituted the basis of the research problem upon 
which to build the study – Chinese language as a resource of soft power – did not seem overly 
complicated, yet extremely interesting. Contrariwise, the concept of soft power was rather new 
to the present writer, thereby triggering a genuine desire to investigate this increasingly popular 
area of international relations and global politics. As a matter of fact, the labels “China’s soft 
power” and “Chinese soft power” had become part of the mainstream discussion on China’s rise 
in the 21st century, in such a way that required a more in-depth examination of the subject. Thus, 
an attempt to reinterpret the current make-up of the global balance of power from the point of 
view of China’s rise and through the lenses of soft power came to constitute the onset of this 
research work, partially replacing the original goal. With the meaning of the theory proposed, at 
the beginning of the 1990s, by American scholar Joseph S. Nye becoming increasingly clear, 
thanks to the analysis of his pioneering works and the related literature, the first research step 
appeared to have been completed; the matter, however, was made more complicated by the 
realization that there exists a substantial difference between the Western and the Chinese 
interpretation of the concept of soft power. The research problem that had constituted the 
original basis of the present thesis took on an unexpected meaning, giving rise to a possibly 
more challenging goal: shedding light on the Chinese conception of soft power. Three main 
assumptions became the pillars sustaining the structure of this thesis; corroborated by secondary 
observations, these hypotheses can all be linked back to the difference detected between 
Western and Chinese soft power. By comparing Joseph S. Nye’s soft power discourse with that 
presented in Chinese sources, including academic works, scholarly writings, political speeches, 
official documents, and media reports (for the most part, state media), the research process 
revealed the fundamental traits that separate the rhetoric of Chinese intellectuals, Party and 
government leaders, policy-makers, and policy-implementers from their Western counterparts.   
First and foremost, the Chinese vision of soft power places emphasis on culture as the 
core in general, and on traditional Chinese culture in particular, striking a difference with Nye’s 
conceptualization, which, developed in the context of the United States, mainly takes into 
consideration American pop culture among other soft power resources. Autochthonous Chinese 
characteristics inherited from the past and elements endemic to China’s enduring culture and 
civilization have indeed allowed for the discourse on soft power in contemporary China to 
develop original features and break away from its Western origins. The emphasis historically 
placed on culture and civilization, in all their functions and connotations, enriches the Chinese 
discourse on soft power with unique Chinese practice so much so as to give shape to a “made-
to-measure” interpretation, that of “wenhua ruan shili” (cultural soft power); this formulation 
peppers the Chinese soft power-related literature, both in the official and public arenas, and 
represents the outcome of the efforts made by Chinese scholars and political thinkers to link 
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China’s past and present realities, converge them into this rather new conception of soft power, 
and generate a specific Chinese interpretation of “ruan shili” (soft power). This is rather 
removed from the idea of “soft power” as conceived by the American scholar, whose theory 
nonetheless remains the underlying basis upon which scientific analyses are usually built at the 
phase of inception. China no longer talks about soft power in a general way, but places the two 
characters for “wenhua” (culture) in front of the term “ruan shili”, making clear that culture 
occupies the highest level in the soft power discourse, as institutions, systems of values, 
international discourse power, and foreign strategies are all dependent on its influence.      
On balance, in evaluating the differentiating factors between the Chinese and Western 
discourse on soft power, it is evident that the interpretation given by the former is broader than 
that of the latter. It has become clear that in the Chinese context, soft power breaks the 
boundaries between areas of foreign and domestic policies and goes beyond the field of 
international relations. This realization can be thought of as being directly related to the 
emphasis placed on culture as the core of soft power, both “in” and “for” China; in the Chinese 
theory and practice of soft power, culture is widely recognized as a means to enhance the 
country’s appeal and influence on the global stage, but also, and more importantly, as a means 
to meet China’s domestic demands. In China, the originality of the theoretical framework 
sustaining the concept of soft power, which has undergone a process of re-elaboration, 
expansion, and localization after having become part of autochthonous scientific analyses, is 
such that it has given shape to a new vision and specific purposes that display a binary nature. 
The expectations raised by the assumptions posed were, thus, even exceeded; the hypothesis 
that one of the most salient differences between the American and Chinese discourses pertains 
to the field in which soft power is applied, with the former considering it a face of power that 
complements hard power in the field of international relations and world politics and the latter 
making it an important part of China’s domestic cultural construction as well, was not only 
confirmed but the definitions that usually emerge in the literature on the nature of Chinese soft 
power analyzed – “holistic”, “inward-looking and outward-looking”, “dualistic”, and “culture-
based” – resulted to be also corroborated by even more relevance in relation to domestic 
priorities and the construction of resources that can benefit, first and foremost, the present-day 
Chinese society, while simultaneously boosting China’s “zonghe guoli” (CNP).  
The peculiarity that characterizes the vision of cultural soft power in China is the 
relevance it bears in strengthening the construction of the national culture and identity; in this 
sense, its basic orientation is in line with the concept of cultural strength, which is built at a 
national but also at an individual level. The scope of the Chinese concept of cultural soft power 
exceeds that of the West’s soft power so much as to embrace multiple levels and, influenced by 
China’s ancient philosophical thinking, even touch the life of every citizen. The construction of 
Chinese cultural soft power exists at the level of every individual because the whole nation is 
called to participate in its enhancement, through self-improvement and under the guidance of 
the Chinese leadership. Supported by a “system of socialist core values” (shehuizhuyi hexin 
jiazhi tixi) that represent the essence of socialist ideology, embracing Marxism adapted to the 
Chinese conditions, principles of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and traditional ethics 
inherited from the past, building cultural soft power strengthens inner qualities, ideals, and 
beliefs, enhances patriotism and consensus for the CPC, becomes a useful tool to unify ideology, 
and coalesces the people around the common goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation. The cultural revival the construction of soft power triggers in China is an aggregating 
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force that closely resembles the ability to bond and keep the Chinese people united historically 
displayed by culture and civilization.  
Moreover, besides pursuing national purposes, domestic identity and culture-building is, 
for China, a way to also wield soft power internationally, in an intricate nexus that makes 
cultural soft power the basis of China’s soft power. The Chinese “made-to-measure” 
interpretation of soft power is thus one that embraces both the domestic cultivation and 
building-up of resources, mainly cultural, which can be wielded within the country, but the 
effect of which can, nonetheless, also produce a soft power outcome on China’s relations with 
the outside world. For this reason, the interpretation of Chinese soft power examined in this 
work embraces both cultural soft power as an innovative vision and as a new approach to 
China’s domestic development within the country and the deployment of strategies aimed at 
enhancing the outcome that resources built at home can obtain abroad. Shared within Chinese 
academic and official circles, this multilayered interpretation is the symbol of both the idea of 
“what cultural soft power is” and “what cultural soft power does” in terms of its binary 
deployment. Domestically, the binary approach to soft power promotes China’s traditional 
culture and the healthy development of a strong cultural life to accompany the society’s material 
growth, while internationally it serves the purpose of making China’s voice heard, establishing 
a positive international image as part of a favorable international environment and accelerating 
the construction of a harmonious world.      
The peculiar features and connotations of the Chinese discourse on soft power reflect on 
the way the theory is turned into practice, as shown by the dynamics of the Chinese 
government’s involvement in developing and promoting an action plan aimed at enhancing the 
role of culture as part of the country’s soft power. Indeed, one of the key characteristics of 
Chinese soft power that the assumptions posed intended to prove is that, differently from the 
idea put forward by Joseph S. Nye, soft power strategies in the Chinese context take on the 
shape of a government project. The call to “enhance the country’s cultural soft power” (tigao 
guojia wenhua ruan shili), officially put forward by Hu Jintao in the course of the 17th National 
Congress of the CPC in 2007, and reiterated by the current leadership, bears witness to the role 
of the government in setting the direction of this national strategy, not only in regard to the 
guidance given to orient the related intellectual and public debate, but also in terms of actions to 
take to actualize an increase in the country’s cultural strength. Thus, the “made-to-measure” 
interpretation of soft power in the Chinese context appears to reclaim propriety on a foreign 
concept progressively “made Chinese” and this process is sustained by the presence of elements 
related to the relevance of culture-building not only in China’s ancient doctrines but also in the 
official discourse of successive generations of CPC leaders, who appear to have accepted the 
mainstream vision that culture is the key to Chinese soft power. The Party and the State have 
actively engaged in the definition of a theoretical framework to support their determination to 
“enhance the country’s cultural soft power”, committing to the development of a system of 
actions aimed at reaching the desired goals, as shown by the evolution of the Chinese soft 
power theory and practice prior to 2007, then even more so in the years that followed until 2012, 
and with remarkable results still evident today. Chinese society has been involved in its entirety, 
with the state media and the general public collectively contributing to the dissemination and 
implementation of important cultural policies. Included in China’s political jargon, the 
formulation “tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” shows that the theory of soft power has evolved 
into that of “wenhua ruan shili”, the enhancement of which has become a national project that is 
promoted by the Chinese leadership, popularized nationwide, and implemented through cultural 
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policies. In their function as formalized vocabulary, these expressions crystalize the Chinese 
vision of soft power, highlighting the belief that Chinese culture is an inborn advantage for 
China, the resourcefulness of which can be exploited for both an internal and an external 
betterment of China’s status. But while an improvement of China’s image and influence abroad 
is merely seen as a reflection of domestic dynamics, the priority is placed on enhancing or 
increasing (tigao) cultural soft power at home.  
The active role of Party-State directives has helped create the foundations upon which to 
build and promote cultural soft power, through an acceleration in the development of the 
cultural industry and the stimulation of creativity. Building cultural soft power has thus a 
positive effect not only on the spiritual and intellectual lives of the people, but also on their 
material lives, as it boosts economic development through the gains obtained from cultural 
undertakings. Therefore, popularity of the concept of cultural soft power appears to have a 
monetary component as well; it is an investment the Chinese leadership is willing to make to 
respond to the need of enhancing the cultural resources of a country that, although supported by 
a strong economy, rises from a less advantageous position, in comparison to the West, in the 
international soft power competition. The placement of the word “culture” in front of “soft 
power” has detached the Chinese discourse from its Western origins, showing that the theory of 
cultural soft power can rightly be considered the inheritance of the relevance always placed on 
culture-building in China’s social and political tradition; this has opened up new spaces for an 
effective use of soft power through its culture-building focus, making the achievement of an all-
around betterment of China’s domestic and international conditions in the age of China’s rise 
the ultimate aim of China’s cultural soft power. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese vision of cultural soft power is not yet completely independent 
from the Western soft power concept; academic and political circles are still negotiating a clear-
cut definition of its connotations and evaluating soft power resources suitable for the context of 
contemporary China. However, an increasingly higher degree of innovation in the Chinese 
discourse on soft power can be detected in the views expressed by intellectual and policy elites 
in recent years, and especially in the Xi Jinping era, accompanied by ever-growing cultural 
awareness and confidence, and the emerging strength in China’s international “discourse power” 
(huayu quan). Culture is being envisioned as a symbol of China’s renewed “wealth and power” 
(fuqiang) which indicates that the country is well on the path to becoming a “socialist cultural 
great power” (shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo). 
All together, these concluding remarks represent the results that have emerged from the 
different components of the present work, which in turn constitutes an attempt to examine the 
nature of Chinese soft power and progress from the idea of “China’s soft power” to that of 
“Chinese soft power”. It must be pointed out that, nevertheless, the researcher’s interest for the 
Chinese language and the original objective of the present work were not lost; they have indeed 
became part of this complex, multilayered, and interdisciplinary analysis in two specific ways: 
first, through the examination of a variety of Chinese sources and, even more importantly, of the 
terminology used therein; and, second, through the topic that has become the focus of the case 
study, that is language standardization and promotion of putonghua, the official language of the 
PRC, as a potential resource of cultural soft power at home and abroad. In regard to the first 
point, in order to complete the task of shedding light on the nature of the Chinese discourse on 
soft power, and on the premise that the jargon used to discuss it is representative of the thoughts 
that constitute its basis, the examination of Chinese scholarly writings, media commentaries, 
and terminological elaborations has served to tackle, with positive results, the question as to 
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weather or not it is possible to talk about “soft power with Chinese characteristics”, as at times 
the literature suggests. Focusing on the term that constitutes, for the most part, the Chinese 
equivalent for the English expression “soft power”, that is “ruan shili”, and other related 
expressions, the investigation touched upon the very interpretation of the concept of “power” in 
the Chinese context, in general, and in this area of study, in particular, showing that, by opting 
for “shili” (strength) to translate the word “power” in the aforementioned formulation, the 
Chinese soft power discourse is connoted with emphasis on the idea of possessing inner 
qualities and natural strengths. In the Chinese view, the Western concept of soft power is 
transformed into one that is devoid of political connotations, to give shape to a new set of 
objectives that China intends to attain through soft power; above all, they include cultural 
construction aimed at reaching a variety of domestic and international purposes that are not 
strictly related to the pursue of hegemony. In a terminological perspective, this is made clear by 
the choice of vocabulary made among a variety of possibilities existing to translate “soft power”, 
while the derivative terms formed on the basis of “ruan shili”, although being in some cases 
rather obscure in their meaning, display the wider breadth of the Chinese discourse on soft 
power. Being one of these derivatives, the formulation “wenhua ruan shili” shows that 
emphasis is placed on “power” intended as an objective strength that China possesses, and that, 
not surprisingly, culture is chosen as the main resource of soft power, representing the inborn 
strength of China’s long-lasting civilization. The scholar or translator who approaches the 
Chinese soft power discourse, which is complex and variegated, at times even contradictory, 
must be aware of the conceptual and ideological orientations embedded in its terminology, 
namely the Chinese characteristics of soft power symbolized by every component of the 
formulations employed. This, in turn, would constitute a first step towards an improvement of 
the scientific soft power-related dialogue between the West and China, overcoming the 
misperceptions that arise, at times, in the related literature.  
One of the biggest challenges the present author had to face in carrying out the tasks set 
for this research was the organization of an abundance of materials dealing with the topic of 
China’s soft power from different angles and in a variety of fields of research. The most 
appropriate method to handle such a complex task was the identification of two possible 
complementary perspectives: an international perspective, represented by the discourse on 
Chinese soft power, and a local perspective, represented by the Chinese discourse on soft power. 
This method proved useful to progressively move from the “big picture” of China’s soft power 
to a more and more detailed analysis of the very nature of the Chinese discourse on soft power. 
This macro-to-micro approach, in fact, detected a subtle difference between what can be 
considered the general discourse around “China’s soft power” and a more specific analysis of 
“Chinese soft power”. Although used interchangeably in the mainstream literature, further 
consideration should be given to the need to differentiate between these two related concepts. In 
this view, the present work, far from claiming to be the definitive authority in the research on 
soft power in the Chinese context, constitutes an attempt to this end, detecting that, when 
talking about China’s soft power, reference is made, by and large, to the country’s resources and 
their outcomes in the field of international relations, while, when discussing Chinese soft power, 
the focus should expand also to an analysis of the elements that constitute the conception of soft 
power in China. The latter can certainly embrace the meaning of the former and for this reason 
it was extensively used in this work. Similarly, the Chinese discourse on soft power is, for the 
most part, comprehensive and detailed, encompassing both aspects. On balance, the risk is 
significant when, for instance, confusion between the concepts of “ruan shili” and “wenhua 
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ruan shili” can lead to a misreading of the Chinese discourse on soft power, and consequently to 
a misuse of the relevant distinction between this and the discourse on Chinese soft power at an 
international level.  
Therefore, the study of Chinese soft power requires further refinement and this work is 
presented with the hope that it will inspire interest in the reader to pursue more in-depth 
analyses. The case study proposed, besides responding, as mentioned above, to the interest of 
the present researcher in China’s language situation, elaborates on an area that requires as much 
attention. Maintaining the same two-pronged approach that characterized the entire work, that is 
investigating domestic and international dynamics in the binary definition, development, and 
deployment of cultural soft power, the case study constituted an attempt to examine the PRC’s 
language policy in relation to the subject explored here. This was done on the premise that the 
management of the domestic and international promotion of putonghua, provides a specific 
example of China’s cultural soft power at work, against the background of the strategic goals 
pursued by the Chinese leadership through the enhancement of the country’s cultural strength. 
Through an overview of the history of language reform in China, which happened in parallel 
with the process of modernization the country experienced in the 19th and 20th century, and the 
vicissitudes that led to the proposal of putonghua and the use of simplified characters as the 
country’s spoken and written standards, it was shown how relevant language uniformity was for 
the making of the Chinese nation. Today, maintaining language unity remains, for PRC 
authorities, equally important, since the promotion of the national language is envisioned as an 
essential component in the establishment of a harmonious society. The current PRC language 
policy can thus be thought of as a strategy to continue to promote putonghua across the country 
and regulate the healthy development of China’s “language life”, tapping into the value that the 
Chinese language, especially in its written form, has always had as a cohering force for the 
Chinese people. Belonging to the overall field of cultural policy, that of the language policy is a 
discourse that appears to be linked to the enhancement of the country’s strength, national unity, 
and sovereignty, making the links between the theory and practice of cultural soft power and 
language standardization and promotion emerge with clarity; an increase in the strength of the 
national language and the harmonious development of society’s language life are resources that 
can improve the citizens’ cultural life and participate in the enhancement of cultural soft power, 
as the identification with a single, unified language can become a tool to increase national 
cohesion and infuse into the people a sense of identity and belonging. But as is the case for 
cultural soft power in general, there is a dual approach also in the design of language policy: 
Chinese can constitute a key instrument through which Chinese culture is expressed to the 
outside world as is shown by the presence, among the derivative terms generated based on the 
expanded interpretation of soft power presented above, of the collocation “language soft power” 
(yuyan ruan shili) which emerges in relation to the idea that language is a vehicle and important 
constituent of culture as well as one of the major indicators of a country’s soft power. Based on 
the prerequisite that China can present to the world a harmonious and cohesive cultural and 
linguistic environment, the international promotion of the Chinese language can draw foreign 
people towards the appreciation of China, a goal which is achieved through language 
standardization and promotion at home first and foremost. In practical terms, this means that 
China’s language policy, which ultimately aims to enhance linguistic uniformity as a key 
component of the country’s self-improvement, cultural construction, and cultural soft power 
enhancement, has a reflection on the management of the global spread of Chinese, embodied 
today in the worldwide promotion of putonghua and, more specifically, in the activities of the 
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Confucius Institute project. In this process, there nonetheless remain a variety of aspects related 
to the people’s language habits that may weaken the cohesiveness of the Chinese nation, pose a 
threat to social harmony, and even harm the beauty of the Chinese language. In this sense, 
besides having to efficiently manage the relationships between putonghua and the languages of 
China’s various ethnic groups, their mutual interactions, the delicate coexistence of the standard 
language and Chinese dialects, and the contacts between Chinese and foreign languages, the 
relationship between the domestic popularization of putonghua and its international diffusion is 
another aspect that requires monitoring by language authorities.   
These are all aspects that ignite deep passions within China’s populous, multiethnic, 
multilingual, and multidialectal society; belonging to the same language policy structure, the 
management of language promotion internationally appears to display similar characteristics to 
that of language standardization and promotion domestically, in some cases raising as many 
concerns. Overall, the activities carried out by the Confucius Institutes are seen as a positive 
symbolic outcome of China’s effort to enhance the efficiency of its cultural attractiveness 
overseas, with supporters labeling it a “trademark” of China’s soft power; but detractors 
highlight utilitarian purposes in the way these language and cultural centers work, pointing the 
finger to the presence of a political agenda behind their establishment. Similarly, the overall 
discussion around China’s soft power is peppered with controversies regarding, for instance, the 
financial component of some of China’s soft power endeavors or their propagandistic purpose 
of molding a positive national image, rebutting the “China threat theory”, and ultimately 
creating alliances in the international arena.  
These considerations indicate that the study of soft power in the Chinese context still 
presents a variety of aspects that are left unresolved, remaining open to further investigations. 
What the present author hopes to have shown is the relevance of this field both in China and for 
the study of contemporary China. As a country that is well on the path to rise to a renewed 
position of great power, China is making considerable efforts to define and put in practice a 
theory of soft power suitable for its characteristics. Laden with all the features described, that of 
“wenhua ruan shili” is the concept that most appropriately describes the PRC’s approach to soft 
power and its multiple objectives. It is the present writer’s opinion that to best describe the 
focus on the country’s inner qualities displayed by the Chinese theory and practice of cultural 
soft power, without neglecting, however, its international reflections, is a Chinese idiom that 
emerged in the study of materials carried out in this thesis: “the cleverest wife cannot cook 
without rice”.  
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Glossary    
Selected terms of Chinese soft power 	
	 	 	
&-T+ chengshi ruan shili urban soft power 
I9 chuantong wenhua traditional culture 
V chuangzaoli creativity 
W1 daode ethics; morals 
5 ganzhaoli appeal; power to inspire 
%YE guoji jingzhengli international competitiveness 
%,T+ guojia ruan shili national soft power 
%,9T+ guojia wenhua ruan shili national cultural soft power 
% guoli national power 
 haozhaoli power to rally supporters 
#S hexie harmony 
	O3 jiazhi guannian values 
H@ jingji  economy; economics 
H@T+ jingji ruan shili economic soft power 
FD9B? jingshen wenhua shenghuo spiritual and cultural life 
	 junshi military 
T+	 junshi ruan shili military soft power 
X	 liliang physical strength; power;  
force; strength 
[	 meili charm 
=:L	 minzu ningjuli national cohesion 
L	 ningjuli cohesion; cohesiveness;  
cohesive force 

T+	 qiye ruan shili enterprise soft power 
#	 qinheli affinity 
'T+	 quyu ruan shili regional soft power 
;	 quanli power; authority 
T+	 ruan shili soft power 
C<2	G	 shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi  system of socialist core values 
C<2	O	 shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan socialist core value system;  
socialist core values 
C9	 shehuizhuyi wenhua socialist culture 
C9/%	 shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo socialist cultural great power 
CU9	 shehuizhuyi xianjin wenhua advanced socialist culture 
B"	 shengmingli vitality 
+	 shili actual strength; strength (power) 
4JT+	 siwei ruan shili thought soft power 
7Z%,9T+	 tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili enhance the country’s cultural soft 
power 
	 tonghua assimilation 
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9	 wenhua  culture 
9*	 wenhua anquan cultural security 
9	 wenhua li cultural strength 
9T+	 wenhua ruan shili cultural soft power 
9MP	 wenhua zijue cultural awareness 
9M	 wenhua zixin cultural confidence 
!.	 xiyinli attractiveness; attractive force 
 2	 xiangxinli centripetal force 
0$	 yingxiangli influence 
RQT+	 yuyan ruan shili language soft power 
8>	 zhengzhi  politics 
8>T+	 zhengzhi ruan shili political soft power 
 %ANC	 Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi  socialism with Chinese characteristics 
 =:)(	 Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation 
M67	 ziwo tisheng self-improvement 
K%	 zonghe guoli comprehensive national power (CNP); 
overall national strength  
K%E	 zonghe guoli jingzheng competition in overall national strength 	
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Promoting Vigorous Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture – Seventh section of Hu Jintao’s 
keynote speech to the 17th National Congress of the CPC in October 2007 (Xinhua She 2007). 
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Xinhua News Agency (2007) 
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Developing a Strong Socialist Culture in China – Sixth section of Hu Jintao’s keynote speech to the 18th 
National Congress of the CPC in November 2012 (Xinhua She 2012). 	
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Xinhua News Agency (2012d) 
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Zhang Guozuo: Zhongguo ruan shili juyou “yi wenhua tianxia” de tese ĩÏȊ%ÏʙüuƘ“Gƀ
ç:”Ǵǣɑ’ [Zhang Guozuo: Chinese soft power has the characteristic of “ruling the world with culture”]  
(Renmin Wang 2015a) 
ĩÏȊ%ÏʙüuƘGƀç:Ǵǣɑ
  ę   Ɨ  Ɖ  
	   ƣǗ@ƽȽ@ƽƉş
©ƪ；%ÏʙüǴǣɑʹ1ôɔɲɝ2
  ʙüƳľǯȾÏÆVæôŽŨȨǫèê79!Ȫ  ęFů3OŴŎÏĔƘ  
äęƴǭǑ£'ƴ3ǭ7Ǒ'Ƨ3ʙü¾Ŷ2%¡ƀǴǀÑÃ˃hˋˍ»
3Cfǘǭƞ3Ɂ ¿ǩ˝ƎǴ%Ïǣɑ3Įō2ɋēǴǥǣʹ
  %ÏʙüuƘGƀç:Ǵǣɑ
  īʂ%Ïǣɑ3ȵː@'Óú6ƢǦˇǴƽƅ(,Ǳ）@ȠƀƎņƏÒ¸ƽƅƀ
Ǻ8ȇų-Ǻ8=ȯ-Ǻ8`ʺ-Ǻ8¾Ŷ%¼­ĎǴQʙüW'9čģȜ3´Ɉ
¯ǣúÏÿǴȰǍÛȃ-źǅĠ-ÏÿǵőȨ3´ɈuƘŊɶĮŁďŅ3´
ɈĮōƘ7tEƽƅÃÏÿǴǣɑǯƹ3%ÏʙüģɳĺǞM/ĞɽGŎ'(3
'ŎőǮkǴ7æůƀʙüƳľ3Ə%ÏʙüŔʭɋēǣɑǴ6$ʷɢƪĻ
3įƐ2%ÏʙüGƀç:ǴňŀnæGƣ30ʢĘºĻr7éüÏÿƀ
ʙüƮÛOŴĬF%ÏIbɤľĎȈ%¡ƀǴǥǣ˜ƫȖĬF%ÏÏÿ
Įʇů %ÏÏ（ɻɾƟț6Ȣʷɢɲʨ3Ə%ÏƀʙüģɳGŎ'(3
'ŎőǮǴˊ%TǩȺ¹ƣǻ3%ÏƀʙüƏăɡƃʙüǴüʉŅŷʭÃƂ
  ŷ°2ʙüǴùƋȾÏśʙüW'ŭɜˎƟ(,ÃīƟźǅǴ6$ʷɢŒƼ%
Ïśů˚ƀʙüW'ÝīȺ¹ÏÃÏ（İÇǴʷɢʫĴăx3Ə'2īȉM
(,ƭĹIbɤģɳ3Ĩŗ%¡LȌOȶƀ3ÚɅ˚ĉŃŉʰĸ3Ýīmk-m{-mÏ
@ƽǴɃ5ăã3Ə'2OŴ%ÏǴȖÔÃß˓3ƫȖɐíǴÏ（Įʇ3ɗʭɐíǴÏ
（ǨÜ3ŭƥģÃĘ-Ãʅ-¹WǴ!Ǳ
  ŠĎ2ʙüǴxǐ%Ïyśʙü）ú'ƀǴ¾ħ-ĠÃIbɤǴ¾ħ
-ũŰÏ（ɻɾƟǴɈ3ɁƏX-ǐǷˆǢʉȄüGãǴȡȋ-ƓŌ-ňŋǴʹ3(
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ɢšƀǴ¾ħ-ɾɩǴʀƙ-ǪŉǴŋ³-ȡȋǴ˟Ɏ-ƓŌǴʭ-ʰĸ
Ǵŋƨ-ǪɲǴŤĄ-ɍɲǴħĄ-ɒƝǴĳƙț
  ģƥ2ƂǴǪɲTȢ%Ïy6ɏÓʃɲʙü3ɁƏÒʙüˑ}Gƀ6ò3
Xƀō'ʙüǴƭĹɷ5yśƀºƥōʙüǴtEɢȣĚ3ɁƏȅȖƀÒʙ
ü%Ɩ˚čƵǴúR3īʂƀăʙütEɢȣǴħ：WǮʤƏË'Ġ-Ibɤ-
ũŰÏ（ɻɾƟ-ã=ʄǲțʙüɢȣ3Ƈǒ¯ƀǴȨÃİÇ
  %ÏƀʙüǴǪɲÃüʗʹ
  %ÏƀʙüCʐʑ2ʙüƳľůɀƖǴŃŉǱÙ3uƘ˝ƎǴ%Ïǣɑ3
Ɂ ɞǩĒæǴǪɲÃüʗʹ
  ƎƒʙüƳľ3'ʙüǴɕǳɥ-ǪɲǒªȢȶȂȒìúÛȃʙüƳľɚ
ƏȨǫèêƖ·ůǴ3QEăʙüĚƛȳǓƒ-Ǝȅ-6Gʊ-Ǵú,%Ïôɀ
Ǻă7Ȅü3ăʙüW2Ǔƒ-Ǝȅ-ȎôǴú,EHśȄüǱú'6ƘĮǴ
-´GʹǴʹ3ɞǩ'ʍǗ-Ǣʉ-īŅʹǴü5śʙüǱú'őƘƇĮǴ-
ˉGʹǴ-ːīŅʹǴü3Tǩ'¾ħ-Ƀ-ŋ³-Á-ʀƙ-ɿĄ-ŋƨ-
q˞-ºțİÇ@ĹǴWǮ
  ŠĎʙüŐǲǸƪ3¼ãÏ（źǅ¤ĥ-¼xŃŉʰĸÃȡȋƀƎģɳÒ
%Ï@ǻƣ3JUÏÿʳˌɢ#ƢɊʏʖ36ƢɊƏǢʉȄü3²6ƢɊċ
ƏƀʙüîƦǢʉȄüɜ3Ƙ´Ɉ6Ŕċ×5Qƀʙüɜ3ċ´ɈŔɋ
×%Ï­Ďʙü3QǽǼÒÏ（9ƫȖɐíĮʇ-ũŰÏ（ɻɾƟ5ƔǽǼÒÏxȶ
6Ńŉ-Ƀ@Ĺ-ÖúǪŉ^ľ-ƫȖɐíʰĸ-ů˚ƽƅȣʉ-ĨŗhɖOȶ-aĄǠ
Ï(,ț3ƘǽƔ'&ĂǴŐǲǸƪ
  ­ŦƀÒʙü%ǴʷɢWǮ3ů ʙüǴ˚Ġ-ŠĎʙüǴěĠÃǒĠɡƃ
ôɀĲĲśʙüɞʨ'ƀ-Ibɤ-Ġ-źȝ-ũŰÏ（ɻɾƟǴɈțɁ%Ï@
ɬ'3ƀÒʙü%uƘ´ƕFǴǣƻÓR3ƏʙüǴǛ˛ÃȰȫ3ĞÃtEɢȣ
ĚőʆǛ˛3ŤƀǴIb®¼~úǽʙüǴ­Ďƃ¼-ùƋÃŃʖ5őʆȰȫ3Ť
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ƀËȣǕʪʙüǴ¸$ƃˑ-¸$Ǩɓ-¸$ʮʝʼƢ%。Ƙƀ˚ĠǴʙüƏ
ȀɦǴ3Ë'õȗRS3MƘA+ʦɣ5。ƘƀǒĠǴʙüƏɄǋǴ3Ë'õǋĊʜ
Ʒ3MƘǒǴɣɨ5。ƘƀěĠǴʙüƏǦˇǴ3Ë'õɦʸǦȕ3ˉGņŲmČ
3ˉjÕ:ɤç3MǔʒeǬɌǏ<
  īʂ%¡LȌOȶƀƏƀʙüǴƮÛőȢ-LőÒ3įƐ%ÏƀʙüǴǥ
ǣL%¡ƀǗʦ》ʾ3Ə%¡ƽƅǴƮ-ɉÃ˛3Ə%ÏƀʙüƖǒ¨ǴƮÛ
t%ɱäȡ¡uƘʕʑƍȓ-ʐʑÏĠǴIbÃŊ,3îɰBǠ-aļ-žĢǈ-ɪƾɓ
-ĐƓŌ-ǰƸ,-ʷƽƜ-öɺ^-ĉ¹Ã-ǁæºțIbǪľʤ;Ǫľ6Ɗɟʎ3Ƃ
ǴƍFxǐ3ċMō'ÝīƀʙüǴĒæƸɈʹLȌOȶƀƏ%ÏǴǣƘL3ʤ
6ǜċʧȨǫèê/ķřɬEʀ3ʙüƳľɚǞƏEůǴ3QĚuƘȾÏ
ǣɑ3%Ï±@ăʙüĵƌċƘǒǴǪɨÃðǟǴʡǮ´ɣ3ǒl­Ū-ƱǪ-ů
ǝ- ¡-Ĩŗ%¡LȌOȶƀ3Əů˚%Ïƀʙü´ŏȼǴʷɢJ
  ÖţG@'Ɯ©3Ƙ7mˑů˚@ǴŃŉƀʰĸȣʉɡƃôɀæʳśʙüW
'Ï（Őǲ-ã=Ɵʄ3¦Ŀɦ@Òʙü%ǴÓRÃWǮÒ%Ïôɀǻƣ3@ăʙü
ǴǏʾ­Ŧǽ~úŅǴWǮů˚ƀʙü3ĺ˕ÖţG@'ƜǴ©ů Ïÿƀʙ
ü3rʽÒ7ÖţG@'Ɯ3mˑů˚@ǴŃŉƀʰĸȣʉ3š@Ǵʰĸ-ÅƯ-ň
ŵ-ŊĻ-Ǫŉ^ľ-Ib®¼-@ƀ_w-ɒƝÅR-Ńȹƃǆ-ƓŌɈț
  īʂƭĹIbTȢ-ƭĹIbɤÒƀʙüģɳ%ǴÛȁWǮ3Ƙ7ÝīÏÿÃƽ
ƅɃJUƽƅ-JUÏÿƖʾ*-Ɩǒ¨Ǵ­Ď3ʳǗɋtőĆĐǴƭĹIbT
ȢƭĹIbɤÏÿƀʙüȔTǩÒƽƅɃ93ɁƽƅɃǴīĪ®~7
tƭĹIbTȢƭĹIbɤÒÏƽ%ǴɬºĠȉM(,ƭĹIbTȢȉM(,ƭĹI
bɤǒl@ĹǴʠȐ3/Ə%ÏƀʙüĮōÃ­ŦWǮǴʠȐËƹ3ů˚%Ïƀʙ
üǴȚ6ɢ3ċƏÖţG˘iŃ(,'ŤĄ3īȉM(,ƭĹIbTȢģɳ3ÚɅÃ
ʗɜȉM(,ƭĹIbɤȨǫèêÒ˂ʶɋēǴʙüǪɲƍ3ņƏśȾÏǴIbɤW
'ȾÏʙüīæ-Ǉú：Ą!ǱǴǪǯ3Ěƶ¼ÏŭěƐǞ3ʤȍɤǜÃcǆƏ
ĵäÏÿőɈŬ¯Ǵ
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  ʢęƣ3ȂȒ%Ï ă%Ï«íǴɡƃôɀʑƣʑä3Q%ÏǴ5ʣķäʿ%Ï@ł+
ǻ-ł+ʀŎHƈɢƘ¤æǴɇɠÃ”ěǴǼǱ-D“½®ãÏ@Ǵºß˓3ƔɢƘ˙
ƾÃğƾ3Öţʰʖɋ^-Ǫɲɋ^-Ġɋ^-Ibɤɋ^Òʙü93ŎH/ɢƘɋ
^3Ö^%ÏƀʙüĔƺĮōɋēǴ˝ƎǣɑÃʹ
  1Wɀ'%ÏƀʙüȂȒ%Ĺ(J-ŽŨ2
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“Table of Contents” in Chinese and English of the volume Zhongguo Yuyan Shenghuo Zhuangkuang Baogao 
2013 %Ïɾɩǭ《ǤşÀ 2013 (Language Situation in China: 2013) edited by Jiaoyubu Yuyan Wenzi 
Xinxi Guanlisi ŽɅʲɾɩƀò^ŇȟǪ· [Department of Language and Script Information Management 
of the (PRC) Ministry of Education] (2013). 	
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Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongyong Yuyan Wenzi Fa %¡@ƽqÃÏÏÿʬǮɾɩƀòǆ 
[Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language of the People’s Republic of China] 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu %¡@ƽqÃÏŽɅʲ [PRC Ministry of Education] (2000)  
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PRC Ministry of Education (2000) 
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Excerpt from “Outline of the National Medium-to-long-term Plan for the Reform and Development of the 
Cause of Chinese Language and Characters” (Guojia Zhong Changqi Yuyan Wenzi Shiye Gaige he Fazhan 
Guihua Gangyao Ïÿ%ʾƚɾɩƀò5"ŷ˒Ã­ĎɥȬɢ) for the period 2012-2020.  
(cited in Jiaoyubu Yuyan Wenzi Xinxi Guanlisi 2013)  
Electronic source:  <http://www.china-language.gov.cn/14/2013_1_5/1_14_5299_0_1357369703676.html> 
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